Bringing Society Back into the Theory of the Firm: the Adaptation of the Mondragon Cooperative Model in Valencia and Beyond by Thompson, Spencer Paul
Bringing Society Back into the Theory of the Firm














This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies
Preface
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University of similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.















Chapter 1: Neglect of Society in the Theory of the Firm					6
1.1.	Introduction										6
1.2.	A Tale of Two Schools								7
1.2.1.	Contract-Based Theories of the Firm						7
1.2.2.	Competence-Based Theories of the Firm					8
1.3.	Neglect of Society in the Theory of the Firm					10
1.3.1.	Neglect of Society in Contract-Based Theories of the Firm			10
1.3.2.	Neglect of Society in Competence-Based Theories of the Firm		13
1.4.	The Constitutive Role of the Firm							15
1.5.	Incompatibility of the Predominant Theories of the Firm			17
1.5.1.	Isolation of Production and Exchange in the Theory of the Firm		17
1.5.2.	The Peculiarity of Labour							18




1.5.7.	Transaction Costs and Capabilities						26
1.6.	Returning to the Roots of the Theory of the Firm				27
1.6.1.	Returning to the Roots of Contract-Based Theories of the Firm		27
1.6.2.	Returning to the Roots of Competence-Based Theories of the Firm		30
1.7.	Conclusion										31

Chapter 2: Knowledge, Cooperation, and Behaviour						32




2.2.	A ‘Social’ Theory of the Firm							34
2.2.1.	Productive Knowledge and Cooperation					34
2.2.2.	The Cognitive and Relational Aspects of Behaviour				37
2.2.3.	Means of Cooperation								40
2.2.4.	The Endogeneity of Behaviour						42
2.3.	Cooperation and Coordination							46
2.3.1.	The Cooperation/Coordination Trade-off					46
2.3.2.	Cultural Contingency and Bureaucratic Control				50
2.3.3.	Structural Consistency and the Distributive Dilemma			53
2.4.	The Firm as a Social Institution							61
2.5.	Conclusion										67

Chapter 3: Technology, Culture, and Organisation						69





3.2.	Technology, Organisation, and Economic Development			70
3.2.1.	Technological Determinism							70
3.2.2.	Technology and the Division of Labour					72
3.2.3.	The Division of Labour and the Management System				74
3.2.4.	The Management System and the Structure of Ownership and Control	77
3.2.5.	The Social Foundations of Economic Development				79
3.3.	Culture, Organisation, and Economic Development				82
3.3.1.	Cultural Determinism								82
3.3.2.	The Organisational Foundations of Economic Development			85
3.4.	Cumulative Causation and Irreducible Agency					88
3.4.1.	Technological and Institutional Cumulative Causation			88
3.4.2.	The Efficiency Inference							89











4.2.	Technological and Cultural Determinism in the Case against Cooperatives	99
4.2.1.	The Denigration of Cooperatives in the Theory of the Firm			99
4.2.2.	Technology and the Division of Labour					100
4.2.3.	The Division of Labour and the Management System				101
4.2.4.	The Organisational Implications of the Contract-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies							103
4.2.5.	Evaluating the Contract-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies	107
4.2.5.1.	The Endogeneity of Behaviour					107
4.2.5.2.	Surface-Level Cooperation without Managerial Hierarchies		115
4.2.5.3.	Cooperatives and Culture Reconsidered				116
4.2.6.	Evaluating the Competence-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies	117
4.2.7.	The Organisational Implications of the Competence-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies							118
4.2.7.1.	The ‘Managerial Sandwich’						118
4.2.7.2.	Overcoming the Cooperation/Coordination Trade-off		120
4.2.7.3.	The Marxist Ambivalence to Cooperatives				125














5.2.	A Brief History of the Mondragón Cooperative Group				141
5.3.	Technology and Organisation in Mondragón					142
5.3.1.	The Managerial Sandwich in Mondragón					142
5.3.2.	Cooperation and Coordination in Mondragón				143
5.4.	Culture and Organisation in Mondragón						146
5.4.1.	Culturalist Explanations for Mondragón’s Success				146
5.4.2.	Structural Consistency in Mondragón					150
5.4.3.	Reconsidering Mondragón’s Cultural Flexibility				153
5.5.	Institutional Cumulative Causation in Mondragón				155
5.5.1.	Historicist Explanations for Mondragón’s Success				155
5.5.2.	The Cooperative Group							157




5.6.3.	The Employment of Non-Member Workers					173
5.6.4.	The Acquisition of Non-Cooperative Subsidiaries				174
5.6.5.	Contradictions in the Marxist Criticism					178
5.6.6.	The Need for Reform								182
5.7.	Conclusion										184









6.2.	Deliberate Attempts to Apply the Mondragón Model				187
6.2.1.	The Cooperative Business Group of Valencia				187
6.2.1.1.	‘Initial Conditions’ in Valencia versus Mondragón			187
6.2.1.2.	Origins of the Group: the Formation of Covipo and the Inspiration of Mondragón								191
6.2.1.3.	First Steps: Formación and Professionalisation			194
6.2.1.4.	The Group Takes Shape: the Advent of Coinser and the Caixa Popular
                                                                                                                196
6.2.1.5.	The Group Expands: Trial, Error, and Innovation			199
6.2.1.6.	The Crisis and Rebirth of the Group					202
6.2.1.7.	Assessing the Adaptation of the Mondragón Model in Valencia	206
6.2.2.	The Influence of the Mondragón Model in the United States			214
6.2.2.1.	The Evergreen Initiative in Cleveland, Ohio				214
6.2.2.2.	The United Steel Workers’ ‘Union Co-op Model’			219
6.2.2.3.	Other American Examples						221
6.3.	Parallels of the Mondragón Model						223
6.3.1.	The Cajamar Cluster in Almería, Spain					223
6.3.2.	The Italian Cooperative Movement						226
6.3.3.	The Region of Santander, Colombia						232
6.3.4.	Kerala Dinesh Beedi in India							232



























In its pursuit of analytical rigour and scientific standing, the discipline of economics has recently sought to distance itself from the ‘soft’ subject matter of the other social sciences. By thus neglecting the social foundations of economic phenomena, however, it has in fact deprived itself of explanatory power (Granovetter 1985). Nowhere is this trend more pronounced than in the theory of the firm – the often esoteric branch of economics dedicated to understanding what firms are, why they exist, and what they do. Whether it was a primary agent in the transition from traditional to bureaucratic organisation, as in Weber’s Economy and Society, the chief arena of class conflict, as in Marx’s Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, or the font of alienation and solidarity, as in Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society, the firm was once conceived as simultaneously the linchpin of the economy and a central unit of society. Since the methodological secession of economics, however, this holistic perspective has fallen by the wayside (Nooteboom 2009: ix). The purpose of this dissertation is to bring the firm’s social foundations ‘back in’ to the theory of the firm. The central argument is that cooperation based on trust and loyalty (what I refer to as “deep-level cooperation”) is not merely a trivial afterthought, as it is often treated in the predominant theories of the firm, but is rather at the heart of why firms exist, what they do, and what they are – the very questions that theories of the firm seek to answer.
The first chapter shows that both of the predominant schools of theories of the firm neglect this ‘social dimension’. While the behavioural assumptions espoused by contract-based theories blind them to the importance of non-transactional and non-instrumental behaviour for cooperation within the firm, competence-based theories, although less at fault, often fail to appreciate the crucial role of cooperation in the development and application of productive knowledge. This common neglect of the social nature of their key concepts prevents both schools from grasping the “constitutive role” of the firm – that is, its ability to influence the cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour, rather than merely constrain destructive behaviour (as in contract-based theories) or enable productive behaviour (as in competence-based theories). It furthermore leads to a stubborn divide between the two schools, precluding the development of a comprehensive, unified theory of the firm. The chapter concludes that the contemporary theories of the firm should revisit their predecessors, including Classical Political Economy and the Old Institutionalism, which offered more holistic ways of conceptualising the firm.
Chapter 2 aims to bring society ‘back in’ to the theory of the firm by venturing “outside of traditional economic analysis” (Nooteboom 1992: 285), consolidating insights from multiple disciplines. The resulting ‘social’ theory of the firm concurs with competence-based theories that the purpose of the firm to develop and apply productive knowledge, but maintains that this purpose requires cooperation, a function that is the focus of contact-based theories. However, the “surface-level” cooperation envisaged in those theories, based on individualistic behaviour and achieved purely through organisational structures, is insufficient for developing and applying productive knowledge. This purpose instead requires cooperation on a “deeper level”, based on solidaristic behaviour and achieved through organisational culture. Furthermore, organisational structures and culture do not only enable and constrain existing patterns of behaviour, but also “constitute” the relational and cognitive foundations of behaviour, which are therefore endogenous to the organisation of the firm.
In addition to cooperation, the development and application of productive knowledge also requires coordination, which also involves ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ levels. As I show in the chapter, the dual functionality of the firm involves a potentially detrimental trade-off between deep-level cooperation and surface-level coordination if the bureaucratic organisational structures required for the latter objective conflict with the solidaristic organisational culture required for the former objective. Although this trade-off can be overcome by establishing an appropriate organisational culture, which mediates the behavioural impact of organisational structures, that culture must be confirmed in organisational structures. This gives rise to a ‘distributive dilemma’, whereby power-holders may be required to revise the very structures on which their power is based in order to achieve deep-level cooperation. Japanese firms, which have arguably succeeded in overcoming these predicaments, demonstrate the theory developed in the chapter.
Again using Japanese firms as an example, the third chapter applies this theory to the question of what determines which organisational structures and cultures prevail in any given society, and consequently, what determines that society’s trajectory of economic development. One line of thought – that of ‘technological determinism’ – maintains that organisation (and thus economic development) is exogenously determined by technology. However, the social theory of the firm implies that, thanks to the mediating role of organisational culture, a range of organisational structures are in fact possible for any given technology. Furthermore, technology is itself driven by innovation within firms, which in turn depends on organisational structures and cultures. The firm is therefore economically proactive rather than economically reactive, actively influencing the process of technological change and economic development. In itself, this does not exculpate the firm (and thus economic development) from being exogenously determined, because it could still be contended that organisational culture is merely a reflection of exogenous cultural traits (‘cultural determinism’). According to the social theory of the firm, however, organisational culture does not exist merely as some nebulous force, but is rather embodied in organisational structures. Thanks to the firm’s constitutive role, moreover, the culture constructed by the firm feeds back into the culture of society at large. In addition to – and part and parcel of – being economically proactive, the firm is therefore also socially proactive.
	This is not to say that the influence of technology and culture is nil. On the contrary, the very fact that the organisation of the firm feeds back into technology and culture suggests the likelihood of cumulative causation between technology and institutions, on the one hand, and the internal organisation of the firm, on the other. While cumulative causation refutes the inference prevalent in the predominant theories of the firm that observed patterns of organisation must be optimal in some absolute sense, the chapter will also contend that innovation and imitation of new combinations of technology, culture, and organisation are possible thanks to the irreducible agency of individuals, especially during periods of crisis in which prevailing patterns of behaviour and structures of power are disrupted. Firms therefore still command a significant degree of primacy in the process of economic development, which the chapter will argue should be supported by policy-makers.
	Chapter 4 applies the social theory of the firm to cooperatives. Despite receiving widespread attention for their positive social and economic benefits, as reflected in the United Nations declaring 2012 to be the ‘International Year of Cooperatives’ and all of the major political parties in the UK extolling the ‘John Lewis model’ of employee ownership, cooperatives are often conceived as inherently limited in the divisions of labour and management system they can apply, the scale at which they can operate, and the technology they can utilise – a perception which is reflected in the predominant theories of the firm. In particular, by respectively focusing on surface-level cooperation and (surface- and deep-level) coordination, both contract- and competence-based theories follow the logic of technological determinism by maintaining that advanced technologies entail complex divisions of labour, which in turn require hierarchical management systems that are associated with the capitalist firm. 
However, when the possibility and importance of deep-level cooperation – and the firm’s constitutive role in achieving that cooperation – are considered, it becomes clear that, by avoiding the distributive dilemma inherent to asymmetric power structures, cooperatives in fact have an inherent advantage in not only attaining an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, but also maintaining that culture alongside the bureaucratic organisational structures required to coordinate advanced technologies – namely, complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems. By thus overcoming the ubiquitous trade-off between cooperation and coordination, cooperatives may, far from being confined to simple technologies as maintained by the predominant theories of the firm, be more technologically flexible than conventional firms. This flexibility, however, may be suppressed by an institutional environment that biases both the options available to individuals and the way those options are perceived in favour of the prevailing capitalist mode of organisation, which in turn feeds back into the institutional environment. This mutual reinforcement of the institutional environment and the internal organisation of the firm refutes the inference that cooperatives are inefficient in some absolute sense merely because they are uncommon and tend to emerge through social movements and government interventions rather than spontaneous ‘natural selection’; indeed, precisely such collective action may be required to realise their productive potential.
The Mondragón Model of cooperatives in the Basque Country, the subject of Chapter 5, is perhaps the most vivid example of the ability of cooperative governance to defy the predictions of technological determinism and so alleviate the cooperation/coordination trade-off. Although numerous commentators have attributed Mondragón’s success to the supposedly unique features of Basque culture, the chapter contends that Mondragón’s remarkable organisational culture, capable of producing deep-level cooperation while tolerating the complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems necessary to coordinate advanced technologies, is in fact grounded in its organisational structures, including cooperative governance itself. Furthermore, although Mondragón has by no means been immune to the forces of institutional cumulative causation – as evidenced by workplace discontent, bureaucratisation of governance, the employment of non-member workers, and the acquisition of non-cooperative subsidiaries – its group structure has in general allowed it to retain cooperative governance while developing and applying advanced technologies. The chapter concludes that Mondragón represents a model that is applicable in other technological and institutional milieus.
	Chapter 6 presents evidence that the Mondragón Model has indeed been adapted to a variety of technological and institutional settings. The chapter firstly examines cases that were directly inspired by the Mondragón Model, the most comprehensive of which can be found elsewhere in Spain in the Autonomous Community of Valencia. The process of adapting the Mondragón Model to the Valencian context, investigated through primary research, offers valuable insights into the possibilities and limitations of this form of cooperative organisation. Other examples are given from various regions in the United States, most notably the Evergreen Initiative in Cleveland, Ohio. The chapter also examines cases across the globe that were not necessarily inspired by Mondragón, but which nevertheless bear notable resemblance to it. These include: the Cajamar cluster in Almería, Spain; the Italian cooperative movement; the region of Santander, Colombia; the Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative in India; and the Polish cooperative movement. Although all of the cases discussed in the chapter feature significant differences with Mondragón and constitute valuable models in their own right, both types of example demonstrate that the Mondragón Model represents an effective and flexible means of realising the productive potential of cooperative firms.







Chapter 1: Neglect of Society in the Theory of the Firm

1.1 	Introduction
This chapter will argue that the two predominant schools of theories of the firm both neglect the firm’s social nature. Contract-based theories, which maintain the firm exists to minimise the ‘transaction costs’ resulting from asymmetric information, cling to a priori behavioural assumptions that exclude the non-contractual and non-instrumental cooperation involved in the firm. Although their neglect of society is arguably less severe, competence-based theories, which maintain the firm exists to develop and apply ‘productive capabilities’, often disregard the importance of cooperation altogether in achieving that purpose.
This common neglect of the ‘social dimension’ has two major consequences. First, both schools maintain a “thin” view of institutions in which individuals are affected by the firm only at a superficial level (Chang and Evans 2005: 100). While contract-based theories perceive the firm as a contractual arrangement by which to constrain destructive behaviour, competence-based theories perceive the firm as a cognitive vessel by which to enable productive behaviour; neither school is able to fully grasp the constitutive role of the firm in affecting behaviour at the fundamental level of social interaction. Second, the two schools remain divided and incompatible, resulting in a false segregation of production and exchange. This discordancy will be demonstrated through a range of issues pertinent to the firm, including the peculiarity of labour; information and knowledge; learning; uncertainty; and bounded rationality. In each case, embracing the insights of the opposing paradigm would require each school to resolve its own neglect of society.
 The chapter will conclude that both of the predominant schools should revisit their predecessors, which possessed a deeper appreciation for the social nature and constitutive role of the firm, and were consequently better equipped to consider production and exchange simultaneously. While contract-based theories should reconsider the insights of the ‘Old’ (as opposed to the ‘New’) Institutional Economics, and even the work of their progenitor Ronald Coase, competence-based theories should return to their self-declared origins in Classical Political Economy, as well as the work of some of their own pioneers, such as Herbert Simon and Frank Knight.
1.2 	A Tale of Two Schools
Broadly speaking, theories of the firm purport to address three related questions. First, why do firms exist (what is their purpose)? Second, what do they do (what is their function – how do they achieve their purpose)? Third, what are they (what is their nature)? The answers to these questions provide implications for industrial organisation (for example, the boundaries and characteristics of firms), comparative organisational analysis (for example, with regard to the efficiency of cooperatives vis-à-vis capitalist firms), and processes of change (for example, institutional change and economic development). There is, however, no ‘general theory’ of the firm that provides a conclusive and incontestable set of answers to these questions, however. Rather, there are a multiplicity of competing theories, which can be divided into two broad categories: contract-based theories and competence-based theories.

1.2.1 	Contract-Based Theories of the Firm
The genesis of contract-based theories of the firm can be located in Ronald Coase’s (1937) seminal article, which first suggested that the firm exists to alleviate the “costs of using the price mechanism” (ibid.: 391). Following the agenda of the so-called ‘New Institutional Economics’, the literature stemming from Coase’s article has sought to improve on the neoclassical conception of the firm as mere placeholder in price theory, mechanically transforming inputs into outputs through an abstract production function, by extending the idea of ‘transaction costs’ to include contractual exchanges that occur not only over the market but also within the firm.
Although not all contract-based theories explicitly appeal to transaction costs, they can all be interpreted in the transaction-cost framework. In ‘measurement-cost’ varieties of contract-based theories, the inability to costlessly determine individual contributions to a joint product induces agents to ‘free-ride’ (or “shirk”) on each other’s work or investment (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Barzel 1987; Holmstrom 1982). In ‘asset-specificity’ varieties, meanwhile, the inability to recoup the value of a ‘specific asset’ outside of a certain investment relationship induces strategic underperformance or threats of withdrawal (“hold-up”) (Williamson 1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990)​[1]​. The consequent diminishment of total product in either case can be conceived as a ‘transaction cost’, defined as the inefficiency pertaining to the ‘opportunism’, or non-cooperative behaviour, made possible by the prevalence of information asymmetries and the consequent inability to exhaustively stipulate and costlessly enforce contracts (Dahlman 1979: 148). Indeed, the work of Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985), which expressly seeks to operationalise Coase’s idea of transaction costs, spans both varieties of contract-based theories. In both varieties, moreover, the firm purports to constrain opportunistic behaviour, and thus achieve cooperation, by implementing organisational structures such as property rights and management systems that optimise incentives, be it for work or investment. The firm in either case can therefore be conceived as a constellation of contractual exchange, which some have labelled a “nexus of contracts”​[2]​.

1.2.2	Competence-Based Theories of the Firm
	Whereas the predecessor of contract-based theories is Neoclassical Economics, competence-based theories trace their ancestry to Classical Political Economy, especially Adam Smith, along with the more recent business history tradition (Foss 1997). Like Neoclassical Economics, these schools never presented an explicit ‘theory of the firm’, considering primarily technological rather than organisational factors. Business history, for instance, tends to treat the firm as “the basic unit of analysis” (Chandler 1992: 85-6), without inquiring why firms should exist in the first place. Similarly, in his analysis of specialisation, Adam Smith did not articulate why the division of labour should occur within the firm rather than over the market – that is, why factory workers are hired as employees rather than as independent contractors (Williamson 1985: 208-9).
Although competence-based theories constitute less of a cohesive school than their contract-based counterparts, being relatively scattered and disparate, their own ‘Coase moment’ may have come from Edith Penrose (1959), who described the firm as a “pool of intangible resources”; it has since been dubbed a “repository of productive knowledge” by Winter (1988). According to competence-based theories, the firm purports to develop and apply productive “capabilities”, which denote its “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, Pisano, and Schuen 1997: 516) or its “capacity…to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007: 4). It does so by coordinating production (Teece 1982), for example by expanding into “activities” that require closely related capabilities (Richardson 1972), or by implementing strategic “routines” to ensure cognitive consonance amongst members of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1982).
To summarise, we can refer back to the three general questions addressed by theories of the firm. According to contract-based theories, the firm’s purpose is to minimise transaction costs, which it accomplishes through its function of achieving cooperation. In this paradigm, the nature of the firm is essentially one of exchange. Competence-based theories, on the other hand, maintain the firm’s purpose is to develop productive capabilities, which it accomplishes through its function of achieving coordination. In this paradigm, the nature of the firm is essentially one of production. This abbreviated précis of the predominant groups of theories is summarised in Table 1 (below).

School of Theories	Contract-based Theories	Competence-based Theories
Purpose of the Firm	Minimise transaction costs (Coase 1937)	Develop productive capabilities (Penrose 1959)
Function of the Firm	Cooperation	Coordination
Nature of the Firm	Exchange-based – a “nexus of contracts” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972)	Production-based – a “repository of productive knowledge” (Winter 1988)




1.3 	Neglect of Society in the Theory of the Firm
Despite their dissimilarities, both schools share a common feature: they both neglect the social nature of the firm. This occurs even though the foundational elements of each school – cooperation in contract-based theories, and knowledge in competence-based theories – are inherently social.

1.3.1 	Neglect of Society in Contract-Based Theories of the Firm
In one strand of contract-based theories, the neglect of the social nature of the firm is immediately apparent. This band of theories considers all interaction to be fundamentally market-based, and essentially devoid of any social content. According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), for instance, the employment relation is no different to any other maekt transaction, such as the purchase of groceries – it occurs only on the basis of “continuous renegotiation” (ibid., p. 794) “on terms that must be acceptable to [all] parties” (ibid., p. 777). Accordingly, in their view, what appears to be a well-defined institution is in reality an arbitrary constellation of market-like exchange, or “nexus of contracts”, characterised by “a team use of inputs and a centralized position of some party in the contractual arrangements of all other inputs” (ibid.: 778). 
Notwithstanding its significant influence, this line of thought represents a significant divergence from Coase (1937), who saw the “nature of the firm” precisely in its dissimilarity to ordinary market transactions. Like Max Weber (1978 [1922]: 668-80) before him and Herbert Simon (1951: 294) after him, Coase distinguishes between a contract for the services of an independent contractor, in which the buyer purchases only an end product or service, and an employment contract, in which the employee accedes to the employer’s control over the work process itself. Williamson (1975, 1985) has built on Coase’s perspective by emphasising that employment contracts are incompletely specified and enforced. Contrary to Alchian and Demsetz’ notion that the employment contract is continuously updated, he points out that employers and employees are in fact locked-in to an uncompetitive “internal labour market” (Doeringer and Piore 1971) that is only open to renegotiation at pre-specified, discrete periods (Williamson 1975, Chapter 4). In the meantime, workers develop skills and experience that represent a “specific asset” for both employers (who are loath to lose their investments in worker training to other firms) and employees (who cannot easily transfer their skills and experience to other firms), making it costly for either party to exit the relationship. In these circumstances, strategic behaviour (such as “holding-up” the opposing party) is likely to abound. In fact, Williamson demonstrates that the incompleteness of the employment contract is important not only in terms of asset specificity, but also to measurement-cost explanations of the firm, which include Alchian and Demsetz’ own theory. Due to the complexity of the work process, involving “task idiosyncrasies” and other sources of asymmetric information, the quantity and quality of work cannot be fully specified or costlessly monitored (Williamson 1975). Consequently, there will always be opportunities for workers to shirk without violating the formal terms of contract, or at least without their infringement being detected, for instance by working in a “perfunctory” as opposed to “consummate” manner.
If employment contracts are incompletely specified and enforced, they are an insufficient descriptor of the relations that prevail within the firm (Durkheim 1893; Selznick 1969; Bowles and Gintis 1993). After all, it cannot be determined merely by the imperfections of the employment contract whether or not employers and employees will threaten to hold each other up, or whether they will cooperate in cultivating mutually beneficial skills. Likewise, the same formal contract and level of enforcement can feature either “perfunctory” or “consummate” performance. Citing legal scholar Francis Batt, Coase (1937) fills this explanatory gap with a master-servant relationship, containing extra-contractual obligations on behalf of the employee and extra-contractual authority on behalf of the employer​[3]​. Williamson (1985: 71-2) likewise cites a legal scholar when he describes the “recurrent” and “idiosyncratic” exchange within the firm as “relational contracting”, stating: “the relation takes on the properties of a ‘minisociety with a vast array of norms beyond those centered on the exchange and its immediate processes’ (Macneil, 1978, p. 901).”​[4]​
Without some degree of cooperation in such non-contractual circumstances, moreover, the firm would collapse under the weight of opportunism, as demonstrated by the fact that ‘work-to-rule’ is a form of sabotage (Leibenstein 1982; Selznick 1969; Crozier 1964). Such extra-contractual cooperation, moreover, cannot be sustained by market-like transactions, but instead requires social relationships based on trust (Fox 1974). The resulting “social contract” (Edwards 1979) also involves a significant cognitive component, because individuals must not only be constrained in their pursuit of material gain, but must intrinsically value the relationships that afford cooperation; they must be non-instrumentally motivated. In this sense, the employment relation contains an element of gift exchange, in that the acts of giving and receiving are as important as the content of the transaction (Akerlof 1982). Indeed, Williamson acknowledges the importance of trust (e.g. 1983: 522), which he recognises has little meaning if it does not go beyond calculative self-interest (1993), even stating: “The standard economic model…assumes that individuals regard transactions in a strictly neutral, instrumental manner. However, it may be more accurate, and sometimes even essential, to regard the exchange process itself as an object of value” (1975: 38). His recognition of contractual incompleteness therefore represents an opportunity to enrich the theory of the firm with a consideration of the social behaviour that underpins exchange (Durkheim 1893).
Alas, Williamson squanders this opportunity, despite claiming that that the New Institutionalism (of which contract-based theories of the firm are a constituent) has crossed the “self-limiting” boundaries imposed by Neoclassical Economics between “the contiguous social sciences”, particularly sociology (2003: 3-4). In order to maintain the pre-eminence of transaction costs, he must treat all intra-firm relationships as essentially contractual (so that they can be conceptualised as ‘transactions’), and ultimately non-cooperative (so that they can be assumed to entail ‘transaction costs’). Thus, for Williamson, when the employment contract cannot be perfectly specified and enforced, opportunistic “contractual man” bears the remainder of the explanatory load (1985, Chapter 2). This representative agent is assumed to not only be self-interested, but also to pursue his self-interest “with guile”​[5]​ (1975: 6). Williamson therefore admits the importance of non-contractual and non-instrumental cooperation, yet maintains behavioural assumptions that preclude such cooperation. This contradiction is exposed by the observation that while Williamson’s early work referred to “transaction relations”, these were later replaced with the less social “transactions” (Nooteboom 1992: 285). In practice, therefore, he still conceives the firms as a “nexus of contracts” (or, to use his own terminology, “a continuation of market relations by other means” [1991: 271]), with the caveat that those contracts are incomplete (and even “relational”). In this regard, he fails to improve on the neoclassical practice, explicitly implemented by Alchian and Demsetz, of imputing “implicit contracts” to explain behaviour in non-contractual circumstances (e.g. Baily 1976; Feldstein 1976; Arrow 1974).
In fact, the same schizophrenia is evident in Coase’s account of the master-servant relationship. On the one hand, he seemed to believe that it extended beyond the employment contract, even stating: “Within a firm…market transactions are eliminated…contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced” (1937: 388-91). On the other hand, like Williamson, he differentiated the firm from the market merely by the type of contract involved, and thus treated it as a feature of the employment contract itself (Hodgson 1999: 201-24). Coase was certainly correct that the actual employment relation still contains the essence of a master-servant relationship, despite the formal employment contract purporting to replace it with a mere exchange of labour a la Alchian and Demsetz. However, neither the employer’s obligations nor the employer’s authority involved in the former are fully contained in the latter (Fox 1974: 188-9, 250; Selznick 1969). Indeed, Coase (1988c: 37-8) later considered his identification of the firm with the employment contract to have been a mistake.

1.3.2 	Neglect of Society in Competence-Based Theories of the Firm
Competence-based theories go a step further in the direction of a ‘social’ theory of the firm by emphasising that many forms of productive knowledge, such as tacit knowledge, can only be developed and applied in a socially and institutionally structured context (Penrose 1959; Winter 1982). However, the social processes by which such knowledge is developed and applied are not articulated. Foss (1993: 134, emphasis added) therefore states that “[t]he competence underlying productive, allocative and strategic decisions is tacit and generated through experience of particularity and idiosyncrasy, particularly in social settings”, and that the social nature of cognition is what separates competence-based theories from their contract-based counterparts, which “generally have room for only individual competences, not…intersubjectively shared and practised competences”. However, he goes on to admit that it is precisely “the social component of the competences of the firm” that is undeveloped in competence-based theories.
More specifically, I would argue that in their focus on coordination, competence-based theories often fail to appreciate that cooperation is also a central part of the development and application of productive knowledge​[6]​ – especially the types of productive knowledge emphasised by competence-based theories, such as tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958, 1966; Collins 2010)​[7]​. This neglect is related to the point that, in their focus on the cognitive aspect of behaviour, competence-based theories generally overlook its relational aspect. An exception that proves the rule can be found in Nelson and Winter’s (1982) concept of “routines”, which represent inter-subjective, collective strategies that purport to deal with issues of not only coordination, but also cooperation, by providing a common set of objectives or principles that establishes a “truce” between different members of the firm. Like other competence-based theorists, Nelson and Winter provide no specific direction as to how the firm should be organised to achieve cooperation – such as whether management should be arranged vertically or horizontally and under what conditions (Nooteboom 2009: 21; Becker 2004; Cohendet and Llerena 2003) – and therefore implicitly assume that cooperation is achieved automatically.
The consequences of neglecting the cooperation involved in the development and application of productive knowledge, and the relational aspect of behaviour involved in that cooperation, can be observed in the way that competence-based theories define the firm. In contrast to the methodological individualism of contract-based theories, which conceive the firm to be nothing more than a “nexus of contracts”, these theories often consider the firm to be more than the sum of its parts, in that the ‘organisational knowledge’ created by the combination of individuals cannot be reduced to the knowledge of those individuals (Winter 1982: 76, 1988: 170; Dosi and Marengo 1994; Penrose 1959). However, just as Williamson failed to explain what fills the gap left by incomplete contracts, competence-based theories fail to explain what links the individual and organisational levels of knowledge (Cohendet and Llerena 2003). Even Kogut and Zander (1992: 388), whose work represents perhaps the most serious attempt at developing a ‘social’ theory of the firm from the capabilities perspective, “leave to the side the important task of specifying a more explicit integration of individual and organizational knowledge (such as via a shared culture, mechanisms of socialization, or an assumption of affiliative needs)”. Despite acknowledging its ‘emergent properties’, competence-based theories consequently define the firm as a mere “repository of productive knowledge” (Winter 1988) or “pool of intangible resources” (Penrose 1959).
That said, the neglect of society in competence-based theories is arguably less acute than it is in contract-based theories, with a more holistic theory requiring only further elaboration, rather than a complete revision, of the school’s central concepts (Borzaga and Tortia 2008). Indeed, Kogut and Zander (1992, 1996), who conceptualise the firm as a social community specialising in social knowledge, and Nooteboom (2009), who considers the function of the firm to be the achievement of “cognitive focus” through cultural and psychological means, demonstrate the potential of the competence-based approach to include the social element. By contrast, Bowles and Gintis’ (1993) theory of “contested exchange”, in which the relations within the firm significantly ‘constitute’ their participants, fundamentally defies the behavioural assumptions of contemporary contract-based theories.

1.4 	The Constitutive Role of the Firm
In fact, Bowles and Gintis’ theory relates to a deficiency that is common to both schools. In contract-based theories, the role of the firm is to constrain opportunistic behaviour in order to minimise transaction costs. In competence-based theories, the role of the firm is to enable productive behaviour in order to develop productive capabilities. Both of these conceptions represent a “thin” view of institutions in which the firm acts on predetermined behavioural traits (Chang and Evans 2005: 100). In reality, institutions such as the firm do not only enable and constrain behaviour, but also constitute the cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour (Hodgson 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Hodgson and Knudsen 2004; Giddens 1984) – a point which other social sciences often take as given (Chang and Evans 2005: 103). 
This common neglect of the firm’s “constitutive role” (Chang and Evans 2005) is a symptom of the predominant theories’ common neglect of the firm’s social nature, discussed in the previous section. We have seen that the behavioural assumptions of contract-based theories blind them to the importance of non-contractual (and non-instrumental) cooperation. In fact, contract-based theories repeatedly intimate that these assumptions are not immutable. Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 790-1), for example, allude to the cultivation of “team spirit and loyalty”, while Williamson (1975: 37-8, 44-5, 79) emphasises the “associational gains” which inhere when the firm transforms the relational “atmosphere” from “calculative” to “quasimoral”, developing a sense of group responsibility. However, these possibilities are referred to only cursorily; in Williamson’s (1975: 79) own word, they are treated as a “caveat”. The substance of the analysis remains dominated by “contractual men”, who, as Hodgson (1999: 251; see also 1998) states, “remain impenetrable atoms: they are not affected fundamentally by institutions and culture.”
The neglect of the firm’s constitutive role is less flagrant in competence-based theories. Indeed, the fact that members of the firm are conceived as joint participants in productive processes, rather than individual participants in contractual exchanges, implies that they are affected by the firm at a fundamental level; as Marx (1887: 124) acknowledged, “By…acting on the external world and changing it”, each worker “the same time changes his own nature.” However, because they overlook the social processes involved in the development and application of productive knowledge, competence-based theories do not fully expound this implication​[8]​ (Nooteboom 1992). Indeed, by implicitly assuming that cooperation occurs by default, and therefore that the firm is always successful in appropriately influencing “workers’ aims and conceptions”, competence-based theories arguably take the constitutive role of the firm for granted.


1.5	 Incompatibility of the Predominant Theories of the Firm
1.5.1	Isolation of Production and Exchange in the Theory of the Firm
Given that production and exchange are inextricably connected, it would seem indisputable that both are important to the firm, and that any theory of the firm considering one or the other in isolation would be fundamentally incomplete. In general, however, the predominant schools remain split between these spheres, with contract-based theories confined to exchange and competence-based theories confined to production (Madhok 2002).
We have seen that contract-based theories preserve the tradition of Neoclassical Economics by confining their attention to exchange, treating the transaction as “the basic unit of analysis” (Williamson 1985). Part and parcel of this methodology is to treat production as secondary (Foss 1993: 131; Hodgson 1998). Indeed, besides rare cases such as Milgrom and Roberts (1992), contract-based theories tend to regard production as a ‘black box’, exogenously determined by technology – a technique which allows Williamson (1975, Chapter 3; 1980; 1985: 255-6) and Demsetz (1988) to hold it constant when comparing the transactional efficiency of various archetypal “work modes”. This trend is more widely evident in contract-based theories when production is admitted only in the form of production costs, which the firm minimises alongside those of transactions (e.g. Riordan and Williamson 1985). Elsewhere, including in Coase (1937), production is relegated to the point of being a mere variant of exchange in which an “entrepreneur-coordinator” allocates “factors of production” by participating in their various markets and engaging in “exchange with nature” (Hodgson 1999: 229, 257).
Despite their best attempts, however, contract-based theories do not succeed in evading the importance of production. On the contrary, they afford pre-eminence to production by assuming that it determines transaction costs (Foss 1991: 131; Hodgson 1999: 264-74). The measurement-cost branch, for example, treats the firm as an “internal market” between “input providers” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 795). However, the measurement costs on which the theory is based derive from the premise of “team production”, which, according to Alchian and Demsetz, is the only factor that distinguishes the firm from the market. The asset-specificity branch similarly treats productive inputs as mere receptacles of value that are exchanged, albeit with difficulty (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). This inconsistency is laid bare when, while discussing a “Fundamental Transformation” driven by changes in inputs over time, Williamson (1985: 87) curiously states: “The presumption that ‘in the beginning there were markets’ informs this perspective.”
Not only is the treatment of production vis-à-vis exchange in contract-based theories contradictory, but so is the treatment of production between the various strands of contract-based theories. Team production is defined as an activity “wherein individual cooperating inputs do not yield identifiable, separate products which can be summed to measure the total output” – in other words, technical indivisibility (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 779). This condition is required if measurement costs are to predominate the analysis. Williamson (1975: 42, 51, 60-1), by contrast, argues that even when economies of scale are available through the combination of factors of production, most tasks are technically divisible. This assumption is required if contractual incompleteness is to be considered the basis of the firm.
The neglect of exchange in competence-based theories is less explicit and less acute than the neglect of production in contract-based theories. Indeed, some eminent scholars in the capabilities tradition (such as Teece and Pisano [1994], Penrose [1959], Nelson and Winter [1982], and Knight [1921]), have considered issues of exchange, such as asset specificity and contractual incompleteness, alongside those of production. Nevertheless, just as contract-based theories treat production as a mere appendage to transaction costs, the opposite trend is evident in competence-based theories: transaction costs are included additively alongside capabilities rather than in a bilateral, dynamic relationship (Foss 1993: 137; e.g. Teece 1982, 1986).
In short, production and exchange remain segregated between the predominant schools of theories of the firm. By considering some potential channels for integrating the two schools, the remainder of this section will demonstrate that this false isolation results from the two schools’ common neglect of the firm’s social nature and constitutive role.

1.5.2 	The Peculiarity of Labour
	One potential intersection of the two schools concerns the peculiar characteristics of labour in terms of both production and exchange. In terms of exchange, labour is a “fictitious commodity”, in that the service supposedly being traded – namely, the worker’s labour – cannot in reality be separated (or “alienated”) from the worker and transferred to a different owner (Polanyi 1957; Ellerman 1992; Putterman 1987). As a result, employment contracts cannot be perfectly specified or enforced, leading to extra-contractual discretion on behalf of the worker. In other words, labour is not a “passive factor of production” (Simon 1951; see also Loasby 1976; Hodgson 1999: 258). Acknowledging this peculiar nature of labour could allow contract-based theories to open the door to production. If labour cannot be fully traded, then production cannot be reduced to a mere “internal market” whereby an “entrepreneur” allocates symmetrical factors of production​[9]​ (Hodgson 1998, 1999: 229). Because they cling to the “nexus of contracts” paradigm that considers all relations to be mere market-like transactions, however, contract-based theories are unable to appreciate the non-contractual relationships (and non-instrumental motivations) required for workers to contribute beyond their contractually specified and enforced obligations. Consequently, labour is treated like any other commodity, with workers conceptualised as mere “input providers” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 795). Even Coase speaks of labour in this manner, which is incongruous with his emphasis on the employment relation (Hodgson 1999: 116).
In terms of production, labour is peculiar because, unlike capital or land, it is involved in social processes of knowledge formation – again, it is not a “passive factor of production” – and is consequently irreducible to individual workers. Competence-based theories in fact acknowledge this, maintaining that the capabilities of the firm reside in the ‘collective knowledge’ of its workforce and are developed and applied through joint labour. By failing to appreciate the cooperation thus involved, however, competence-based theories squander what could otherwise represent a potential segway into exchange.

1.5.3	Information, Incentives, and Knowledge
Section 1.3 mentioned that whereas contract-based theories are primarily concerned with cooperation, competence-based theories are primarily concerned with coordination. These two functions can be represented in game theory as distinct yet interrelated ‘games’. Starting with the ‘cooperation game’, incentives are the focal factor, but only because information is assumed to be imperfect​[10]​. Indeed, Dahlman (1979: 148) argues that all incentive problems (and therefore all transaction costs) can be reduced to matters of imperfect – particularly asymmetric – information. Contract-based theories could therefore integrate production into their analysis by relaxing their assumption of imperfect information, and thus making the coordination problem relevant.
There is, however, a missing component that obstructs this convenient connection, namely productive knowledge. When such knowledge is tacit, idiosyncratic, or shared, it is indivisible from its social, practical, and organisational setting (Polanyi 1958, 1966; Collins 2010; Goffin and Koners 2011; Schmidt and Hunter 1993). It must therefore be developed and transmitted within that setting, and consequently cannot be traded even in principle. In this regard, as many competence-based theorists have stressed​[11]​, non-contractibility is “the very essence of capabilities/competences” (Teece and Pisano 1994: 540). To genuinely accommodate knowledge, and thus production, contract-based theories would therefore be obligated to dispense with their exclusive focus on market-like transactions, along with the associated assumption of instrumental rationality​[12]​. Instead, contract-based theories merely absorb productive knowledge into their neoclassical, Bayesian paradigm, which treats information as objective, codifiable, blueprint-like data that can be traded like any other commodity (Nelson 1980; von Tunzelmann 1995; Fransman 1994: 715). Indeed, it was Coase (1937: 92) who claimed that “[w]e can imagine a system where all advice or knowledge was bought as required”. Consequently, productive knowledge is viewed as merely a form of asymmetric information, and thus a source of incentive problems (Hodgson 1999: 204, 250, 270ff). For example, Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) consider their notion of “team production”, involving indivisible group-knowledge, to be merely a source of measurement costs. Williamson (1975: 31), meanwhile, explicitly treats tacit knowledge as equivalent to asymmetric information by agglomerating both under the rubric of “information impactedness”, a platform for opportunism.
Whereas incentives are pivotal in the cooperation game because information is assumed to be imperfect, the opposite is the case in a (pure) coordination game: information is pivotal, because incentives are assumed to be aligned. Indeed, we have already seen that competence-based theories tend to implicitly assume that cooperation problems are absent. To incorporate exchange, they would have to acknowledge that cooperation is central to the development and application of productive knowledge. In this regard, Foss (1993: 137-8) is equally mistaken as Williamson to reverse the terminology of “information impactedness”, treating both information and knowledge as non-tradable and thus ignoring exchange.

1.5.4 	Learning
Despite the incompatibility of the two schools with regard to information, incentives, and knowledge, introducing time into the equation reopens the portal, because cooperation games can become coordination games when they contain multiple iterations. If ‘players’ expect to interact with each other in the future, they will prefer to implement strategies that are conditional on the behaviour of others, even if non-cooperation is the most rewarding strategy in the short run (Taylor 1987; Axelrod 1984; Gintis et al. 2005​[13]​). The dynamic ‘game’ thus becomes one aligning expectations (information) rather than payoffs (incentives). A possible synthesis of the two schools may therefore maintain that contract-based theories are relevant in the short run, when information is fixed, while competence-based theories are relevant in the long run, when information is variable (Foss 1993: 138). 
Competence-based theories may reply that because production is constantly shifting (for example due to changes in technology), so too the transaction costs minimised by the firm, which derive from production, are constantly shifting (Nooteboom 1992). Langlois (1992) thus argues that in the long run, as more information becomes available to monitor agents and specify contracts, the only transaction costs that matter for organisation are the “dynamic transaction costs” of “persuasion, negotiation, coordination, and teaching”, or equivalently, those of “not having the capabilities you need when you need them”. Similarly, Teece (1976: 13), and arguably Frank Knight and even Ronald Coase, contended that amidst technological change, issues of contractual incompleteness become issues of coordinating interdependent stages of production (Langlois and Cosgel 1993; Madhok 2002). However, these time-based fusions basically amount to a deferral of exchange rather than an unbiased integration. “Dynamic transaction costs”, for instance, are not truly transaction costs, but rather denote differences in capabilities. It is these differences, moreover, that are conceived as ultimately determining patterns of organisation, with transaction costs proper having a secondary, and perhaps even insignificant, effect (Jacobides and Winter 2005: 398-9).
This conclusion depends on a rigged conception of time. To validate his assertion that transaction costs are eventually ‘learned away’, Langlois (1992: 102-5, 110) defines the long run as “the asymptotic end-state of a process of learning”. Contract-based theories could retort that the ‘long run’ is in fact made up of a string of ‘states’, and is anyway a constantly shifting horizon that is never actually reached (it is, after all, “asymptotic”). Furthermore, given that there are innumerable “processes of learning”, there will never be a point at which all information has been acquired. Indeed, every time-slice represents the “end-state” of some such process. In any case, contracts written today take into account all available information, including not only probabilities of future outcomes but also all the “learning” that has taken place up to this point. To explain patterns of organisation at any point in time, according to this logic, therefore requires analysis of the incentives that prevail given existing information. 
However, just as Langlois’ (1992) framework allowed him to eschew exchange, this logic leads to an eschewal of production. Whereas Teece (1976: 31) reduces asset specificity to a coordination problem in a dynamic context, Riordan and Williamson (1985) express production costs along with transaction costs as a function of asset specificity. In this model, markets enjoy production-cost advantages over firms by combining the demands of many buyers, thus achieving economies of scale and scope. However, as investment partners become ‘locked in’ to the investment relationship, these advantages are overshadowed by the transaction-cost advantages of firms. Production-cost differences between firms and markets are thus only relevant when asset specificity is negligible, according to Riordan and Williamson. This is tantamount to shelving production completely as an explanation for the firm; indeed, their conclusions and predictions are indistinct from those of standard asset-specificity explanations (see, for example, pages 369 and 375).
One reason that neither school is able to unite production and exchange through the dimension of time is that neither adequately considers the firm’s social nature and constitutive role. In order to downplay exchange, Langlois (1992: 103-5) is obligated to make a priori assumptions about social relationships, namely that “norms of reciprocity and cooperation” will eliminate transaction costs. He thus overlooks the fact that which norms emerge depends crucially on the institutions in which social relationships are situated (Nooteboom 1992: 284-6). Conversely, the neoclassical paradigm of information espoused by contract-based theories, which fits neatly with their insistence that all interaction consists of market-like transactions, ignores the “intrinsically social and collective” process of learning (Teece and Pisano 1994: 544-5), which involves not only the acquisition of objective data through instant, anonymous transactions, but rather the formation of altogether new knowledge through institutionalised, social relationships – a particular form of ‘learning-by-doing’ that Penrose (1959: 53) called “learning by interaction” ​[14]​. Indeed, learning is entirely absent in measurement-cost variants of contract-based theories. In asset-specificity versions, it appears only under the rubric of ‘human capital’, in which static situations are compared before and after some learning has occurred (von Tunzelmann 1995: 4; e.g. Williamson 1975, Chapter 4, 1983, 1985: 55, 1986: 191). Consequently, learning is treated as purely a source of incentive problems, viz. the hold-up of specific (human) assets.
Furthermore, learning involves not only social, institutionalised relationships, but also alterations in cognitive frames (Argyris and Schön 1978; Dosi and Marengo 1994: 162; Nooteboom 1992​[15]​). To fully incorporate learning, contract-based theories would therefore be obligated to revise their behavioural assumptions by acknowledging that “learning is a developmental and reconstitutive process” in which not only knowledge, but individuals themselves, change over time (Hodgson 1999: 252). After all, as Hodgson (ibid.: 206) states, a given piece of information “can lead to different conclusions depending on the…cognitive framework”. By instead espousing a “Bayesian updating of subjective probability estimates in the light of incoming data”, the neoclassical paradigm of information essentially holds these cognitive frameworks constant, thus allowing contract-based theories to retain their behavioural assumptions. That said, despite their emphasis on learning, competence-based theories generally fail to develop its socially ‘reconstitutive’ effects as well, leaving “the workers’ aims and conceptions…unchanged” (ibid.: 262). 

1.5.5	Uncertainty
Another issue relating to information in a dynamic context is uncertainty, which is also related to the peculiarity of labour (see Section 1.5.2). According to Knight (1921), future events are often inherently unforeseeable due to the inherent unpredictability of human agency. In his formulation, “judgement” is required to “transform the uncertainties of human opinion and action into measurable probabilities by forming an approximate evaluation of the judgement and capacity of the [worker]” (ibid.: 311). The purpose of the firm is to specialise in this particular capability by amalgamating multiple, related activities into a single organisation, which additionally allows it to endure or exploit unpredictable contingencies (Loasby 1976; Kay 1984; Langlois 1984).
	Uncertainty seems to offer an alternative route through which to integrate the two schools. Indeed, in the spirit of Dahlman’s (1979: 148) assertion that all transaction costs can be reduced to matters of imperfect information, Langlois (1984, 2007) has gone so far as to claim that, in a dynamic context, all explanations of the firm – contract- and competence-based – can be restated under the rubric of uncertainty. Indeed, while Knight’s theory can be considered a precursor to (more recent) competence-based theories (Langlois and Cosgel 1990), Teece (1976: 13) has argued that it “reduces, at least in some respects, to a contractual-incompleteness argument” as the presence of uncertainty makes it impossible for a long-term contract to “stipulate exhaustively the appropriate conditional responses” to all the “relevant contingencies”. Relying on ad hoc, short-term contracts, however, would incur significant transaction costs, which can be alleviated by “administrative processes under vertical integration”. 
	However, the neglect of society in the predominant theories of the firm once again prevents the development of a unified theory. If the uncertainty explanation “reduces…to a contractual-incompleteness argument”, then to integrate it, contract-based theories would have to account for behaviour in non-contractual circumstances. Indeed, the conversion of the fundamental uncertainty of human agency into “relational risk” surely involves social relationships (Nooteboom 2009). Contract-based theories sidestep this implication by espousing the neoclassical paradigm of information, which denies the existence of radical uncertainty in the first place. This is exposed in Hart and Moore’s (2006) claim that, by circumscribing potential points of dispute, employment contracts themselves serve to reduce uncertainty. Competence-based theories, meanwhile, although affirming that non-contractibility is “the very essence of capabilities/competences” (Teece and Pisano 1994: 540), often fail to fully appreciate that cooperation is crucial to managing human agency.

1.5.6	Bounded Rationality
An alternative means by which to synthesise the two schools is the concept of bounded rationality, which holds that cognitive limitations prevent individuals from calculating optimal decisions. To guide their decisions, they instead rely on cognitive heuristics, which determine how ideas and information are perceived, filtered, and evaluated, yielding ‘satisfactory’, rather than optimal, outcomes (Simon 1957). In fact, bounded rationality is explicitly present in both schools. In competence-based theories, it acts in conjunction with uncertainty to create a need for coordination within the firm (Langlois and Cosgel 1990). In contract-based theories, Williamson (1985: 44-67) has claimed that bounded rationality ensures that opportunism cannot be fully covered by contracts. A possible synthesis, perhaps predicted on Knight’s theory, may thus maintain that the cooperation and coordination functions of the firm stem from bounded rationality.
Once again, however, this bridge is burnt by the neglect of society. Contract-based theories, for instance, embrace bounded rationality awkwardly and half-heartedly, if at all (Hodgson 1999: 209). Although Williamson claims that it is essential to contractual incompleteness and opportunism, it is not clear why asymmetric information is insufficient (Foss 2003). Indeed, in accordance with their neoclassical paradigm of information, contract-based theories tend to construe bounded rationality as essentially a problem of imperfect information, whereby agents maximise subject to information costs; in Williamson’s (1985: 32) terminology, “economizing on transaction costs essentially reduces to economizing on bounded rationality”. In reality, the issue is cognitive capacity, not imperfect information, meaning that optimisation of any kind (let alone optimisation of bounded rationality) is a chimera​[16]​ (Hodgson 1999: 207-8). A plausible reason why contract-based theories shy away from earnestly incorporating bounded rationality is that doing so would contradict Williamson’s other, less equivocal assumption of “contractual man” – namely, that he is invariably opportunistic, not to mention purely “contractual” – by implying that cognitive frameworks are shaped by institutionalised, social interaction, leading to a variety of possible behaviours (Foss 1993: 134-5; Nooteboom 2009: 286; Hodgson 1999: 258). Ironically, therefore, Williamson’s (1985: 44-67) attempt to reinforce his behavioural assumptions by mentioning bounded rationality only serves to call those assumptions into question. Although competence-based theories hold no such assumptions, in their neglect of cooperation they likewise fail to appreciate the crucial role of the firm in ‘constituting’ boundedly rational individuals.

1.5.7	Transaction Costs and Capabilities
The multifarious hurdles discussed in this section combine to generate a seemingly impassable rift between the predominant schools, which diverge on the fundamental question of the firm’s purpose, and how that purpose is accomplished. For example, competence-based theories might wish to subsume transacting, including the alteration of the transactional environment, as merely one of many capabilities that are relevant to the firm (Jacobides and Winter 2005: 400; Winter 1988: 178; Argyres and Mayer 2004, 2007​[17]​). Innovation could then be conceived as not only technological but also organisational, leading to a more efficient handling or a more favourable distribution of transaction costs (Winter 1988: 177; Nelson and Winter 1982; Foss 1993: 131). Contract-based theories, however, would undoubtedly dispute this assessment, which still assumes that production is the ultimate purpose of the firm. Indeed, they may take the opposite perspective – that the activities of the firm stressed by competence-based theories (competitive strategies, innovations, and so on) are merely some of the many ways that firms minimise transaction costs (Williamson 1975, Chapter 11). For example, whereas Langlois (1992: 113) argues that transaction costs boil down to “the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them”, contract-based theories may counter that the capability of producing a certain good is essentially the ability to reduce the transaction costs associated with organising the production of that good over the market.
The reason for this discordancy lies in both schools’ neglect of the firm’s social nature and constitutive role. As Kogut and Zander (1992: 396) state, “the transaction as the unit of analysis is an insufficient vehicle by which to examine organizational capabilities, because these capabilities are a composite of individual and social knowledge”. To embrace the concept of capabilities, contract-based theories would therefore be obliged to dispense with their exclusive focus on market-like transactions and their behavioural assumption of instrumental rationality in order to appreciate the “‘soft assets’ like values, culture, and organizational experience” (Teece and Pisano 1994: 553) that are involved in the formation of this “social knowledge”. By the same token, however, Foss (1993: 142) admits that it is precisely “the social component of the competences of the firm” – in particular, I would argue, the cooperation involved in the development and application of productive knowledge – that remains undeveloped in competence-based theories.

1.6	Returning to the Roots of the Theory of the Firm
1.6.1	Returning to the Roots of Contract-Based Theories of the Firm
	Contract-based theories of the firm, especially those that explicitly espouse the transaction-cost framework, are in fact a subset of a wider school, namely the self-styled ‘New Institutional Economics’. In contrast to the so-called ‘Old Institutional Economics’, which intended to challenge the core tenets of mainstream economics, this ‘new’ school seeks to “extend the range of neoclassical theory by explaining the institutional factors traditionally taken as givens” (Rutherford 2001: 187). In so doing, it foregoes the sound appreciation for the firm’s social nature and constitutive role that was a valuable attribute of its ‘old’ counterpart, as well as the formative harbingers of institutionalism such as Durkheim, Weber, and Marx (Scott 2001).
Firstly, the Old Institutional Economics differed from its ‘new’ counterpart at a fundamental level by rejecting the behavioural assumptions of Neoclassical Economics, including both its exclusive focus on market-like transactions and its assumption of instrumental rationality. This distinction is revealed by the fact that, although Williamson (1975: 3, 254) claims to be following Commons by taking the transaction to be the “basic unit of analysis” or “the ultimate unit of economic investigation”, Commons (1931: 652; 2009 [1934]: 55) in fact described the transaction of only one of many “unit[s] of economic activity”, explicitly refuting the narrow focus of the “transactional theorists” (Commons 2009 [1934]: 117; see Hodgson 1999: 218). In contrast to the New Institutionalist conception of transactions as devoid of social content, moreover, Commons (1925, 1931, 1934) maintained that transactions are themselves embedded in social interaction – a point that was most influentially established by Durkheim (e.g. 1898), and which was also evident in Coase’s (1937; 1988c: 36) (inconsistent) treatment of the employment relation as essentially a master-servant relationship, containing non-contractual authority on behalf of the employer and non-contractual obligations on behalf of the employee. Even though it was not reflected in his own work (Hodgson 1999: 230), Coase (2012) also rejected homo economicus, instead advocating the study of “man as he is” (2012). This approach was more loyally taken by Veblen (1898a, 1898b, 1899), who, prefiguring Simon’s concept of bounded rationality, argued that individuals act according to instincts, habits, and beliefs before they engage in rational calculations. He thus allowed for a range of possible behaviours beyond the “self-seeking with guile” assumed in contract-based theories (Williamson 1975: 6). 
Furthermore, while the Old Institutionalists considered existing norms and cognitive frames to be crucial factors in explaining institutions (as exemplified in Veblen’s [1899] Theory of the Leisure Class, in which he expounded the idea of “conspicuous consumption”), they also considered those behavioural traits to be institutionally endogenous; that is, they appreciated the constitutive role of institutions (Hodgson 1999: 218; 2007). Marx(ians) (e.g. 1959 [1932]) likewise appreciated that organisation could induce false consciousness and alienation, just as Durkheim (1893) was concerned with both the anomie and solidarity resulting from the division of labour. As a result of this perspective, both the precursors and pioneers of institutionalism, especially Commons, viewed institutions such as the firm as “organic and collective” entities with emergent properties rather than mere extensions of a fictitious, all-embracing market (Hodgson 1999: 218). In other words, firms were conceived as social institutions rather than “nexuses of contracts”. In this regard, Coase’s own perspective was more in keeping with the Old Institutionalism than the New, defining economics as the study of “the working of social institutions which bind the economic system together” (1977: 487, emphasis added).
Because the Old Institutionalists recognised that social institutions like the firm operate within a broader institutional environment, which changes over time, they were able to situate firms and other institutions within a historically specific context. Weber’s (1978 [1922]) analysis of bureaucratisation likewise related specifically to the ‘modern’ historical period. Marx’s (1887) exposition of the capitalist firm, meanwhile, was specific to the “capitalist mode of production”, which also allowed him to show that prevailing power relations – and not only efficiency considerations – determine organisation. In contrast, “by confining itself to allegedly universal and ahistorical concepts”, the New Institutional Economics “fails to become rooted in any specific socio-economic system” (Hodgson 1999: 230; see also 2001) and is unable to grasp the distributive issues underlying organisation (Dow 1986).
Given their appreciation for the firm’s social nature and constitutive role, the Old Institutional Economics, along with the forerunners of institutionalism and even Ronald Coase, would be more thoroughly equipped to consider issues of production alongside those of exchange than modern-day contract-based theories. Marx (1886), who argued that the dynamics of capitalist exchange rely on the production of surplus value in the factory, is the most obvious example. Indeed, although Alchian and Demsetz (1972) make no mention of Marx, their idea of “team production” was captured by Marx (1887: 225) almost a century earlier​[18]​. The Old Institutionalism, too, could easily accommodate concepts such as capabilities and learning by virtue of its recognition of the social and collective nature of institutions, as well as its emphasis on socio-economic change – in terms of not only institutions themselves, but also the environments in which they operate and the individuals that operate within them. In this respect, the Old Institutional Economics may be closer to contemporary competence-based theories than to the contract-based theories that bear its namesake (Foss 1996b; Tavares Silva, Castro Teixeira, and Rui Silva 2004: 4). Coase’s perspective is likewise amenable to a more unified theory than his successors have delivered (Madhok 2002; Langlois 1992: 115-6). In fact, over half a century after publishing his famous 1937 article, Coase recanted his original preoccupation with transaction costs, stating that the firm’s purpose is instead to coordinate production (Coase 1988a, 1988b, 1988c).

1.6.2	Returning to the Roots of Competence-Based Theories
While contract-based theories should revisit their Old Institutional predecessors, competence-based theories should return to their self-proclaimed roots in Classical Political Economy (Foss 1993, 1997). In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith recognised the importance of the relational aspect of behaviour, arguing that people’s “sense of propriety” derives from their “mutual sympathies”. In his Wealth of Nations (1776), meanwhile, he acknowledged the constitutive role of the firm in affecting these “sentiment[s]” and “social…virtues” (1904 [1776], Book V, Chapter 1, para. 178; see also Book I, Chapter 1). Marx (1887) likewise appreciated the relational underpinnings of production in his concept of “productive relations”, even referring to “the co-operative character of the labour process”​[19]​. As mentioned in Section 1.4, he also appreciated the firm’s constitutive role, and of course remains unparalleled in his treatment of the distributive issues surrounding organisation.
	Furthermore, just as contract-based theories should reconsider the work of Coase, competence-based theories should revisit the insights of some of their own ‘founding fathers’. Indeed, we have already seen that Frank Knight’s theory of the firm based on uncertainty was potentially capable of integrating exchange-based phenomena (Langlois and Cosgel 1990), and that Herbert Simon’s work on bounded rationality offers an ideal bridge between the cognitive and relational aspects of behaviour while also revealing the firm’s constitutive role. The fact that Simon (1979: 499) explicitly acknowledged the influence of Old Institutionalists such as Commons on his thinking demonstrates the potential for his work to motivate a unified theory of the firm (Rutherford 2001: 188).

1.7	Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the two predominant schools of theories of the firm both neglect the firm’s social nature. Contract-based theories cling to a priori behavioural assumptions that exclude the non-instrumental and non-contractual cooperation involved in the firm. Although their neglect of society is less severe, competence-based theories often ignore the importance of cooperation altogether in the development and application of productive knowledge.
The chapter further contended that this common neglect for the ‘social dimension’ has two major consequences. First, both schools maintain a “thin” view of institutions (Chang and Evans 2005: 100) in which individuals are affected by the firm only at a superficial level.  Contract-based theories perceive the firm as a contractual arrangement by which to constrain destructive behaviour, whilst competence-based theories perceive the firm as a cognitive vessel by which to enable productive behaviour. Neither school is able to fully grasp the constitutive role of the firm in affecting behaviour at the fundamental level of social interaction. Second, the two schools remain divided and incompatible, resulting in a false segregation of production and exchange.
The chapter finally suggested that the two schools should reconsider the insights of their predecessors, which possessed a greater appreciation for the firm’s social nature and constitutive role, and were consequently better equipped to consider both production and exchange. The following chapter will develop a theory that aspires to these same qualities by bringing society ‘back in’ to the theory of the firm.

Chapter 2: Knowledge, Cooperation, and Behaviour
Towards a ‘Social’ Theory of the Firm

2.1	Introduction
The previous chapter contended that the two predominant schools of theories of the firm are critically incomplete and fundamentally incompatible due to a common neglect of the firm’s social nature. This chapter will develop a theory that appreciates this social nature by drawing on, consolidating, and building on insights from a variety of disciplines in addition to economics, including sociology, psychology, and organisational behaviour.
This ‘social theory of the firm’ agrees with competence-based theories that the purpose of the firm is to develop and apply productive knowledge. Besides being inconsistent with the activities of real-life business firms, the alternative purpose suggested by contract-based theories – namely the minimisation of transaction costs – is confined to tradable information, and is consequently unable to explain why the firm should amount to anything more than a “nexus of contracts”. However, the purpose of developing and applying productive knowledge requires the achievement of cooperation, a function that competence-based theories often overlook. Although contract-based theories emphasise cooperation, the development and application of productive knowledge requires cooperation on a ‘deeper level’ than their behavioural assumptions allow.
In order to ascertain how such cooperation arises, the social theory of the firm takes a behaviouralist perspective based on Simon’s account of bounded rationality. By combining the cognitive and relational aspects of behaviour, which are generally segregated between the two predominant schools, this perspective reveals that, contrary to contract-based theories, behaviour can be not only ‘individualistic’, comprising market-like transactions and instrumental rationality, but also ‘solidaristic’, comprising social relationships and substantive rationality. In turn, this implies that cooperation can be achieved not only on the ‘surface-level’ through organisational structures, but also on the ‘deep-level’ through organisational culture. Furthermore, these means of achieving cooperation feed back into their associated behavioural modes, revealing the ‘constitutive role’ of the firm.
In addition to cooperation, the development and application of productive knowledge also requires coordination, as emphasised by competence-based theories. Like cooperation, this function includes ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ levels, respectively involving organisational structures and organisational culture. The chapter will show that a potentially devastating trade-off exists between deep-level cooperation and surface-level coordination, if the ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘mechanistic’ organisational structures required for the latter objective are inconsistent with the solidaristic organisational culture required for the former objective. Because organisational culture mediates the behavioural impact of organisational structures, this trade-off can be overcome given the appropriate organisational culture. However, that organisational culture must be confirmed in organisational structures, giving rise to a ‘distributive dilemma’ whereby power-holders may be required to revise the very structures on which their power is based in order to achieve deep-level cooperation.




2.2	A ‘Social’ Theory of the Firm
2.2.1	Productive Knowledge and Cooperation
Contract-based theories pride themselves on explanatory rigour vis-à-vis alternative explanations of the firm, including those offered by competence-based theories. Williamson (1985: 208-9), for example, has pointed out that Adam Smith’s theory of the division of labour (which, according to Langlois and Foss [1996], laid the groundwork for competence-based theories) does not provide a sound explanation as to why production is integrated within a firm rather than performed over the market – that is, why workers inside a factory sign employment contracts rather than sell their labour (or its fruits) as independent traders. Contract-based theories attempt to answer this question by invoking the cooperation problems associated with asymmetric information and the contractual means of overcoming them, thus offering a coherent and parsimonious explanation for the existence of the firm that is allegedly lacking in competence-based theories. This explanation, however, does not satisfactorily answer the very question that Williamson posed to Adam Smith. If the underlying issue was indeed imperfect information, efficiency would require only “an association of producer-traders who pool relevant information” (Hodgson 1999: 205). Perhaps this is precisely what contract-based theories have in mind when they imagine the firm to be a mere “nexus of contracts” – but in that case, they are essentially maintaining that employees are in fact merely independent contractors continuously selling their labour through the market (or an “internal” subdivision thereof). As we saw in the previous chapter, this description of the firm is explicit in one branch of contract-based theories (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972), but even Williamson, who nominally rejects it, effectively accepts it by failing to explain behaviour in non-contractual circumstances.
As it happens, although Smith himself did not explicitly address the question of why firms exist, competence-based theories have presented explanations that are at least as convincing as those submitted by their contract-based counterparts. According to the likes of Penrose (1959), firms do not exist because of inefficiencies associated with asymmetric yet hypothetically tradable information, but rather for the very reason that many forms of productive knowledge cannot be traded over the market, even in principle – these include not only tacit knowledge and knowledge embedded within groups, but also knowledge that has not yet been created or learnt. Such knowledge must instead be harnessed within the collective organisation of the firm, a point which Joseph Stiglitz et al. (2014) have recently reiterated. Other capability theorists have similarly stressed the role of the firm in mitigating fundamental uncertainty (e.g. Knight 1921) and bounded rationality (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982), as opposed to merely asymmetric information. Besides being more theoretically sound, these explanations are more consistent with the activities of real-life businesses, which, far from passively responding to static, exogenously determined transaction costs, actively pursue organisational goals and evolve over time (Walker and Weber 1984; Monteverde and Teece 1982; Cohendet and Llerena 2005​[20]​). They do so both by developing productive knowledge (i.e. innovation, or what March [1991] has called “exploration”) and applying productive knowledge (i.e. production, or “exploitation”).
The social theory of the firm therefore agrees with competence-based theories that the purpose of the firm is to develop and apply productive knowledge. However, the previous chapter also contended that these theories do not adequately articulate the social processes by which the firm achieves this purpose. In particular, while competence-based theories tend to focus exclusively on the function of coordination, the development and application of productive knowledge also requires cooperation. In other words, the firm’s economic purpose of developing and applying productive knowledge entails a social function of achieving cooperation. 
Although cooperation is the focal point of contract-based theories, the type of cooperation they envisage is not sufficient for the development and application of productive knowledge. In the previous chapter, we saw the behavioural assumptions of these theories prevent them from explaining cooperation in non-contractual circumstances. The development and application of productive knowledge falls into this category, which is precisely why contract-based theories are unable to integrate it (see Section 1.5). Cooperation based on market-like transactions between instrumentally motivated “contractual men” (what I call ‘surface-level cooperation’) may allow for cooperation that is adequate when it comes to tradable information (and perhaps tacit knowledge that is confined to individuals, who can be made residual claimants), but is patently insufficient for non-tradable forms of knowledge, which cannot be assigned property rights or monetary value (Osterloh and Frey 2000; Polanyi 1958, 1966; Nooteboom 2009​[21]​). This is obvious for productive activities with large components of teamwork, tacit knowledge, innovation, and other sources of non-tradable knowledge, for which contractual specification and material incentives are woefully ineffective. Indeed, Williamson (1975: 56, 79; 1981: 565) concedes that when workers possess exceptionally high degrees of rarefied skill, monitoring and material rewards may be not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. In fact, however, non-tradable knowledge – and thus the insufficiency of surface-level cooperation – is ubiquitous in production. Even the most ‘deskilled’ tasks contain “some residual element of discretion” that cannot be covered in contract, controlled by managers, or ‘purchased’ from instrumentally-motivated workers​[22]​ (Fox 1974: 19-20). After all, sabotage via ‘work-to-‘rule’ has traditionally occurred primarily in assembly-line factories (Leibenstein 1982; Selznick 1969; Crozier 1964).
If surface-level cooperation is insufficient for the development and application of productive knowledge, then cooperation must be achieved on a ‘deeper level’ the behavioural assumptions of contract-based theories allow. Indeed, if the firm exists to develop and apply productive knowledge precisely because that knowledge is inherently non-contractible, as maintained by competence-based theories, then this ‘deep-level cooperation’ – which both of the predominant schools neglect – is “the very nature and rationale of organization” (Simon 1991: 33). What, then, is this ‘deep-level cooperation’, and how is it achieved? Given that the rationalist approach is incapable of providing a satisfactory answer to this question, I instead take a behaviouralist perspective based on Simon’s account of bounded rationality. I therefore follow the example set by Simon’s (1947) Administrative Behavior, March and Simon’s (1958) Organizations, and Cyert and March’s (1963) Behavioural Theory of the Firm, the latter of which was based on Simon’s (1955) Behavioural Model of Rational Choice.

2.2.2	The Cognitive and Relational Aspects of Behaviour
The behaviouralist perspective firstly reveals that behaviour includes both a cognitive aspect and a relational aspect, each of which works through a distinct channel. On the relational side of behaviour, the nature of prevailing rules and norms govern expectations of others’ behaviour. On the cognitive side, prevailing cognitive frames govern perceptions of others’ behaviour. In turn, perceptions and expectations ultimately determine behaviour. Each of the predominant schools of theories of the firm tends to focus on only one of these aspects. Contract-based theories, by assuming a predisposition towards opportunism, essentially hold cognitive frames constant, treating behaviour as a function of expectations: people are opportunistic because, based on prevailing rules and norms, they expect others to behave opportunistically. This approach characterises Williamson’s (1975) exposition of the employment relation, for example (Nooteboom 1992: 285). Competence-based theories, on the other hand, generally take expectations of cooperation as given, instead treating behavioural tendencies as a function of perceptions: people act according to their cognitive frames, through which they perceive the social world. This approach seems to characterise Nelson and Winters’ (1982) emphasis on routines, for instance. Table 2 (below) summarises this information.

School of Theories	Contract-based Theories	Competence-based Theories
Behavioural Aspect	Relational	Cognitive
Behavioural Channel	Rules and Norms	Cognitive Frames
Behavioural Determinant	Expectations	Perceptions
Table 2: Perspectives on Behaviour in the Predominant Theories of the Firm​[23]​

In reality, both aspects of behaviour – the cognitive and relational – are variable rather than fixed. On the cognitive side, a distinction can be drawn between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality (March and Olsen 1989: 23ff; Weber 1978 [1922]: 85-6​[24]​). Instrumental rationality is the “self-interest with guile” assumed by contract-based theories to prevail universally (Williamson 1975: 6); it describes the “anticipatory” motivation that prevails when interaction with others is perceived as a means to the end of individual gain (March and Olsen 1989). In contrast, substantive rationality describes the “obligatory” motivation that prevails when interaction with others is perceived as an end in itself​[25]​ (ibid.).
An equally useful distinction can be drawn on the relational side between market-like transactions and social relationships, each entailing their own set of rules and norms (Blau 1964: 91; Simmel 1964 [1917]; Selznick 1969; Fox 1971: 71-2)​[26]​. Market-like transactions, which are assumed by contract-based theories to prevail universally, exist when parties interact only in order to secure some pre-specified, extrinsic benefit. They are therefore impersonal, or at least arms-length, if not completely anonymous. The terms of the exchange are negotiated, specified, and agreed in advance, and once those terms have been satisfied, the exchange is terminated, with no future obligations expected on behalf of either party. Adherence to these terms is secured through the legal enforcement of contract rather than trust. By contrast, social relationships are personal and usually face-to-face, providing intrinsic rather than extrinsic benefits, such as group membership or social status. The responsibilities of each party are established implicitly in social norms of reciprocity rather than specified explicitly in contract. Accordingly, they are spatially and temporally diffuse, adjusting to the needs and actions of the other parties rather than being set in stone, and remaining open-ended and ongoing rather than expiring once fulfilled. Although these obligations may be enforced – whether directly through social sanctions or indirectly through reputation effects – their lack of specificity implies that some level of discretion, and therefore trust, is required for their fulfilment: parties must expect others to take initiative in discharging their obligations, even if they could benefit from reneging.
As the field of social psychology has demonstrated, the cognitive and relational aspects of behaviour are not only variable, but also interdependent: cognitive frames determine the rules and norms that emerge within socio-economic relations and are themselves constructed according to, and disseminated through, the relational environment (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1981, 1984, 2013; Hogg and Vaughan 2002; Berger and Luckmann 1967​[27]​). This interdependence is evident in the distinctions made previously within each aspect of behaviour. Market-like transactions exist to generate extrinsic benefits and are therefore perceived instrumentally, just as instrumental motivation is the defining characteristic of “contractual man” (Williamson 1985, Chapter 2). Conversely, social relationships exist to provide intrinsic benefits and are therefore perceived substantively, just as substantive rationality is a “logic of appropriateness” that implies diffuse loyalty to social norms rather than specific adherence to formal rules (March and Olsen 1989). As established by a host of sociological and organisational literatures, two archetypal behavioural modes can therefore be established (see Table 3, below), corresponding to some extent with Tönnies’ famous distinction between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. The first, which I term the ‘individualistic mode’, and which contract-based theories assume to prevail universally, comprises a relational model of market-like transactions together with a cognitive model of instrumental rationality. This mode is contrasted with the ‘solidaristic mode’, which consists of a relational model of social relationships together with a cognitive model of substantive rationality.

Behavioural Mode	Individualistic Mode	Solidaristic Mode
Relational Aspect	Market-like Transactions	Social Relationships
Cognitive Aspect	Instrumental Rationality	Substantive rationality
Table 3: Archetypal Behavioural Modes

2.2.3	Means of Cooperation
	Each of these behavioural modes requires a different means for achieving cooperation. When the individualistic mode is active, the firm achieves cooperation on what I call the ‘surface-level’. This involves implementing organisational structures such as property rights and management systems that constrain individualistic behaviour by influencing the opportunities and incentives of alternative strategies, such as shirking versus working or holding up versus investing. When the solidaristic mode is active, by contrast, the firm achieves cooperation on the ‘deep-level’. This involves establishing an organisational culture, comprising a shared set of cooperative norms and cognitive frames that enable solidaristic behaviour by fostering trust and loyalty.
Theories of organisational culture, popularised by Peter and Waterman’s (1982) book In Search of Excellence​[28]​, tend to fall on one of two extremes, treating the concept as either as an ethereal ‘force’ that can only be described in vague, abstract language, or a well-defined variable that can be precisely measured​[29]​. In order to pinpoint exactly what organisational culture is, it is helpful to consider the cognitive and relational aspects of behaviour in turn. On the cognitive side, organisational culture purports to channel substantive rationality into organisational loyalty such that individuals subordinate their immediate interests to those of ‘the common good’ and so “accept…responsibilities beyond any specific contracted function” (Parson and Smelser 1956: 116​[30]​). It does so by providing a common set of values, objectives, or principles through which individuals perceive their social environment, including their relations with the firm and those within it (Smircich 1983; Weick 1979; Harris 1994). On the relational side, organisational culture purports to instil trust into social relationships so that individuals expect others to act according to organisational loyalty. This may involve the use of common slogans, symbols, and rituals (Schein 1992; Islam and Zyphur 2006; Kogut and Zander 1992).
If deep-level cooperation is “the very nature and rationale of organization”, as argued above, then organisational culture is an inherent feature of the firm (Simon 1991: 33). Of course, firms may contain sub-cultures spread across distinct groups (Schein 1992; Deal and Kennedy 2000). This can have adverse effects on cooperation, for example if groups relate to each other antagonistically or pursue their own ‘sub-goals’ that diverge from the firm’s own goals (Ravasi and Schultz 2006; March and Simon 1958, Chapter 5; Cyert and March 1963, Chapter 3). On the other hand, it may be beneficial for the firm, if it avoids some of the debilitating consequences of a strong organisational culture, such as group-think and an incapacity for innovation (Nooteboom 2009; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2012; Morgan 2006: 208-11). In any case, however, the firm must convince all of its members that “at some level objectives are shared and that disagreement over subgoals can be mediated by reference to common goals” (March and Simon 1958: 129, emphasis added). Thus, just as individual behaviour involves relational and cognitive aspects, so too organisational behaviour involves a relational aspect (viz., organisational structures) and a cognitive aspect (viz., organisational culture).
This is not to say that surface-level cooperation is unimportant. In fact, without some degree of surface-level cooperation, deep-level cooperation may be unattainable. As Maslow (1943) famously postulated in his “hierarchy of needs”, workers can only activate their ‘higher’ motivations once their individual, basic, material needs have been met (see also Sheldon and Kasser 2000, 2008; Kasser et al. 2004). Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990: 136-8) note that the Japanese practices of seniority-based promotion (nenko) and lifetime employment demonstrate this principle. Although these structures can be interpreted from an ‘internal labour markets’ perspective (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Cole 1971, Chapter 4; 1979, Chapter 1; Lazear 1979), in that they tie workers’ material aspirations to the firm through a “continuous and reliable flow of increments in pay and status”, the authors find that Japanese workers in fact attach lower priority to both pay and promotions than American workers. It is therefore more plausible that these systems are effective in eliciting commitment precisely because they take material concerns ‘off the table’. That is, by providing stability of employment and certainty of pay, they allow workers to focus their attention on social relationships and intrinsic rewards, thus making deep-level cooperation possible. 
Table 4 (below) summarises the distinction between the two ‘levels’ of cooperation.

Behavioural Mode	Individualistic Mode	Solidaristic Mode
Level of Cooperation	Surface-level	Deep-level
Purpose of Cooperation	Constrain individualistic behaviour	Enable solidaristic behaviour
Means of Cooperation​[31]​	Organisational structures (e.g. management systems and property rights)	Organisational culture (trust and loyalty)
Table 4: Levels of Cooperation

2.2.4	The Endogeneity of Behaviour
We have established that the firm does not merely constrain individualistic behaviour through organisational structures, but also enables solidaristic behaviour through organisational culture. The role of the firm, however, is more profound still. According to the behaviouralist perspective, individuals are not fully pre-determined (to be either individualistic or solidaristic), but rather contain a range of possible ‘selves’ (Simon 1957; Elster 1987). This is evident in the work of Adam Smith, who, despite referring repeatedly in The Wealth of Nations to “a certain propensity in human nature… to truck, barter, and exchange” and assuming that “the butcher, the brewer, [and] the baker” all perform their jobs out of purely instrumental motivation (1904 [1776], Book I, Chapter 2, paras. 1 and 2), opens The Theory of Moral Sentiments with the statement: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (1790 [1759], Section I.I.1). As confirmed by the findings of social psychology​[32]​, which self is manifested depends on the social and institutional context. According to Berger and Luckmann (1967: 158), moreover, the workplace is “secondary” only to upbringing in its capacity to effect this “socialization”, which they define as “the internalization of institutional or institution-based ‘sub-worlds’”. Indeed, in The Wealth of Nations Smith (1904 [1776], Book V, Chapter 1, para. 178) himself acknowledged that “the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments”, referring to changes in workers’ “sentiment[s]” and “social…virtues”. Far from passively ‘making do’ with given patterns of behaviour, the firm is therefore able to “constitute” the relational and cognitive foundations of behaviour (Hodgson 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Hodgson and Knudsen 2004; Chang and Evans 2005)​[33]​. It does so through both its organisational structures and organisational culture.
By providing a common set of social norms and cognitive frames, organisational culture achieves deep-level cooperation not only by harnessing solidaristic behaviour, but also by generating that behaviour (Kogut and Zander 1996: 502-3). Durkheim (1893) thus contended that the division of labour involves a transformation of identity, capable of inducing solidaristic behaviour. Building on the work of utopian socialists like Proudhon and G. D. H. Cole, Carole Pateman​[34]​ (1970) similarly considered the workplace to be the most crucial means of stimulating democratic attitudes and abilities within society. Several case studies support this “spillover thesis”​[35]​. On the cognitive side, organisational culture may emphasise the intrinsic rewards of work in order to stimulate substantive rationality, and thus organisational loyalty (Deci 1975). In Japanese firms, for example, rituals such as company songs purport to induce this effect (Rohlen 1974). On the relational side, organisational culture can cultivate social relationships when obligations on behalf of both workers and managers are broad and undefined, leaving room for initiative, teamwork, and reciprocity (Fox 1974). This is again borne out in Japanese firms, wherein managers maintain personal, paternalistic relationships with subordinates by looking out for their welfare and interacting with them informally outside of the workplace. In turn, workers are expected to contribute ideas and work unsupervised in quality circles (Clark 1979; Yoshino 1971; Dore 1973).
Organisational structures also play a constitutive role in both the cognitive and relational components of behaviour. On the cognitive side, structures such as intensive monitoring systems and extensive incentive schemes fuilfl their own assumption of instrumental rationality to the neglect of organisational loyalty (Moschandreas 1997; Bowles 1985; Nooteboom 2009: 79) – a tension that Max Weber (1978 [1922]) recognised when he surmised that bureaucratic organisations would stimulate “formal rationality” at the expense of “substantive” or “value rationality”. Indeed, both psychological and economic research has demonstrated that an overemphasis on extrinsic rewards may ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivations surrounding work and the workplace​[36]​. Titmuss’ (1970) seminal study, which found that the commercialisation of blood donation caused donations to critically decrease because individuals had previously donated out of a sense of duty or altruism, is the most famous example of this effect, which also pertains to intensive monitoring​[37]​.
As for the relational dimension, organisational structures have the potential to alter expectations by replacing social relationships with market-like transactions. Extensive specification of obligations and intensive enforcement of compliance can form a “straightjacket” around intra-firm relationships, limiting the very discretion that allows for reciprocity, and therefore trust (Nooteboom 2009: 13, 42 94). This occurs not only by impeding vertical and horizontal communication, but also by making individuals feel that they are not trusted to carry out their minimal duties, let alone expected to take initiative beyond their formal obligations – a perception that will eventually become self-fulfilling (Fox 1974: 27-8, 74​[38]​). This process can be observed in the rise of the employment contract, which, broadly coinciding with the implementation of the minute divisions of labour and hierarchical management structures characteristic of the factory system, purported to transmute the diffuse obligations of the master-servant relationship into a purely transactional arrangement (Selznick 1969). Although the employment contract retained much of the master-servant relationship, as Coase (1937) recognised, it did so asymmetrically in that the employee’s extra-contractual obligations outweigh those of the employer (Bowles and Gintis 1993). The result of this “imbalance of reciprocity” has been a “downward spiral of distrust”, as reflected in the parallel rise of trade unionism​[39]​ (Fox 1974: 98-9, 188). In his comparison to the Japanese firm Hitachi, for example, Dore (1973: 199) observed this dynamic at play in the British firm English Electric.




Although deep-level cooperation is “the very nature and rationale of organization” (Simon, 1991: 33), the development and application of productive knowledge also requires coordination, as competence-based theories have stressed; it is not enough for workers to be motivated to do their jobs, if those jobs are not appropriately organised. Like cooperation, coordination can be divided between the ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ levels. On the one hand, each individual task must be appropriately specified and synchronised with other tasks. Organisational structures – in particular, complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems​[41]​ – may serve to provide this ‘surface-level coordination’, for instance by controlling information flows, allocating skills and resources, and diversifying risk across subgroups (Chandler 1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981; Simon 1962; Knight 1921; Nooteboom 2009: 13). However, surface-level coordination may be insufficient for innovation or for adaptation to unforeseen social, economic, or technological changes, which require learning, initiative, and teamwork beyond what is stipulated by existing organisational structures (Cameron and Quinn 1999; Clark and Wilson 1961; Etzioni 1961). In these cases, coordination will be required on the ‘deep-level’ of organisational culture, which provides a set of objectives towards which members of the firm can direct their efforts. Divisions of labour and management systems may therefore be less rigid and bureaucratic in order to allow for informal interaction (Burns and Stalker 1961; Arygris 1957, 1964; Aoki 1984, 1986, 1990). 
Alas, cooperation and coordination do not perfectly coincide on either of the two levels. For example, the individualistic behaviour involved in surface-level cooperation may encumber surface-level coordination, if individuals cannot be relied upon to perform the tasks assigned to them. Similarly, achieving trust and loyalty (deep-level cooperation) may come at the price of “cognitive variety”, thus hampering innovation (deep-level coordination), just as the heterogeneity of members of the firm (for instance in terms of preferences and skills) may benefit deep-level coordination but complicate deep-level cooperation (Nooteboom 2009; Ravasi and Schultz 2006; Granovetter 1973). Deep-level coordination and deep-level cooperation may also come into conflict if the former requires some form of leadership that contradicts the firm’s organisational culture. Certain features of Japanese firms can be understood as means of overcoming these ‘deep-level dilemmas’: while semi-autonomous work groups protect against group-think, cooperative organisational cultures are based on respect for superiors. In short, there may be intra-level, inter-functional trade-offs, as depicted in Figure 1 (below).

Figure 1: Intra-level, Inter-functional Trade-offs

In general, however, the means of achieving coordination overlap with the means of achieving cooperation: on the surface level, both functions require “mechanistic” forms of organisation, based on organisational structures, while on the deep level, both functions require more “organic” forms of organisation, based on organisational culture. This is unproblematic, and even convenient, if an organisation purports to operate primarily on only one of the two levels, as would appear to be the case with Burns and Stalker’s (1961) “mechanistic” and “organic” organisations. The former, for example, might resemble a traditional factory, with foremen not only enforcing compliance (surface-level cooperation) but also ensuring the smooth functioning of the production process (surface-level coordination), while the latter may apply to small-scale, craft-based production or ICTs (Woodward 1965; Blauner 1964; Touraine 1955; Piore and Sabel 1984).
Critical dilemmas emerge, however, when an organisation purports to operate on both levels simultaneously. On the one hand, such dilemmas are evident within each function. We have already seen, for instance, that the organisational structures purporting to achieve surface-level cooperation may in fact stimulate individualistic behaviour, thus precluding deep-level cooperation. An equivalent dilemma between surface- and deep-level coordination is drawn by Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973), who argue that while stability is required for the application of productive knowledge (what March [1991] calls “exploitation”), the bureaucratic organisational structures thus involved may hamper the flexibility required for the development of productive knowledge (“exploration”). If this dilemma is the most crucial one facing firms, then the ‘holy grail’ of organisation is to become “ambidextrous” in coordination (Duncan 1976; see also March 1991; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). The distinctive features of Japanese firms can be interpreted from this perspective. For example, semi-autonomous work groups (including ‘quality circles’) allow for flexibility and creativity even though individual tasks are highly prescribed and management systems arranged hierarchically (Gjerding 1992; Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1999; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). In short, there may be inter-level, intra-functional trade-offs, as depicted in Figure 2 (below).

Figure 2: Inter-level, Intra-functional Trade-offs

However, intra-functional trade-offs are only part of the story. Consider Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek’s (1973) “flexibility-stability dilemma”, which Gjerding (1992) restates as one between “persistence in the pursuit of organisational goals” and “the need for change in the pursuit of organisational survival”. Although these two options are treated as features of surface- and deep-level coordination, both in fact appear to reside on the deep level, given that they both stem from organisational culture. What seems to be missing, as is often the case in competence-based theories, is the importance of cooperation in the development and application of productive knowledge. This same omission is apparent in Aoki’s (1990: 18) own analysis of Japanese firms, in which he refers to “comply[ing] with managerial authority” – clearly a form of cooperation – under the heading of “coordination”. 
When both coordination and cooperation are considered, it becomes clear that the most crucial dilemmas pertain when firms attempt to achieve coordination on one level and cooperation on the other (see Figure 3, below). One such inter-level, inter-functional trade-off pertains to surface-level cooperation and deep-level coordination. For example, Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek’s dilemma can be modified to state that, while the formalisation of roles and responsibilities, centralisation of authority, and enforcement of rules may be required for the application of productive knowledge by providing conformity and predictability (surface-level cooperation), they may impede its development by constraining initiative and creativity (deep-level coordination) (Gjerding 1992: 98-101). This particular trade-off helps to explain why the “heterogeneity of knowledge, preferences and behaviors” in contract-based theories represents a source of opportunism, which the firm will attempt to minimise, but in competence-based theories represents a source of learning and innovation, which the firm will attempt to cultivate (Langlois and Foss 1996: 30). 
However, given that deep-level cooperation is “the very nature and rationale of organisation” (Simon 1991: 33), I maintain that the most critical dilemma is between deep-level cooperation and surface-level coordination. Specifically, the ‘mechanistic’ or ‘bureaucratic’ structures required to achieve surface-level coordination (such as highly partitioned divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems) may stimulate individualistic behaviour, thus undermining deep-level cooperation. Indeed, this trade-off may be so critical that it competes with, or at least supplements, other answers to the perennial question of why firms do not expand indefinitely, such as the proliferation of ‘bureaucratic costs’ (Coase 1937: 394-8; Williamson 1985, Chapter 6; Mahoney 1992). As the firm expands, and as production becomes more complex, the trade-off becomes more acute, because surface-level coordination becomes increasingly essential while organisational culture becomes increasingly difficult to maintain (Kogut and Zander 1996: 511-2; Nooteboom 2009: 15). The range of theoretical and empirical literature implying that the size of the firm is correlated with either the degree of worker alienation (e.g. Blauner 1964, Indik 1963; Ingham 1970) or the fomentation of class consciousness (e.g. Phillips 1985-6; Kerr and Siegel 1954; Shorter and Tilly 1974), to the neglect of organisational trust and loyalty, is germane​[42]​.

Figure 3: Inter-level, Inter-functional Trade-offs

Given the criticality of the trade-off between deep-level cooperation and surface-level coordination, overcoming it – that is, fulfilling both functions simultaneously – can be considered the ‘holy grail’ of organisation. However, to fully grasp the coordination/cooperation trade-off and how it can be overcome, we must further investigate the relationship between organisational structures and organisational culture. So far, for the purpose of exposition, a crude distinction has been made whereby organisational structures are associated with individualistic behaviour while organisational culture is associated with solidaristic behaviour. In reality, however, organisational structures and organisational culture work in concert to influence behaviour.

2.3.2	Cultural Contingency and Bureaucratic Control
First of all, the behavioural influence of organisational structures is mediated by organisational culture. Empirical work in both economics and psychology has confirmed that what matters for behaviour is not whether a certain structure prevails, but how it is interpreted by workers (Akerlof and Kranton 2008). This interpretation, in turn, is conditioned by what organisational scholars call “work values”, which include the prioritisation of leisure time, the intrinsic value afforded to work, preferences for autonomy and other job characteristics, career aspirations, expectations of rewards, any other cognitive frame through which individuals perceive their relations with the firm (Vroom 1964; Blood and Hulin 1967; Turner and Lawrence 1965​[43]​). Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) thus refer to work values as “software of the mind”, acting to mediate the behavioural impact of organisational ‘hardware’ – that is, organisational structures. Given the constitutive role of the firm, organisational culture is bound to significantly influence (and even ‘constitute’) these values (Fox 1974: 68, 96-7). As Berger and Luckmann (1967: 158) contend, the “institutional or institution-based ‘sub-worlds’” that individuals occupy are “socially constructed” realities supported by “a legitimating apparatus, often accompanied by ritual or material symbols” – that is, an organisational culture. The cognitive aspect of organisational behaviour (organisational culture) therefore mediates the relational aspect (organisational structures). 
This notion of “cultural contingency” (thus called in the literature because the behavioural impact of a given structure is “contingent” on culture) may help to resolve the contradictory assertions found in the literature regarding the behavioural impact of ‘bureaucratic’ structures. On the one hand, organisational sociologists espousing the thesis of ‘bureaucratic alienation’ maintain that that the formalisation, standardisation, and rationalisation of the division of labour and management system lead inexorably to a state of alienation and antagonism (Blau and Scott 1962; Blauner 1964; Child 1984). On the other hand, Marxian and Weberian commentators espousing the thesis of ‘bureaucratic control’ maintain that such structural characteristics need not undermine deep-level cooperation, and may even reinforce it by legitimising authority (Edwards 1979; Edwards, Gordon, and Reich 1975; Burawoy 1983​[44]​)​[45]​. In reality, which of these eventualities is borne out depends on the firm’s organisational culture, thus implying that, given the appropriate organisational culture, the ‘mechanistic’ structures required for surface-level coordination need not crowd out the solidaristic behaviour required for deep-level cooperation. Durkheim (1893), who arguably pioneered the concept of organisational culture (Lincoln and Guillot 2004), acknowledged this when he argued that the “anomie” often resulting from specialisation and differentiation can be overcome through “regulation” that convinces workers that their role is of crucial importance to the working of the system. Indeed, Durkheim insisted that as the division of labour evolved, a new “organic” type of solidarity could emerge, socially superior to the “mechanistic” type that prevailed amidst more primitive divisions of labour.
Japanese firms present an enlightening example of cultural contingency. At first glance, they seem to present a paradox, whereby highly bureaucratic structures such as tall, narrow hierarchies and highly partitioned divisions of labour coexist with an exceptional degree of deep-level cooperation (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Dore 1973; Cole 1971, 1979). This feat is made possible by an organisational culture that emphasises conformity to the group, the prestige of formal rank, and respect for authority, reinforced through symbols and rituals such as company songs and group exercise sessions (Rohlen 1974). Consequently, Lincoln and colleagues (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Lincoln, Hanada, and Olson 1981) observe that whereas American workers in their samples tended to react negatively to structural characteristics such as formalisation, vertical differentiation of management, and regular, close contact with supervisors, the opposite was the case for Japanese workers. Dore (1973: 261-2) similarly noted that although “work at Hitachi is more minutely prescribed and regulated…than at English Electric”, “Hitachi workers are more likely to express a sense of pride in their work” as they “more easily accept the firm’s legitimacy: English Electric workers are more likely to see it as a system of exploitation…” The consequent ability of Japanese firms to overcome the cooperation/coordination trade-off may explain why Ouchi deemed that they did not fit within either McGregor’s (1960) managerial dichotomy of “Theory X” and “Theory Y” (analogous to Burns and Stalker’s [1961] “organic” and “mechanistic” organisations) or Williamson’s (1975) transactional dichotomy of “markets and hierarchies”, instead representing a third category – what he called “Theory Z” (1981) or “clans” (1980). It may also explain why radicals have fervently scorned them (along with the diffusion of some of their organisational structures abroad), considering them a means of ‘bureaucratic control’ aimed at substituting organisational loyalty for occupational loyalty (e.g. Grenier 1988​[46]​).
While cultural contingency implies that bureaucratic organisational structures need not elicit individualistic behaviour, by the same token it implies that ‘organic’ structures may fail to elicit deep-level cooperation if they are not accompanied by, or do not succeed in supporting, an appropriate organisational culture. Leibenstein (1987: 203, emphasis in original) therefore states that, in reference to the Japanese practice of ‘lifetime employment’, “what matters [for behaviour] is not whether there is lifetime employment, in fact, in all cases (or even in most), but that there is a lifetime employment ideal that is part of a larger set of expectations that exists within the enterprise”. This is a relevant point given that lifetime employment, along with other benefits such as welfare services, are in fact only offered to a core cadre of workers (Kamata 1982). Transplantations of isolated structures from Japanese firms to other countries, meanwhile, have generally failed to elicit solidaristic behaviour to the extent observed in Japan (Hill 1986; Bradley and Hill 1987; Fucini and Fucini 1990).

2.3.3	Structural Consistency and the Distributive Dilemma
While organisational culture mediates the behavioural impact of organisational structures, it must also be confirmed in organisational structures. Ultimately, individuals will only espouse a cognitive frame or relational norm if it is borne out in practice (Kogut and Zander 1996). The cognitive aspect of organisational behaviour (culture) therefore relies on the relational aspect (structures). Geertz (1973) analogously argued that “cultural systems” must always be rooted in “social systems”. This requirement of ‘structural consistency’​[47]​ implies, on the one hand, that organisational structures can support not only surface- but also deep-level cooperation. This in turn raises the possibility that the cooperation/coordination trade-off can be transcended by reforming only a subset of the manifold structures of the firm in order to substantiate an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, while retaining the bureaucratic structures required for surface-level coordination. In the bureaucratic control model, for instance, managers secure commitment by providing welfare services and promotional opportunities even while retaining a complex division of labour and a hierarchical management system.
Japanese firms feature an interesting variation of this model, in which the bureaucratic structures are themselves altered in order to achieve structural consistency. Although individual tasks are often highly prescribed, individual jobs often contain significant amounts of discretion, as workers operate within semi-autonomous production teams, rotate between tasks, and train in multiple competencies (Gjerding 1992: 106; Lincoln 1990; Aoki 1990). Furthermore, the practice of seniority-based promotion (nenko) allows a worker’s role in the firm to be broader than even their job. In the nenko system, remuneration, status, and advancement depend more on seniority and age than on productive or managerial roles, which can remain unchanged as an employee advances within the company (Clark 1979). As Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990: 95) note, “this decoupling of responsibility and status allows the organization to reward seniority (loyalty), while nonetheless allocating tasks on the basis of competence” – in other words, to achieve both deep-level cooperation and surface-level coordination.
In fact, the nenko system is only part of a broader set of structures in Japanese firms pertaining to managerial hierarchies that help to achieve structural consistency. Although managerial hierarchies are ‘tall’ with narrow spans of control, they are also finely graded, with managers participating directly in the work process rather than merely supervising, thus reducing the distance and blurring the distinction between workers and managers (Cole 1971​[48]​). Furthermore, pay levels vary little within the hierarchy, and even low-level workers enjoy benefits such as welfare services and lifetime employment. Additionally, senior managers are appointed from within the workforce, and belong to the same unions – which are delimited by organisation rather than occupation – as shop-floor workers. All of these features encourage workers to perceive managers as morale-building ‘leaders’ rather than overbearing ‘bosses’, and managers to perceive themselves as “elders of a corporate community” rather than representatives of shareholders (Dore 1973: 260). A solidaristic organisational culture that tolerates complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems is therefore substantiated in organisational structures. This is lucidly demonstrated in the contrast between the core of large Japanese firms, which feature potentially alienating mass production methods but nevertheless achieve prestige amongst their workforce by implementing the organisational structures discussed here, and the periphery of small firms, which, because they do not implement those structures, fail to achieve such prestige even while utilising production and management methods that would appear to be less alienating (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 220-4; Vogel 1963).
On the other hand, structural consistency entails somewhat of a ‘catch-22’: in order to achieve deep-level cooperation, those who have the power to design organisational structures may paradoxically be required to revise the very structures that sustain their power. Words are cheap – appeals to organisational trust and loyalty, even combined with some structural concessions, will be ineffective if they are not reflected in the structures that really determine ‘who controls whom’.  The division of labour and the management system (often identified by Marxians to contain the essence of power within the firm) are germane, as is the ownership structure (favoured by those in the neoclassical tradition, including the ‘New Institutional Economics’) (see Ellerman 1992; Putterman 1988, 1989). If workers are not granted rewarding jobs, participation in decision-making, or share in ownership – that is, unless the power structure is altered – other structural reforms will be insufficient to fulfil the structural consistency required for deep-level cooperation. Pateman (1970: 68-72) thus argued that schemes purporting to achieve worker consent on decisions already made by management – what she called “pseudo participation” – were unlikely to elicit a positive behavioural response. Willmott (1993: 532) has similarly pointed out that organisational culture cannot elicit non-instrumental/non-transactional behavior if it is itself perceived as ultimately a means to the end of corporate performance. In fact, these tactics may even backfire if individualistic workers use any marginal increases in workplace discretion or participation in governance to shirk, hold-up, or make unreasonably cumbersome demands. In short, managers cannot have their cake (by fully retaining their power) and eat it too (by achieving deep-level cooperation). Fox (1974: 356), who variously refers to this ‘distributive dilemma’ as “swallowing the sugar and spitting out the pill” (ibid.: 237) and “enjoy[ing] the best of both worlds” (ibid.: 238), expresses it thus:
“Were ‘social reality’, as men perceive it, to be assimilated somewhat closer to that envisaged in the rhetoric of social democracy and the pluralist society, the possibility might begin to emerge of an economic system still based on extreme division of labour which nevertheless generated a higher level of trust than does the present one. Changes in men’s perceptions of the society they live and work in can bring significant changes in how they respond to it. The fate of managerial ideology shows us, however, that to try to induce men to see their world through a frame of reference which does not tally with their observations and experience is unlikely to lay a firm foundation of confidence.”
The distributive dilemma helps to explain why not all firms achieve high levels of deep-level cooperation, despite its benefits (see Ben-Ner, Montias, and Neuberger 1993; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Putterman 1993). Fox (1974, Chapter 4; see also Brody 1980) mentions the largely unsuccessful “industrial welfare movement” that emerged in Great Britain during the Industrial Revolution, whereby managerial exhortations of trust and loyalty were combined with only superficial structural revisions (such as better cloakrooms and canteens) with the division of labour, management system, and ownership structure remaining essentially inviolate. The same pattern was evident in the subsequent ‘human relations’ paradigm with its emphasis on ‘job enrichment’ programmes to the neglect of more radical changes, in addition to initiatives by employers to let workers air grievances that did not concede any real deicision-making power (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 150). “Corporate culturalism”, which professes to confer ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-determination’ to the individual worker, is the most recent managerial approach purporting to elicit deep-level cooperation from workers while keeping the underlying power structure in tact (Willmott 1993​[49]​). Employee Stock Ownership Programmes (ESOPs), meanwhile, have produced “mixed and contingent” results on factors like productivity, motivation, and organisational commitment (Freeman 2007: 15). Most notably, their effects depend tremendously on whether they consist of merely stock options or are accompanied by real participation in governance (United States General Accounting Office 1987​[50]​).
The relationship between the level of participation and the net benefits of achieving deep-level cooperation accruing to power-holders can be elaborated (see Figure 4, below). We have seen that cosmetic structural changes that do not significantly alter the power structure, such as job enrichment programmes, will generate no increases in deep-level cooperation if workers can ‘see through’ them. Thus, in the figure, the total benefits of deep-level cooperation do not initially increase with participation, and do not outweigh the loss of power thus incurred until participation has reached a certain threshold (‘a’ in the figure). At intermediate levels of structural change (between levels ‘a’ and ‘c’ in the figure) – which may approximate the European ‘codetermination’ systems, for example – the relationship is likely to be curvilinear from the perspective of power-holders: increasingly substantial benefits of deep-level cooperation are discounted by an increasingly substantial loss in power. If power-holders maximise the benefits of deep-level cooperation that accrue to them, they will therefore choose a level of participation that corresponds to ‘b’ in the figure.​[51]​. However, while further structural changes beyond this point would be unprofitable for power-holders, the total benefits of deep-level cooperation would still increase, meaning that some degree of deep-level cooperation will be left untapped. Indeed, at some critical level of structural change (‘c’ in the figure), the power structure would be completely overhauled; for instance, increases in worker discretion or participation may eventually obviate the monitoring role of management, while concessions in ownership may eventually spell outright worker control. Power-holders will obviously not cross this Rubicon, because the benefits of deep-level cooperation generated by doing so would not accrue to them – indeed, they would no longer be power-holders (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 150). 

Figure 4: The Distributive Dilemma​[52]​

Managers may attempt to avoid this dilemma by drawing on cultural values that legitimise the status-quo, such as rationality and formality in the case of the ‘bureaucratic control’ thesis or autonomy and self-determination in the current ‘corporate culture’ paradigm, thus altering the very “definition of power and interests” (Friedland and Alford 1991: 246, quoted in Chang and Evans 2005: 108). This ‘cultural manipulation’ amounts to a ‘steepening’ of the ‘Total Benefits of Deep-level Cooperation’ curve, so that higher degrees of deep-level cooperation can be elicited at lower levels of participation (see Figure 5, below). The degree of participation at which the difference between the two curves is maximised thus moves to the left from ‘b’ to ‘b prime’, resulting in a lower loss of power for any given degree of deep-level cooperation.

Figure 5: Cultural Manipulation

This strategy has undoubtedly enjoyed great success. For example, pay differentials usually reflect social norms of appropriateness rather than differences in skill or training costs (Wootton 1955: 66)​[53]​. Chang (2011a: 148-156) shows that the average pay of a CEO in the United States relative to the average worker has increased tenfold since the 1960s, while workers’ wages have barely changed at all. Consequently, the average remuneration of an American CEO is now up to four-hundred times that of the average American worker, and up to twenty times that of CEOs in other countries. Chang argues that such inequalities cannot be explained purely by ‘market forces’, but are rather the result of the inordinate degree of power that managers enjoy, within both corporations and governments. Moreover, according to Chang, managers have forestalled widespread outcry over this state of affairs by successfully “spread[ing] the free-market ideology that says that whatever exists must be there because it is the most efficient” (ibid.: 155). However, while such legitimisation strategies can mitigate the need for structural reform, they cannot altogether eliminate it. Wage gaps, for instance, have recently become subject to public scrutiny, with executive bonuses (especially in the financial sector) generally perceived as excessive and unfair. In Switzerland, for example, a motion to impose a maximum pay differential of 1:12 recently went to referendum.
Ultimately, then, deep-level cooperation – and the ability to maintain it alongside surface-level coordination – will be reflected in the power structure. For example, consider the argument that the distinctive organisational structures of Japanese firms (such as job rotation, participatory decision-making, and bonus systems) are means of maintaining ‘bureaucratic control’ that conceal the real distribution of power (e.g. Grenier 1988​[54]​). Cole’s (1971, 1979) analysis that Japanese managers successfully invoked traditional values of paternalism and loyalty in order to substitute organisational loyalty for occupational loyalty resonates with these criticisms. However, other commentators argue that while de jure authority is highly centralised in Japanese firms, de facto authority is highly diffused, with managers constrained by the consent of workers (Dore 1979; Clark 1979; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 237-41). Some even argue that Japanese firms are, for all intents and purposes, worker-controlled, in that they are effectively run in the interest of their workers (Yoshino 1971; Vogel 1975; Itami 1988; Urabe, Child, and Kagono 1988). They contend, for example, that the ringi system of decision-making, whereby lower-level workers and managers draft proposals that are then ratified by higher-level managers and executives, is not merely a form of Pateman’s “pseudo participation” designed to legitimise executive authority; on the contrary, the ‘top brass’ serve a merely symbolic role by legitimising proposals from lower levels, which coheres with an organisational culture based on formality and seniority.
This contention finds support in the lack of remunerative variation between managers and workers, which leads Dore (1973: 269) to conclude in his comparison of Hitachi and English Electric that “it does not seem that the effect of Hitachi’s greater paternalism is to brainwash the Hitachi workers into a less critical acceptance of the inequalities which exist”. It is also supported by the fact that managers are usually appointed from within the enterprise after gradually progressing through the incremental promotion system from the entry level, which prompts Dore (1973: 265) to rhetorically ask: if “the Japanese system is a hypocritically devious form of exploitation by paternalism”, then “who, exactly, is conning whom?” The ownership structure is also germane: although banks own large proportions of the firms’ shares, they intervene in the affairs of management only during crisis situations – unlike in conventional capitalist corporations, wherein equity investors directly appoint the management board (Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Berglof 1989; Sheard 1989). Meanwhile, a sophisticated bonus system (along with some outright profit-sharing) allows workers to share in the company’s profits (Leibenstein 1987: 212; Itami 1988; Freeman and Weitzman 1986). As a result, the profit motive is at least partially subordinated to the interests of workers (Aoki 1988, Chapter 5; 1990: 14-22). Finally, the notion that the ability of Japanese firms to overcome the cooperation/coordination dilemma is reflected in the power structure seems to be confirmed by the observation that transplantations of Japanese organisational structures (especially quality circles) that leave the power structure in tact have failed to yield the anticipated behavioural outcomes (Hill 1986; Bradley and Hill 1987; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 82-3).

2.4	The Firm as a Social Institution
By appreciating the importance of solidaristic behaviour, organisational culture, and deep-level cooperation, the social theory of the firm follows March and Simon’s (1958: 21-2) emphasis – and indeed, that of virtually all of the predecessors of contemporary theories of the firm discussed in Section 1.6 – on the importance of firms as social institutions. The firm is social because it features not only ‘individualistic’ but also ‘solidaristic’ behaviour, and it is an institution because it is based the dual properties of interdependence and repeated interaction between its members: while Simon (1991: 33) has noted that interdependence is “the very nature and rationale of organization”, Stinchcombe (1965: 142) has defined organisation as a “set of stable social relations…with the explicit intention of continuously accomplishing some specific goals or purposes”. What distinguishes the firm from other social institutions is that its “goals or purposes” are specifically productive, in that it purports to cultivate productive knowledge. Thus, the firm can be defined as a social institution dedicated to production.
 By harking back to the ‘roots’ of the theory of the firm (see Section 1.6), this definition improves on those offered by the predominant schools in several ways (see Gruchy 1987; Lawson 2015; Putterman 1988). Contract-based theories of the firm, which define the firm as a “nexus of contracts”​[55]​ between “contractual men” (Williamson 1985, Chapter 2), view interdependency and repeated interaction as purely the source of cooperation problems. In measurement-cost varieties, production involving interdependencies between workers over time (“a team use of inputs” or “team production”) induces shirking by precluding the measurement of individual contributions (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 778), while in asset-specificity varieties, assets involving interdependencies between investors over time (“specific assets”) induce hold-up by precluding costless exit (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). Williamson (1985: 71-2), whose work spans both of these branches, explicitly identifies the “recurrent” and “relational” features of intra-firm exchange, which impede comprehensive specification and enforcement of contracts, as the source of opportunism. In reality, however, repeated interaction and interdependence – and thus contractual incompleteness – are intrinsic to the development and application of productive knowledge (Simon 1991: 33; Teece and Pisano 1993: 540; Valentinov 2004; Cartier 1994). Consequently, situations characterised by these features are precisely those in which the firm must achieve deep-level cooperation. They are, moreover, precisely the circumstances in which the firm can most effectively exercise its ability to constitute the cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour. Because members of a firm interact intensively for long periods of time on a predictable and face-to-face basis, sharing common skills, experiences, and interests, they are auspiciously situated to be influenced by the firm at a fundamental level​[56]​. 
To grasp the importance of this, consider the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, the most generic game-theoretic representation of cooperation problems. The standard interpretation of the dilemma – that players will inevitably choose to ‘defect’ rather than cooperate – is based on two critical assumptions: first, that participants are unable to communicate with each other before making their decisions; and second, that the game is played only once. If these assumptions are relaxed – which they should be when considering the firm, in which interaction is repeated and based on interdependencies – individuals may learn about each other’s behaviour, thus facilitating trust, and internalise each other’s worldviews, thus facilitating loyalty (Taylor 1987; Axelrod 1984; Gintis et al. 2005​[57]​). Indeed, although confined to a footnote, even Mancur Olson (1971: 62), the pioneer of the collective action problem, admits that “affective groups such as family and friendship groups could normally be studied much more usefully with entirely different sorts of theories, since the analysis used in this study does not shed much light on these groups”. As a social institution, the firm also has the potential to manifest this “affective” component by cultivating social relationships and substantive rationality. Indeed, Tönnies (1955: 223, quoted in Fox 1974: 214) noted that the elements of society demonstrating gemeinschaft included not only kinship, neighbourhood, and friendship, but also communities “of spirit and mind based on common work or calling and thus common beliefs”, including firms. In this regard, the assumption that only individualistic behaviour prevails within the firm should be just as controversial as Becker’s (1981) treatment of family decisions as merely the result of economic cost-benefit calcluations.
In fact, Williamson (1975: 65, 79) concedes that the firm may need to stimulate solidaristic behaviour in situations where contracts are especially difficult to specify and enforce, such as when workers possess high degrees of rarefied skill. In such circumstances, pursuing surface-level cooperation through monitoring and material rewards may be not only ineffective, but also counterproductive, creating an “atmosphere” of individualistic behaviour and thus undermining “cooperative attitudes” (ibid.).  Instead, the firm “will engage in considerable social conditioning” (Williamson 1981: 565) in order to reap the “associational gains” that are produced when the relational atmosphere is transformed from “calculative” to “quasimoral” (Williamson 1975: 37-8, 44-5, 79). If taken to their logical conclusion, these admissions imply that “[f]irms replace markets when nonmarket means of coordination and commitment are superior” (Rumelt et al. 1991: 19, quoted in Osterloh and Frey 2000: 539; see also Teece and Pisano 1994: 539). Indeed, Williamson (ibid.: 256) identified the employment relation as a whole to be “the leading instance of a market exchange where the influence of metering intensity on work attitudes needs to be assessed with care”. However, he later clarified that he considered “associational gains”, which “are sometimes held to be the main purpose of economic organization, especially by noneconomists”, to be “auxiliary” to the “core purpose” of minimising transaction costs by constraining opportunism​[58]​ (1996: 55). Martin (1993: 1096, quoted in Hodgson 1999: 251) describes the situation thus: “the new institutional economics does not take institutions seriously enough: organization is reduced to the status of a means of regulating relationships in default of market relations.”
This paradox, discussed at length in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.4, ultimately stems from the primacy afforded by contract-based theories to an idealised version of the market. This “market primacy” paradigm” (Chang and Evans 2005), which holds that the firm (and all other institutions) evolved from and revolve around the market​[59]​, is encapsulated in Williamson’s (1975: 20) dictum that “in the beginning there were markets” and is manifested in the definition of the firm as a “nexus of contracts”. Of course, even if this were true, many if not all market transactions are undergirded by social elements such as trust, loyalty, and power, meaning that the market is itself a social institution (Harriss-White 2003; Granovetter 1985; Offer 1997; Chang 2003) – a point that was central to the Old Institutionalism, especially the work of John R. Commons (see Section 1.6.1). The market generally envisaged by contract-based theories, however, is one of anonymous, instantaneous transactions between pre-determined, instrumentally motivated individuals (Ankarloo and Palermo 2004).
Furthermore, the market primacy paradigm treats the firm as merely a solution to a particular kind of market failure – namely transaction costs – and thus a structure “of last resort, to be employed when all else fails” (Williamson 1991: 279; e.g. Hansmann 1996). However, far from existing “in the beginning”, organised markets – and certainly market economies – are in fact relatively recent institutions, especially compared to firms (Polanyi 1957). Of course, it could be retorted that transaction costs were simply so high in the past that all exchange took place within firms and other institutions, and that once these costs decreased (for instance due to legal reforms and technological advances), markets appeared as more transactions reverted to what was always their ‘natural state’. However, this would violate the principle of ‘inference to best explanation’, which would suggest that firms, far from substituting for markets, possess an entirely different purpose. Indeed, because contract-based theories treat the firm, which is a relatively ancient institution, as a mere epi-phenomena of the market, which is a relatively modern institution, its broad claims regarding the firm end up pertaining to a specifically modern type of firm rather than firms in general, namely the capitalist firm (Hodgson 1999: 220-2). Indeed, Coase, whose 1937 article marked the birth of contract-based theories, deemed the employment contract to be the very “nature” of the firm. However, the firm in fact precedes the modern employment contract, overlapping with other social institutions such as families and guilds (Polanyi 1957; Powell 1990: 329). Furthermore, many existing firms do not feature an employment contract; in cooperatives, for example, workers are admitted as members rather than hired as employees. In contrast to the amnesic view of contract-based theories, the firm defined as a social institution is “seemingly ubiquitous and pre-eminent throughout all civilised human history”, on par with the family​[60]​ (Hodgson 1999: 220). The social theory of the firm has also shed light on the distributive issues surrounding capitalist firms, which the market primacy paradigm dismisses as an illusion (Dow 1986; e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson 1985, Chapter 9).
The notion that the firm is merely “a continuation of market relations by other means” (Williamson 1991: 271) also provides no clear-cut method by which to distinguish firms from markets. While this is especially problematic in cases such as networks, coalitions, joint ventures, and other ‘hybrid organisations’ (Powell 1990; Granovetter 1995; Grabher 1993), the bulk of the economy in fact consists of a variety of non-market relations between firms, rather than the archipelago of “islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations” normally imagined by contract-based theories (Richardson 1972: 883; see Simon 1991; Goldberg 1980). Of course, the arbitrariness of the delineation between firm and market is precisely what Alchian and Demsetz (1972) seize on, and even Williamson (1985: 83) felt compelled to revise his original dichotomy between markets and hierarchies to acknowledge the prevalence of “transactions in the middle range”. However, the explanation that transactions lie on a spectrum (however continuous) between intra-firm cooperation and inter-firm competition again violates the principle of inference to best explanation, which would suggest that, as Commons (1931: 652; 2009 [1934]: 55, 117) understood, the transaction is not the only “unit of analysis” (see Hodgson 1999: 218). According to the definition suggested above, by contrast, firms will exist when the development and application of productive knowledge requires deep-level cooperation that can only be achieved by an organisational culture. Where the development and application of productive does not require deep-level cooperation (or where deep-level cooperation does not require an organisational culture) we may instead observe inter-firm relations, including market transactions. Conversely, where deep-level cooperation is required for means other than production, another type of social institution may prevail​[61]​. 
As argued in the previous chapter, competence-based theories surpass the contract-based conception of the firm as a mere “nexus of contracts” by acknowledging that, due to the collective nature of productive knowledge – characterised by interdependency and repeated interaction – the firm is more than the sum of its parts (e.g. Winter 1982: 76, 1988: 170; Dosi and Marengo 1994; Kogut and Zander 1992: 384). Perhaps for this reason, they do not fall prey to the fallacies of comparative statics, and can more easily accommodate the heterogeneity of firms observed in the real-world than can their contract-based counterparts (Hodgson 1998; 1999: 260). Nevertheless, their own neglect of the relational aspect of behaviour leads them to label the firm a mere “pool” or “repository” of productive knowledge (Penrose 1959; Winter 1988). By appreciating the social processes of cooperation involved in the development and application of productive knowledge, and thus harking back to the precursors of competence-based theories (see Section 1.6.2), the social theory of the firm is able to truly appreciate the firm’s ‘emergent properties’. Firms are constituted not only by objective organisational structures, but also by subjective interpretations of those structures – that is, organisational culture (Searle 1996; Hodgson 2002: 173; Smircich 1983). Durkheim thus referred to the “collective consciousness” of a cultural group (Lincoln and Guillot 2004); Weick and Roberts (1993) have more recently referred to the “collective mind” of organisations.
The social theory of the firm not only improves on each of the two schools, but also unifies them. Section 1.5 argued that the predominant schools are fundamentally incompatible due to their common neglect of the social nature and constitutive role of the firm, leaving production and exchange segregated. By contrast, the social theory of the firm maintains that the development and application of productive knowledge, stressed in competence-based theories, requires cooperation, stressed in contract-based theories. Furthermore, that cooperation involves both the cognitive aspect of behaviour emphasised by competence-based theories, and the relational aspect of behaviour emphasised by contract-based theories.

2.5	Conclusion
This chapter has made a preliminary attempt to construct a theory of the firm that rectifies the neglect of society in the predominant theories. In this ‘social theory of the firm’, the firm’s ultimate purpose is to develop and apply productive knowledge, as maintained by competence-based theories. Although this purpose requires the achievement of cooperation, which is the function emphasised by contract-based theories, cooperation is required on a ‘deeper level’ than is permitted in those theories. To understand how such cooperation is achieved, the chapter has taken a behaviouralist perspective, which combined the cognitive and relational aspects of behaviour. This perspective revealed that, contrary to contract-based theories, behaviour can be ‘solidaristic’ as well as ‘individualistic’, which in turn implies that cooperation can be achieved not only on the ‘surface-level’ through organisational structures, but also on the ‘deep-level’ through organisational culture. Furthermore, these means of cooperation feed back into behavioural modes, implying that the firm has a constitutive role – rather than only a constraining or enabling role – in behaviour.
Given this behavioural endogeneity, a potential trade-off arises between achieving cooperation and the secondary function of achieving coordination, particularly when the firm attempts to achieve cooperation on the deep level and the coordination on the surface level. This dilemma can in principle be overcome by establishing an appropriate organisational culture that tolerates bureaucratic structures without sacrificing deep-level cooperation. However, that organisational culture must be confirmed in organisational structures, giving rise to a ‘distributive dilemma’ whereby power-holders may be required to revise the very structures on which their power is based in order to achieve deep-level cooperation.
By acknowledging the importance of solidaristic behaviour, deep-level cooperation, and organisational culture, the ‘social theory of the firm’ allows the firm to be defined as a social institution, based on the dual features of productive interdependence and repeated interaction. This definition surpasses both the contract-based view of the firm as a “nexus of contracts”, which treats the firm as merely an extension of the market, and the competence-based view of the firm as a “pool of intangible resources” or “repository of productive knowledge”, which fails to specify the firm’s emergent properties. Moreover, in rectifying their neglect of the ‘social dimension’, the social theory of the firm also unifies the predominant theories, which, as shown in the previous chapter, are otherwise segregated. The social theory of the firm remains, however, closer to the capabilities tradition than the transaction-cost tradition. Table 5 (below) summarises the key tenets of the social theory of the firm as compared with those of the predominant theories.

School of Theories	Contract-based Theories	Competence-based Theories	Social Theory
Purpose of the Firm	Minimise transaction costs	Develop productive capabilities	Develop and apply productive knowledge
(Primary) Function of the Firm	Achieve cooperation by constraining opportunistic behaviour	Achieve coordination by enabling productive behaviour	Achieve deep-level cooperation by constituting solidaristic behaviour
Nature of the Firm	Exchange-based – a “nexus of contracts”	Production-based – a “repository of productive knowledge”	Socially-based – a social institution dedicated to production
Table 5: The Social Theory of the Firm Compared

Chapter 3: Technology, Culture, and Organisation
The Firm as a Social Vehicle of Economic Development

3.1	Introduction
This chapter will argue that the ‘social theory of the firm’ developed in the previous chapter enriches our understanding of the firm’s role in economic development, which I define as the sustained improvement in living standards resulting from the implementation of new technologies or forms of organisation in a given society. It is virtually self-evident that that the firm is central to economic development, at least to those who take a competence-based perspective. However, what determines which organisational structures and organisational cultures will prevail in any given society – and consequently, which trajectory of economic development that society will undertake – is subject to more debate. The central proposition of this chapter is that firms enjoy a significant degree of primacy in the processes of technological, cultural, and organisational change underlying economic development.
The chapter will began by addressing the pervasive view that the internal organisation of the firm is ultimately determined by the imperatives of technology. Contrary to this perspective of ‘technological determinism’, which leads to a fatalistic view of social change and economic development, the social theory of the firm implies that a range of organisational forms are possible for any given technology, because, as explained in Chapter 2, organisational culture conditions the behavioural effect of any given organisational structure. Furthermore, technology is itself driven by innovation within firms. In itself, this economically proactive role of the firm does not afford the firm real ‘agency’, because it could still be claimed that organisational culture is merely a reflection of exogenous cultural traits. However, contrary to this perspective of ‘cultural determinism’, which entails a view of social change and economic development that is equally fatalistic as its technological counterpart, the social theory of the firm implies that firms possess the ability to create distinct organisational cultures, selectively applying the “raw material” of culture by implementing organisational structures (Chang 2008: 193). In so doing, moreover, they influence the culture of society in the long run by partially ‘constituting’ the relational and cognitive foundations of behaviour. In addition to – and part and parcel of – being economically proactive, the firm is therefore also socially proactive.
This is not to say that technology and culture are inconsequential in the organisation of the firm, and thus the course of economic development. Indeed, the very fact that technology and culture are substantially endogenous to the firm implies the likelihood of ‘cumulative causation’ between technology and institutions, on the one hand, and the internal organisation of the firm, on the other. Such cumulative causation refutes the inference, prevalent in the predominant theories of the firm, that observed patterns of organisation are necessarily ‘optimal’ in some absolute sense. However, the chapter will also contend that innovation and imitation of new combinations of technology, culture, and organisation are still possible thanks to the irreducible agency of individuals, especially during periods of crisis in which prevailing patterns of behaviour and structures of power are disrupted. Firms therefore still command a significant degree of primacy in the process of economic development, which the chapter will argue should be supported by policy-makers.

3.2	Technology, Organisation, and Economic Development
3.2.1	Technological Determinism
In the previous chapter, we saw that the purpose of the firm is to develop and apply productive knowledge. This leaves open the question of which productive knowledge the firm must develop and apply. If that is determined exogenously, the possibility arises that the internal organisation of the firm is likewise determined exogenously. This was the line taken by the so-called ‘technological determinists’ (also known as the ‘technological imperative theorists’ or simply the ‘technologists’), who postulated that technology ultimately determines how the firm is organised (Woodward 1965; Blauner 1964; Touraine 1955). 
The causational process by which this was presumed to occur was that a given technology would stipulate a certain division of labour, which would in turn contain problems cooperation and coordination that would have to be addressed through a particular management system. That management system, in turn, would be associated with a certain structure of ownership and control. Accordingly, a dichotomy was posed between technologies corresponding to divisions of labour for which surface-level cooperation and coordination were sufficient (such as mass production based on standardised assembly-line work), and those technologies for which the division of labour demanded deep-level cooperation and coordination (such as craft-based unit production involving high levels of uncertainty, skill, and discretion). Firms employing the former technologies were likely to espouse rigid and bureaucratic management systems, whereas firms employing the latter technologies were likely to adopt more flexible and participatory systems of decision-making. These dichotomous organisational forms correspond to the “mechanistic” and “organic” organisations discussed Section 2.2.4 (Burns and Stalker 1961; Arygris 1957, 1964​[62]​).
The technologists furthermore proposed that there exists a discernible historical relationship between these two modes. As technologies evolved from pre-industrial, to industrial, to post-industrial​[63]​, an ‘inverted U’ could be observed as organisations transitioned from organic, to mechanistic, and finally back to organic. Although the technologists differed in the extent to they attributed this progression to the inevitable forces of technology as opposed to the free will of organisational designers, the unifying principle was that “organic” organisations would (once again) become economically rational, but only due to changes in technology (Fox 1974: 338-9). Indeed, Burns and Stalker (1961) posited that in more stable industries, mechanistic organisations would still be preferred.
The logic of technological determinism has been invoked to explain the distinctive features of Japanese firms. Aoki (1990), for example, contrasts the archetypal Japanese firm (the “J-mode”), characterised by a flexible division of labour, with the archetypal American hierarchical firm (the “H-mode”), characterised by greater specialisation. According to Aoki, the J-mode is favourable to the H-mode for technologies involving numerous stages of production and high levels of instability (such as small- and medium-batch production), but not for technologies involving simple production and relative stability (such as mass production), although improvements in information technology may render the J-mode preferable for a larger range of technologies (ibid.: 3, 9). Following the sequence of technological determinism, Aoki then states that, based on their respective divisions of labour, each of the two modes requires a different type of cooperation and coordination, which is in turn elicited through organisational structures, especially the management system (ibid.: 18). That system, in turn, is associated with control of the firm. For instance, the high amount of discretion involved in J-mode’s division of labour confounds monitoring and renders labour a highly ‘specific’ asset, thus entailing both a less authoritarian management system and a high degree of de facto worker authority.
Essentially, then, the theory of technological determinism treats the firm as an economically reactive entity, subservient to the requirements of technology. To critically examine this theory, it is necessary to consider each of its logically sequential premises in turn: first, that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour; second, that a given division of labour stipulates a certain management system; and third, that a given management system stipulates a certain structure of ownership and control (see Figure 6, below).


Figure 6: The Three Premises of Technological Determinism

3.2.2	Technology and the Division of Labour
The first premise is that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour. Because they focused on automation, the technologists considered this premise to be largely axiomatic: advances in mechanisation would, ipso facto, transform the labour process. Nevertheless, the premise has been thoroughly challenged by a wide range of authors who argue that the division of labour is socially, rather than technologically, determined​[64]​. For instance, several commentators have argued that the factory organisation adopted by the West in the nineteenth century, characterised by mass production methods, was not the only – nor even the most efficient – system compatible with the underlying technologies (Piore and Sabel 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, 2002). On the contrary, they maintain that a more efficient alternative, based on more flexible divisions of labour within networks of small-scale firms, was equally viable. Although Scranton (1997) shows that such an organisational pattern was in fact adopted in parts of the United States, mass production methods were generally favoured in the West due to the relative political strength of certain parties, such as telegraph companies in the case of telephone technology. On similar grounds, some (but not all) radicals have also disputed the first premise of technological determinism (e.g. Edwards 1979; Braverman 1974). Marglin (1974), for instance, contends that the advantages of specialisation described by Adam Smith (1776) in his Wealth of Nations did not require the complex divisions of labour of the factory system, and could have been enjoyed through more participatory means of organising production. Providing evidence from the steel and coal industries, Marglin contends that the transition to factory production was dictated not by the underlying technologies, but rather by capitalist owners seeking to secure the dependence and subjugation of workers.
Williamson (1985: 211-2, 231-7) and Landes (1986) respectively claim that Marglin’s account fails to appreciate the problems of cooperation and coordination involved in highly partitioned division of labour. Williamson further contends that Marxians, and even Marx himself, inadvertently acknowledge that efficiency is a sufficient explanation for observed patterns of organisation without any reference to power, and submits his own evidence of circumstances in which efficiency has prevailed in spite of what a power-based analysis would predict. However, these criticisms misinterpret the radical stance. Marglin acknowledges that the factory system was a response to the coordination and cooperation problems implied by a complex division of labour. His point is that the division of labour itself – and hence problems of cooperation and coordination – did not arise neutrally from underlying technologies. Rather, through the putting-out system, capitalist owners deliberately contrived a division of labour that would, precisely due to the cooperation and coordination problems inherent in it, require their administration via a factory system. In their critiques, neither Williamson nor Landes seem to have conceptually separated the division of labour from technology – which is precisely the issue at hand – causing them to address a straw man.

3.2.3	The Division of Labour and the Management System
In fact, Williamson and Landes appear to be defending not the first premise of technological determinism, but rather its second premise, namely that a given division of labour stipulates a certain management system. As reflected in Marglin’s (1974) argument that capitalists were able to justify their managerial role by manipulating the division of labour, this premise is generally taken for granted in Marxian thought, in which the division of labour and the management system are conceived as inseparable components of the “labour process” (e.g. Braverman 1974; Friedman 1977; Edwards 1979). Given that both the technologists and their radical critics agree with the second premise, it may seem redundant to separate it from the first. However, understanding the relationship between the division of labour and the management system is in fact crucial to understanding the relationship between technology and organisation.
In general, the second premise is based on the assumption that the division of labour determines the type of cooperation and/or coordination required for production, which is in turn elicited by the management system. Although each author utilises her own terminology, the common channel through which this occurs is the amount of discretion associated with each task (Fox 1974). Basic, predictable tasks involving little discretion require only that workers adhere to their pre-specified contractual obligations, rendering surface-level cooperation and coordination sufficient. A hierarchical management system​[65]​ capable of overseeing production and implementing material rewards and punishments will therefore be appropriate. Conversely, complex tasks involving high levels of discretion, such as those containing significant components of skill, tacit knowledge, uncertainty, or teamwork, require that workers exercise initiative beyond their contractually defined and enforced responsibilities – in other words, that cooperation and coordination be achieved on the deep level. In such circumstances, more participatory management systems will be preferred.
The ‘social’ theory of the firm developed in Chapter 2 indicates that some important qualifications must be affixed to this premise. It should first be noted that most cases lie in between the two archetypal extremes, involving cooperation and coordination on both the surface and deep levels. For example, Section 2.2.1 noted that although the need for deep-level cooperation is greater for certain divisions of labour, even the most ‘deskilled’ tasks contain “some residual element of discretion”, thus requiring some degree of deep-level cooperation (Fox 1974: 19-20). Weber (1978 [1922]) recognised this when he postulated that modern bureaucracies would never fully eliminate “substantive” or “moral rationality”, even while eclipsing them with “formal rationality” (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 49). In fact, even the technologists acknowledged that all forms of production require workers to think “in terms of the collective whole rather than the individual part”, even if the extent of deep-level cooperation required varies according to technology (Blauner 1964: 173; see also Touraine 1955: 429). By the same token, some degree of surface-level cooperation will be ubiquitously necessary, and may even be a prerequisite for deep-level cooperation, because workers will only abide by social norms and substantive rationality if they are assured that their material needs will be met (Sheldon and Kasser 2000, 2008; Kasser et al. 2004). Both surface- and deep-level coordination will likewise be necessary to some degree in any given division of labour, even if the ratio between them varies.
More importantly, the dual functions of cooperation and coordination are related to the division of labour in distinct ways. On the one hand, the need for surface- and deep-level coordination is likely to be largely, if not fully, defined by the division of labour. In rigid, complex divisions of labour, tasks will need to be synchronised with each other, while more organic and flexible divisions of labour will require initiative and teamwork. Distinct combinations of organisational structures and organisational culture, including the management system, will be required in each case. This is likely to be true regardless of which behavioural mode prevails; and in this sense, given divisions of labour will indeed be associated with certain management systems. On the other hand, the need for surface- and deep-level cooperation is not completely defined by the division of labour, but is rather dependent on behaviour: individualistic behaviour requires surface-level cooperation, while solidaristic behaviour requires deep-level cooperation. 
It is true that behaviour is endogenous to organisational structures, including the division of labour – and in this sense, a given division of labour may indeed require a certain form of cooperation. In the cognitive aspect of behaviour, Berger and Luckmann (1967) have argued that the division of labour is the arena of “secondary socialisation”. Indeed, job characteristics such as task discretion are widely acknowledged to be prime determinants of intrinsic rewards, and thus organisational loyalty (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 85, 118). Adam Smith, while recognising the potentially favourable behavioural effects of specialisation (1776, Book I, Chapter 1), also acknowledged that repetitively performing a menial task within a highly partitioned division of labour could render a worker not only “stupid and ignorant”, but also “incapable of…conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment”, even to the point of adversely affecting her “private life” and requiring government intervention (1904 [1776], Book V, Chapter 1, para. 178). On the relational side of behaviour, Durkheim (1893) has contended that the division of labour is associated with a distinct system of obligations and privileges. For instance, if it involves teamwork, discretion can allow for reciprocity between peers. This would appear to be a principal function of Japanese quality circles, for example (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 110-1; Berg, Freedman, and Freeman 1987). Discretion can also allow for reciprocity between the firm and its members: if workers perceive it as a ‘gift’ from the firm, they will feel obliged to use it productively (Akerlof 1982; Ortega 2010). This may be one reason why Japanese firms eschew rigid job classifications and invest so heavily in worker training (see Section 2.3.3) (Williamson and Ouchi 1981; Rohlen 1974). Conversely, tasks devoid of discretion are likely to “alienate” the individual worker from both her fellow workers and from the firm (e.g. Blauner 1964).
However, as Section 2.3.3 explained, the behavioural influence of the division of labour (or any other organisational structure) is not set in stone, but rather contingent on organisational culture: with the appropriate organisational culture, even a complex division of labour can coexist with solidaristic behaviour, while even the most “organic” division of labour may fail to stimulate that behaviour if it is not accompanied by the appropriate organisational culture. This implies that given divisions of labour do not categorically stipulate certain management systems on the basis of cooperation. Of course, as explained in Section 2.3.3, ‘cultural contingency’ is accompanied by the requirement of ‘structural consistency’. An organisational culture of deep-level cooperation that tolerates an otherwise alienating division of labour would therefore have to be reflected in other organisational structures​[66]​, which leads us to the third premise of technological determinism.

3.2.4	The Management System and the Structure of Ownership and Control
	The third premise of technological determinism holds that a given management system stipulates a certain structure of ownership and control. Radical commentators who maintain that the labour process contains the essence of power within the firm generally agree with this third premise; although capitalists usually hire managers (Marx 1887: 227-8; 1959 [1894]: 249-253), it is the managerial function on which the capitalists’ power rests (Marglin 1974). Indeed, when combined with the second premise (which Marxians take for granted), the third premise is reflected in Marx’s (1887: 242) statement that “[t]he division of labour in the workshop implies the concentration of the means of production in the hands of one capitalist”. When also combined with the first premise (which Marxians sometimes dispute), the third premise completes the logical sequence of technological determinism, leading to the conclusion that given technologies are associated with certain structures of ownership and control. For instance, technologies involving mass production techniques and hierarchical management systems are bracketed with capitalist corporations, whilst technologies involving flexible production methods and participatory systems of management are coupled with family- and worker-controlled and firms. 
According to the theory developed in Chapter 2, this premise will tend to be true, but not in all cases, and for different reasons than those assumed by the technologists. In a “classical firm”, such as that conceptualised by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), it is impossible to evaluate the premise, because the central monitor is also the residual claimant; the management system and structure of ownership/control are indistinct. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the premise in relation to an enterprise in which management is separated from ownership and its associated control rights, namely the capitalist corporation. Although such firms contain managerial hierarchies, the authority enjoyed by managers is delegated by those with “real authority” (Aghion and Tirole 1997), namely the owners. Of course, managers will not be perfectly monitored, and will thus be free to pursue their own ‘sub-goals’ (Bearle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). Nevertheless, if they so desired, shareholders could choose to more closely scrutinise managers (as in the case of ‘shareholder activism’), and even replace the management board. In fact, several conventionally-owned firms in sectors with divisions of labour that involve high levels of discretion, teamwork, and innovation have recently eliminated managerial hierarchies altogether in order to better achieve deep-level coordination (Wirthman 2014). As I will argue in Section 4.2.7, just as it is possible for a capitalist firm to have a non-hierarchical management system (and its associated division of labour), so too it is possible for a non-capitalist firm to have a hierarchical management system (and its associated division of labour). Even if both combinations are relatively rare, they nevertheless confound any categorical association between management systems and structures of ownership and control.
Furthermore, as I will further elaborate in Section 4.3.2, these organisational patterns are not rare because the labour process contains the essence of power, as often assumed by radicals, but rather due to problems of structural consistency. Although worker ownership and control may facilitate an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, hierarchical management systems and the complex divisions of labour associated with them may be inconsistent with that organisational culture. Conventionally-owned and -controlled firms, on the other hand, may struggle to achieve deep-level cooperation even with ‘organic’ divisions of labour and management systems due to the distributive dilemma discussed in Chapter 2.3.3, and may therefore rely on managerial hierarchies to achieve surface-level cooperation​[67]​. This point brings us full circle to the first premise of technological determinism, that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour. If managerial hierarchies are required in order to achieve (surface-level) cooperation, as in the case of a conventionally-owned/-controlled firm, then a complex division of labour may be required in order to facilitate contractual specification and enforcement, even if a less complex division of labour were possible with deep-level cooperation. As Marxians have long argued, the division of labour (and its accompanying management system) may therefore act as a disciplinary device to enforce worker compliance. However, that is not to say that complex divisions of labour (and hierarchical management systems) are not sometimes required for the purpose of coordination, the need for which is inherent to technology rather than endogenous to organisation. In this manner, the distinction between cooperation and coordination as they pertain to the management system and structure of ownership/control resolves the disagreement between the technologists and their Marxian critics regarding technology and the division of labour.
It may appear that I am affording primacy to ownership, and thus committing the same fallacy as contract-based theories of the firm by reducing the firm to a mere “nexus of contracts”. It is true that I depart from the particular Marxian paradigm that affords primacy to the labour process (understood here as the management system and its associated division of labour), although it should be noted that even Marxian analysis defines capitalism as private ownership and control of the “means of production”. However, I do not maintain that ownership of residual claims per se contains the essence of power within the firm; rather, it is the control rights associated with ownership that I consider paramount, as these rights generally afford a sort of ‘ultimate control’ over other stakeholders. This association is not absolute, but is rather specific to Anglo-Saxon law, which bundles residual claims and control into a ‘property right’ (Ellerman 1992). Indeed, in Section 2.3.3 I argued that Japanese workers effectively control their firm, even if they are not (always) owners in a formal or strict sense. Even in Western countries, the association between ownership and control is not absolute​[68]​; many preference shares, for example, are non-voting, just as employee stock ownership programmes (ESOPs) are rarely accompanied by participation in governance.

3.2.5	The Social Foundations of Economic Development
If extrapolated to the long run, technological determinism leads to a particular version of modernisation theory, namely convergence theory. Essentially, if technology determines organisation, then economies facing similar technological constraints will feature similar patterns of organisation (Kerr et al. 1960; Harbison and Myers 1959). Thus, as developing countries industrialise by adopting modern technologies, their patterns of organisation will converge with those of developed countries. Cultures will converge accordingly, as ‘modern’ organisational forms propagate ‘modern’ values of individualism and rationalism (Inkeles 1960, 1969). This sociological theory of convergence has its economic counterpart in exogenous growth theory, which predicts that cross-country per capita income levels should converge over time as poorer countries adopt the technologies of more advanced economies (Harrod 1939; Domar 1946; Solow 1956; Swan 1956).
However, this chapter has contended that, thanks to the role of organisational culture in the development and application of productive knowledge, a multiplicity of organisational structures (including divisions of labour, management systems, and structures of ownership and control) are in fact possible for any given technology. In this vein, Lincoln and colleagues (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 214; Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride 1986) deduce from their comparative studies that, due to the organisational cultures of Japanese firms, the organisational structures of those firms are less tied to certain technologies than their American counterparts. In this regard, we have returned to the distinction between information and productive knowledge discussed in Sections 1.5.3 and 2.2.1: there is a fundamental difference between technology, conceived as a kind of abstract ‘blueprint’ of information, and productive knowledge, which is embedded in social interaction. Furthermore, firms do not only apply productive knowledge, but also develop it; that is, they innovate. Thus, not only are firms not fully governed by technology, but, as Schumpeter (1911, 1943) lucidly explained, they in fact drive technological change. Consequently, they play a proactive, rather than merely reactive, role in economic development.
While Schumpeter was concerned with innovation in advanced capitalist economies, the field of development economics has (at least before its colonisation by neoclassical economics) emphasised the importance for less-developed countries of assimilating existing technologies in order to ‘catch up’. Particularly relevant is research that, like Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, emphasises the firm-level basis of technological change, beginning with Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1962) analysis of historical instances of countries overcoming “economic backwardness” and including more recent case studies examining the development experiences of Japan, Korea, and other ‘Newly Industrialised Countries’​[69]​, as well as other Asian and Latin American countries​[70]​. Drawing on Korea’s miraculous economic transformation, for instance, Kim (1980, 1997) proposed the concept of “technological capability”, defined as “the ability [of firms] to make effective use of technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, adapt and change existing technologies” (1997: 4). The so-called “endogenous” or “new growth” theory has similarly attempted to treat technology as “micro-founded” within firms in order to explain spatial and temporal differences in economic development that contradicted the ‘convergence hypothesis’ of exogenous growth theory (Young 1928; Lucas 1988; Romer 1990).
	Because they neglect productive knowledge, along with its development and application within the firm (see Section 2.2.1), contract-based theories are unable to appreciate this key role of the firm in driving technological change and economic development (Langlois 2007; Lundvall 1992: 1). From the perspective of contract-based theories, any changes observed in the firm suggest that contracts have been updated to reflect exogenous changes in transaction costs, which presumably stem from exogenous technological innovations (Foss 1993: 131-2). By thus treating the firm as essentially static and reactive, contract-based theories are inherently predisposed to technological determinism. By contrast, competence-based theories view the firm as inherently dynamic and proactive in the process of economic development, even if they often exhibit traces of technological determinism (Tavares Silva, Castro Teixeira, and Rui Silva 2004; Hodgson 1999: 248; Foss 1993: 142). Indeed, the very mechanism by which firms develop new capabilities, according to competence-based theories of the firm, is through the formation of new “combinations” of knowledge and resources – essentially the process of innovation suggested by Schumpeter (Kogut and Zander 1992; Nelson and Winter 1982: 39; see also Arthur 2009). Chandler (1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981) also echoed Schumpeter when he argued that large industrial firms had come to be the primary means through which countries imitate and innovate new technologies. 
That said, as elaborated in Section 1.3.2, competence-based theories often fail to appreciate that the firm’s economic purpose of developing and applying productive knowledge involves a social function of achieving cooperation through organisational culture. In fact, this same neglect is evident in the non-exogenous theories of economic development aforementioned, which, despite pursuing the “micro-foundations” of technological change, fail to appreciate its social foundations. Endogenous growth theory is the most blatant example, as it treats skills and other capabilities as merely “human capital” – valuable for economic development, but essentially acquired through a mechanical process devoid of social content. Indeed, it often resorts to the neoclassical view of the firm as a mere production function, perhaps to allow for convenient aggregation into macro-level models. Even the more nuanced concept of “technological capabilities” does not, in itself, provide an adequate account of the social processes underlying those capabilities. Without an understanding of the firm’s social function, particularly the role of organisational culture, there is nothing to stand in the way of technological determinism. The firm is then once again reduced to a mere “pool” or “repository” of productive knowledge, essentially passive in the course of technological change and economic development.
The recent approach of National Systems of Innovation (NSI) has made progress in addressing this deficiency. Like the non-exogenous theories of economic development, the NSI literature recognises that economic development is largely a function of technological change; that countries differ in their capacity to innovate and imitate technology (e.g. Nelson 1993; see Edquist 2004 for an overview); and that these differences, in turn, can help to explain long-term trends of divergence in economic development across countries (Viotti 2002; Muchie et al. 2003; Lundvall et al. 2006). The NSI approach goes further, however, by appreciating that the development and application of productive knowledge – that is, technological innovation and imitation – is a socially-embedded process, involving learning-by-doing through social interaction – what Penrose (1959) called “learning-by-interacting” (Rosenberg 1982, Lundvall 1992). This social process, in turn, is acknowledged to be grounded within firms, which (along with other institutions like the state and educational institutions, and the relationships between these various institutions) are consequently considered to be crucial drivers of economic development.

3.3	Culture, Organisation, and Economic Development
3.3.1	Cultural Determinism
	Although organisational culture allows for a range of possible organisational structures to prevail for any given technology, it could still be asserted – and indeed, has been widely asserted – that organisational culture is itself merely a reflection of exogenous cultural traits. The primary way that the cultural setting is supposed to determine organisational culture is by governing “work values” (see Section 2.3.2). As Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990: 158) state, these values are thought to “constitute a set of influences on work attitudes and behaviors which are largely…exogenous to the employment relation and the job”. Hofstede and colleagues (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010: 346), for instance, claim that work values are entirely defined during childhood, and are already “firmly in place” by the time a worker joins a firm. Organisational culture allegedly affects behaviour only by providing “shared practices”, including “symbols, heroes, and rituals”, which merely “reinforce” existing cultural traits (Hofstede 2001: xix). Furthermore, if organisational culture (which includes work values) is determined exogenously, then so too is the range of organisational structures that are appropriate in any given time and place – a point that was emphasised by the so-called ‘contingency theory’ popular in the 1960s and ‘70s​[71]​. Hofstede (2001) has followed this line of thought by suggesting that certain deep-seated “dimensions” of national cultures​[72]​ explain cross-country differences in both behaviour and organisational structures. Numerous cross-country comparisons have been interpreted as confirmation that the prevalence of organisational structures is determined primarily by cultural (rather than technological) factors (e.g. Gallie 1978; Maurice, Sorge, and Warner 1980; Brossard and Maurice 1976).
A lucid example of this ‘cultural determinism’ is found in the longstanding claim that the distinctive features of Japanese firms are merely the reflection of the particular forms of paternalism, loyalty, and submissiveness that characterise Japanese culture, supposedly stemming from the Japanese variant Confucianism (Morishima 1982; Fukuyama 1995; Huntington 1996​[73]​). Nakane (1970), for instance, contrasts the “attribute orientation” (identification of the individual with her own position) of Western cultures with the “frame” or “collectivity orientation” (identification of the individual with her social group) of Japanese culture. Other authors point to historically strong familial ties and hierarchical yet diffuse interpersonal relationships (Yoshino 1971; Bhappu 2000). Allegedly, these cultural factors have allowed the country to adopt advanced technologies even while retaining ‘traditional’ forms of organisation that diverge from those normally associated with modernisation (Abegglen 1958). Moreover, in countries that lack those cultural factors, the organisational structures that have been successful in Japan will not be feasible, according to this line of thought. This prediction finds support in evidence that overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms tend to hire workers of Japanese descent, and that the ethnic makeup of each firm is correlated with the organisational structures that prevail within it​[74]​ (e.g. Johnson and Ouchi 1974; Lincoln, Hanada, and Olson 1978; Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride 1986​[75]​). 
Cultural determinism therefore leads to an equally fatalistic view of economic development as its technological counterpart: even if firms are economically proactive, due to their role in developing and applying productive knowledge, they are still socially reactive, because the social processes underlying productive knowledge are exogenously determined. Consequently, whereas technological determinism yields the prediction that standards of living, forms of organisation, and cultures will ultimately ‘converge’ as countries around the world adopt advanced technologies, cultural determinism implies that enduring differences in culture will generate corresponding differences in organisation, and thus technological and economic development. To see this, recall that Kim’s (1980, 1997) concept of “technological capabilities” did not provide an explanation of its underlying social factors. In his celebrated article, Abramovitz (1986: 388-9) recognised these social foundations by proposing the concept of “social capabilities” to describe countries’ “institutional arrangements”, including the “organization of firms” (as well as “other aspects of economic systems” like competition, vested interests, and educational systems), that determine a country’s potential for absorbing advanced technologies and thus converging with advanced economies. However, the vagueness of his concept (which he admits) invites a culturalist perspective, in which social capabilities are determined by inherent features of national culture. In fact, he himself refers to social capabilities as “tenacious societal characteristics” (ibid.: 387). The NSI approach likewise falls prey to a culturalist perspective, maintaining that cultural differences between countries will influence the organisation of firms and limit organisational diffusions, thus explaining variations in technological change and economic development (Edquist and Lundvall 1993; Kogut 1991).
	In fact, the notion that economic development is ultimately determined by culture has been pervasive at least since Weber’s (1905) The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, which linked competing religious beliefs concerning morality and the afterlife to entrepreneurship, thrift, and productivity (see Chang 2008, Chapter 9). Authors such as Fukuyama (1995), Huntington (1996), and Landes (1998) have similarly attributed cross-country differences in economic development to differences in culture, be it in the form of trust, entrepreneurship, or thrift. A related school of thought has identified “institutions” such as legal and political systems – along with the cultural traits associated with them – as the principal drivers of economic development (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Because culture and institutions are treated as essentially immutable, changing only through “epochal external shocks like colonization”, a country’s economic development is considered to be “already ‘written’” (Chang 2011b: 289). Methodologically, moreover, both of the predominant schools of theories of the firm contain traces of culturalism: while contract-based theories explicitly assume that the individualistic mode of behaviour prevails irrespective of the firm, competence-based theories, by neglecting issues of cooperation, arguably assume that the opposite type of culture – one characterised by solidaristic behaviour – prevails unconditionally (see Section 1.3).

3.3.2	The Organisational Foundations of Economic Development
While it is true that the behavioural impact of organisational structures is mediated by organisational culture (what Section 2.3 referred to as “cultural contingency”), organisational culture must be substantiated in organisational structures (“structural consistency”). This implies that organisational culture is not merely a reflection of exogenous cultural traits, but rather that firms command a significant degree of cultural primacy. 
	To see this, first note that the culturalist perspective treats culture as fixed. Hofstede (2001: 454), for example, states: “In organizing our world, we had better take mental programs as given facts.” Indeed, his ‘fifth’ cultural dimension of long-term orientation (1991) has occasionally been referred to as ‘Confucian dynamism’, in reference to the philosophical framework supposedly central to the culture of certain East-Asian countries such as Japan (see 1983). In reality, however, culture varies over time. Indeed, Chang (2008: 191) demonstrates that before the East-Asian countries took off, Confucianism was in fact decried as a culture that “disparages practical pursuits, discourages entrepreneurship, and retards the rule of law” rather than praised as a culture that encourages “thrift, investment, hard work, education, organisation, and discipline”, as Huntington (2000: xi) characterised it. Similarly, although loyalty is often treated as an inherent feature of Japanese culture, the Japanese were in fact known for their individualism until relatively recently. 
According to Chang, the variability of culture arises because each culture contains multiple, sometimes contradictory, elements. Each element, in turn, contains the potential to work either against or in favour of economic development. Even the particular trait of loyalty – which, according to Morishima (1982), differentiates the Japanese variety of Confucianism from those of China and Korea and is responsible for Japan’s economic success – can be construed as either detrimental to creativity or favourable to cooperation. Which cultural attributes are manifested, and the way that they affect economic development, depends largely on which organisational structures prevail, according to Chang. He shows, for example, that the Japanese trait of loyalty arose only after firms implemented organisational structures such as welfare schemes and lifetime employment; Weitzman (1984: 76-7) has similarly pointed out that most of the institutions associated with Japanese firms only emerged after the Second World War. Indeed, before that time, Japanese culture contained elements that would have been inconsistent with modern Japanese firms, such as a four-class system that viewed merchants as unproductive (Leibenstein 1987: 184).
Another lucid example of how culture varies according to the institutional context is found in Lincoln and colleagues’ observation that whereas Japanese workers seem to prefer and react positively to vertically differentiated management systems and regular, close contact with supervisors, the opposite appears to be the case with American workers (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 91, 99, 111, 186-7, 234, 241-2; Lincoln, Hanada, and Olson 1981). An undiscerning observer of this behavioural difference may be swift to attribute it to a difference in the two countries’ cultures – for example “that greater individualism and need for self-determination characterise US employees while a group- and hierarchy-centeredness prevails among the Japanese” (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 234). However, Lincoln and Kalleberg (ibid.: 158, 244-5) also found that American employees in declining Midwest manufacturing were attracted to the notion of the “firm as a family”, possibly due to the saliency of unemployment. They therefore favoured an expansion of corporate welfare programmes, which yielded similar “returns in loyalty and morale” as in Japan. Similarly, expanding task discretion increased intrinsic rewards, and therefore organisational loyalty, irrespective of differences in professed work values (ibid.: 147-8).
Furthermore, even if organisations such as the firm are “socially constructed” (Dobbin 1994), through their constitutive role they are also centres of “secondary socialisation” (Berger and Luckmann 1967) (see Sections 1.4 and 2.2.4). By governing the manifestations of culture (what Hofstede calls “practices”), firms therefore alter the cognitive and relational foundations of culture (Hofstede’s “mental programs”) (Simon 1976); by sculpting the “raw material” of culture into organisational culture, firms alter the raw material itself (Chang 2008: 193). Perrow (2002: 11) therefore states: “We hear that culture shapes our behavior, and because organizations are made up of behaving people, organizations therefore must be shaped by culture. They are shaped by culture, but they also shape culture.” With regard to Japanese firms, Dore (1973: 284) similarly argues: “The way people perceive the structure of the individual factory – the social microcosm in which they work – inevitably affects the way their perceive the society at large…if Japanese workers are less likely to see their factory in terms of the bosses and the workers, they are less likely also to see their society in terms of a boss class and a working class.”
Moreover, firms need not be passive in their cultural influence. Leibenstein (1987: 195) points out that culturalist explanations fail to explain “why the Japanese should put almost all of their emotions, efforts, and loyalties, primarily into two organizations; the household and the firm”. In fact, Japanese firms actively aspire to the status of “corporate families”, for instance by offering comprehensive welfare services, lifetime employment, and continuous training and promotion, encouraging off-the-job socialisation, and treating workers’ families as ‘part of the company’ (Bennet and Ishino 1963; Dore 1973). They therefore bridge the gap between “primary” and “secondary” socialisation (Berger and Luckmann 1967), and between organisational role and personal identity (Simmel 1964 [1917]). In addition to – and part and parcel of – being economically proactive, the firm is therefore also socially proactive.
Given that the firm can not only utilise culture in a diversity of ways, but also influence culture itself, it is circular to attribute prevailing forms of organisation to exogenous cultural traits. Dore (1973: 290) therefore argues that, while the lack of class consciousness in Japanese culture may have facilitated the use of managerial hierarchies without sacrificing a solidaristic organisational culture, those perceptions were themselves partly the result of organisational structures, which “promot[ed] a sense of membership in the enterprise rather than class membership, making a Hitachi welder willing to believe that he has more in common with a Hitachi manager than with a Mitsubishi welder”. The opposite point could pertain to Goldthorpe et al.’s (1969) study of British manufacturing employees, who, because they viewed their jobs only instrumentally/transactionally, were content to work monotonous tasks for long hours in undesirable environments as long as their pay was satisfactory and stable – these workers expressed their ‘work values’ while working in mechanistic organisations, and had they been exposed to a different version of working life, their values may have changed accordingly (Fox 1974: 45).

3.4	Cumulative Causation and Irreducible Agency
3.4.1	Technological and Institutional Cumulative Causation
We have seen that a range of organisational structures are possible for any given technology thanks to mediating role of organisational culture, which is not fully determined by the cultural environment. That is not to say, however, that the range of possible organisational structures and cultures is limitless. On the contrary, it would be equally misguided to assume complete organisational “voluntarism” as it would be to assume complete technological or cultural fatalism​[76]​ (Chang 2011b), for multiple reasons.
First of all, as we saw in Section 3.2.3, technology is likely to have a direct influence on organisation by stipulating the balance of surface- and deep-level coordination required for production, which in turn is likely to stipulate certain organisational structures (such as divisions of labour and management systems) independently of which behavioural mode prevails. Although organisational culture allows for more flexibility in meeting the requirements of cooperation, it must be consistent with these organisational structures, which also have a constitutive role in behaviour. Prevailing power structures will also dictate which organisational structures and cultures can be implemented for any given technology, even if cultural manipulation can partially loosen this constraint (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Because the organisational structures and cultures that are selected from within the consequently limited range feed back into technology, a self-reinforcing spiral between technology and organisation is likely to develop (Pagano 1991; Pagano and Rowthorn 1994, 1996; Earle, Pagano, and Lesi 2006). This technological cumulative causation has been expounded not only by radical economists, but also, from a different perspective, by competence-based theories of the firm (e.g. Teece et al. 1994; Rumelt 1974; Kogut and Zander 1992) and the NSI literature (e.g. Dosi 1988; Rosenberg 1994; Perez 1983, 1985).
In addition to technological constraints, organisational culture must vie with the “habits of thought” (Veblen 1899) that are involved in a mutually reinforcing relationship with social institutions such as the education system, the state, and other firms (the “institutional environment”), all of which are also laden with vested interests. As a consequence, the firm will face pressure to conform to prevailing “institutional logics” (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Dobbin 1994), leading to “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; see also Scott and Meyer 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Although the firm has an influence on these institutional forces as a social institution in its own right, by that very fact it is likely to further ingrain prevailing patterns of behaviour and their associated institutions (Hodgson 2007: 331). Indeed, the stability that results from this institutional cumulative causation​[77]​ is valuable for dealing with bounded rationality (and uncertainty), and thus for achieving the cooperation and coordination required for the development and application productive knowledge (Soskice, Bates, and Epstein 1992; Langlois 1984, 2007). Nevertheless, while “the durability of institutions makes them meaningful… it also hinders efforts at institutional change, impedes inter-society transplants of institutions, and makes institutional change ‘overwhelmingly incremental’ (North 1990: 89)” (Kingston and Caballero 2009: 172).

3.4.2	The Efficiency Inference
A prevalent notion in the predominant theories of the firm is that “whatever is, is right” with regard to observed patterns of organisation (Ogilvie 2007). That inference is based on the “market primacy assumption” (Chang and Evans 2005) discussed in Section 2.4, which postulates that an idealised version of the market is historically and logically prior to other institutions, including the firm (Williamson 1975: 20). In that paradigm, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market is believed to reward efficiency and punish inefficiency by flawlessly coordinating the rational (trans)actions of individual agents, thus driving a process of ‘natural selection’ that leaves only the most efficient organisational forms intact (‘survival of the fittest’). However, technological and institutional cumulative causation imply that observed patterns of organisation, even if efficient given the prevailing technological and institutional conditions, are not necessarily optimal in some absolute sense, because alternative patterns of organisation would be efficient if alternative conditions were to prevail. In other words, when it comes to the interaction between technology and institutions on the one hand and the internal organisation of the firm on the other, there are likely to be multiple ‘equilibria’ (or ‘paths’), each of which is ‘locally stable’ but not necessarily ‘globally optimal’. This is reflected in the biological process of speciation, whereby the evolutionary fitness of a given mutation depends on which species already predominate (Pagano and Rowthorn 1996).
	In fact, some of the most important progenitors of both contract- and competence-based theories explicitly disputed the efficiency inference. For example, in his seminal 1950 article, which arguably originated Evolutionary Economics (which includes competence-based theories of the firm), Alchian emphasised that uncertainty was likely to induce multiple equilibria. Similarly, North (1990), arguably the father of the New Institutional Economics (which includes contract-based theories of the firm), acknowledged that inefficient institutions could persist due to bounded rationality and distributive conflict. In so doing, he harked back to the work of the ‘Old’ Institutionalists, particularly Veblen (1898b: 378; 1900: 266; 1904), who explicitly used the idea of “cumulative causation” to argue that the cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour could not be taken as given as in mainstream economics, but were rather determined simultaneously with the social environment (see Hodgson 2004; 2007; 1999: 207-15; Rutherford 1994, 1995). 

3.4.3	Organisational Innovation and Imitation
Despite the forces cumulative causation, however, the organisation of the firm is not ‘written in the stars’ (Chang 2011b; Chang and Evans 2005). Although the range of possible combinations of technology, culture, and organisation may be limited, choices within that range nevertheless remain (Teece, Pisano, and Schuen 1997). Indeed, we have already seen that, according to Schumpeter (1911), the application of new “combinations” is the very definition of innovation. In this regard, organisational change differs fundamentally from biological evolution in that, rather than undergoing random mutations upon which the selection process acts, firms make deliberate decisions to alter themselves in order to compete​[78]​ – what Schumpeter (2003 [1943]: 83) called “industrial mutation” (Chang 1993: 73-4). Of course, the fact that firms can choose from within an exogenously determined range of organisational combinations does not undo the forces of cumulative causation. It does, however, raise the question as to how firms make these choices – how can we account for the agency left over after the constraints of technology and institutions have been met? The predominant theories of the firm struggle to answer this question (Nooteboom 2009: 67; Hodgson 2002: 171-2). In contract-based theories, the firm is no more than the sum of its parts – namely, its individual members and the contractual ties between them (see Section 1.3.1). Although this methodological individualism may appear to prioritise agency over structure, contract-based theories do not truly allow for agency either, because agents are fully pre-determined by the idealised market. In competence-based theories, on the other hand, the firm has ‘emergent properties’ – it is more than the sum of its parts – due to the irreducible nature of organisational knowledge. However, as explained in Section 1.3.2, these theories tend to treat the firm as the “basic unit of analysis” (Chandler 1992: 85-6), ignoring the relations between its members. 
The answer to the question lies in the fact that, although institutions such as the firm largely ‘constitute’ individuals, individual agency still exists; indeed, institutions are also ‘constituted’ by individuals (Hodgson 2002). Consequently, behaviour does not simply reflect and reproduce existing institutional patterns in a “self-reinforcing homeostasis” (Chang and Evans 2005: 100). Knight (1921), recognised this when he argued that human agency is fundamentally uncertain because it cannot be ‘explained away’ by structural factors like incentives. Along with Schumpeter, Knight particularly emphasised the role of “entrepreneurs” who would specialise in harnessing this unique form of uncertainty​[79]​. In addition to innovating new organisational combinations, entrepreneurs can, corresponding to the ‘replication’ of advantageous traits in evolutionary biology, imitate innovations that have been successful elsewhere, or at least allude to them in order to provide an additional source of organisational “raw material”​[80]​. As with technological imitation, the process of adapting organisational prototypes to the local technological and institutional environment, and thus creating new combinations, is itself an example of innovation (Chang 2007b: 28-30), akin to biological ‘interbreeding’. Japanese firms, for example, actively experimented with new combinations by ‘reverse engineering’ existing technologies and innovating new forms of compatible organisation, including welfare services and lifetime employment (Aoki 1984; Aoki and Dore 1996). The resulting organisational form seemed to outperform its Western counterparts and led to an economic ‘miracle’ that preceded ‘East Asian Miracle’ led by South Korea (Freeman 1987).
Furthermore, since technology and culture are largely endogenous to the organisation of firms, the choices made by entrepreneurs have the potential to ‘change the course of history’ (Schumpeter 1947). This is another aspect of organisational change that distinguishes it from biological evolution – firms do not only alter themselves in response to the environment, but also, and in so doing, alter the environment itself (Chang 1993: 73-4; Kelm 1997; Hodgson 1997; 1999: 143; 2013). Again, this does not undo cumulative causation; on the contrary, it is part of how cumulative causation operates. However, firms can deliberately create ‘space’ for experimenting with new combinations by deliberately altering the institutional environment rather than passively responding to it (Jacobides and Winter 2005: 400​[81]​). Japanese firms, for instance, benefitted significantly from the keiretsu – groups of firms, usually consisting of “one or two fairly large manufacturing enterprises, a bank, one or two trading companies, subsidiaries of the larger companies, and a group of smaller firms that operate as suppliers of various parts for the larger firms” (Leibenstein 1987: 217). The members of the group cooperate “in various ways” with each other, for instance by sharing personnel, offering strategic advice, and providing long-term credit (ibid.; see also Imai and Itami 1984). Freeman (1987: 52ff) in particular argues that the keiretsu allowed Japanese firms to exploit the economies of scale afforded by advanced technologies without suffering the diseconomies of scale associated with large organisations (see also Aoki 1990: 25ff).
In fact, inter-firm associations like the keiretsu are by no means unique to Japan, but are rather so common that Herbert Simon (1991: 28) believed that modern economies are more appropriately referred to as “organizational economies” than “market economies”​[82]​. The most common example is the industrial clusters of the so-called “New Italy”, such as those in the textile industry, which facilitate the sharing of knowledge and resources between numerous small firms (Piore and Sabel 1984). Even conglomerate enterprises, including the Japanese zaibatsu in addition to the multidivisional corporations studied by Chandler (1977, 1980; Chandler and Daems 1981), can be considered as (hierarchical) variations of the business group, as they are essentially ‘firms of firms’ coordinated by a holding company. Interestingly, Williamson (1975: 162) acknowledged in a footnote that the zaibatsu confounded his market-hierarchy dichotomy, but regarded them as “culturally specific”. However, Goto (1982), analysing the zaibatsu using Williamson’s own framework, argues that they are not confined to Japanese culture and have widespread applicability.
Indeed, several authors have contended that the entire Japanese “techno-economic paradigm”, although developing out of specific institutional conditions, is relevant across the globe (Johnson 1992: 40). Cole (1971, Chapter 4; 1979, Chapter 1), for example, argues that systems of lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion, while reflecting cultural traits such as “the importance the Japanese attribute to age” (1979: 3), would be effective in eliciting organisational loyalty in other contexts, and in any case “serve[d] as both cause and effect of the important role assigned to seniority…” (ibid.; see also Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 147-8, 158, 244-5). Indeed, Dore (1973) predicted, and noted evidence of, a sort of ‘reverse convergence’, whereby the organisational innovations of Japan would be adopted in the West. A vast literature, prominently represented by Piore and Sabel’s (1984) notion of the “second industrial divide”, has since confirmed that the organisation of work shifted in dramatically in the 1980s and ‘90s to a less Taylorist system, with work teams, job rotation, and other so-called “high-performance” or “high-involvement” practices resembling those found in Japanese firms becoming the norm in Western countries (see Godard and Delaney 2000). Gjerding (1992) provides particularly relevant evidence of this trend in the Nordic countries, a cultural characterisation of which – for instance along the “dimensions” proposed by Hofstede (2001), especially individualism versus collectivism and attitudes towards uncertainty and superiors – would be virtually the opposite of that of Japan.
Still, organisational innovation and imitation is not straightforward, because the firm must deal with technological and institutional constraints. A social, political, or economic crisis in which prevailing patterns of behavior and structures of power are disrupted may therefore be particularly conducive to organisational innovation and imitation, inducing a search for, and experimentation with, alternative organisational combinations until a new ‘equilibrium’ or ‘path’ is reached (Aoki 2001, Part 2; Greif and Laitin 2004; Simon 1983, Chapter 3). In the long run, this is observed as “punctuated equilibria” whereby “radical innovations” fundamentally alter the nexus of technology, institutions, and organisation (Perez 1983, 1985). Post-World-War Japan, for example, may have represented such an instance.

3.4.4	Policy Implications
In this chapter, we have seen that the firm’s economically proactive role in technological change is undergirded by its socially proactive role in cultivating organisational culture, which is subject to forces of cumulative causation. Although we have also seen that these forces can be resisted through organisation innovation and imitation, they are likely to be magnified by globalisation. Consequently, as most​[83]​ of the theories of economic ‘catch up’ discussed in Section 3.2.5 realised – and as history confirms (Chang 2002) – premature openness is likely to result in organisational combinations that are not necessarily conducive to economic development. Indeed, Gunnar Myrdal (1957) coined the phrase “cumulative causation” to describe the way that social, political, and economic factors, including institutions, interact in a mutually reinforcing manner to stabilise the relative positions of developed and underdeveloped economies, leading to the ‘core-periphery’ dynamics that are the primary concern of dependency theory​[84]​.
An ‘infant firm’ or ‘infant organisational culture’ argument thus emerges: to promote economic development, policy-makers should protect and support the “irreducible agency” of firms in experimenting with alternative organisational combinations that may not be immediately supported by prevailing technological and institutional conditions. Indeed, as Dore (1973) argued in relation to Japan, “latecomers” potentially have greater liberty in determining their socio-economic trajectories, both because their processes of cumulative causation are less advanced and because they can import successful combinations from advanced economies. However, the pressures of globalisation, if left unrestrained (or rather, if manipulated by developed countries) may negate this advantage, implying that successful ‘late development’ involves a proactive state (Dore 2001: 192). Of course, this implication contradicts the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ doctrine, which maintains that economies will spontaneously develop if and only if they remove barriers to trade and investment (along with other ‘market distortions’) – a prescription that gives virtually no consideration to matters of technological change (see Gore 2000; Reinert 2007). 

3.5	Conclusion
To conclude, the firm is a socio-economically proactive institution that plays a key role in the processes of technological and culture change underlying economic development. It is economically proactive because, far from being fully determined by exogenous forces of technology, it actively contributes to the technological foundations of economic development by both applying and developing productive knowledge. It is socially proactive because the cooperation thus involved is based on an organisational culture that not only is distinct from culture at large, but also, through the firm’s constitutive role, influences that culture over time.




















	The first chapter of this dissertation criticised the predominant theories of the firm for neglecting the firm’s social nature, which Chapter 2 attempted to ‘bring back in’ by developing a ‘social’ theory of the firm. A key result of the theory was that firms may face a trade-off between ‘deep-level cooperation’ (cooperation based on trust and loyalty) and ‘surface-level coordination’ (efficient organisation of production), because the bureaucratic organisational structures required for the latter objective may inhibit the solidaristic organisational culture required for the former objective. Because the behavioural effects of organisational structures are mediated by organisational culture (“cultural contingency”), this trade-off can be overcome through an appropriate organisational culture. However, because that organisational culture must be still be substantiated in organisational structures (“structural consistency”), it may require that power-holders relinquish their power (the “distributive dilemma”). Finally, Chapter 3 argued that although forces of cumulative causation exist between technology and institutions on the one hand and the internal organisation of the firm on the other, the firm commands a significant degree of primacy in its selection of organisational structures and organisational cultures, which refutes fatalistic views on economic development.
The present chapter will show that these ideas improve our understanding of cooperative firms. Despite receiving widespread attention for their social and economic benefits, as reflected in the United Nations declaring 2012 to be the ‘International Year of Cooperatives’ and all of the major political parties in the UK extolling ‘the ‘John Lewis model’ of employee ownership, cooperatives are often conceived as inherently limited in the divisions of labour and managerial techniques that they can apply, the scale at which they can operate, and the technologies that they can manage. This perception is reflected in the predominant theories of the firm. In particular, by respectively focusing on surface-level cooperation and (surface- and deep-level) coordination, both contract- and competence-based theories follow the logic of technological determinism by maintaining that advanced technologies entail complex divisions of labour, which in turn require hierarchical management systems​[85]​ that are associated with the capitalist firm. 
However, when the possibility and importance of deep-level cooperation – and the firm’s constitutive role in achieving that cooperation – are considered, it becomes clear that, by avoiding the distributive dilemma, cooperatives in fact have an inherent advantage in not only attaining an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, but also maintaining that culture alongside the bureaucratic organisational structures required to coordinate advanced technologies. By thus overcoming the ubiquitous trade-off between cooperation and coordination, cooperatives may, far from being confined to simple technologies, be more technologically flexible than conventional firms, which is confirmed by both the scorn and praise that they have received from Marxist quarters. This flexibility, however, may be suppressed by an institutional environment geared towards capitalist organisation, which biases both the options available to individuals and the way those options are perceived against cooperatives. Cumulative causation between institutions and the internal organisation of the firm refutes the inference that cooperatives are inefficient because they uncommon and tend to emerge through social movements and government intervention; indeed, precisely such collective action may be required to realise the productive potential of cooperatives.
Note that the analysis of this chapter applies primarily to worker cooperatives – firms that are owned and controlled by their workers. Although consumer cooperatives that are also worker cooperatives (such as Mondragón’s Eroski) fall under this umbrella, in most consumer cooperatives workers are merely hired employees, as in a capitalist firm. It is not clear how the distributive dilemma and the cooperation/coordination trade-off apply to such enterprises; indeed, more research is needed to clarify the distinctive behavioural dynamics of the multifarious forms of cooperative enterprise. It may nevertheless be telling that, in distinguishing between worker and consumer coops, Marx (1867, Section 5, para. 4, emphasis in original) stated: “We recommend to the working men to embark in co-operative production rather than in co-operative stores. The latter touch but the surface of the present economic system, the former attacks its groundwork.” Indeed, it is evident that consumer coops tend not to face the same degree of ‘institutional bias’ as worker coops (see Section 4.3.2). For example, Beatrice Webb (1891; see also Webb and Webb 1920), while dismissing the feasibility of worker coops in the UK due to shortfalls in finance and managerial expertise, believed that federated consumer cooperatives (which would in turn purchase factories and farms) could succeed. The same points also apply to ‘hybrid’ forms of enterprise, whether they be capitalist firms undertaking Employee Stock Ownership Programmes or the sociedades laborales of Spain, which are majority, but not fully, worker-owned and -controlled.
A similar qualification must also be made with regard to agricultural cooperatives, which in fact include (at least) two distinct forms of enterprise. Some agricultural cooperatives are essentially worker cooperatives, wherein the worker-members are farmers (or other agriculturalists). Others, however, are constituted not by individual farmers, but rather by multiple farms, sometimes alongside suppliers and retailers, all of which engage in separate productive activities and only cooperate in order to further specific, coincidental interests, such as the achievement of more favourable input and output prices. Although trust and loyalty are undoubtedly important in these entities, they are not firms proper, in that they do not themselves engage in production (Phillips 1953). It is therefore not surprising that contract-based theorists have represented them as “nexuses of contracts” (Staatz 1987; Cook 1995; Cook and Iliopoulos 2000; Domar 1966; Robinson 1967). That said, if their constituent members are themselves cooperatives, such ‘firms of firms’ could be considered to be a form of the ‘second-tier’ cooperatives discussed in the following chapters, which help resist the forces of cumulative causation that otherwise inhibit cooperatives from achieving their productive potential (see Section 4.3.4).

4.2	Technological and Cultural Determinism in the Case against Cooperatives
4.2.1	The Denigration of Cooperatives in the Theory of the Firm
Both of the predominant schools of theories have tended to deride cooperatives for being inefficient, although contract-based theories have done so more explicitly and extensively than competence-based theories. Despite Williamson’s (1985: 86-90; 1988) claim to the contrary, both sets of criticisms can be regarded as variants of technological determinism – the thesis that technology ultimately stipulates which structures of ownership and control are efficient, and thus likely to emerge (see Section 3.2.1). To see this, consider in turn each of the logically sequential premises of technological determinism: first, that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour; second, that this division of labour stipulates a certain management system; and third, that this management system stipulates a certain structure of ownership and control.

4.2.2	Technology and the Division of Labour
Both sets of criticisms take the first premise – that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour – for granted. In particular, both generally assume that advanced technologies require, and have given rise to, more specialised and complex divisions of labour. Turning firstly to competence-based theories, Chandler (1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981) explicitly argues in his explanation for the rise of the multidivisional corporation that the economies of scale and scope afforded by innovations in transport (viz. the railroad) and communication (viz. the telegraph) could only be realised when stages of production were multiplied and rationalised to facilitate specialisation. 
The first premise is also evident contract-based theories. As Section 1.5.1 explained, these theories tend to assume that transaction costs are inherent in the division of labour, which is in turn treated as exogenous – presumably because it assumed to be determined by technology (Foss 1991: 131). For example, when comparing alternative management systems (“work modes”), Williamson (1975, Chapter 3; 1980; 1985: 255-6) explicitly assumes that each work mode uses the same technology and division of labour. More generally, measurement-cost varieties tend to envisage a division of labour characterised by “team production”, whereby the fruit of each individual’s labour depends on the effort expended by her peers, and then seek to ascertain which management systems and ownership/control structures are efficient given this division of labour (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Barzel 1987; Holmstrom 1982). Asset-specificity varieties, meanwhile, assume that the efficiency of alternative governance structures is determined by which assets are more “specific” to the production process (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). This production process, which is treated as exogenously determined, is bound to involve the division of labour. To see this, note that for worker control to be efficient in asset-specificity models, “human capital” would have to be more “specific” than physical capital. This may be the case when production tasks are highly idiosyncratic and required high levels of skill, while machines could be easily redeployed elsewhere (Dow and Putterman 1996: 22). It should be apparent, however, that these conditions are unlikely to prevail amidst a factory-style division of labour whereby each job has been stripped of its discretionary content and reduced to a programmable movement (“de-skilled”) – the very conditions that spawned the rise of the capitalist firm. In that case, human capital will be highly unspecific, leaving workers with a weak case for controlling the firm.
The first premise of technological determinism has been disputed by Marxians and others (see Section 3.2.2). If their criticisms are valid, cooperatives could potentially apply advanced technologies by implementing less partitioned divisions of labour and less hierarchical management systems. In this vein, it is interesting to note that Cistercian monks at the Rievaulx Abbey in Yorkshire apparently developed a prototype blast furnace in the 1500s, centuries before the Industrial Revolution, and were set to use it on a wide scale before being evicted by Henry VIII (Derbyshire 2002). However, while there is certainly some leeway in workplace design, and while maximally partitioned divisions of labour are likely to be inefficient (for instance, because they stifle teamwork, learning, and innovation, as Adam Smith [1904 [1776], Book V, Chapter 1, para. 178], who famously expounded the productive benefits of specialisation in his Wealth of Nations, acknowledged in the same text), a significant degree of specialisation is likely to be optimal – and perhaps even required – for advanced technologies. Even Marx (1887, Chapter 13; Chapter 14, Section 5) acknowledged that the division of labour has productive benefits independently of ownership by capital – benefits that would be foregone if functional differentiation were abolished​[86]​.

4.2.3	The Division of Labour and the Management System
	In addition to agreeing on the first premise of technological determinism (that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour), contract- and competence-based theories both espouse its second premise by assuming that complex divisions of labour require hierarchical management systems. At this point, however, the two schools subtly diverge: whereas contract-based theories maintain that managerial hierarchies are needed to solve cooperation problems, competence-based theories instead focus on coordination problems, both of which are assumed to stem from complex divisions of labour.
	Turning firstly to contract-based theories, measurement-cost varieties assume that workers have an incentive to free-ride on each other due to the information asymmetries inherent in a division of labour characterised by joint production. For instance, if the marginal product of each worker is unobservable or prohibitively costly to ascertain (or if workers are risk averse), then workers must be paid fixed wages. This induces ‘moral hazard’, because workers are not faced with the full positive and negative consequences of their actions, be it in terms of expenditure of effort, maintenance of equipment, or contribution to investment. Accordingly, to correctly align the incentives of workers, and thus achieve surface-level cooperation, requires managers to appropriately monitor, reward, and punish workers (Williamson 1975: 44-54, 73-4, 98-102; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Holmstrom 1982; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The second premise is less obvious, but no less present, in asset-specificity varieties of contract-based theories. According to these theories, asset specificity – which, as we saw in the previous section, depends on the division of labour – establishes the basis for the “hold-up” problem, whereby asset owners seek to appropriate ‘quasi-rents’ from each other by strategically threatening to renege or underperform, resulting in suboptimal investment decisions (Williamson 1986; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). According to Grossman, Hart, and Moore (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), this cooperation problem can be mitigated by allocating one of the parties “residual rights of control”, which authorise their possessor to control the use of the other parties’ assets beyond any contractually-specified rights. It may appear that this explanation eludes the second premise of technological determinism by jumping from the division of labour straight to the ownership/control structure, but this is only because Grossman, Hart, and Moore essentially envisage a ‘classical firm’ whereby owners are managers. In fact, residual control rights are supposed to be allocated to the party that can most efficiently manage the other party’s assets. Indeed, they are equivalent to what Coase (1937) called “direction”, which he equated with managerial hierarchies. 
Whereas contract-based theories maintain that managerial hierarchies are needed to achieve surface-level cooperation, competence-based theories maintain that managerial hierarchies are needed in order to achieve coordination, on both the surface and deep levels. On the surface level, managerial hierarchies enable separation and specialisation of operational and strategic issues, thus allowing for the numerous stages of production involved in a complex division of labour to be efficiently coordinated in terms of the flow of information, the allocation of skills and resources, the diversification of risk, and so on (Chandler 1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981; Langlois 2007: 58). On the deep level, managers can implement a common set of strategies and practices, for instance by setting a standard of behaviour (Mintzberg 1989). These “routines” in turn provide a common set of cognitive frames that channel the initiative of workers towards to the goals of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1982). On both levels, hierarchical management can facilitate adaptation to change and uncertainty (Simon 1962). For these reasons, if cooperatives are unable to implement managerial hierarchies, they will, from the competence-based perspective, be unable to implement advanced technologies.
Williamson and Chandler both downplay the distinction between the contract- and competence-based rationales for managerial hierarchies, which they respectively invoke to explain the rise of the capitalist firm, even to the point of citing each other (Chandler 1992; Chandler and Daems 1981: 217; Williamson 1985, Chapter 11). As explained in Section 2.3, however, cooperation and coordination are separate objectives, even if certain organisational structures and cultures purport to achieve both (especially on each of the two ‘levels’). Indeed, despite his lip-service to Chandler’s account, Williamson’s (1975, Chapter 3; 1980; 1985: 255-6) dismissal of egalitarian work modes is fully predicated on their alleged inability to achieve surface-level cooperation, as they perform proficiently on his criteria of “product flow” and “assignment”, which essentially refer surface-level coordination, falling short only in the category of “incentives” for work, equipment maintenance, and investment. Contrariwise, although Chandler mentions Williamson’s transaction-cost arguments, they are in no way necessary for his story of coordination to remain coherent.

4.2.4	The Organisational Implications of the Contract-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies
Whether managerial hierarchies are justified by reasons of cooperation or coordination has significant implications on whether worker-owned and -controlled firms are inherently inefficient. That is to say, which of the two arguments is espoused for the second premise of technological determinism (that a given division of labour stipulates a certain management system) matters for the third premise (that a given management system stipulates a certain structure of ownership and control).
If hierarchical management is justified by cooperation problems, as maintained by contract-based theories, then, as those theories have argued, it stipulates non-worker ownership and control. The reason is that ownership of the firm (and its associated control rights) is an intrinsic part of resolving the sort of cooperation problems envisaged in contract-based theories. This is most obvious in measurement-cost varieties, in which the focal cooperation problem is free-riding by workers. In Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) model, the most efficient way to incentivise managers to monitor workers is to award them the rights to the ‘residual’, which represents the product left over after all individually contractible returns have been paid. Workers, however, could not be thus incentivised by residual claims, because they would merely free-ride on each other’s monitoring just as they were already free-riding on each other’s work, investment, and equipment maintenance. The same reasoning is found in Holmstrom’s (1982) model, in which managers achieve surface-level cooperation by implementing incentive schemes rather than directly monitoring workers​[87]​. In both models, hierarchical management purporting to achieve surface-level cooperation stipulates non-worker ownership and control. As Holmstrom (ibid.: 338-9) states, “…the free-rider problem, which may arise in a multiagent setting, can largely be resolved if ownership and labor are partly separated. This gives capitalistic firms an advantage over partnerships.”
In asset-specificity varieties, meanwhile, owners of labour and capital have equal a priori claims to control rights – which party should hire the other party’s assets depends only on which assets are more specific to the production process at hand, and in many cases skills are likely to be more specific than machinery. However, by treating capital and labour symmetrically, these models overlook the fact that workers could purchase equipment rather than lease it – a possibility that does not apply to capital suppliers, who, due to the prohibition of slavery, can only hire labour (see Section 1.5.2) (Dow and Putterman 1996: 61-2; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). In any case, it is usually providers of financial capital, and not physical capital, that own the firm – and financial capital is surely less production-specific than either human or physical capital (Leijonhufvud 1986). The question is therefore why investors should own the firm rather than workers.
To answer this question, contract-based theories invoke a series of neoclassical models maintaining that a worker-owned and -controlled firm (“Labour-Managed Firm” or “LMF”) suffers from an array of suboptimal investment incentives relative to an otherwise identical capital-owned and -controlled ‘twin’ (a “KMF”)​[88]​. The first of these models was that of Ward (1958), in which workers maximised average share value rather than total profits, leading to ‘perverse’ behaviour with regard to membership, output, and factor intensity in a sort of ‘tragedy of the commons’ (see also Domar 1966; Vanek 1970). A later set of models, building on this neoclassical foundation, analysed the issues of liquidity and appropriability that stem from worker ownership, especially when workers collectively rather than individually own the firm’s assets (Furubotn 1976; Pejovich 1969; Furubotn and Pejovich 1970). In these models, ownership by labour elevates transaction costs of negotiation, regulation, and enforcement; inhibits wealth diversification and breeds risk-aversion; biases investment decisions away from labour-saving technologies; and mismatches reward with effort and time horizons with investment returns. 
In true neoclassical style, the LMF models had no place for the division of labour or the management system, and thus, like asset-specificity varieties of contract-based theories, appear to sidestep the logical sequence of technological determinism by skipping straight to ownership and control. In fact, however, by ignoring the division of labour, and thus implicitly assuming that an LMF must utilise the same division of labour as its KMF twin, these models inadvertently acceded to the first premise of technological determinism. That they also acceded to the second premise is demonstrated by the fact that, although they compare how alternative ownership structures fare with cooperation problems, they nevertheless label their representative firms as labour- or capital-“managed”. Their accession to the third premise is similarly revealed by their implicit assumption, which they share with the asset-specificty theories, that whichever party manages the firm (viz. capital or labour) also owns and controls it.
In short, if the division of labour is such that hierarchical management is needed to achieve surface-level cooperation, then workers should not own/control the firm, according to contract-based theories. Accordingly, cooperatives will only be viable from the contract-based perspective when the division of labour is such that managerial hierarchies are not the most efficient way of achieving surface-level cooperation. In particular, when labour is exceptionally difficult to monitor (in the measurement-cost branch), specific to the production process (in the asset-specificity branch), and/or intensive in production relative to capital (in the LMF models), the costs of enforcing cooperation borne by non-worker-owners will outweigh the cooperation problems involved in worker ownership/control. For example, contract-based theories generally agree – and evidence seems to confirm (Wilson, Zhang, and Robinson 2003) – that worker ownership and control (especially in the form partnerships) can be optimal in professionals like law, in which workers possess significant levels of rarefied knowledge and skill (Jensen and Meckling 1979: 500-3; Russell 1985). Not only is such ‘human capital’ unusually specific to the particular occupation and worker (Hart and Moore 1990: 1135), but it also makes its possessors virtually impossible to monitor, other than by peers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 786), and is often the most intensive ‘input’, with a relatively low capital requirement (Meade 1972: 426-7). In industries where such conditions do not hold, however, managerial hierarchies will be required, and worker ownership/control will be inefficient, according to contract-based theories.
Incidentally, this prediction also entails the culturalist implication that where cooperatives are successful in such industries, it must be due to underlying cultural factors that reduce the prevalence of cooperation problems, for example by altering “transactional attitudes” (Williamson 1975: 30, fn. 22). For example, the ability of the Mondragón cooperatives to thrive in industrial sectors with high levels of capital intensity, significant investment requirements, and complex divisions of labour has been attributed to the uniquely cooperative traits of Basque culture (See Section 5.4.1). Amidst cultures that lack such traits, cooperatives will generally be “rendered nonviable by the intrusion of unscreened and unpenalized opportunists” (Williamson 1985: 64-5).
So, given its implications for cooperative organisation, is the contract-based rationale for hierarchical management justified?

4.2.5	Evaluating the Contract-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies
4.2.5.1	The Endogeneity of Behaviour
Contract-based theories are predicated on the assumption that individualistic behaviour prevails universally and unconditionally. Accordingly, from this perspective, there is nothing fundamentally different between a cooperative and a capitalist firm – both are merely “nexuses of contracts”. Indeed, Hansmann (2013) has argued that all firms (and even governments) are essentially cooperatives – the question is simply which stakeholders are ‘cooperating’ by holding shares. Regardless of whether it is a “capital cooperative” (i.e. a capitalist firm) or a “labour cooperative” (i.e. a cooperative in the usual sense), to use Hansmann’s terminology, the purpose of the firm is to achieve surface-level cooperation in transactionally costly situations of joint production and investment (that is, the division of labour), according to contract-based theories. If managerial hierarchies are required to achieve this surface-level cooperation, they are therefore the very “nature of the firm”, as Coase argued in his seminal 1937 article, and as Williamson (1975) acknowledged in his dichotomy between “Markets and Hierarchies”. It therefore goes without saying that when Williamson (1975, Chapter 3; 1980; 1985: 255-6) compares alternative modes of governance, the least hierarchical modes perform the worst​[89]​.
However, as Section 2.2 made clear, behaviour can be not only “individualistic”, but also “solidaristic”. If this latter “behavioural mode” prevails, cooperation based on trust and loyalty (“deep-level cooperation”) is possible, even amidst complex divisions of labour. Which behavioural mode prevails in turn depends on the organisation of the firm, and therefore cannot be held constant when comparing alternative types of firm. As Hodgson (1999: 214) states, “…Williamson puts forward a model of individual human nature (i.e. ‘opportunism’) and recklessly assumes that it applies equally to quite different forms of institutional arrangement, and that in particular it applies equally and universally to the market and all types of firm…No recognition is made of the effect of the institutional environment in moulding actions and beliefs.” Indeed, as we saw in Section 2.2.4, managerial hierarchies may reinforce, or even generate, the individualistic behaviour that they purport to constrain. By contrast, participatory management systems may contribute to an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation (Pérotin and Robinson 2004). In fact, even Williamson (1975: 44-5, 79) concedes the “caveat” that the “atmosphere” of non-hierarchical forms of organisation (what he calls “peer groups”) may generate “associational gains” by transforming behaviour “from calculative to a more nearly quasimoral mode”. Hierarchical management systems, by contrast, tend to “upset” such behaviour, which Williamson suggests is the primary reason that they do not fully displace peer groups (ibid.: 55). 
Furthermore, the prevalence of individualistic behaviour may be a symptom not only of managerial hierarchies, but also of non-worker ownership, along with its associated control rights. According to the distributive dilemma of Section 2.3.3, attempts to stimulate solidaristic behaviour and achieve deep-level cooperation without altering the power structure (which, in Section 3.2.4, I argued is embodied in the control rights associated with ownership) are likely to be ineffective and even counterproductive. By contrast, worker ownership and control may stimulate solidaristic behaviour and deep-level cooperation; as Albert Hirschman (1979, Chapter 7) recognised, individuals enjoying “voice” within an organisation are likely to behave loyally towards that organisation. Indeed, cooperatives often feature higher levels of organisational identification, stronger work ethics, more cooperative relationships, and higher levels of productivity than conventional firms (Thomas and Logan 1982; Bradley and Gelb 1981; Frohlich et al. 1998; Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 1987). This is often the case even when the firm is collectively owned by the workforce – a situation in which material incentives are particularly weak, as the LMF literature was at pains to show​[90]​ (Bonin and Putterman 2001: 128-9). Indeed, the non-contractible nature of collective property rights may be precisely what allows non-contractual relationships (and the non-instrumental rationality accompanying them) to take hold. By avoiding the distributive dilemma, worker ownership and control may also augment the positive behavioural effects of participatory organisational structures, including management systems (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). To this effect, Doucouliagos (1995) found that although capitalist firms introducing participatory work techniques (such as quality circles) or employee-stock ownership programmes (ESOPs) usually enjoy an increase in productivity, the effects are significantly greater for firms that are actually worker-owned and -controlled​[91]​.
Crucially, the stimulation of solidaristic behaviour and deep-level cooperation may obviate the need for managerial hierarchies to achieve surface-level cooperation. Indeed, worker-owned firms often feature less managerial supervision than traditional firms, in part due to the prevalence of ‘mutual monitoring’ amongst peers (Weitzman and Kruse 1990; FitzRoy and Kraft 1986; Bradley and Gelb 1981​[92]​). Echoing Alchian and Demsetz’ argument for non-worker ownership, Jensen and Meckling (1979: 485) point out that mutual monitoring entails a collective action problem, because the costs of time, effort, and possibly social status borne by each individual monitor are likely to offset her share of the benefits generated by monitoring, which she can anyway enjoy without monitoring so long as enough of her co-workers choose to monitor. This, however, is precisely the point – workers will only choose to monitor each other if they are intrinsically motivated to do so (due to loyalty), and if they expect enough of their coworkers to do so (due to trust) – that is, if deep-level cooperation prevails (McCain 2007).
The need for managerial hierarchies to achieve surface-level cooperation, far from being inherent in the division of labour, may therefore be a symptom of – and therefore not a reason for – non-worker ownership and control. As Valentinov (2004: 11) states, “Whereas the advantages of hierarchy are mainly seen in enhanced incentive instruments to combat opportunistic behaviour…the advantage of…cooperative organisation lies in eliminating the opportunistic behaviour itself…” Indeed, although Coase reckoned in his seminal 1937 article that managerial hierarchies purporting to achieve surface-level cooperation were the very “nature of the firm”, he was in fact referring to the capitalist firm, characterised by an employer-employee relationship (see Section 2.4) (Hodgson 1999: 220-2). It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that the concept of transaction costs – which, according to Williamson, are based on opportunistic behaviour – derives from the same article. Cooperatives, by contrast, possess a “dual nature” in that they are simultaneously business enterprises with economic objectives and social groups based on deep-level cooperation (Draheim 1952).
We have established that the need for surface-level cooperation is not completely determined by the division of labour, because it can be largely substituted by deep-level cooperation. However, as has been emphasised in earlier sections (particularly Sections 1.3.1, 2.2.1, and 2.4), the opposite does not hold – surface-level cooperation is insufficient in circumstances requiring deep-level cooperation. This implies that that the division of labour is more likely to stipulate a certain degree of deep-level cooperation than it is to stipulate a certain degree of surface-level cooperation. To see this, consider that for firms achieving cooperation on the surface level, job-specific skills and discretion represent sources of asymmetric information (and thus cooperation problems) that must be minimised (Williamson 1975). Marx (1887, Chapter 13; Chapter 14, Section 5) therefore contended that ownership by capital entails a sub-optimal division of labour that limits the physical and cognitive capacities of workers – a point which Braverman (1974) extensively demonstrated in his wide-ranging study subtitled The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. However, such “de-skilling” will not be feasible for technologies that involve a significant, irreducible component of skill and discretion, which may stipulate more “organic” divisions of labour (Burns and Stalker 1961). “Flexible production”, for example, may have increased in prevalence thanks to its superior ability to handle innovations in ICT (Piore and Sabel 1984). Indeed, a number of surveys have shown that the organisation of work shifted in dramatically in the 1980s and ‘90s to a less Taylorist system, with work teams, job rotation, and other so-called “high-performance” or “high-involvement” practices resembling those found in Japanese firms becoming the norm in Western countries (see Godard and Delaney 2000) (see Section 3.4.3).
By requiring a greater extent of deep-level cooperation, these divisions of labour may, as per Piore and Sabel’s (1984) thesis, in turn be stipulating alternative management systems (Jones and Goic 2010), such as those characterising Japanese firms (Aoki 1990​[93]​). Indeed, Dore (1973) noted that the so-called ‘Japanese Management System’ was being adopted around the world. Due to the distributive dilemma discussed in Section 2.3.3, however, conventionally-owned and -controlled firms may be unable to achieve a sufficient degree of deep-level cooperation in any event, and may therefore be unable to forego the disciplinary function of traditional managerial hierarchies (see Section 3.2.4). Alternative management systems may therefore stipulate the “organic” as opposed to “mechanistic” organisations theorised by Burns and Stalker (1961; see also Arygris 1957, 1964; McGregor 1960; Etzioni 1961​[94]​), which could conceivably include cooperative firms (Bennis and Slater 1968; V. N. Zamagni 2014; Valentinov 2004). In fact, already in 1889 Alfred Marshall believed that, owing to their unique advantage in achieving deep-level cooperation, cooperatives had the potential to make use of skills and resources that would otherwise be wasted by distributive conflict, and as a result would eventually displace capitalist firms as the predominant mode of organisation (Jossa 2014: 2-3). Indeed, a trend towards participatory organisation has been widely noted across the globe (e.g. Vanek 1971; Kato, Lee, and Ryu 2010; S. Zamagni 2014).
The possibility that the minimum degree of deep-level cooperation required by technology may be out of reach of conventionally-owned firms can be illustrated graphically by a modification of Figure 4, presented in Figure 7 (below). Here, the division of labour associated with the underlying technology requires a minimum degree of deep-level cooperation, ‘μ’. The level of participation that maximises the difference between the total benefits of deep-level cooperation and the loss of power incurred by power-holders (‘b’), however, yields a degree of deep-level cooperation below this minimum. In fact, achieving that minimum may require a degree of participation for which the net benefits of deep-level cooperation accruing to power-holders is actually negative; in the figure, this is represented by the Loss of Power curve lying above the Total Benefits curve at the degree of participation associated with μ. In other words, achieving μ is not feasible given the current power structure, and would require that the power structure be completely overhauled.

Figure 7: The Minimum Degree of Deep-Level Cooperation

In fact, we have already seen that contract-based theories often deem worker ownership and control to be the most efficient means of securing surface-level cooperation when high levels of specific and rarefied human capital would otherwise lead to uncontrollable problems of shirking and hold-up. However, the benefits of worker ownership and control in terms of deep-level cooperation may be equally necessary in such situations precisely because surface-level cooperation is likely to be insufficient. Indeed, Williamson (1981: 565) states that when human capital confounds contracting and monitoring, the firm will resemble a “relational team” that “will engage in considerable social conditioning, to help assure that employees understand and are dedicated to the purposes of the firm”. Once solidaristic behaviour is thus achieved, skill and discretion can be used as a platform for trust and loyalty – that is, deep-level cooperation. While in Section 2.3.3 we saw this phenomenon at play in Japanese firms, which eschew rigid job classifications and invest heavily in worker training, investments in worker skills are also markedly prevalent in cooperatives, such as those discussed in the following chapters. Indeed, although Williamson (ibid.) believes that his “relational teams” are “very difficult to develop” and that “it is uncertain how widespread or sustainable they are”, he identifies “some of the Japanese corporations” and “certain utopian societies” – the latter in which he (1985: 65-6) seems to categorise cooperatives – as examples.
A particularly enlightening example is offered by agriculture, in which cooperatives are relatively common. It is generally agreed that agriculture is characterised by acute seasonal variations, climactic uncertainty, task-specific equipment, and temporally and geographically dispersed labour, among other factors that inhibit contractual specification and enforcement (e.g. Staatz 1987; Bonus 1986). Evoking the old debate over sharecropping​[95]​, Bradley and Clark (1972) argue that worker ownership may be optimal under these circumstances because it provides material incentives for workers to expend effort and take initiative without supervision. However, Bradley and Clark exclusively focus exclusively on surface-level cooperation, even stating that cooperatives should be based on “the self-interest of the member” rather than “non-selfish other-directed motivation”, the latter of which, according to them, have generally been unforthcoming other than in “rare cases, such as monastic farms and the Israeli Kibbutz” (ibid.: 466, 472). However, Cook (1995; Cook and Iliopoulos 2000) has shown that property rights in agricultural cooperatives are poorly defined, and thus subject to free-riding, obviating the value of worker ownership for surface-level cooperation. It may therefore be more reasonable to interpret the prevalence of cooperative organisations in agriculture as a means of eliciting the high degree of deep-level cooperation required in the sector (Valentinov 2007)​[96]​. 
If cooperatives are required in sectors where the minimum degree of deep-level cooperation is relatively high, what about in sectors where that minimum is relatively low, such as mass production industries? Although conventional firms may subsist in such cases, productive advantages can always be generated by increasing deep-level cooperation beyond the minimum requirement (Owan 2011). After all, even a firm in a low-skilled manufacturing sector can benefit from less shirking and less need to monitor workers, not to mention less strikes. The ability of cooperatives to achieve deep-level cooperation will therefore still be advantageous. For example, Perry (1978) found that workers in cooperative garbage collection firms had a greater sense of pride, ownership, and dignity than workers in equivalent private and municipal firms, perceiving themselves as “partners” rather than “garbage men” in a low-skilled occupation traditionally perceived as menial and degrading. Piore and Sabel’s (1984) notion of the two “industrial divides” can be reinterpreted in these terms: although non-participatory firms subsisted during the “first industrial divide” (i.e. the rise of mass production in the 1900s) because the minimum degree of deep-level cooperation was low relative to the “second industrial divide” (i.e. the rise of IT in the 1970s) – during which the heightened need for deep-level cooperation necessitated participatory organisation – they were nevertheless outperformed by their participatory counterparts in other countries. Dore’s (1973) theory of ‘reverse convergence’ can likewise be restated in the proposition that, while Japanese-style organisational forms would eventually be embraced around the world due to the heightened need for deep-level cooperation, they nevertheless gave the Japanese economy an advantage in earlier decades. This is an important point given that virtually no country has ever established a developed economy without industrialising (Chang 2002, 2008; Reinert 2007).
It has been claimed, most forcefully by Hansmann (1988, 1990, 1996), that worker governance contains inherent inefficiencies – that is, inefficiencies that do not necessarily derive from the need for hierarchical management – not least due to the intensive and extensive processes that it involves. Indeed, in her oft-cited survey, Webb (1891; see also Webb and Webb 1920) identified the costs of democracy as a major cause of the rarity of worker coops in Great Britain. However, while democratic governance is indeed likely to entail costs that could be avoided by a more authoritarian system, these must be weighed against the benefits of deep-level cooperation that it affords. In fact, these benefits may even reduce the costs to an extent, because it will be easier for individuals espousing an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation to achieve consensus – whether because their preferences are similar (which Hansmann identifies as the primary factor in reducing the costs of democracy) or because they are willing to forego their preferences for the sake of organisational goals. 

4.2.5.2	Surface-level Cooperation without Managerial Hierarchies
The organisational strategy of achieving deep-level cooperation through non-hierarchical management and worker ownership/control rests on the idea that ‘the best defence (against individualistic behaviour) is a good offense (of stimulating solidaristic behaviour)’. As Williamson (1985: 65-6) points out, this is a risky strategy, because the firm will be left exposed to opportunism if a solidaristic organisational culture is not established. Some degree of surface-level cooperation, moreover, is likely to be required regardless of the organisational structures and organisational culture that do or do not prevail.
However, although I argued in the previous sub-section that worker ownership is not necessarily optimal for surface-level cooperation, neither is it necessarily sub-optimal. This seems to be confirmed empirically, as capitalist firms introducing employee stock ownership programmes (and other forms of what Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi [2011] call “shared capitalism”) often enjoy an increase in productivity (Matrix Evidence 2010; Blinder 1990; Institute for Social Research 1979). In fact, while Alfred Marshall believed that cooperatives would eventually displace capitalist firms as the predominant mode of organisation owing to their superior ability to generate deep-level cooperation, John Stuart Mill made the same prediction based on their capacity for surface-level cooperation (Jossa 2014: 2-3). Non-hierarchical management, meanwhile, may entail less asymmetry of information than hierarchical management because workers are most advantageously positioned to monitor each other (Aoki 1984: 167; 1986). It may also reduce the number of layers in the ‘principal-agent problem’, thus mitigating the wasteful pursuit of managerial ‘sub-goals’ like career enhancement (Eswaran and Kotwal 1984​[97]​). 
Furthermore, even if non-hierarchical management and worker ownership are not inherently better suited to achieve surface-level cooperation than their opposite numbers, organisational structures other than managerial hierarchies and non-worker ownership are available to protect against opportunism, such as Mondragón’s ‘internal capital accounts’ discussed in Section 5.5.2, or the group reward schemes suggested by Holmstrom (1982), which Archibald and Neary (1983) and MacLeod (1984, 1988) argue can be feasibly implemented without resorting to non-worker managers or owners. Although such structures cannot be excessively emphasised if an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation is to be preserved, worker-managed and -owned/controlled firms may be more propitiously structured to strike this balance of ‘structural consistency’ than conventional firms, the power structures of which render deep- rather than surface-level cooperation the elusive objective.

4.2.5.3	Cooperatives and Culture Reconsidered
The ability of cooperatives to create solidaristic organisational cultures and to restrain individualistic behaviour disputes the culturalist implication of contract-based theories. In a “digression” on opportunism, even Williamson (1985: 65-6, emphasis added) admits that non-hierarchical firms “based on nonopportunistic principles”, although “very fragile” due to the pervasive menace of opportunism, may be able to not only “screen against” but also “socially recondition, and otherwise penalize opportunistic invaders” (see also Williamson 1975: 55; Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 95-7). While it is true that organisational culture must work with the “raw material” of culture, moreover, it is plausible that virtually every culture contains aspects that are conducive to cooperative organisation, be it Basque ‘solidarity’, Confucian ‘loyalty’, or even a ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ (see Furlough and and Strikewerda 1999). This flexibility helps to explain why cooperatives exist in virtually every country around the world. For example, despite its reputation as the cradle of individualism and capitalist enterprise, the United States boasts a rich history of cooperativism, as well as communalism, unionism, and other labour movements (Curl 2009; Nadeau and Thompson 1996). In the 1880s, the US contained more cooperatives than in other country (Franke and Chasin 2013: 25), and in 2008, more than 120 million people in the US – about 40% of the country’s population – were members of cooperatives (Curl 2009: 1), although most of these are not worker coops per se (electricity coops are particularly common, as are federations of dairy coops like CHS, Dairy Farmers of America, and Land O’Lakes, respectively the second, fifth, and sixth largest agricultural cooperatives in the world) (World Co-operative Monitor 2013: 17).
Furthermore, as Pateman (1970) proposed, the organisational culture embodied in industrial democracy may ‘spill over’ into the culture of society at large, albeit slowly and marginally, at least to begin with. John Stuart Mill (1871: 716, quoted in Jossa 2014: 2) expressed the same idea a century earlier when he predicted that cooperatives would incite a “moral revolution” thanks to “the conversion of each human being’s daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies…”; Alfred Marshall (1889: 227, quoted in Jossa 2014: 2-3) likewise praised the ability of cooperatives “to produc[e] fine human beings”, “train[ed]…to collective action…and for the attainment of collective ends”. The so-called ‘spillover thesis’ has been confirmed in several case studies (see Footnote 35), and is further corroborated in the following chapters. In Venezuela, to take but one example, Piñeiro Harnecker (2009b: 323, 330) found a positive association between participation in cooperatives, which the late president Hugo Chavez promoted as a key component of his ‘Bolivarian Revolution’, and community participation more broadly, for example in the ‘communal councils’ that he concomitantly established as a conduit for what he called ‘twenty-first century socialism’.

4.2.6	Evaluating the Competence-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies
If managerial hierarchies cannot be justified by their ability to achieve surface-level cooperation, as in contract-based theories, can they be justified by their ability to achieve (surface- and deep-level) coordination, as in competence-based theories? The theory of the firm developed in Chapter 2 would answer in the affirmative. In Section 3.2.3, we saw that although the division of labour does not necessary stipulate a certain degree of surface-level cooperation, which can be substituted with deep-level cooperation, the same cannot be said for surface- (and deep-) level coordination, the need for which is insensitive to which behavioural mode prevails. Furthermore, because they forego the benefits of managerial specialisation by requiring consent on every decision made in the workplace, completely egalitarian management systems will be unable to achieve the high degree of surface-level coordination stipulated by complex divisions of labour (Williamson 1975, Chapter 3). Pagano (1991: 318n) therefore argues that the division of labour may be more efficiently coordinated by skilled managers in a hierarchical system even if transaction costs are completely absent. Complex divisions of labour may also require managerial hierarchies for the purpose of achieving deep-level coordination, because a multiplicity of diverse jobs must all be channelled to a common objective (Nelson and Winter 1982). Even Marx (1887: 227) recognised the ubiquitous need for managerial hierarchies to achieve coordination when he stated: “All combined labour on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious working of the individual activities, and to perform the general functions that have their origin in the action of the combined organism, as distinguished from the action of the separate organs. A single violin player is his own conductor; an orchestra requires a separate one.”

4.2.7	The Organisational Implications of the Competence-Based Rationale for Managerial Hierarchies
4.2.7.1	The ‘Managerial Sandwich’
However, whereas managerial hierarchies justified on the basis of surface-level cooperation imply that workers should not own/control the firm, managerial hierarchies justified on the basis of coordination have no clear implication regarding the structure of ownership and control, and therefore do not imply that cooperative organisation is technologically or culturally constrained. Noting that “[a]n orchestra conductor need not own the instruments of his orchestra, nor is it within the scope of his duties as conductor to have anything to do with the ‘wages’ of the other musicians”, Marx (1959 [1894], Chapter 23, para. 46) therefore stated that “the work of supervision, entirely divorced from the ownership of capital, is always readily obtainable” (see also Tomlinson 1980). Williamson (1985: 222) in fact acknowledges this when he states: “Although capitalist modes are more hierarchical than collective ownership modes from a contractual point of view, the more critical hierarchy for performance purposes is the decision-making hierarchy. The observed relation between ownership and hierarchy is very weak in decision-making respects.” Indeed, unlike their contract-based counterparts, competence-based theories have not methodically analysed the efficiency of competing “modes of organization” (Williamson 1975, Chapter 3; 1980; 1985: 255-6) in like fashion to contract-based theories, and so do not explicitly denounce cooperative organisation by drawing a theoretical connection between managerial hierarchies and the capitalist firm. Chandler (1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981) assumes that managerial hierarchies are associated with capitalist ownership and control, but solely, it would appear, due to historical happenstance​[98]​ (see also Langlois 2007).
It may be assumed that cooperatives are precluded from implementing managerial hierarchies because they are based on egalitarian principles. For example, Rothschild and Whitt (1986: 60-1) maintain that egalitarian management systems, along with undifferentiated divisions of labour, are “an essential feature” of what they call “collectivist organizations”. As they acknowledge, such organisations will subsist only when technology is “relatively undeveloped”, when tasks are “relatively simple”, and/or when “processes of knowledge diffusion” can be applied (ibid.: 104-5). Otherwise, as Williamson (1975: 47) has pointed out, “a trade-off between performance and peer group democracy must be faced”. Indeed, this very trade-off motivated Weber to dismiss “the anarchist ideal of organization without authority” as “a hopelessly utopian idea”, feasible “only under select conditions” (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 22). The conclusion that results from this analysis is that “standardised production, assembly-line systems, unskilled employment, a vertical command chain – all characteristics of Chandler’s corporation… – represent factors that effectively impeded the co-operative movement’s success in the world of manufacturing, particularly during the phase of American ‘Fordism’” and that capitalist firms will inevitably “continue to [predominate] in those areas characterised by high levels of standardisation and mechanisation in capital-intensive sectors” (V. N. Zamagni 2014: 197-8, 207). Even the kibbutzim – Israeli communal settlements that operate primarily in the agricultural sector, often regarded as the foremost example of “collectivist organizations” – seem to be unable to adhere to Rothschild and Whitt’s ideal, with functional and managerial differentiation increasingly evident​[99]​ (Rosner 1982, 1985; Leviatan and Rosner 1980).
However, managerial hierarchies in the competence-based rationale are fundamentally distinct from managerial hierarchies in the contract-based rationale: whether they purport to achieve coordination on the surface or deep level, such organisational structures are merely another cog in the division of labour (Knight 1921; Langlois and Cosgel 1993). Thus, as long as worker-owners agree to tolerate functional differentiation – perhaps espousing a principle of solidarity rather than egalitarianism – there is no definitive reason why they cannot elect managers for the sake of achieving coordination while retaining ultimate control – such managers would exercise only delegated (or “formal”) rather than ultimate (or “real”) authority​[100]​ (Aghion and Tirole 1997). The resulting organisational form can be conceptualised as a ‘managerial sandwich’, whereby workers consent to functional differentiation and ma	nagerial control in the workplace, but nevertheless enjoy equal treatment as members and retain ultimate control over managers in the realm of governance (see Figure 8, below). In fact, electing managers is a common practice amongst cooperatives, and it is hard to find an example of a cooperative that does not delegate authority to some extent (Russell 1985; Vogt 1996: 40-1). Although such practices rule out Rothschild and Whitt’s ideal of a “collectivist organization”, they can potentially allow cooperatives to reap the benefits of surface-level coordination and so manage advanced technologies.


Figure 8: The Managerial Sandwich 

4.2.7.2	Overcoming the Cooperation/Coordination Trade-off
In fact, worker-owned and -controlled firms may be more capable of implementing managerial hierarchies for the sake of achieving coordination than conventionally-owned and -controlled firms. The reason lies in the fact that the competence-based rationale for hierarchy, like its contract-based counterpart, does not fully articulate the importance of deep-level cooperation – “the very nature and rationale of organization” (Simon 1991: 33): as Section 1.3 argued, while contract-based theories focus exclusively on surface-level cooperation, competence-based theories tend to ignore issues of cooperation altogether in their preoccupation with coordination. Moreover, as Section 2.3 explained, a potentially critical trade-off exists between coordination (especially surface-level coordination) and deep-level cooperation, if the bureaucratic organisational structures needed for the former objective – namely complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems – undermine the solidaristic organisational culture needed for the latter objective. Although this trade-off can be alleviated by an organisational culture that tolerates those bureaucratic structures while still nurturing solidaristic behaviour and deep-level cooperation (“cultural contingency”), that culture must still be substantiated in organisational structures (“structural consistency”).
Conventional firms are likely to face a ‘distributive dilemma’ in this regard, as the structural changes required in the realm of governance will undermine the role of power-holders, who will consequently not receive the full benefits of deep-level cooperation generated by those structural changes (see Section 2.3.3). As a result, any managerial hierarchies that they implement for the sake of surface-level coordination are likely to stimulate individualistic behaviour, and so exacerbate cooperation problems. This is perhaps why Williamson and Chandler, who primarily analyse the capitalist firm, seem to believe that their competing rationales are merely expressing two sides of the same coin – in capitalist firms, the coordination and cooperation roles of managerial hierarchies do indeed dovetail.  Cooperatives, by contrast, do not face the distributive dilemma, and so contain the potential to separate these functions: with deep-level cooperation achieved through participation in governance, coordination can be achieved through managerial hierarchies in the workplace (Fox 1974, Chapter 2)​[101]​. Because managers in this system are elected by workers (they are “representative”) and do not purport to achieve cooperation but only coordination (they are not “punishment-centred”), their adverse behavioural effects are likely to be diminished (Gouldner 1954). They may, for example, come to be seen as salutary ‘leaders’ rather than imperious ‘bosses’ (Avey, Wernsing, and Palanski 2012). As Marx (1959 [1894], Chapter 23, para. 48) recognised, “In a co-operative factory the antagonistic nature of the labour of supervision disappears, because the manager is paid by the labourers instead of representing capital counterposed to them.” Perhaps for this reason, Pateman (1970: 69-72) argued that “full participation” in governance (what she called the “high level”) could significantly affect democratic attitudes and abilities even when participation in the workplace (the “low level”) was only “partial” (see also Kaswan 2013). 
By virtue of their ability to alleviate the cooperation/coordination trade-off, cooperatives may, far from being technologically constrained, in fact be more technologically flexible than conventional firms. Agriculture again offers an enlightening example. We saw in Section 4.2.5.1 that agricultural cooperatives may preponderate due to their ability to achieve the high degree of deep-level cooperation required for production in the sector. Why, though, are cooperatives needed for this purpose, when family farms would serve equally well (Pollak 1985)? According to Valentinov (2007), the answer lies in the fact that family farms are inherently limited in their ability to achieve economies of scale (Schmidt 1991), which in Section 2.3.1 I suggested can be conceived as a function of surface-level coordination. They are, in this sense, equivalent to Rothschild and Whitt’s (1979, 1986) “collectivist organizations”. Although Bradley and Clark (1972: 472) express concern that agricultural cooperatives may likewise have to forego economies of scale in order to maintain surface-level cooperation, Valentinov argues that agricultural cooperatives are capable of garnering the benefits of family-based firms in terms of deep-level cooperation, fostering organisational rather than familial loyalty, whilst also achieving the economies of scale foregone by those firms. Essentially, I am suggesting that a variation of Valentinov’s argument can be extended to all worker cooperatives, which have the potential to enjoy the benefits of capitalist firms in terms of surface-level coordination without sacrificing the benefits of Rothschild and Whitt’s (1986) “collectivist organizations” in terms of deep-level cooperation.
In fact, this ability may help resolve a significant controversy regarding the three-stage sequence of organisational evolution proposed by the thesis of technological determinism, discussed in Section 3.2.1. There appears to have been consensus among the technologists that “organic organisations” would prevail in the first stage (characterised by “small-batch production”, “unit technology”, or “craft industry”), with “mechanistic organisations” assuming predominance in the second stage (characterised by “mass production”, “large-batch production”, or “assembly-line industry”). However, a controversy arose in the third stage, characterised by “continuous process” technologies. Although most authors (including Blauner [1964], Touraine [1955], Woodward [1965], and Burns and Stalker [1961]) believed that organic organisations would once again be preferred, others contended that, on the contrary, organisations would become more mechanistic, featuring an increase in bureaucracy and alienation (e.g. Bright 1958; Braverman 1974). Some of the disagreement undoubtedly originated in how the third stage was envisaged – for some, it heralded a ‘post-industrial age’, whereas for others, it marked the height of mechanisation. Nevertheless, it could also derive from the fact that firms implementing “continuous process” technologies would require both deep-level cooperation (due to the abundance of worker discretion) and surface-level coordination (due to the complexity of the production process), and would thus appear to be “organic” in some respects and “mechanistic” in others. 
Japanese firms – which represent the archetypal ‘third-stage’ organisations – seem to fit this description, as they embody a seemingly impossible combination of bureaucratic organisational structures and solidaristic organisational cultures that allows them to overcome the cooperation/coordination trade-off (see Section 2.3.3) (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Gjerding 1992; Dore 1973). Indeed, this feat could explain Ouchi’s claim that Japanese firms did not fit within either McGregor’s (1960) managerial dichotomy of “Theory X” and “Theory Y” (analogous to Burns and Stalker’s [1961] “organic” and “mechanistic” organisations) or Williamson’s (1975) transactional dichotomy of “markets and hierarchies”, instead representing a third category – what he called “Theory Z” (1981) or “clans” (1980). As I argued in Section 2.3.3, moreover, such a feat is only possible because Japanese firms are effectively run in the interests of their workers, which allows them to implement what is essentially a variation of the managerial sandwich. The need for participatory organisations due to a high requirement of deep-level cooperation may therefore be especially acute when the minimum requirement of surface-level coordination is also high. Indeed, the eminent scholar of Japanese firms Ronald Dore (2001: 87-9) predicts that as these requirements increase with technological development, which will entail increasingly complex divisions of labour but also the “increasing need to manage by consent rather than coercion”, established power structures will become deficient and industrial democracy will become the preferred organisational form.
It has been suggested that the arrangement proposed here may exacerbate the agency problems involved in managerial hierarchies, for example due to a multiplicity of (possibly non-quantifiable) organisational goals by which to evaluate managerial performance and a lack of disciplinary pressure from stock and managerial markets (Spear 2004; Cornforth 2004). Besides the possibility that managers may be influenced by the firm’s organisational culture – which is in turn the product of worker control – and so behave solidaristically (Spear 2004: 46; Avey, Wernsing, and Palanski 2012), these issues are debatable on their own terms. It could be retorted, for example, that a narrow focus on quarterly reports and the obligation to appease corporate markets tend to encourage short-termism and rent-seeking on behalf of owners as well as managers (e.g. Stiglitz 1985), both of whom may be more free, and indeed obligated, to pursue longer-term objectives under a system of worker ownership and control. Furthermore, the relative concentration and immobility of their wealth may cause worker-owners to take a greater interest than investor-owners in ensuring that managers perform – which they will be also be more equipped to do, given that they are in daily, face-to-face contact with managers (Putterman 1984). Their ability to pursue job security in addition to profits, meanwhile, may provide worker-owners with longer time horizons than not only investor-owners but also hired employees (Ireland and Law 1982)​[102]​. The upshot of all this is that worker ownership and control may have an advantage in achieving not only deep-level cooperation, but also deep-level coordination – which, for similar reasons, may be difficult for conventional firms to achieve alongside the surface-level coordination offered by managerial hierarchies (see Section 2.3.1) – thus adding to their technological flexibility. This notion finds support in evidence that cooperatives often demonstrate an exceptional degree of innovation (Smith 1994; Restakis 2010; Deller, Hoyt, and Sundaram-Stukel 2009) and adaptability to changing economic conditions (Jones and Backus 1977; Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1993, 1995).

4.2.7.3	The Marxist Ambivalence to Cooperatives
Marx appreciated the ability of cooperatives to overcome the distributive dilemma and the cooperation/coordination trade-off more than most. In his inaugural address to the First International, for example, he stated that cooperatives “have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands…and that…hired labor is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labour plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous heart” (Marx 1864, para. 13, emphasis added; see also Engels 1947 [1878], Part III, Section 1, para. 9). As this quote suggest, Marx considered cooperatives to be a “transforming force” (Marx 1867, Section 5, para. 2) to the extent that they “represent within the old form the first sprouts of the new” (Marx 1959 [1894], Chapter 27, para. 17; see also Bernstein 1993 [1899], Chapter 4), which explains their proliferation in the Soviet Union under Lenin.
Ultimately, however, Marx (1864, para. 14) believed that true and lasting “emancipation of labor” would require that “co-operative labor…be developed to national dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered by national means”. Isolated cooperatives, by contrast, “were ‘utopian’ in Marx’s view because they assume the harmonious cooperative relations of production can be achieved immediately without the intervening stages of organization building, the development of class consciousness among workers, and the struggle for economic reforms” (Lembcke 1982: 56-7, quoted in Morrison 1991: 152). The “private efforts” of “individual wage slaves” to create “dwarfish forms” of cooperativism would therefore “never transform capitalist society”, according to Marx (1867, Section 5, para. 3; see also 1970 [1875]). In fact, as Rosa Luxemburg (1986 [1900], Part 2, Chapter 7) forcefully alleged, cooperatives may even be inimical to that objective (see also Clarke 1977, 1984). As an inherent “contradiction of capitalism”, the distributive dilemma is, according to Marxists, at the foundation of the development of class consciousness, and ultimately the revolution of the working class. By cultivating organisational loyalty rather than class identity, alleviating antagonism between workers and managers, and potentially eliminating class distinction within the enterprise altogether, cooperatives may therefore impede the revolution. They may, for example, obviate the role of trade unions​[103]​, which have consequently maintained a historically ambivalent relationship with cooperatives​[104]​ (Haiven and Haiven 2014). 
To place the Marxist ambivalence to cooperatives within the context of this dissertation, recall from Section 3.2 that Marxians often agree with the second and third premises of technological determinism – that a given division of labour (in this case a complex division of labour) is associated with a certain management system (in this case a hierarchical management system), which is in turn associated with a certain structure of ownership and control (in this case the capitalist firm). According to this view, the “emancipation of labor” would be achieved by reforming the labour process​[105]​ (that is, the division of labour and its associated management system), which determine the “social relations of production”. However, following the argument made in Section 3.2.4 that it is “ultimate control” rather than the labour process that contains the essence of power within the firm, I have argued in this chapter that while managerial hierarchies purporting to achieve cooperation may be incompatible with cooperative organisation, managerial hierarchies purporting to achieve coordination are not, and accordingly, the third premise of technological determinism does not necessarily hold. Nevertheless, from the Marxist perspective, if worker-owners choose to endure a complex division of labour, and even a hierarchical management system to coordinate that division of labour – all the while maintaining deep-level cooperation – then they are essentially acting as “their own capitalists”, exploiting themselves while espousing an organisational culture that legitimises their plight as workers (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) (Marx 1959 [1894], Chapter 27, para. 17; see also Clarke 1977, 1984; Paranque and Willmott 2014).​[106]​
In short, both the praise and the scorn that cooperatives have received from Marxists are based on their productive potency. This ambivalence – which is reflected in Marx’s own mercurial (or perhaps dialectic) treatment of cooperatives (Jossa 2005​[107]​) – arises from the fact that individual worker-owned and -controlled firms are considered not a radical challenge to prevailing power relations, but rather a palliative sugar-coating of the contradictions of capitalism that “reproduce…all the shortcomings of the prevailing system” (Marx 1959 [1894], Chapter 27, para. 17) – a system which, it should not be forgotten, Marx praised for its productive capacity. It should also be noted that the Marxist critique contains a ‘contradiction’ of its own. On the one hand, cooperatives are criticised for engendering “false consciousness”, but on the other hand, they are criticised for ultimately ‘degenerating’ into capitalist firms (Egan 1990). These two lines of criticism are inconsistent – if cooperatives are complicit in perpetuating false consciousness, it is precisely due to their ability to endure within the capitalist system.

4.3	Explaining the Infrequency of Cooperatives
If cooperatives are not fully constrained by either technology or culture, and in fact have inherent advantages in developing and applying productive knowledge, the question arises as to why they are not more common in practice, and why capitalist firms predominate. After all, if deep-level cooperation offers productive benefits even above the minimum degree required by technology, cooperatives capable of avoiding the cooperation/coordination trade-off could theoretically out-compete conventional firms in any sector. 

4.3.1	Technological Cumulative Causation
One explanation derives from the cumulative causation between technology and organisation discussed in Section 3.4.1. In particular, it could be argued that the divisions of labour and management systems associated with the prevailing, capitalist mode of organisation govern the innovation and adoption of technology, which is consequently biased towards those patterns of organisation. According to this hypothesis, while there may exist an alternative ‘equilibrium’ or ‘path’ involving technologies that are more conducive to cooperative organisation, within the current equilibrium/path cooperatives will generally be confined to “relatively undeveloped” and “relatively simple” technologies that allow for egalitarian divisions of labour and management systems, as Rothschild and Whitt (1986: 104-5) deem in relation to their “collectivist organizations”. This seems to be confirmed empirically as cooperatives are concentrated in sectors with low requirements of capital, skill, and scale (Ben-Ner 1988a; Dow 2003; World Co-operative Monitor 2013), and have been since they first emerged in the nineteenth century (V. N. Zamagni 2014: 197-8; Shaffer 1999).
However, the chief argument of the previous section was precisely that advanced technologies do not disqualify cooperatives organisation even if they entail complex divisions of labour and even if those divisions of labour entail hierarchical management systems, so long as those management systems are based on coordination rather than cooperation. Quite the opposite, in fact – cooperatives may have an inherent advantage in implementing such structures by avoiding their adverse behavioural effects, and may therefore be more technologically flexible than conventional firms. The critical question is therefore why cooperatives do not implement these structures more often – why, on the contrary, are managerial hierarchies and their associated divisions of labour historically associated with the capitalist firm, as Chandler (1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981) observes?

4.3.2	Institutional Cumulative Causation
I submit that the answer to this conundrum lies in the fact that, as Chapter 3 explained, the translation from technology to organisation involves a complex interaction between organisational structures and organisational culture, which is in turn affected by the institutions prevailing in society. Those institutions, moreover, inherently favour predominant forms of organisation, such as capitalist firms, and thus implicitly discriminate against alternative forms, such as cooperatives. Although we saw in Section 4.2.5.3 that cooperatives can establish their own organisational cultures and even alter the broader culture in the long run, they will be facing an uphill battle if they constitute only a small fraction of the economy and society. In that case, the ‘institutional environment’ will have a strong influence on both the options available to individuals (the structural or relational aspect of behaviour), and the way those options are perceived (the cultural or cognitive aspect), leading to institutional cumulative causation (see Section 3.4).
Considering firstly the structural/relational aspect, there are likely to be positive externalities associated with a higher frequency of cooperatives. For example, contrary to the prediction of LMF models that worker-owners will refuse to expand their membership, cooperatives have been widely praised for their ability to generate employment. Indeed, this was the primary reason why the UN declared 2012 to be the ‘International Year of Cooperatives’. Numerous studies​[108]​ have shown that cooperatives are particularly useful in this regard during downturns, as cooperative members can vote to accept lower wages rather than cut jobs. Indeed, not only do cooperatives generally exhibit lower failure rates than conventional firms (Olsen 2013), but unemployment is further kerbed when failed capitalist enterprises are converted into cooperatives (Jones 1984), as famously occurred in Argentina with the empresas recuperadas (Howarth 2007). These positive spillovers​[109]​, however, do not enter the decisions of individuals thanks to the predominance of capitalist firms and their associated institutions of law, finance, education, and so on – and to the extent that they do, they are too widely dispersed relative to the benefits of capitalist organisation, with the result that cooperatives remain “latent” (Olson 1971). In short, cooperativism may be a public good, subject to a prisoner’s dilemma and thus underprovided.
For example, capitalist firms will usually offer greater material rewards to entrepreneurs starting new firms (Aldrich and Stern 1983; Weitzman 1984; Podivinsky and Stewart 2012). As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) acknowledged in relation to their concept of “institutional isomorphism”, entrepreneurs will be additionally deterred by the risk and uncertainty involved in experimenting with alternative forms of organisation (Conte 1986; Putterman 1982; Vanek 1971: 73-6; 104-13). Similiar obstaclesr  apply to managers, who, due to the prevalence of capitalist corporations and their associated institutions, have come to expect a significant degree of autonomy and unduly high incomes (Chang 2011a, Chapter 14), both of which are likely to be foregone in a cooperative (Basterretxea and Albizu 2010). Even worker-members are subject to these sorts of collective action problem: as the LMF literature has elucidated, cooperatives are susceptible to “degenerating” into capitalist firms as worker-owners are tempted into hiring non-member employees or selling their shares to outside investors (Ben-Ner 1984, 1988b; Miyazaki 1984; Vanek 1975​[110]​). This latter possibility has been observed in American plywood cooperatives, for example (Craig and Pencavel 1992). However, the fact that these processes of degeneration are not observed consistently (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman 1993; Dow and Putterman 1996) implies that they stem not from any inherent inefficiencies of worker ownership/control, but rather from an adverse institutional environment. For example, some authors have argued they could be avoided by a market for cooperative membership akin to the stock market​[111]​ (Schlicht and von Weizsäcker 1977; Sertel 1982; Dow 1986).​[112]​
It is true that cooperatives have been criticised, often rightly, for acting purely in the interests of their members and displaying ‘individualistic’ behaviour towards the rest of society – thus creating negative externalities – despite the fact that “Concern for Community” is one (albeit the last) of the International Co-operative Alliance’s seven Cooperative Principles (Hanappi-Egger 1996). Describing this behaviour as “enterprise egoism”​[113]​, Greenberg (quoted in Warner 1984: 14, quoted in Morrison 1991: 153), thus stated that “[w]ith respect to the outside world, [some] producer cooperatives seem to nurture outlooks characterized not by community, mutuality, equality, and confidence in others, but outlooks more congruent with the tenets of classical liberalism: those of individualism, competition, limited government, equality of opportunity and inequality of condition, and so on”. Webb and Webb (1920: 462ff) even believed that an inherent conflict of interests between cooperative members and the wider community. However, because they are owned and controlled by their workers rather than itinerant investors, cooperatives are likely to be more strongly rooted in their communities than conventional firms (Clarke 2005; MacPherson 2012; Zwerdling 1978). In any case, the positive spillovers of cooperatives do not rely on them being explicitly concerned for non-members. Any negative spillovers of “enterprise egoism”, meanwhile, would dissipate in an economy dominated by cooperative firms wherein the majority of the population were cooperative members.
Besides the cooperation problems involved in establishing cooperatives, there are also coordination problems: not only may the private returns of forming, managing, and working in capitalist firms exceed those of cooperative firms, but cooperatives may not even be an option (Smith 2001; Kremer 1997). For instance, the lack of limited liability and non-voting financial claims in nineteenth-century Britain may have prevented entrepreneurs from raising finance for new cooperatives without accepting investor control of the firm (Everett and Minkler 1993). As the LMF literature has explained, this problem persists today as investors are reluctant to provide finance to cooperatives without being represented on their boards, particularly due to their unconventional nature (see Dow 2003). For the same reason, banks may charge prohibitively severe risk premia on loans to cooperatives, or else refuse them funding altogether. Indeed, Aoki (1990: 19ff) suggests that this may help explain why Japanese firms, which are arguably worker-controlled (see Section 2.3.3), do not become worker-owned – not only would workers have to agree on how to distribute the firm’s profits (see also Weitzman 1984), but the role of the banks would be obviated, thus eliminating their source of finance. Furthermore, cooperatives may be unable to not only attract skilled managers, but also to find managers that are capable of working a cooperative (Chaves and Sajardo 2004; Davis 2001; Spear 2004). Indeed, due to their chronic lack of legal support, finance, and skilled managers, Beatrice Webb (1891; see also Webb and Webb 1920) believed that worker cooperatives would be unable to thrive in nineteenth-century Britain.
	The obstacles to establishing and sustaining cooperatives may be manipulated by those with vested interests in the status quo (Aldrich and Stern 1983), as would appear to be reflected in the tendency for all sections of society apart from managers and owners to support industrial democracy (Rifkin 1977; Haas 1980; Zipp, Leubeke, and Landerman 1984). Chandler (1977), for example, observed that once managerial hierarchies became institutionally entrenched through career professionalization and the separation of ownership and management, they constituted a “Visible Hand” that actively influenced the subsequent trajectory of economic change, for instance by establishing holding companies and cartels. In a similar vein, Ireland (2010) argued that the rise of the public limited company was not a response to the demands of technological efficiency, but rather a political fabrication devised by the rentier class in collaboration with a ‘captured state’ to shelter their “corporate irresponsibility” – a suspicion which Adam Smith expressed over two centuries earlier. On the opposite end of the class system, we have already seen in Section 4.2.7.3 that unions, to which leftist parties are often beholden, may be apprehensive towards cooperatives for their own reasons. That apprehension, however, ultimately derives from the underlying capitalist system, and the role of unions within that system, viz. as counterweights to capitalist employers. In fact, the entire institutional milieu that supports the status quo of capitalist organisation can be traced back to what Karl Polanyi (1957) called “the Great Transformation” of pre-modern society into a “market society”, which was manufactured by the landed gentry in order to preserve their interests. 
Polanyi also touches on the second channel through which prevailing institutions reinforce themselves – by influencing not only the options available to individuals (the structural/relational aspect), but also the way those options are perceived (the cognitive/cultural aspect), which can likewise be manipulated by power-holders (see Section 2.3.2). In particular, the predominance of capitalist firms and their associated institutions may reinforce itself by generating a sense of normality and legitimacy to the point that individuals may not even think about forming, managing, or working in a cooperative, at most seeing it as a perilous step into the unknown reserved for idealists (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Everett and Minkler 1993; Kanter 1972: 152-4). This must be especially true in countries like the UK in which a cooperative is not even a recognised legal form, meaning that individuals seeking to form a coop must go through the circuitous process of registering as some other type of company (e.g. a limited company or an ‘industrial and provident society’) and then deliberately integrate the principles of cooperativism as stipulated by the International Co-operative Alliance into their statutes. 
Furthermore, due to the tendency discussed in Section 4.2.5.1 for non-participatory organisations to stimulate an instrumental/transactional approach to work, a society and economy dominated by such organisations will tend to produce individuals who lack the desire to participate in industrial democracy (Elster 1989; Blumberg 1973; Kanter 1977). Isolated coops will thus face an uphill battle of structural consistency. As Rothschild and Whitt (1986: 67) put it: “In the face of…pervasive behavior-shaping institutions, it is difficult to sustain collectivist personalities. It is asking, in effect, that people in collectivist organizations constantly shift gears, that they learn to act one way inside their collectives and another way outside. The difficulty of creating and sustaining collectivist attributes and behavior patterns reflects a cultural disjunction, deriving from the fact that alternative organizations are as yet isolated examples of collectivism in an otherwise capitalist-bureaucratic context.” Indeed, “value-based organisations” have been widely reported to struggle with a kind of ‘cultural degeneration’, especially as their ideologically-motivated founding members pass the mantle to the next generation (Bruni and Smerilli 2014; see also Zald and Ash 1966; Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 128).
The challenge of achieving structural consistency amidst an institutional environment based on capitalist organisation will be even more challenging for cooperatives if they attempt to implement the divisions of labour and management systems normally associated with capitalist firms, even if only for the purpose of achieving coordination. This essentially amounts to requiring workers to not only “act one way inside their collectives and another way outside” (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 67), but also to act one way in governance and another way in the workplace. This is true even if cooperative members democratically consent to bureaucratic structures in the workplace, because in so doing they may face an internal tension between their interests as owners and their interest as workers. Of course, it is this very internalisation of interests that allows cooperatives to alleviate the coordination/cooperation dilemma by letting worker-members implement bureaucratic structures on their own terms. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if the day-to-day experience of worker-members in the workplace is no different from that of employees in a conventional firm – that is, if experience their work as a mere means to the end of income and are treated as mere ‘hired hands’ – abstract notions of participation and occasional exercise of voting rights are unlikely to suffice for an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, even if equality is retained in governance. This is evident in the fact that Employee Stock Ownership Programmes (ESOPs) tend to be ineffective in improving worker motivation if they are unaccompanied by concessions in workplace participation (United States General Accounting Office 1987; Jones and Pliskin 1989; Long 1979). In fact, although democratic governance has the potential to counteract the adverse behavioural effects of hierarchical workplaces, it also has the potential to highlight the lack of participation in the workplace by making the issue of participation more salient (Rothschild and Whitt 1979: 152; Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 7, 130-1; Tretheway and Ashcraft 2004).
Furthermore, a lack of participation in the workplace could initiate a vicious circle that ‘spills over’ into the realm of governance, as worker-members may become inexperienced and apathetic with regard to democratic processes and increasingly concerned with pecuniary criteria (Ben-Ner 1982). Managers, meanwhile, may come to be seen by both themselves and rank-and-file workers as deserving special membership status (Meister 1984). In his study of the kibbutzim, for example, Rosner (1982, 1985; see also Leviatan and Rosner 1980) found that hierarchy in the workplace tends to hinder equality in governance. Thus, even if managerial authority is initially only delegated, over time it may become “real” (Aghion and Tirole 1997) – a problem that is also evident in capitalist corporations that separate ownership and management​[114]​ – as democracy deteriorates into technocracy. This tendency for bureaucracy to expand into all aspects of social life and effect “a fundamental change in the authority structure” is what Weber (1930 [1905]) termed an “iron cage” and what his apprentice Michels (1962 [1911]) termed the “iron law” (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 113).
Juggling surface-level coordination and deep-level cooperation amidst a capitalist environment becomes increasingly challenging as the firm expands. On the one hand, the increased complexity of production heightens the need for surface-level coordination (Valentinov 2004: 14-5); indeed, this is Chandler’s (1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems 1981) explanation for why managerial hierarchies came to prominence in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the loss of face-to-face interaction stifles the achievement of deep-level cooperation (Ingham 1970). For these reasons, Michels believed that organisational growth would inevitably activate his “iron law of oligarchy” as members would gradually abandon their democratic principles; Weber similarly deemed small-scale organisation to be the only alternative to the “iron cage” of bureaucracy (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 22, 91-2, 113). Cooperatives have therefore been widely criticised for facing a ‘double bind’ between foregoing economies of scale and advanced technologies, on the one hand, or allowing their democratic structures and cultures to ‘degenerate’, on the other (see Jones and Kalmi 2012). Indeed, Rosner (1982, 1985; see also Leviatan and Rosner 1980) found that participation in the kibbutzim tended to decline with the size of the enterprise, especially when the firm was based on deep-level rather than surface-level cooperation.
However, as has been repeatedly shown to be true within cooperatives​[115]​, bureaucracy and democracy are not inherently incompatible. Indeed, while recognising that bureaucracy would pose problems to socialism and democracy, Schumpeter (2003 [1943]: 206) acknowledged that, as “an inevitable complement to modern economic development”, it “is not an obstacle to democracy but an inevitable complement to it” and will thus “be more than ever essential in a socialist commonwealth”. In a similar vein, Dore (2001: 74) states that modern cooperatives must implement “rationalized” organisational structures while preserving “the sense of mutual trust between members…and the sense of loyalty to the group” characteristic of traditional communities. While admitting that this “trick” is “immensely difficult”, he maintains that it is not “impossible”, and indeed “has been managed” in Japanese cooperatives. The fact remains, however, that the “trick” of combining democracy in governance with bureaucracy in the workplace would be immeasurably easier to pull off within Schumpeter’s “socialist commonwealth” – especially if based on cooperative enterprises, along the lines of the “socialist commonwealth” that Webb and Webb (1920; see also Webb 1891) proposed for Great Britain – than it is within the current institutional environment. 
4.3.3	The Efficiency Inference
In accordance with the “efficiency inference” discussed in Section 3.4.2, the predominant theories of the firm frequently infer that capitalist firms are optimal vis-à-vis alternative forms of ownership and control from the very fact that they predominate. This inference is most prevalent in contract-based theories, which additionally dismiss cooperatives based on the fact that they tend to emerge only through political activism and government intervention (Jensen and Meckling 1979; Williamson 1985: 269; North 1981: 38-9), but is also evident in competence-based theories. For example, Chandler’s (1977, 1980; Chandler and Daems 1981) argument that capitalist corporations represented the most efficient means of managing advanced technologies is based on the observation that such firms emerged alongside momentous technological changes and rapid economic growth. The reality of cumulative causation, however, implies that the status quo may represent a stable but suboptimal ‘equilibrium’ or ‘path’ (e.g. Pagano and Rowthorn 1996; Putterman 1982; Everett and Minkler 1993).
In particular, by suppressing the ability of cooperatives to overcome the cooperation/coordination trade-off, the structural and cultural obstacles posed by the institutional environment may prevent cooperatives from operating in sectors where the minimum extent of deep-level cooperation required for production is relatively low, and where non-participatory organisations can subsist. In fact, the forces of cumulative causation may be so strong that they prevent the emergence of participatory organisations even in sectors where such organisations are required for production due to a high minimum of deep-level cooperation, especially when combined with a high minimum or surface-level coordination. Consider agriculture, which in Section 4.2.7.2 we saw fits this description (Valentinov 2007). Although cooperatives are common in the sector, Chang (2009) shows that many of the largest and most successful agricultural cooperatives throughout the world have only come about thanks to intelligent government policies, including the provision of inputs such as credit, fertiliser, machinery, research, and education, as well as policies to stabilise farm income and improve marketing and processing. As the example of agriculture demonstrates, precisely the sorts of collective action identified by contract-based theories as evidence of inefficiency may be required in order to tap the productive potential of cooperatives (Bhowmik and Sarker 2002). According to Section 3.4.4, this implication may be particularly relevant for developing countries, which pontentially have greater liberty to determine their institutional trajectories (Abell 1988).

4.3.4	Overcoming Cumulative Causation
A shining example of effective cooperative policy can be found in Spain​[116]​, in which cooperatives are supported by tax incentives, start-up grants, interest rate subsidies, and loan guarantees, along with a system of interlocking federations and confederations at regional, national, and European levels that also represent their member cooperatives in legislative organs. A particularly effective policy has been to allow individuals to capitalise their unemployment benefits in order to start new cooperatives (Lewis 2000: 4). Of course, this newfound support for cooperatives has not been without adverse side effects, not least the proliferation of micro-cooperatives (Alba Benaches 2006: 209-10, 252). Nevertheless, undoubtedly thanks to these policies, Spain’s cooperative sector is substantial: in 2008, 15% of the Spanish population were members of a cooperative (Monzón Campos 2008), and in 2011, the country contained 22,595 cooperative businesses with 290.6 million members (Confederación Empresarial Española de Economía Social 2014). To put this into perspective, the UK, with an economy almost twice the size of Spain’s, contained only 5,450 cooperatives (four times less) with 12.8 million members (twenty times less) in the same year​[117]​ (Co-operatives UK 2011).
Section 3.4.3 noted that endeavours to overcome cumulative causation can be particularly effective during crisis periods, in which the disruption of behavioural patterns and power structures motivates a search for alternative forms of organisation. This is certainly true for cooperatives, which, although largely ignored during ‘good times’, often enjoy widespread support from both politicians and citizens during socio-economic crises (e.g. Boone and Özcan 2014). Spain’s system of cooperative federations, for example, emerged alongside the country’s transition to democracy following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco, whose policies had suppressed democratic expression (including cooperativism) and wreaked economic havoc. Similarly, although cooperatives in the United States have often suffered political repression – not least through the anti-left pogroms of McCarthyism and the anti-union policies of conservative politicians, backed by and beholden to powerful business lobbies that also developed ‘employers’ associations’ to combat the power of collective labour (Wolff 2013; Curl 2009) – they have been on the rise since the financial crisis of 2007/8 and its enduring aftermath, along with the chronic breakdown of the political system (Alperovitz 2011; Islam and Crego 2013b, 2014). In countries around the world, unions have often formed cooperatives as a means of continuing production during labour disputes, while workers have often taken over factories abandoned by their capitalist owners (Birchall and Ketilson 2009). More generally, cooperatives appear to emerge and thrive during periods of transition in either the structure of the economy (such as the transition from subsistence to commercialised agriculture, the Industrial Revolution, and recent bouts of deindustrialisation) or the political-economic regime (such as the transition towards socialism in the Soviet Union and Venezuela, and the transition away from central planning and autarky in Cuba and China). 














Chapter 5: The Mondragón Cooperative Model

5.1	Introduction
	This chapter applies the arguments of the previous chapter to the Mondragón cooperative group in the Basque Country (hereafter ‘Mondragón’), the largest and arguably most successful group of worker cooperatives in the world.
After a brief history of Mondragón, the chapter shows that Mondragón’s system of representative democracy has allowed it to cultivate an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation that tolerates the bureaucratic organisational structures that are required for coordination and that are normally associated with capitalist organisation. Numerous commentators have attributed this organisational culture to the supposedly unique solidarism of Basque culture, implying that the Mondragón’s system of governance is inapplicable in regions with less solidaristic cultures. However, the chapter will show that Mondragón’s organisational culture of deep-level cooperation is in fact substantiated in its organisational structures, including its system of governance, which therefore represents an organisational combination that is applicable to other cultural milieus.
Although culture per se is not a binding constraint to imitating Mondragón, Section 4.3.2 explained that cooperatives are vulnerable to forces of institutional cumulative causation, especially when they attempt to implement the bureaucratic organisational structures normally associated with capitalist organisation. Acknowledging this, several authors have attributed Mondragón’s success to the unique institutional conditions that prevailed at the time of its inception and the visionary role of the founder. In fact, however, these factors demonstrate precisely that the Mondragón’s example can be followed in other institutional milieus, given the appropriate policies. In any case, Mondragón has implemented a sophisticated group system that effectively protects the cooperatives against the forces of institutional cumulative causation, which would otherwise bias both the options available to individuals and how those options are perceived against cooperatives.
Cooperative groups, however, are not failsafe. Indeed, Mondragón has not been able to fully resist the forces of institutional cumulative causation, as evidenced by workplace discontent, bureaucratisation of governance, the employment of non-member workers, and the acquisition of non-cooperative subsidiaries. However, the chapter will argue that, despite a number of allegations to the contrary, none of these problems show that Mondragón has failed to achieve deep-level cooperation, nor that it has completely ‘degenerated’ into a non-cooperative organisation. This argument is corroborated by the fact that Marxist critics also allege that Mondragón has facilitated ‘self-exploitation’ and crowded out labour movements – allegations that are only possible if Mondragón has in fact retained cooperative governance, and if it has in fact mitigated the cooperation/coordination trade-off. That said, there is clearly a need for reform if Mondragón is to retain its coveted organisational culture.

5.2	A Brief History of the Mondragón Cooperative Group​[118]​
In 1941, a Catholic priest with a vision to improve society through education and cooperative work arrived in the war-torn Basque town of Mondragón (or Arrasate in Euskara, the Basque language), forty miles east of Bilbao in the mountainous province of Gipuzkoa. After the town’s only major company, the Unión Cerrajera steel manufacturer, refused his request to expand its training programme, Don José María Arizmendiarrieta (affectionately known as ‘Arizmendi’) turned to the local community to raise funds for a cooperatively-run technical college (the Escuela Politecnica), which was founded in 1943. In 1952, under the guidance of Arizmendiarrieta, a group of five students that had studied for their engineering degrees at the school set out to campaign for worker participation in the Unión Cerrajera, in which four of them were employed. Again, the firm categorically refused their requests, and again, they turned to the community for funds to establish their own cooperative.
After briefly operating an abandoned paraffin stove factory in nearby Vitoria, in 1956 they built a new factory in Mondragón, producing stoves that they had copied from a French manufacturer. Beginning with only twenty-four workers, the cooperative (called ‘Ulgor’ after the initial letters of each of the founder’s names) soon exploded, triggering a set of similar cooperative experiments in and near Mondragón. This unexpected growth raised a number of problems, the most pressing of which was a lack of finance. Through Arizmendiarrieta’s leadership, and despite resistance from his colleagues, the Caja Laboral Popular (or ‘People’s Bank’) was established in 1959 to link the governance structures of the various coops in the area and provide them with a stable source of finance. Since then, the number of businesses in the Mondragón group has skyrocketed, with its governance structure transforming into a sophisticated corporate model.

5.3	Technology and Organisation in Mondragón
5.3.1	The Managerial Sandwich in Mondragón
From the perspective of this dissertation, the most significant aspect of Mondragón is that, while it is owned and controlled by its workers, it has not shied away from implementing complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems. Indeed, in its early days, it explicitly adopted the ‘scientific management’ principles of Taylorism in vogue at the time (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 279). In large part, this is a reflection of the founder, Arizmendiarrieta, who had a remarkable appreciation for the competence-based rationale for managerial hierarchies (see Section 4.2.3). Echoing Knight, he considered management to be a special capability possessed only by certain ‘entrepreneurs’, so crucial for coordinating the complex divisions of labour associated with advanced technologies that it constituted its own factor of production alongside capital and labour (MacLeod 2000: 70-1, 84-87). In his view, moreover, this applied equally to cooperatives as to capitalist firms; in fact, he reckoned that managers were doubly important in cooperatives, which required not only the surface-level coordination of conventional firms but also deep-level coordination in the form of leadership. To allow for specialisation, moreover, he believed that management systems were optimally arranged in a hierarchical fashion – that is, with a distinction between the roles of workers and managers. In his estimation, traditional cooperatives had dogmatically insisted on egalitarian workplaces to their detriment (ibid.: 74; Azurmendi 1985: 421; Whyte and Whyte 1988: 253, 257). Thus, since its inception, Mondragón has accepted the first two premises of technological determinism – that advanced technologies stipulate complex divisions of labour, which in turn stipulate hierarchical management systems (see Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3).
It has done so, however, without forfeiting worker ownership and control, and has thus defied the third premise of technological determinism – that hierarchical management systems stipulate non-worker ownership and control (see Sections 3.2.4 and 4.2.4-4.2.7). It has achieved this feat by applying a variation of the “managerial sandwich” discussed in Section 4.2.7.1, drawing a crucial distinction between management and governance. Members of Mondragón exercise sovereignty by participating on a one-vote-per-member basis in the General Assembly, which periodically elects a Governing Council that is in turn responsible for appointing and overseeing managers (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 85; Turnbull 1994). Although managers are not directly elected by workers in this system, and are thus afforded a degree of autonomy in making decisions, they are ultimately accountable to the membership. They must, for example, regularly report to the General Assembly and obtain its approval for major policy changes, including the annual business plan. Furthermore, formal grievance procedures can result in recall elections or intervention, including by supervisory bodies such as the ‘Watchdog Council’.

5.3.2	Cooperation and Coordination in Mondragón
The managerial sandwich could potentially allow Mondragón to overcome the cooperation/coordination trade-off discussed in Section 2.3.1. With participatory governance supporting an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, managers are not delegated the authority to enforce surface-level cooperation (which, as we saw in Section 4.2.3, is the contract-based rationale for managerial hierarchies), but are rather entrusted only with the responsibility of achieving surface- and deep-level coordination (the competence-based rationale). Morrison (1991: 73) describes it thus: 
“The consensus-seeking process is accompanied by a commitment to strict discipline and clear delegation of authority. The co-ops are not collectives, in which everyone becomes involved in every decision or all roles are routinely rotated. Co-op members have clear job titles and well defined formal responsibilities; management is ‘free to manage’ – that is, to implement the plan agreed to by the cooperators. But the coop discipline is not the familiar assertion of power by management over the workers. Rather, all members share the responsibility to fulfil cooperative agreements and policies.” 
Both because managers are ultimately subordinate to the membership and because they purport only to achieve coordination, the adverse effects of managerial hierarchies on behaviour and cooperation may be avoided, even while their benefits in terms of coordination are enjoyed.
As explained in Section 4.2.7.1, this formula for achieving deep-level cooperation alongside coordination is not available to conventional firms. Because their power structures preclude deep-level cooperation, any managerial hierarchies they implement – even if only for the purpose of achieving coordination – are likely to reinforce individualistic behaviour. Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 150) therefore concluded from their study on the Fagor sub-group of Mondragón “that managers elsewhere who are tempted to strengthen organizational culture in order to eliminate internal conflict are likely to be disappointed. Either they will fail by creating a pseudo-corporate culture that is only an internal marketing image, or they will succeed in getting creative cultural processes under way and then be quite unhappy about the amount of debate and dynamism this creates”. The Unión Cerrajera clearly suffered from this “distributive dilemma” (see Section 2.3.3). Unwilling either to expand its training programme or to permit greater worker participation, its directors evidently preferred to forego deep-level cooperation than to forfeit control. It consequently struggled with a history of intense industrial conflict, including numerous strikes. 
Indeed, Arizmendiarrieta reckoned that “democratic organisation” (which remains one of Mondragón’s ‘Ten Principles’) could allow cooperatives to implement managerial hierarchies and complex divisions of labour while maintaining deep-level cooperation, thus affording “all the means available to capitalistic corporations plus the added moral force of cooperative principles” (MacLeod 2000: 85). In this manner, he believed that cooperatives could not only compete with capitalist firms, but also surpass them, particularly through their superior flexibility in adapting to shifts in technology​[119]​ (ibid.: 88). As elaborated in Section 4.2.5.1, worker control can also permit more flexibility than is available to conventional firms when managerial hierarchies are not required by technology. Mondragón’s mission statement explicitly states that the purpose of appointing managers is ultimately to generate surpluses that are “distributed for the benefits of its members and the community…” (MacLeod 2000: 38). The membership therefore implements managerial hierarchies and tolerates complex divisions of labour only because they perceive a net collective benefit of doing so. In cases where they do not perceive such a benefit – for example, when technologies stipulate more ‘organic’ divisions of labour – then they can choose, and indeed have chosen, to implement less hierarchical management systems (Morrison 1991: 214; Whyte and Whyte 1988: 126-7, 213; Kasmir 1996: 181-4). Conventional firms, by contrast, may be unable to forego managerial hierarchies for the purpose of achieving (surface-level) cooperation. As Arizmendiarrieta recognised, cooperatives thus have the potential to incur less supervisory costs than conventional firms (MacLeod 2000: 85).
The evidence confirms that Mondragón has indeed alleviated the trade-off between cooperation and coordination. Mondragón’s ability to achieve coordination is demonstrated, firstly, by its sheer size. According to its latest available Annual Report, in the year to 2012, the Mondragón Corporation’s 289 business entities operated in over 40 countries, earned over 14 million Euros of revenue, employed over 80,000 people, and controlled over 7 billion Euros of fixed assets and nearly 4 billion Euros of current assets, making it the seventh-largest company in Spain and the largest group of worker cooperatives in the world (Mondragón Corporation 2012a). Furthermore, the quality of management in Mondragón’s cooperatives appears to be higher than in conventional firms operating in the same sectors (Abando, Gallartegi, and Rodriguez 2007). Contrary to the predictions of both contract-based and competence-based theories of the firm that cooperatives will be confined to certain sectors, moreover, Mondragón operates in a multiplicity of sectors. Indeed, ever since Ulgor began producing paraffin stoves, most of Mondragón’s cooperatives have remained concentrated in industrial sectors such as household appliances, machine tools, and automotives – precisely the sectors in which the predominant theories of the firm would predict that cooperatives would be at a disadvantage (see Section 4.2). In fact, not only has Mondragón survived and competed in these industries, but thanks to its fifteen centres of technology, it has been a forerunner of innovation; in 2005, new products (fewer than five years old) accounted for almost 20% of Mondragón’s total sales (Lopez, Lopez, and Larrañaga 2009: 51). In light of this remarkable capacity for innovation, which has earned it numerous accolades​[120]​; Bakaikoa et al. (2008) argue that Mondragón features “neo-Schumpeterian” attributes.
Furthermore, Mondragón appears to have created an organisational culture that tolerates complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems, thus achieving the coordination required for advanced technologies without sacrificing deep-level cooperation (Gorroño 1975; Larrañaga 1981). Workers surveyed by Bradley and Gelb (1981) perceived greater levels of job control and participation, identified more strongly with their firm, and maintained higher-trust and more consensual relationships with their colleagues and managers than workers in capitalist firms with similar divisions of labour and management systems. Indeed, they found that “even managerial grades in the control [comprising two comparable, nearby capitalist firms] respond less positively than do many lower-grade co-operateurs” on these criteria (ibid.: 221). Other studies confirm that workers are considered “collaborators” rather than “subordinates”, managers “leaders” rather than “bosses” (Whyte and Whyte 1998: 235; Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 153). This deep-level cooperation motivated over half of the survey participants to report that they worked “significantly harder” than they would in conventional firms, and even to engage in mutual monitoring (Bradley and Gelb 1981: 224). Thomas and Logan (1982: 108) estimated that, in 1972, labour productivity in Mondragón exceeded the Spanish average by 7.5% for other large enterprises, and 40% for small and medium-sized enterprises, while Levine (1983) confirmed that Mondragón enjoyed higher levels of labour productivity than other large firms in Spain.

5.4	Culture and Organisation in Mondragón
5.4.1	Culturalist Explanations for Mondragón’s Success
Echoing the contract-based treatment of cooperatives (see Section 4.2.4), numerous commentators have attributed Mondragón’s remarkable organisational culture, which supports deep-level cooperation while tolerating the bureaucratic structures required for surface-level coordination, to what they perceive to be an exceptionally solidaristic ethnic culture in which “social distinctions are minimized at work, in public affairs, and even in interpersonal relations”​[121]​ (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 12; e.g. Smith 2001: 77; Logan 1979; Hansmann 1996, Chapter 6). For example, the Basques exhibit a consensual leadership style and tend not to view manual labour as inferior to more professional work (Morrison 1991: 67-70). Particularly noted are traditions such as the chiquiteo, whereby groups of men comprising both workers and managers travel from bar to bar at the end of the working day, socialising and discussing work-related issues (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 34; e.g. Oakeshott 1982; Oakeshott et al. 1977). Similar traditions include private eating clubs, whereby groups of families eat meals together in a house they collectively own and stock, along with various other neighbourhood associations that facilitate communal use of resources and mutual assistance. 
	The cooperatives certainly made use of existing cultural traits and traditions. For example, Arizmendiarrieta and his followers utilised the chiquiteo to disseminate information and raise funds for both the technical college and Ulgor, which were financed by voluntary contributions from the community. Furthermore, members of the Mondragón cooperatives appear to identify with the characterisation of Basque culture as exceptionally solidaristic; they speak openly, for instance, of their “associative tendencies” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 271). However, for reasons that correspond to those enumerated in Section 3.3.2, Mondragón’s organisational culture cannot be assumed to represent a mere reflection of Basque culture. As a result, the culturalist perspective fails to explain why the cooperatives emerged when and where they did, why they took the particular organisational form that they did, and why they have continued to flourish (Whyte 1995: 60; Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 54-5).
The first problem with the culturalist explanation is that the cultural traits supposedly responsible for Mondragón’s success are not exclusive to Basque culture. That is not to say that Basque culture is not unique – the Basques are an ancient ethnic group with distinct customs and traditions, including dress, folklore, festivals, and cuisine, in addition to a unique language famous for its mysterious origins. Furthermore, the Basque Country is peculiarly situated as a nation within two states (Spain and France), geographically delineated by mountains and ocean. However, perceptions of ethnic solidarity and cooperative tendencies are not unique to Basque culture. Virtually every ethnic group, region, or country possesses some sort of shared history and identity that defines them as a people (Morrison 1991: 67). In fact, as mentioned in Section 4.2.5.3, a history of cooperatives can be found in virtually every country. The fact that Mondragón has traditionally included a significant proportion of non-Basque worker-members (about 25% in 1988, according to Whyte and Whyte [1988: 271]), attests to the fact that Mondragón’s organisational culture is not only possible given Basque cultural traits.
	Another reason that the culturalist perspective falters lies in the fact that the Basque Country is often presented, in like manner to Japan in the context of the ‘convergence’ debate discussed in Section 3.3.1, as retaining traditional values and institutions while undergoing industrial transformation. Hofstede (2001: 13) even goes so far as to claim that Basque culture has remained constant “for hundreds and thousands of years”. To be sure, there are factors in Basque history that endorse the idea of Basque solidarism (Otazu 1986). In the sixteenth century, for example, the Kingdom of Castile bestowed the title of hidalguía – a category of nobility without hereditary title – to all Basques, perhaps in recognition of their egalitarian society (Kasmir 1996: 44-5). Furthermore, having largely avoided colonisation and feudalism, the Basque Country retained democratically-elected clan-based elites, municipal governments based on communal property rights (fueros), and other traditional institutions such as farmsteads, neighbourhood associations, and guilds, long after they had vanished elsewhere in Spain (Whyte and Whyte 1988, Chapter 2; Morrison 1991: 67-8). Some of the guilds eventually formed producer coops, which have been a feature of the Basque economy since the formation of the Sociedad Cooperativa de Obreros de Barakaldo [Workers’ Cooperative Society of Barakaldo] in 1884 (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 18-9; Altuna Gabilondo 2008). Of direct relevance to Mondragón is the Alfa cooperative, a sewing machine manufacturer converted in 1920 from a firearms factory in the nearby town of Eibar. According to Morrison (1991: 70-1), Arizmendiarrieta had at least some “clandestine correspondence” with Alfa’s socialist founder.
However, there have also been periods in history when Basque culture deviated from its stereotypical characterisation (Otazu 1986). For example, the technological advances, international trade, and financial development associated with the growth of the Basque iron ore industry have tended to undermine traditional institutions and social harmony. During a series of Spanish civil wars during the 1800s known as the Carlist Wars, the fueros, which protected traditional craft producers, were abolished (Kasmir 1996, Chapter 2). Morrison (1991: 39; see also Graham 1984: 73) notes that “iron ore, once communally owned, became private property; artisan industry gave way to mills and factory production; and tensions between capitalists and workers grew” as a class of “merchant bankers” emerged to control the bulk of the region’s financial and industrial resources. “Strong and militant unions” arose to counter this dominance, while “members of skilled crafts and professions struggled to maintain their values of equality and democracy within their occupational associations” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 11-2). Kasmir (1996: 44-5), meanwhile, suggests that the Basque tradition of collective nobility is “essentially an invention for the purpose of producing an image of Basque society free from internal conflicts and inequalities…employed at historical junctures that are most rife with social and class tension” – which would include, according to her, the formation of the cooperatives (ibid.: 44-5). Indeed, Morrison (1991: 136) notes that, in addition to solidaristic traits, Basque culture at the time featured all “the ills of industrialism, including inequality” and “acquisitiveness”. Although agricultural collectivism was common, it featured little in the way of trust and loyalty, existing merely “to serve…particular ends” (Jackobs 1979: 39, quoted in Morrison 1991: 68), and Arizmendiarrieta himself lamented what he perceived to be the growing individualism of Basque culture (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 259, 281).
	A final point against the culturalist explanation is that the causation between organisational culture and culture broadly conceived cannot be presumed to run only from the latter to the former, because culture is ultimately based on prevailing institutions, including the firm (see Sections  3.3.2 and 4.2.5.3). This must be especially true for the Mondragón cooperatives, which constitute a vast proportion of the local and regional economies. In 1991, Morrison (1991: 195) stated: “More than half the employees in the Mondragón area work in the cooperatives. The ways the cooperatives are organized, operate, and develop socially and economically have a pervasive influence on the entire community.” Today, with approximately 33,000 worker-owners in the Basque country, the Mondragón Corporation accounts for 3.5% of the Basque Country’s employment, including 8.4% of jobs in industry; 3.2% of its GDP, including 7.4% of its industrial GDP; 12.2% of its exports; and 10.7% of its industrial investment (Quigley 2014; TU Lankide 2013b). The organisational culture of such a vast institution must have a significant influence on – and even constitute some part of – Basque culture. 
In fact, Mondragón has, since its inception, deliberately sought to (positively) influence Basque society at large, as reflected in its principle of “Social Transformation” (see Bradley and Gelb 1982: 21). In line with the argument of Section 4.2.5.3, Lizarralde (2009) confirms that Mondragón has in numerous ways created the “social capital” that is often attributed with its success. For example, the cooperatives adopted a mission of preserving Basque culture when it was under threat from the Franco regime, supporting ‘underground schools’ that taught in the outlawed Basque language, Euskara. This approach reflects Arizmendiarrieta’s  insistence that the cooperative movement must be “projected and developed in its social surroundings with its consequent rooting in the sphere of…social and economic relations” (Azurmendi 1999: 214) and his belief that the firm, as an inherently social institution, “is predominant in moulding the fabric of society not only on the economic level, but also on the social, political, and cultural levels”, even to the point of replacing the family as the basic unit of society in the modern, industrial age (Azurmendi 1985: 411-2​[122]​) – an idea that resonates with the thrust of this dissertation (e.g. Sections 1.4, 2.2.4, and 3.3).

5.4.2	Structural Consistency in Mondragón
If Mondragón’s coveted organisational culture is not merely the reflection of Basque cultural traits, how can it be explained? The answer, according to the theory developed in previous chapters (see especially Sections 2.3.3, 3.3.2, and 4.2.5.1), is that organisational culture must be rooted in organisational structures (“structural consistency”). As Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 154) observe, “…the cooperatives did not arise from some pre-existing communitas in the Basque Country that made the cooperatives a mere business application of Basque culture…the degree of community currently visible in Fagor is a product of the cooperative process.” By applying cooperative governance, “[t]he leaders of Mondragón have selected from among the elements of the Basque culture, while…reinforc[ing] those aspects they value and…creat[ing] other elements that are not present (or at least not prominent). In this way, they have created a distinctive organizational culture” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 281, emphasis in original). In fact, both Mondragón’s organisational culture and its organisational structures are largely due to Arizmendiarrieta, who not only drew from a range of influences in addition to Basque social traditions – including Catholic social doctrine, humanist philosophy, and socialist theory (MacLeod 2000, Chapter 3) – but also insisted that the solidaristic traits of Basque culture, while superlatively amenable to cooperative ideals, had to be not only “interpret[ed]” appropriately, but also “give[n]…an expression and well-defined materialisation, translatable into institutions or concrete entities around which to galvanise an effort, to justify a dedication” (Azurmendi, 1999: 208-9).
The foremost source of structural consistency is the managerial sandwich itself, which embodies Arizmendiarrieta’s approach to work and governance. In accordance with various papal encyclicals, Arizmendiarrieta advocated a ‘people-centred’ economics, in which labour was sovereign rather than a mere instrument of capital accumulation, and in which work was intrinsically good rather a necessary evil (Azurmendi 1985). He therefore viewed work as a moral sphere of personal development and social harmony (MacLeod 2000: 44, 58, 61-3). In short, the firm he sought to create was characterised by social relationships and substantive rationality – that is, solidaristic behaviour. Furthermore, although we saw in Section 5.3.1 that he decried traditional cooperatives for dogmatically shunning complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems, he embraced these organisational structures as servants, rather than masters, of cooperating worker-owners (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 131). This approach, which is directly reflected in two of Mondragón’s Ten Principles (namely the Sovereignty of Labour and the Instrumental and Subordinate Nature of Capital), is the very essence of the managerial sandwich (Ormaetxea 1993). It is supported, moreover, by the concept of ‘equilibrio’, which appears frequently in interviews and publications. Literally translated ‘balance’, in the context of Mondragón it refers to “balancing economic and technological imperatives with social values and objectives”, the former “driven by” the latter (MacLeod 2000: 37​[123]​). A notable manifestation of equilibrio is the system of maximum wage differentials, implemented in Mondragón since its early days under the principle of Solidarity in Payment. Members consider the compressed wage scales to be an effective means of offsetting the stratified nature of work and the hierarchical nature of management (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 131-2). 
Another relevant facet of Arizmendarrieta’s philosophy that has been preserved in Mondragón’s organisational culture and embodied in its organisational structures is the concept of ‘formación’, which describes education for the purpose of individual and collective betterment, beyond and broader than the minimum amount of technical training required for production (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 256; Logan 1981). As mentioned in Section 4.2.5.1 (see also Sections 2.3.3 and 3.2.3), this can be an effective way of increasing perceived discretion, thus counteracting the tendency for workers to feel undervalued by their position in a complex division of labour, especially vis-à-vis managers. It is also conceived as sort of ‘socialisation’ into cooperative ideals, and is thus related to the ability (and need) of the firm to stimulate solidaristic behaviour by “constituting” (or ‘forming’) the cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour (see Sections 1.4, 2.2.4, 3.3, and 4.2.5). Indeed, Arizmendiarrieta believed that formación was crucial to the successful functioning of a cooperative, going so far as to say: “The cooperative movement is an economic effort that is translated into an educational action, or it is an educational effort that uses economic action as a vehicle of transformation” (Azurmendi, 1999: 182). This conviction is demonstrated in the fact that Arizmendiarrieta’s first major project in Mondragón, and the foundation of the cooperative group, was the creation of a technical college. A host of other institutions have since emerged to provide education and training to cooperative members, and Mondragón continues to regard formación as “the basic…principle that feeds and feeds off all the others”​[124]​ (Mondragón Corporation 2012b: 17-8).
Although Mondragón’s organisational culture has produced a remarkable degree of deep-level cooperation, surface-level cooperation is still required in Mondragón – as it is in all firms (see Section 2.2.3) – even if to a lesser extent than in conventional firms. However, as per Section 4.2.5.2, it is enforced through means other than managerial hierarchies, such as mutual monitoring (Bradley and Gelb 1981: 224). Furthermore, it is not emphasised to the point of ‘crowding out’ deep-level cooperation. This is evidenced by the fact that Mondragón has managed to sustain a virtuous circle of deep-level cooperation even while maintaining a strict code of conduct, formally backed by punishments “rang[ing] from small monetary penalties to suspension” (Morrison 1991: 74). As Bradley and Gelb (1981: 225) note: “By reducing the need for control, this [the solidaristic organisational culture] will also reduce individual perceptions of being subject to control. From the outside, the co-operatives should thus appear as well disciplined. However, a high degree of acquiescence to discipline and, therefore, a somewhat less disciplined impression should prevail inside. Survey data provide some support for these hypotheses…” Meanwhile, the additional monetary rewards of being a cooperative member as opposed to a traditional employee do not act only as material incentives – after all, they are not vast, and could anyway be enjoyed by free-riders – but also serve a symbolic role in substantiating an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation (Morrison 1991: 159-60; Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 128). Although members do appear to be strongly motivated by the job security of cooperative membership due to the pervasiveness of unemployment and temporary work (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992; Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014), it is plausible that the cooperative system is effective in eliciting solidaristic behaviour precisely because its takes material concerns ‘off the table’.

5.4.3	Reconsidering Mondragón’s Cultural Flexibility
Whyte and Whyte (1988: 270) astutely point out that “[w]ere the Basque culture the primary basis for the creation and development of the Mondragón cooperative complex, then the practical implications to be drawn from Mondragón for other societies would be extremely limited”. Indeed, observers assuming a culturalist perspective on Mondragón generally come to precisely this conclusion (e.g. Thomas and Logan 1982, Chapter 8; Oakeshott 1982; Oakeshott et al. 1977). Smith (2001: 77), for example, states : “It will likely be much more difficult to establish such networks in areas of substantially less trust, or social capital, than had been found in the Basque region…prior to the establishment of Mondragón…” Gregory and Logan (1982), meanwhile, suggest that Wales may be an eligible candidate for emulating Mondragón, but only because of its cultural similarities in terms of social cohesion and class harmony. However, if Mondragón’s organisational culture is in fact a product of its organisational structures, as I have argued, then the “pre-existing idiosyncratic cultural features [of the Basque Country] are not necessarily essential to the success of cooperatives” (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 154; see also Morrison 1991, Chapter 5). Rather, Mondragón’s system of governance represents an organisational combination that is applicable to other cultural milieus.
	Consider, for instance, the assertion made by Hansmann (1996, Chapter 6) that Basque culture has reduced the costs associated with cooperative governance, which are likely to be prohibitive in other regions, by homogenising interests and encouraging consensus. In reality, as we will see in Section 5.6.2, governance costs are high in Mondragón; but more importantly, commonality of interests and consensus are not merely a by-product of Basque culture, but rather result from the very systems of participatory governance that generate those costs (see Section 4.2.5.1) (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992). A similar criticism applies to Bradley and Gelb’s (1981, 1982) claim that Mondragón’s organisational culture derives from its rigorous screening process​[125]​, along with a degree of self-selection by cooperatively-minded individuals – an assessment that echoes Hofstede’s (2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) argument that workers’ “mental programmes” are fully determined before they enter employment, and that what appears to be ‘socialisation’ into the organisational culture of firms is in fact the result of a bilateral selection process (see Section 3.3.1). Although they admit that their analysis is principally based on “the same self-centred individualistic human model common to conventional economic theory”, and concede that “co-operatives might induce fundamental changes in economic man”, perplexingly they attribute even this to pre-existing community ties and the screening process (1981: 217-8), adding in a footnote that “it seems unwise to found arguments for co-operatives solely on the presumption of fundamental changes in economic man” (ibid.: 231). Despite their claim to the contrary (1982: 30), their conclusion that Mondragón has limited applicability in other regions is therefore essentially culturalist, because it fails to appreciate the ability of firms to ‘constitute’ behaviour at a fundamental level (MacLeod 2000: 93-5).
	In fact, because they allow for behavioural endogeneity, Greenwood and Gonzalez come to virtually the opposite conclusion as Bradley and Gelb. Whereas members in Bradley and Gelb’s (1982: 27) sample tended to “[see] the co-operatives as one of a range of alternative opportunities” and therefore joined out of a pre-existing desire to work in a cooperative, most of the members interviewed by Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 128) in the Fagor sub-group joined merely with the intention of securing a job. However, “[t]hough they did not join out of a commitment to cooperativism, many members stated that, once inside for a period of time, they became convinced of the value of the cooperative idea and structures” (ibid.: 156). Greenwood and Gonzalez (ibid.) believe that this process of socialisation “shows that the basic ideas and institutions of Fagor have the capacity to take relatively uncommitted individuals and gradually convince them of the value of cooperativism”, and are therefore applicable in other cultural contexts. Indeed, Arizmendiarrieta himself once stated: “…to be a cooperator requires a social maturity, a training in social living. For one to be an authentic cooperator, capable of cooperating, it is necessary to have learned to tame one’s individualistic or egoistic instincts and to adapt to the laws of cooperation…One becomes a cooperator through education and the practice of virtue” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 256). 

5.5	Institutional Cumulative Causation in Mondragón
Although culture per se does not limit the applicability of Mondragón in other regions, it is true that organisation is subject to forces of institutional cumulative causation, which include a structural element in addition to the cultural element (see Section 3.4). As explained in Section 4.3.2, these forces are likely to militate against cooperatives, especially when they attempt to implement the divisions of labour and management systems normally associated with capitalist firms, as Mondragón has done.

5.5.1	Historicist Explanations for Mondragón’s Success
Acknowledging this, multiple explanations for Mondragón’s success maintain that the cooperatives enjoyed exceptionally favourable historical conditions at the time of their inception (e.g. Oakeshott 1982; Oakeshott et al. 1977). Allegedly, these conditions are unlikely to be repeated in other countries at other times, wherein the forces of cumulative causation will generally prevent the emergence of cooperatives like those in Mondragón. This may explain why Morrison (1991: 4, 32, 82) and MacLeod (2000, Chapter 2), while acknowledging that Mondragón’s many aspects of Mondragón’s organisational culture can be applied elsewhere, are less sanguine with regard to Mondragón’s structures, which they (rightly) believe do not represent a “secret formula” or set of “technical fixes” that can be applied willy-nilly to other societies. The ‘historicist’ explanations can be divided into two categories: the institutional environment at the time of Mondragón’s inception, and the role of its founder. 
The first set of historicist explanations underscores that the Mondragón cooperatives emerged during an unusual period of political and economic isolation from the world economy following Spanish Civil War, when the victorious Franco regime implemented a country-wide policy of almost complete autarky and further isolated the Basque Country from the rest of Spain through negelect and repression. The town of Mondragón may have experienced especial isolation thanks to its mountainous terrain, lack of road access, and landlockedness. These conditions supposedly sheltered the cooperatives from the forces of institutional cumulative causation that would have otherwise prevented their emergence. Only later, after the cooperatives had already reached a significant level of development, were these conditions relaxed, allowing them to benefit from larger markets – firstly when trade was partially liberalised in the late-1950s, which led to an economic boom (sometimes referred to as “the Spanish miracle”), and secondly when Spain entered the European Common Market in 1986. Although this ‘initial conditions’ argument fails to explain why generalised economic isolation would favour cooperative firms over alternative forms of organisation (Smith 2001: 42-3), Bradley and Gelb (1982) suggest that a lack of labour-market mobility and alternative employment opportunities may have made workers and managers more willing to respectively lock themselves into cooperative ownership and accept lower pay.
However, even if the exact conditions of mid-century Mondragón are unlikely to be repeated elsewhere, these historical explanations essentially amount to an ‘infant industry’ argument, not unlike that elaborated in Sections 3.4.4 and 4.3.4. In fact, Bateman (2006) has highlighted the support received by the cooperatives from municipal, Basque, and even national governments as significant to Mondragón’s success. The Ulgor pioneers also ‘took matters into their own hands’ by producing an already-patented stove, which they had reverse engineered from a French manufacturer and re-patented in Spain (Morrison 1991: 48). Far from demonstrating that Mondragón is historically ‘one-off’, the fact that the coops enjoyed irregular economic conditions at the time of their inception may therefore imply that the Mondragón experience can be applied elsewhere, if provided the appropriate policies are implemented. For example, if Bradley and Gelb are correct that labour mobility prevents other regions from imitating Mondragón, it follows that interventions in the labour market (such as subsidising cooperative entry fees) or organisational innovations (such as the group system discussed in the next sub-section) may facilitate its diffusion.
While historical explanations of Mondragón’s success based on its peculiar initial conditions tend to focus on Mondragón’s isolation, it should also be noted that the post-Civil War era in which the cooperatives emerged featured a severe crisis in standards of living, including widespread unemployment, overcrowding, and tuberculosis, in addition to the poverty and food shortages that earned it the name “the hunger period” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 26). As argued in Sections 3.4.3 and 4.3.4, crises such as this – which are obviously not unique to Mondragón’s history – provide a valuable opportunity for organisational experimentation, because established relations and cognitive frames are disrupted, with people literally ‘hungry’ for new solutions. 
Furthermore, for such opportunities to be expediently seized, and for a new institutional equilibrium/path to be set, ‘entrepreneurs’ may be required to offer new organisational combinations. This leads to the second set of historical explanations, which focus on the role of Arizmendiarrieta, Mondragón’s charismatic founder who, as we have seen, was extraordinarily inspired and extraordinarily inspirational in the establishment of the cooperatives. Allegedly, other regions are unlikely to enjoy the leadership of such a unique figure. However, while Arizmendiarrieta’s critical role is indisputable, it does not necessarily represent a limitation on the development of similar experiences elsewhere. On the contrary, the very fact that a single individual had such a decisive effect on Mondragón’s trajectory demonstrates that, despite the forces of institutional cumulative causation, some irreducible agency exists in the selection of organisational forms, which can be exercised by policy-makers and social reformers the world over (see Section 3.4).

5.5.2	The Cooperative Group
In any case, just as Japanese firms have done through the keiretsu and zaibatsu (see Section 3.4.3), Mondragón has deliberately resisted the forces of institutional cumulative causation through its cooperative group, which Arizmendiarrieta helped inspire and design based on the principle of ‘Inter-cooperation’ (Azurmendi 1999: 213). In the group system, semi-autonomous cooperatives are associated into an apex organisation (Turnbull 1995; Bradley and Gelb 1982: 31). Originally this was the cooperative bank (Caja Laboral Popular), which held a ‘contract of association’ with each coop outlining certain terms of membership, such as a set contribution of profits, a commitment to participate in joint projects, and an agreement to allow the bank to intervene during crises. In 1985, in response to the size and complexity that the group had reached as well as Spain’s impending entry into the European Common Market, Mondragón began the process of reorganising itself as the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation, today the Mondragón Corporation (Whyte and Whyte 1988, Chapter 17). Rather than being associated with the Caja, members coops are now represented in a supreme ‘Cooperative Congress’, as well as a host of ‘intermediate’ structures.
Perhaps the most crucial element of the cooperative group is the plethora of ‘second-tier’ (or ‘second-level’ or ‘second-degree’) coops – umbrella organisations whose memberships are normally constituted 50% by their own workers and 50% by representatives from the ‘first-tier coops’ associated with them, which they purport to provide with ‘public’ (or more accurately ‘club’) goods that are not available from mainstream institutions. We have already seen, for example, that the Caja Laboral Popular was established in 1959 to meet the cooperatives’ increasing financial requirements. Soon after the Caja’s founding, the members of Mondragón’s coops found that they were legally classified as ‘self-employed’ and thus ineligible for Spanish social security. They therefore created Lagun-Aro to provide social and welfare services to cooperative members. Another example can be found in the various managerial training centres, which offset the need to attract skilled and cooperatively-minded managers externally (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 44, 217; Basterretxea and Albizu 2011; Meek and Woodworth 1990). In recent years, more than half of Mondragón’s managers have been trained internally (Basterretxea and Albizu 2010: 208). The second-tier educational cooperative Alecoop, meanwhile, purports to nurture cooperatively-minded members by allowing students to divide their time between university-level study and work experience in a first-tier cooperative. Mondragón also boasts a range of ‘Technology Centres’ dedicated to research and development, and the technical school which initiated the Mondragón experience is now a University owned by its workers and governed in collaboration with students and related institutions.
The División Empresarial (‘Business’ or ‘Entrepreneurial’ Division) – initially part of the Caja Laboral Popular and subsequently a separate cooperative called LKS – has arguably been the most crucial second-tier coop, although many of its responsibilities have gradually been transferred to other institutions within the Mondragón group. By bearing some of the burden of surface-level coordination, and thus bureaucratic organisational structures, the División Empresarial and its modern incarnations allow the group as a whole to grow and develop, and thus achieve economies of scale and scope, while preserving an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation on the level of the firm (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 58-9; Morrison 1991: 127-8, 170; Ellerman 1982, 1984). For instance, they can coordinate managerial strategies, fashion forward and backward linkages, prevent duplication, redistribute profits and losses, and relocate workers between first-tier coops. Traditionally, the División Empresarial also played a sort of ‘venture capitalist’ role by carrying out feasibility studies on business plans proposed by potential cooperative founders, maintaining a selection of ‘pre-made’ plans to be used off-the-shelf, and providing new cooperatives with financial and technical assistance during an initial incubation period (Smith 2001: 40). Moreover, rather than allowing member coops to expand indefinitely, the División Empresarial would hive off enterprises once they reached a maximum size (five-hundred members was historically considered the benchmark), even when this would result in multiple firms sharing production facilities. In addition to providing surface-level coordination, cooperative groups may also enhance deep-level cooperation (Diamantopoulos 2012; Sacchetti and Tortia 2015). For example, at least in Mondragón’s early days, the División Empresarial extensively screened potential members in order to accept those with cooperative inclinations and immersed them in programmes of ‘socialisation’ such as education in cooperative principles and history (Bradley and Gelb 1981). All of these policies are facilitated by cooperative sub-groups (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 237; Morrison 1981: 201, 203). Originally organised by region and later by sector, the sub-groups are now collated into four ‘Divisions’ – Knowledge, Industry, Distribution, and Finance – each with their own governance structures, which have in fact absorbed a large part of the responsibilities of the División Empresarial.
Mondragón’s system of distributing net earnings (beneficios, akin to profits), which represents an innovative halfway house between individual and collective ownership, is also crucial to the functioning of the group. In addition to receiving wages, each member holds an ‘internal capital account’ in the cooperative bank, into which their share of beneficios is periodically distributed. The capital accounts are more akin to savings accounts than to shares, in that they are non-transferrable and only redeemable upon retirement (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 42-5). In the meantime, members receive regular interest payments on their accounts. Whyte and Whyte (1988: 42) note that, in this regard, “[i]t is as if members are lending money to the firm”. Furthermore, beneficios are distributed into various reserve, social, and ‘inter-cooperative’ funds according to pre-determined percentages, before the remainder is deposited into the capital accounts (Forcadell Martínez 2000). 
The earnings system avoids the inefficiencies predicted by models on the ‘Labour-Managed Firm’ (see Section 4.2.4). For example, in what Ellerman (1982) has termed the “socialisation of entrepreneurship”, both the capital accounts and the various funds provide liquidity for the bank and other second-tier coops to undertake large-scale investments, such as research and development and the creation of new firms, thus avoiding the potential for cooperatives to underinvest (see also Gui 1984). Furthermore, because members cannot trade or redeem their accounts until retirement, they are prevented from ‘selling out’ to investors​[126]​. In addition to the fact that each workers pays an initial deposit into their account, deducted from wages if necessary, this also extends member time horizons by ‘locking them in’ to the firm. Indeed, members of Mondragón have, on numerous occasions, voted to reduce their capital earnings in hard times in order to preserve their jobs, with their foregone earnings eventually repaid (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 146; Forcadell Martínez 2000; Smith 2003). The members of Eroski, the retail cooperative, recently agreed to assume 30% of firm’s losses in 2013 by creating ‘individual negative reserves’ alongside their individual capital accounts (Observatorio Español de la Economía Social 2014c). The capital accounts also prevent members from being encouraged to hire non-member workers with the objective of defending the value of their wealth, as, unlike shares, the accounts are not diluted when new members are added (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 289).
The success of the group structure is evidenced by Mondragón’s impressive capacity for job creation and preservation, which it has long pursued as an explicit objective (Smith 2003). This is particularly evident during recessions, wherein Mondragón has repeatedly outperformed the rest of the economy (Basterretxea and Albizu 2010; Bradley and Gelb 1983, 1987; Morris 1992). Indeed, Mondragón has experienced remarkably low rates of business failure (Ormazabal 2013; Ellerman 1982, 1984): Smith (2001: 45) reports only eight cases up to 1992, many of which were ‘experimental coops’ set up in distant regions (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 78-80). In fact, when mortality and unemployment rates rose in the rest of Spain amidst the recessions of the 70s and 80s, Mondragón enjoyed net creation of firms and jobs; the same has been true of Basque cooperatives (of which Mondragón is by far the largest) in the most recent recession (Ormazabal 2013). Consequently, employment in Mondragón increased from 19,669 workers in 1986, to 30,634 in 2006, to 83,569 in 2011 (Cheney et al. 2014: 594).
The recent collapse of Mondragón’s flagship cooperative Fagor Electrodomésticos in November 2013 was portrayed in the media as the death knell of the cooperative group, especially as the rest of the cooperatives (most notably the large Eroski retail cooperative) voted not to bail out the ailing appliance manufacturer despite the Basque government offering to meet them half way. For instance, in an article entitled “Trouble in Workers’ Paradise”, The Economist (2013, para. 7) sneered: “The co-operative model has its virtues, but there are times when those nasty, money-obsessed capitalists have their uses too.” While undoubtedly a symbolic catastrophe given Fagor’s roots in Mondragón’s original Ulgor cooperative and its status as one of the handful of large, high-tech manufacturing cooperatives in the world, the group had in fact been subsidising Fagor for years amidst a recessionary economy, lending it 700 million euros in total (Navarro 2014, para. 4). At any rate, Mondragón has proven exceptionally adept at minimising unemployment when its coops do fail, either by relocating redundant workers in other cooperatives or creating new firms to employ them (Smith 2001; Whyte and Whyte 1988, Chapter 13). Since the collapse of Fagor, for example, Mondragón has managed to relocate 1,050 of the 1,895 redundant workers in other coops, with an additional 450 receiving early retirement or compensation packages (Chávarri 2014, para. 4). 

5.5.3	The Limitations of Cooperative Groups
The ability of the cooperative group to defy the forces of institutional cumulative causation implies that Mondragón’s governance structure could potentially be (and, as the next chapter will demonstrate, has been) adopted in other institutional environments by implementing similar inter-cooperative associations. However, cooperative groups are by no means a quick fix. In a personal interview, Mario Amparo Camacho of the Valencian cooperative university Florida suggested that cooperative groups can involve a “chicken-and-egg problem” (Smith and Rothbaum 2014: 236), because while some critical number of cooperatives may be required before a group becomes viable, individual cooperatives are themselves unviable without a group to support them (see also Dow and Putterman 1996: 67-70; Smith 2001: 33-5). In addition to this coordination problem, Smith (2001: 36) notes a cooperation problem whereby cooperatives may be able to benefit from the existence of a group without actually joining it, for example through its favourable impact on mainstream institutions of law, finance, and education, or through the higher frequency of cooperatives that it supports. These issues are exacerbated by the governance problems inherent to cooperative groups, most notably a precarious balance between centralisation and autonomy (Morrison 1991: 169). Member firms cannot be fully independent, because in that case the group structure would be powerless to achieve coordination; but neither can member firms be fully subordinate, because in that case they would essentially be engulfed into one large firm. Rather, member cooperatives must voluntarily forfeit a significant (but not total) degree of sovereignty. For instance, they must agree to conform to the group’s strategic plans, contribute a certain percentage of profits, participate in joint projects, and even subsidise ailing partners. This sacrifice requires deep-level cooperation on the level of the group, and will be difficult to secure through a purely contractual and instrumental relationship. Consequently, although cooperative groups purport to combat the forces of cumulative causation by facilitating collective action between cooperatives, they may themselves be ‘public goods’ in that no single coop has an incentive to create them (Joshi and Smith 2008). 
Indeed, it is likely to be at least as challenging to develop an inter-cooperative culture as it is to develop an intra-cooperative culture. Because members are more distant from the group than from their own firm, not only are there far less opportunities for structural consistency, but problems of bounded rationality are likely to prevent members from sufficiently understanding, or even being sufficiently concerned about, inter-cooperative issues (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 226). Inter-cooperation will then operate only on the surface level, with the group deteriorating into a merely instrumental, transactional association. Furthermore, just as maintaining a cooperative culture alongside functional and remunerative distinctions in the workplace is challenging, so too is maintaining cooperation between cooperatives with different characteristics. For example, if the one-member-one-vote rule is adhered to, larger coops will tend to dominate smaller coops in organs of governance. Whyte and Whyte (1988: 144) note that this problem was addressed in the Ularco group, wherein Ulgor was larger than all of the other cooperatives in the group combined, by developing a hybrid voting system, whereby the average was taken of the one-member-one-vote system and a second system that accorded larger weights to smaller firms. Other problems occur when earnings, costs, or resources are shared, but certain firms are more or less profitable, have higher or lower costs, or use shared resources more or less intensively than others, although inter-cooperative funds and interventions by superordinate institutions may be able to alleviate these issues (ibid.: 188). Furthermore, in like manner to individual firms, the challenge of maintaining ‘deep-level inter-cooperation’ is magnified as groups expand, which is of course one of their primary purposes. As Mondragón soon found, moreover, expanding exclusively along existing social ties is not likely to be feasible in the long run (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 72).

5.6	‘Degeneration’ in Mondragón
The inability of Mondragón to fully resist the forces of institutional cumulative causation has been manifested in workplace discontent, the bureaucratisation of governance, the employment of non-member workers, and the acquisition of non-cooperative subsidiaries, each of which are examined in further detail below. These issues have motivated some observers to lament that Mondragón has ‘lost its soul’, effectively ‘degenerating’ into a capitalistic organisation based on surface-level cooperation, thus yielding to the third premise of technological determinism (viz., that managerial hierarchies are associated with capitalist organisation) and with it, the cooperation/coordination trade-off (e.g. Freundlich 1996; see Cheney 1999; Azkarraga Etxagibel, Cheney, and Udaondo 2012; Taylor 1994). Commentators in the Marxist tradition who view the labour process as determinant of the power structure go further by challenging even the historical image of Mondragón, which they reject as a fantasy (e.g. Kasmir 1996; Kohler 1996). The ‘real Mondragón’, in this line of thought, is plagued by “social contradictions of all types”, in the words of a 1972 report by the Basque separatist group ETA, and has never been structurally or culturally cooperative in any meaningful sense (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 92-3). However, while issues of degeneration certainly squash the romanticised, even “mythical” image of Mondragón that is often depicted in the uncritical management literature (Azkarraga Etxagibel, Cheney, and Udaondo 2012: 76; Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014: 646-7), none of them show that Mondragón has completely relinquished cooperative governance or deep-level cooperation (Schweickart 2002: 72-3). To the extent that they are significant, moreover, they represent not an inherent incompatibility between the organisational structures associated with advanced technologies and cooperative governance, but rather the magnitude of institutional cumulative causation (Alperovitz and Hanna 2013).

5.6.1	Workplace Discontent
The first area in which it would appear that Mondragón has ‘degenerated’ is the discontent expressed by workers over the complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems implemented in the workplace. Consider a managerial technique described by Kasmir (1996: 181-4), implemented in the Copreci cooperative, whereby each manual task was decomposed into its most basic movement patterns, with workers filmed to ensure that they did not engage in any movement, however minor, that was not strictly required for the completion of the task. It would appear from Kasmir’s description that the purpose of the technique was not to prevent ‘shirking’ per se (that is, to achieve surface-level cooperation), but rather to eliminate unconscious ‘slack’ (that is, to achieve surface-level coordination). Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that even intensive participation in governance could fully offset the tendency for techniques like this, which deprive workers of even elementary forms of discretion, to be perceived as degrading and invasive, and thus to stimulate individualistic behaviour. 
Indeed, in the Fagor sub-group of Mondragón, Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992; see also Kasmir 1996: 160-7) found that although workers recognised the value of participatory governance and worker ownership, they also expressed profound dissatisfaction with what they perceived to be menial work and a lack of workplace participation – a trend that seems to persist today (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014: 654, 657). In fact, we saw in Section 4.3.2 that equality and participation in governance can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the adverse behavioural effects of complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems by drawing attention to the lack of equality and participation in the workplace. This appears to be borne out in Mondragón: Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 8) found that “[t]he members’ experience of the processes of governance and the processes of work…can be quite contradictory”, leading to frustration and scepticism over Mondragón’s professed values, the official list of which curiously includes the principle of “Participatory Management” (ibid.: 7, 130-1). 
Since its early days, Mondragón has sought to expand worker participation beyond governance into matters of the workplace by establishing a series of ‘Social Councils’ – elected bodies akin to unions that represent the interests of members as workers, complementing the Governing Councils that primarily represent the interests of members as owners, and the General Assemblies that primarily address strategic issues (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 231, 39-40). Whyte and Whyte (1988: 230) note that “[t]his dual structure [comprising both Governing and Social Councils] gives the Mondragón cooperatives strength in decision making not available in large worker cooperatives elsewhere…having two official bodies…enables them to achieve balance (equilibrio)”. ‘Watchdog councils’ have also been established to oversee management and improve transparency (Sperry 1985: 351; Thomas and Logan 1982: 29).
However, whereas unions (as well as the works councils that operate within the codetermination systems of various northern-European countries) purport to negotiate on behalf of workers (forcefully if necessary), the Social Councils resemble the Franco-era jurados de empresa (company councils) – and perhaps the Japanese ‘enterprise unions’ (see Section 2.3.3) – in that they are only authorised to ‘discuss’ issues with management (Smith 2001: 53); Mondragón’s website describes them as “consultative bod[ies]” (Mondragón Corporation n.d.b). Indeed, their chairs have historically been appointed by management or shared with the Governing Councils, and their role within the cooperatives – as well as their effectiveness in securing deep-level cooperation – is further obfuscated by the fact that they are limited to one representative per fifty members and (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 39-41, 112, 123). Whyte and Whyte (ibid.: 229-33) even opined that worker participation in Mondragón is essentially “reactive” as opposed to “proactive”, and that capitalist firms often have superior opportunities for the latter, especially when unionised; Noam Chomsky made a similar criticism in a 1994 interview. Kasmir (1996: 130) appears to confirm this by pointing out that workers in the nearby capitalist firm Mayc voted against converting the firm into a cooperative because they judged that their interests would be more safely protected by relying on unions or syndicates.
The inability of the Social Councils to contain worker disgruntlement was most markedly exposed in 1974, when a group of worker-members in the Ulgor cooperative organised Mondragón’s only ever strike in protest against a proposed job evaluation system that introduced “a number of fine distinctions and included a ‘merit factor’ based on an immediate supervisor’s judgement” (Morrison 1991: 150; see also Whyte and Whyte 1988, Chapter 9). Although the system would not significantly affect earnings – especially as those members whose jobs would be downgraded were promised that their pay would not be reduced – workers interpreted it as devaluing their roles and granting undue power to supervisors. More than four-hundred members participated in the strike, but failed to force managers to meet their demands for greater wage equality. Most of the strikers were disciplined, and twenty-four members identified as ‘leaders’ were immediately expelled, although they were later readmitted. Eighteen of the leaders were women, who, because they primarily worked in low-skilled jobs, were disproportionally harmed by the new system, in addition to experiencing other forms of discrimination common at the time. 
Reflecting on the strike, the Ularco sub-group of Mondragón, of which Ulgor was the leading cooperative, admitted in 1985 that “…the potential for conflict between technocracy and participation is an undeniable risk not sufficiently dealt with…by the dynamics of the organs of governance and participation…” (ibid.: 101). In fact, although numerous ‘proximate causes’ for this state of affairs were identified – such as the need to stay competitive and the group’s recent episode of unbridled expansion – the general manager of Ularco went so far as to state that “the growing tensions in the workplace revealed the inherent contradiction between the democratic system of cooperative governance and the rigid and authoritarian system for organizing work relations according to the scientific management principles of Frederick W. Taylor” (ibid.: 113-4, emphasis added; see also Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte 1977: 29). Indeed, the strike’s underlying tensions were never fully resolved. Morrison (1991: 150) contends that the strike spurred a series of important reforms, including limiting the size of each cooperative to no more than five-hundred members, permitting workers to express solidarity with strikers in other firms (for instance by undertaking temporary work stoppages), and increasing the participation of women. Eventually, moreover, unions and political parties were granted representation in governance, having previously been excluded altogether (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 108-12). In Ularco itself, however, the main response was a campaign to reform the Social Councils, to which management was intransigently opposed: while agreeing to limited reforms such as the formation of ‘mini-councils’ and training programmes to improve managers’ social skills, they repeatedly refused to allow the Social Councils to elect their own chairs (Whyte and Whyte 1988, Chapter 10; Kasmir 1996: 139).
The failure to reform the Social Councils was exposed in the subsequent campaign for workplace reform, implemented by Ularco in an attempt to “explore possibilities of creating new forms of work organization that would be economically efficient yet more in harmony with the social values on which the cooperative movement was based”, in the words of Ularco’s manager (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 113-4). Despite their intended purpose of increasing worker participation in workplace decisions, the Social Councils were hardly involved in the programme, tending to deflect issues to organs of governance. As a result, the programme was ultimately directed by managers (ibid., Chapter 11). This “institutional reflex” appears to be systemic in Mondragón: twenty years after the strike, workers in the Fagor sub-group, a reincarnation of Ulgor, alluded to a “missing organization” to provide workers a voice in the workplace (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 140, 158), and similar sentiments persist today (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014).
Significant workplace reforms were achieved in the household appliance manufacturer Copreci, which replaced assembly lines with autonomously managed work tables after studying the production methods of Scandinavian firms like Volvo (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 118). As a result, productivity increased, relations with managers improved, and inventories and management costs decreased. However, Copreci had started off the campaign with “the best prospects” for reform, due to the simplicity of its production process and the receptiveness of its managers (ibid.: 115). The only other notable success was in Vergara, a dishwasher factory built from scratch (ibid.: 122). Where reforms were more problematic or expensive, they were generally unsuccessful. Ulgor – the largest firm in the Ularco group, and the source of the strike itself – did not even attempt radical changes as its production processes consisted of long assembly lines that would require “enormous investments” to replace, and even the modest changes it did attempt did not last (ibid.: 115, 120). Eventually Ularco’s programme petered out as the Spanish recession of 1979 diverted attention towards survival, and the rationalisation of production continued (ibid.: 125; Kasmir 1996: 181-4).
When Mondragón has reformed its workplaces, it has generally been in response to technological changes, such as the transition to a service-based economy, or changes in consumer demand that require increases in quality and flexibility (Kasmir 1996: 181-4). In such cases, cooperatives have “increasingly utiliz[ed] their natural comparative advantage in team- and participation-based approaches” (see Sections 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.7.2) (Smith 2001: 57). Even in these cases, however, it has often been a challenge for managers accustomed to the technical duties involved in surface-level coordination to take on the symbolic and leadership duties of deep-level coordination (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 127). Moreover, other technological changes, such as the rise of automation, have threatened low-skilled jobs (Morrison 1991: 214-5). In any case, on the whole, “programs involving ‘quality of work life’ and ‘employee involvement’…are not a major part of the Mondragón system” (Morrison 1991: 80; see also Whyte and Whyte 1988: 134). Indeed, in the large Eroski retail cooperative, workplace participation has actually fallen since the firm began to aggressively expand in the 1990s (Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014: 637-8).
However, workplace discontent does not necessarily imply that Mondragón has failed to achieve deep-level cooperation, because the satisfaction of preferences does not translate neatly into solidaristic behaviour, nor does the lack of preference satisfaction translate neatly into individualistic behaviour (March and Simon 1958: 48, 50; Vroom 1964: 181-6; Katz and Kahn 1966: 373; Gallagher and Einhorn 1976: 367, 71). In fact, deep-level cooperation and preference satisfaction may be inversely correlated, because the expectations and aspirations of workers who approach their jobs instrumentally/transactionally (and thus exhibit individualistic behaviour) will be easier to fulfil than those of workers who approach their jobs substantively and relationally (and thus exhibit solidaristic behaviour). As has been suggested with regard to Japanese firms (Cole 1979, Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 24-6), participatory governance may therefore encourage solidaristic behaviour while increasing dissatisfaction, a dynamic which Heras-Saizarbitoria (2014: 654) identifies in his interviews with Mondragón worker-members, and which Arando et al. (2011) suggest could explain why job satisfaction is lower, yet productivity higher, in Eroski’s cooperative stores than in its chains that are only partially worker-owned.
Following Durkheim (1893), it could furthermore be argued that the mediating role of organisational culture in attenuating the adverse behavioural effects of mechanistic organisational structures is not to convince workers that they enjoy working in those structures, but rather to convince them that their roles within those structures are important to the functioning of the system. Of course, some of the discontent observed in Mondragón – including the 1974 strike – derives precisely from the fact that workers do not feel that they are appreciated. However, it could be argued that such expressions of discontent are part of the way that cooperative governance achieves consensus (Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014). As Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 1) note, “…a great many issues affecting standard firms – hierarchy, alienation, change, etc. – also affect the cooperatives and, by implication…successful democracy is not about the eradication of difference and conflict.” Unlike in “standard firms”, however, workers and managers in cooperatives deal with “difference and conflict” as equal members. 
Durkheim also emphasised that “regulation” could be implemented to counteract the “anomie” resulting from complex divisions of labour. In Mondragón, a notable example of such regulation is the maximum wage differentials, which, as we saw in Section 5.4.2, workers consider to be an effective means of offsetting the stratified nature of work and the hierarchical nature of management (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 131-2). It is true that some cooperatives in high-tech sectors that place high premiums on technical and managerial skills have voted to widen these differentials from the initial 3:1 ratio; in 1982, Thomas and Logan (1982: 159) found ratios as high as 10:1. However, it is remarkable that the differentials have not been widened since Thomas and Logan’s study over thirty years ago, given that, in the interim, managerial pay packages have skyrocketed in the rest of society. Indeed, many cooperatives still adhere to the original ratio, with the average ratio remaining approximately 5:1, which generally results in higher wages for low-level workers and lower wages for high-level workers than in conventional firms (Herrera 2004: 7).





The second way in which Mondragón has allegedly succumbed to the third premise of technological determinism is the apparent bureaucratisation of its governance system, a danger which Arizmendiarrieta and his followers warned against years before (Larrañaga 1981; Whyte and Whyte 1988: 100). In this line of critique, the lack of workplace participation has ‘spilled over’ into the realm of governance as per Weber’s (1930 [1905]) “iron cage” of bureaucracy and his protégé Michels’ (1962 [1911]) “iron law of oligarchy” (see Section 4.3.2). For example, many members seem to be neglecting opportunities to participate in governance, apparently swamped by the surfeit of “technical and financial information” relevant to strategic decisions (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 108, 117-8, 129, 135​[127]​). Meanwhile, professional managers have been increasingly hired externally rather than trained and appointed from within the cooperatives, and managerial status seems to be the most important factor in determining appointments to the various organs of governance (Kasmir 1996: 151-3; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014: 639). Already in 1974 after the Ulgor strike, the report issued by Ularco noted a “concentration of decisions at high organizational levels, as influenced by technical specialization” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 105). Complaints have also arisen that higher-skilled workers were given priority in inter-cooperative transfers (Kasmir 1996: 200).
Such bureaucratisation has the potential to undermine deep-level cooperation. Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 113, 129, 158), for instance, observed in 1991 that the “feeling of overall social closeness ha[d] been lost” in the Fagor sub-group, noting “[a] sense of not participating in key technical and production decisions, [a] feeling of being subject to technical and managerial whims, and [a] consequent belief that they are not being taken into account as equal members…” Over twenty years later, Heras-Saizarbitoria (2014: 654) still encountered scepticism towards the rhetoric of participation and disdain towards managers amongst Mondragón’s worker-members. More fundamentally, as envisaged by Weber and Michels, bureaucratisation could potentially mark a fundamental shift in the mode of organisation, if the authority enjoyed by managers comes to be ultimate (or “real”) rather than delegated (or “formal”) (Aghion and Tirole 1997). A report by ETA in 1971, for example, referred to a “technocratic class that calls itself cooperativist”, which, according to a report issued the following year by a Maoist faction of ETA, commands de facto authority while permitting, but ultimately controlling, nominally democratic organs such as the Governing Councils​[128]​ (Azurmendi 1984: 624, 626, quoted in Whyte and Whyte 1988: 99). The term “technocracy” still appeared in critiques of Mondragón years later (e.g. Lertxundi 2002).
In Mondragón, the difficulty of introducing democratic reforms into governance, as is also true for the workplace, derives in part from the fact that the costs of decision-making are already high in Mondragón​[129]​. Whyte and Whyte (1988: 146) noted that “[c]hanges require an extended and complex process of discussion and negotiation within each cooperative and between the cooperatives and management of the group. Major changes cannot be accomplished quickly…” They furthermore stated that “[t]he costs of this process, including materials preparation time, training time, and time for which workers are paid but away from their jobs, are very substantial”, providing several astonishing estimates (ibid.: 227; see also Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 148-9). However, the high costs of governance also reveal that bureaucratisation has been exaggerated, because they derive precisely from the democratic processes on which member sovereignty – and thus deep-level cooperation – are predicated. According to Whyte and Whyte (1988: 229), worker-members enjoy real power through their participation in the general assemblies – they “do not simply rubber-stamp the proposals of management and the governing council”​[130]​. Although a two-thirds majority is usually the formal requirement for a proposal to pass, moreover, in practice the organs of governance strive to achieve consensus, if not unanimity. Greenwood and Gonzalez (1992: 148-9) also describe a plethora of participatory structures besides formal voting procedures, which foster “an environment of dialogue”. For example, before each formal meeting of the General Assembly, informal meetings called charlas (‘chats’) are often held in small groups to disseminate information and promote discussion, especially in large coops in which formal assemblies may lack face-to-face interaction. 
The especial respect conferred to managers, meanwhile, seems to derive mainly from the fact that they are more visible and well-known (Kasmir 1996: 151-3). This implies not that managers are ‘taking over’, but rather that they are successfully fulfilling their role of providing deep-level coordination by acting as leaders – a role which Arizmendiarrieta emphasised (MacLeod 2000: 85-6). In any case, to the extent that bureaucratisation has occurred, it seems to have resulted – like workplace discontent – from comparisons with capitalist firms, as some members have become convinced that the sluggishness of democratic decision-making puts the cooperatives at a competitive disadvantage (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1991: 151). This view is particular prevalent amongst “members who belong to cooperatives from the industrial sector, working in the production of labor-intensive products, and who are exposed to direct competition from other organizations that manufacture in countries with low labor costs” (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014: 655). Bureaucratisation therefore demonstrates not that cooperative governance is inherently incompatible with hierarchical management systems, but rather that cooperatives seeking to implement such systems will confront hostile forces of institutional cumulative causation.
Perhaps the most significant event in the evolution of Mondragón’s governance system, however, has been the new corporate structure implemented in the mid-1980s (Bakaikoa et al. 2004). Although the structure is notionally “inverted” so that individual cooperatives possess ultimate authority through their representation in the Cooperative Congress, some believe that power has been centralised, not least in the the new executive arm, comprising a CEO and an executive board (Smith 2001: 46). Indeed, it is telling that the Mondragón pioneers originally rejected the corporate form as detrimental to the autonomy of individual firms (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 58-9). In fact, the large ULMA group voted to secede from Mondragón in 1991 for precisely this reason, although it has since re-joined (Cheney 1999: 49-50). By widening the distance between individual cooperative members and the sovereign organs of power, the corporate format has also ‘stretched’ the ability of democratic governance to provide structural consistency (Morrison 1991: 201-2; Whyte 1995: 64-5). The restructuring was implemented primarily in anticipation of Spain’s entry into the European common market; when that occurred in 1986, one year after Mondragón had initiated the restructuring process, an unprecedented amount of workers were laid off. Furthermore, concurrently with the restructuring, Mondragón switched its expansion strategy from creating new cooperatives to converting existing capitalist firms (and to spinning off existing cooperatives), which has led to further governance problems due to differences in organisational culture as well the vested interests of unions and managers (Cheney 1999: 49-50​[131]​).
However, it should be noted that a host ‘intermediate’ organs of governance were created between individual cooperatives and the apex institutions that compensate (and perhaps even super-compensate) for the system’s tendencies to undermine the sovereignty of individual cooperatives and to alienate individual members, such as a number of committees and a divisional system whereby cooperatives organised into Finance, Industry, Retail and Knowledge groups (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 83; Morrison 1991: 169). Furthermore, for the explicit purpose of avoiding an excessive concentration of power, the División Empresarial was made autonomous from the Caja Laboral Popular, and eventually converted into the LKS cooperative, with many of its functions being assumed by other institutions within Mondragón such as the new Divisions. The layoffs and shift in expansion strategy, meanwhile, appear to have resulted from the abrupt increase in competition from capitalist firms and exposure to a less complementary institutional environment that followed Spain’s entry into the European common market, and may have been even more problematic had Mondragón not taken steps to restructure beforehand.

5.6.3	The Employment of Non-Member Workers
Another way in which Mondragón seems to have ‘degenerated’ into a non-cooperative organisation is through the significant increase in employment of non-member workers within the cooperatives (Bakaikoa et al. 2004: 76-9; Cheney 1999: 86). According to Kasmir’s (1996: 158) observations, these workers were treated as ‘third-class citizens’, subordinate to both managers and member-workers (who they referred to as “jefecitos” or “little bosses”) and “were assigned to the most routinized and unpleasant jobs” in at least one cooperative. After the recent collapse of Fagor Electrodomésticos, moreover, members were prioritised over non-members in the process of relocating redundant workers to other cooperatives (Navarro 2014, para. 5). In short, Mondragón appears to have adopted a two-tier system, much like the archetypal Japanese firm in which a core of workers are afforded lifetime employment and welfare services while a periphery of workers are treated as mere ‘hired hands’ (Morrison 1991: 122; see Kamata 1982).
However, the increase in non-member workers does not mark a fundamental shift in Mondragón’s mode of organisation. Such workers are usually hired to fill jobs for which permanent member-workers cannot be found, such as seasonal demand fluctuations or specialised services such as legal services, the need for which has undoubtedly increased in step with Mondragón’s expansion and diversification. In any case, Spanish law stipulates that non-members cannot account for more than 30% of total hours worked in a worker cooperative, and most of the cooperatives have deliberately limited the proportion of such workers to no more than 20% of the total workforce​[132]​ (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social n.d.; Smith 2001: 44). Furthermore, many workers in Mondragón coops that are initially hired as non-members or temporary members are given the option of eventually becoming permanent members (Smith 2001: 77-8). Indeed, interviews conducted by Smith (ibid.: 44) “showed that…the goals of virtually all [of the] co-ops are to bring as many workers as possible to member status as soon as prudently possible”. In any case, as I argued in Section 4.3.2, the tendency for cooperatives to hire non-members – predicted by the LMF literature and documented in numerous cases – derives from the predominance of capitalist firms and their associated institutions, such as labour and stock markets (Weitzman 1954; Schlicht and von Weizsäcker 1977; Sertel 1982; Dow 1986).

5.6.4	The Acquisition of Non-Cooperative Subsidiaries
Far more critical than the employment of non-member workers within the cooperatives is the recent trend of acquiring non-cooperative subsidiaries. Mondragón opened its first overseas manufacturing plant in Mexico in 1989 and adopted an explicit strategy of overseas expansion in its 1993 Congress. Today, Mondragón has corporate offices in eight countries outside of Spain and controls over a hundred overseas production plants, primarily in ‘emerging economies’ like China and Eastern Europe (Errasti et al. 2003: 556; Mondragón Corporation n.d.c; Ormaetxea 1993, 2003, 2006). These plants now represent a significant proportion of Mondragón’s turnover and employment; in 2012, for instance, they accounted for €4 billion – almost a third – of the Corporation’s €12.9 billion turnover, and in 2004, they accounted for 65% of the turnover of the Industrial Division (TU Lankide 2013a; Errasti et al. 2003: 557). Rather than organising these plants as cooperatives, the prevailing strategy has been for a ‘parent’ cooperative in Spain to acquire a majority shareholding in an existing overseas business, appointing expatriate chief executives and retaining the bulk of R&D (Errasti et al. 2003: 558; Errasti 2013). As a result, Mondragón now comprises more subsidiary companies (122) than it does cooperatives (103), with the proportion of members in total employment plummeting from 86% in 1991 to 29.5% in 2007 (Mondragón Corporation n.d.d; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014: 628). This seems to represent an ongoing trend. In 2014, for example, the Fagor Ederlan cooperative, which already has a large international presence (Errasti and Mendizabal 2007), engaged in joint venture with the Infun Group to establish a large automotive parts factory in China (TU Lankide 2013a). In the same year, the Orona cooperative, the largest lift/elevator manufacturer in Europe, bought out the Polish firm Techlift (Observatorio Español de la Economía Social 2014d).
This situation, which Mondragón pioneer Jesús Larrañaga (1981) presaged years before, “has produced contradictions between the basic objectives of a business organisation competing in international markets and the historical core principles and values of the Mondragón cooperatives” (Errasti et al. 2003: 566​[133]​). Indeed, the internationalisation strategy directly betrays Mondragón’s principle of Social Transformation (and arguably Inter-Cooperation), which emanates from Arizmendiarrieta’s vision of cooperative values “extend[ing] beyond the limits of the individual enterprise, on a broader scale” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 243). The disingenuousness of Mondragón’s internationalisation strategy was embarrassingly exposed in November 2010, when workers in a Polish plant owned by Fagor Electrodomésticos (Mondragón’s flagship cooperative, which was ailing at the time, and which collapsed three years later) went on a ‘work-to-rule’ strike for two months, disputing the firm’s excessive employment of temporary workers and chronically low pay, which it had refused to raise despite consistent increases in labour productivity (McNamara 2011).
A few Mondragón coops such as Maier and Ulma Construction have sought to extend some of Mondragón’s cooperative principles, including Formación and Participatory Management, to their overseas subsidiaries (Flecha and Ngai 2014: 676-8; Errasti et al. 2003: 571, 576). However, it is hard to see how either of these principles – the latter of which is conspicuous by its absence even within the cooperatives – amount to anything more than window-dressing or conscience-soothing without the crucial factor of worker ownership/control. The same can be said for Mondragón’s various foundations and programmes dedicated to overseas development, which resemble the ‘corporate social responsibility’ campaigns of other large multinationals. Indeed, by justifying its internationalisation strategy on the basis of preserving the jobs of cooperative members in Spain (e.g. Luzarraga Monasterio, Aranzadi Telleria, and Irizar Etxebarria 2007; Mondragón Corporation 2012c), and thus maintaining double standards between its foreign and domestic firms, Mondragón appears to be behaving as a sort “ethnocentric multinational”​[134]​ (Chakravarthy and Perlmutter 1985, quoted in Errasti et al. 2003: 558; see also Urdangarin 1999; Clamp 2000).
For many, these contradictions are the final ‘nail in the coffin’ of naïve delusions of Mondragón as a visionary ‘third way’. Indeed, it has been suggested that the strategy of combining cooperatives with conventional firms represents a ‘new wave’ of cooperativism that is more aptly termed “neo-cooperativism” (Larrañaga 1998) or “coopitalism” (Defourny, Develtere, and Fonteneau 1999). This seems to be confirmed by the fact that Mondragón now refers to itself as ‘the Mondragón Corporation’, appearing to have dropped the ‘Cooperative’ adjective (although it is now rebranding itself as simply ‘Mondragón’). Furthermore, maintaining a “social movement orientation” may be crucial to maintaining structural consistency within the cooperatives (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 127-136; Cancelo 2000). The sort of ‘collective egoism’ practiced by Mondragón, to borrow a phrase from the anarchist and social critic Peter Kropotkin, may therefore undermine an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation.
	The internationalisation strategy, however, represents a deviation away from the cooperative ideal-type, not a fundamental shift in the mode of organisation (Flecha and Ngai 2014; Arando et al. 2010); in a way, it is the reverse of a capitalist firm offering Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) to its employees. Indeed, at its 2003 General Congress, Mondragón began to promote the conversion of its subsidiaries into ‘mixed cooperatives’, an organisational form pioneered by the Eroski coop in which one portion of voting rights are allocated according to the ‘one-member-one-vote’ principle while the other portion are allocated according to capital contribution, with the capital coming from the parent cooperative​[135]​ (Altuna Gabilondo 2008; Azkarraga Etxagibel, Cheney, and Udaondo 2012; Flecha and Ngai 2014). The mixed cooperatives are seen as a step towards full cooperativism, and in its 2005 Congress Mondragón committed to eventually converting all of its subsidiaries into cooperatives. If Mondragón’s members do not actually see this as a priority, it could paradoxically be a symptom of the ‘strength’ of Mondragón’s organisational culture; as has been widely noted, closely-knit social groups engender an ‘in versus out’ mentality almost by definition (e.g. Granovetter 1973).
In any case, as with all of the issues already discussed, the issue derives from the hostile forces of institutional cumulative causation, and the inability of cooperative groups to completely allay those forces. In Mondragón’s early days, institutional obstacles prevented it from successfully establishing cooperatives even in other parts of the Basque Country, with firms nearer to the town of Mondragón demonstrating “stronger” organisational cultures of deep-level cooperation than those farther away (Morrison 1991: 161; see also Whyte and Whyte 1988: 78-80, 218). More recently, the innovative hybrid consumer/worker cooperative Eroski, which controls a vast chain of supermarkets, has deemed it necessary to acquire non-cooperative subsidiaries while expanding into other parts of Spain (and France) (Arando et al. 2011). As a result, only 20% of its workers were full cooperative members in 2011, even though the figure was 80% – similar to that of other Mondragón cooperatives – within the Basque Country (Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014: 635). Although Eroski pioneered the ‘mixed cooperative’ model, moreover, the automotive parts manufacturer Maier had to negotiate extensively with public officials and cooperative associations in the nearby autonomous community of Galicia for an amendment to be passed before it could apply the model to its Ferroplast subsidiary (ibid.: 675). Furthermore, the Mondragón coops have generally waited until a subsidiary is already successful before offering it the chance to convert into a mixed cooperative, and even then have felt obliged to retain majority voting rights in order to safeguard their investment in should the business collapse (ibid.: 671-2).
Clearly, in expanding abroad, Mondragón has faced the same issue on a larger scale “due to obstacles of an economic, jurisdictional and cultural nature” that do not apply with equal force in the Basque Country – or even in Spain – thanks to the strength of the cooperative group, the favourability of public policy, and the mere prevalence of cooperatives (Errasti et al. 2003: 555, see also p559-60; Flecha and Ngai 2014; Clamp 2000). As Smith (2001: 48) notes, “converting an individual firm to a coop in a foreign country where no other such coops exist” – and, I would add, where the institutional environment is unfavourable – “could well be putting the jobs of the workers of that firm at heightened risk”. The mixed cooperative model, meanwhile, has not yet been possible within the legal regimes of foreign countries (Flecha and Ngai 2014: 674). It should also be kept in mind that Mondragón’s internationalisation strategy consists of buying out existing capitalist firms rather than creating non-cooperative subsidiaries de novo, meaning that it is minimising its contribution to the forces of institutional cumulative causation, and possibly even altering them if those enterprises are eventually converted into coops (Luzarraga Monasterio, Aranzadi Telleria, and Irizar Etxebarria 2007).

5.6.5	Contradictions in the Marxist Criticism
	That Mondragón has overcome the third premise of technological determinism, and consequently has alleviated the cooperation/coordination trade-off, is corroborated by closer inspection of Marxist criticisms. In addition to being admonished for degenerating into an essentially capitalist organisation characterised by worker discontent, bureaucratic governance, non-member workers, and even non-cooperative subsidiaries, Mondragón has also been accused of facilitating ‘self-exploitation’ and displacing more radical social movements (Kasmir 1996). These latter criticisms are only valid if Mondragón has in fact achieved cooperation and coordination simultaneously. As I have argued, moreover, this feat is only possible by avoiding the distributive dilemma, which Marxists take for granted as an inherent ‘contradiction of capitalism’ (see Section 4.2.7.3).
Considering firstly the charge of self-exploitation, the general accusation echoes the ‘bureaucratic control’ thesis discussed in Section 2.3.2 and applied to cooperatives in Section 4.2.7.3. Participation in Mondragón is seen as ersatz, with the Social Council dismissed as a “bourgeois parliament” manipulated by a ruling class of managers, in the words of a report by a Maoist faction of ETA in 1972 (Azurmendi 1984: 627, quoted in Whyte and Whyte 1988: 93). This façade of participation allegedly deludes workers into believing that they govern the organisation and that it serves their interests (Taylor 1982: 28). They consequently consent to harsh working conditions, long working hours, and de-skilling, even choosing to reduce their own pay during recessions (Eaton 1982; see Morrison 1991: 188). Indeed, one worker in Greenwood and Gonzalez’ (1992) study stated: “I believe that we are less equal among ourselves than the workers in a capitalist firm: being members, many of us often have to put up with things that workers in other firms would not tolerate” (ibid.: 133). However, if Mondragón’s worker-members are indeed more tolerant of bureaucratic organisational structures than conventional employees, even to the point of imposing these structures on themselves, it implies precisely that Mondragón has succeeded in overcoming the cooperation/coordination trade-off, a feat that I have argued can only be achieved by avoiding the ‘distributive dilemma’ inherent to capitalist organisation (see Sections 2.3.3 and 4.2)​[136]​.
	The second allegation is that Mondragón has subdued or even displaced more radical Basque associations. According to Kasmir (1996), Mondragón contained an exceptionally high degree of working class consciousness before the coops were formed, perhaps because due to the presence of a strong iron ore industry dominated by the Unión Cerrajera​[137]​. Mondragón allegedly suppressed this revolutionary potential by eliminating opportunities for class activism​[138]​. Indeed, members are forbidden to strike​[139]​, which motivated the Catholic Church – hardly the vanguard of progressivism – to claim in 1971 that the cooperatives “give rise to an internal situation much more restrictive for labor relations than in any other type of firm” (Azurmendi 1984: 633, quoted in Whyte and Whyte 1988: 99). However, if Mondragón truly has supplanted labour movements, it can only be because it has succeeded in replacing occupational trust and loyalty with organisational trust and loyalty. ETA’s criticisms seem to support this assessment. In 1971, for example, one faction referred to cooperativism as “undermining…the conscience of the Basque working class”, while a Maoist faction lamented the following year that the cooperatives were forming “an island of peace and collaboration in an environment of social contradictions…” (Azurmendi 1984: 617, 624, quoted in Whyte and Whyte 1988: 92-3)​[140]​. Another piece of evidence to this effect is that workers have rarely exercised their right to represent themselves through unions or political parties (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 107-12).  Indeed, in Bradley and Gelb’s (1981: 221) surveys, only 25% of respondents in the cooperatives supported a role for trade unions within their enterprise, in contrast to 86% in the capitalist firms​[141]​.
Disputing Bradley and Gelb’s findings, Kasmir (1996: 162) argues that although Mondragón’s members enjoy a “feeling of ownership”, this is primarily confined to “those in high positions”. According to her own survey, workers in the Clima cooperative of Mondragón were over 10% less likely to feel that they are “part of the firm” and almost 25% more likely to consider themselves as “working class” than workers in the private firm Mayc, which was also included in Bradley and Gelb’s ‘control group’ along with the Union Cerrajera (ibid.: 158-168). However, if Mondragón has not elicited deep-level cooperation from its workers and has not muffled working class consciousness, then it is not clear how it has displaced labour movements. The Social Councils, which have been inconsistently criticised both for failing to provide workers a real voice in the workplace and for obviating the role of unions, are a case in point (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 40-1). This ambiguity is evident in Kasmir’s own account, which emphasises Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the disappearance of the town’s working class character when the cooperatives were formed. Indeed, she claims that Arizmendiarrieta “set out to introduce middle-class values to the working class” (ibid.: 71), which caused him to be viewed by the Franco regime a useful counterweight to working class activism (ibid.: 86-7). Kasmir evidently wants to maintain both that Mondragón’s workers are being ‘held against their will’, vehemently opposing the whims of the organisation, and that they have lost their class consciousness, embracing the firm’s organisational culture.
Furthermore, Kasmir (1996, Chapter 4) associates Basque ethnic identity with working class consciousness, arguing that the two were “bridge[d]” in Mondragón​[142]​ (ibid.: 91). However, as Mondragón pioneer Alfonso Gorroñogoitia (1987: 31, quoted in Morrison 1991: 160) states, “there exists a complicated and dynamic relation between social class and ethnicity” in the Basque country, as is true anywhere. In particular, feelings of ‘Basqueness’ are as likely to counteract class consciousness as to reinforce it, by uniting people from all classes under a common identity (Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte 1977: 21-2). Indeed, as we saw in Section 5.4.1, Basque culture is famed for its exceptional degree solidarity and cooperation, which supposedly cuts across class boundaries. Kasmir (1996: 58-9) herself describes “a kind of ideological and political schizophrenia”, which was played out politically between the socialist but antinationalist PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) and the nationalist but antisocialist PNV (Basque Nationalist Party). According to her, the ANY (Basque Nationalist Action), which was “the first party to attempt to bring together both ideologies”, was electorally successful in Mondragón even while faltering elsewhere in the Basque Country precisely because “the competition between socialism and nationalism for the allegiance of [the] working class” was particularly “acute in Mondragón”. 

5.6.6	The Need for Reform
Although the problems discussed above do not show that Mondragón has failed to overcome the third premise of technological determinism and the cooperation/coordination trade-off, they risk undermining the ‘equilibrio’ on which its structural consistency depends, with concerns over competition and efficiency coming to dominate concerns over participation and solidarity (Cheney 1999; Taylor 1994; Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014). It would therefore appear that Mondragón is at a critical juncture, whereby the inconsistencies between its organisational culture and its organisational structures are being exposed. In Geertz’s (1973) formulation, the dissonance between Mondragón’s “cultural system” and its “social system” has culminated in an identity crisis that can only be resolved by altering one or the other of the systems – either organisational structures are reformed or else organisational culture will adjust to increasingly stark realities (see Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 49-50, 97). If the latter eventuality transpires, the deep-level cooperation associated with cooperative governance will be replaced by a transactional, instrumental model of behaviour in which members act as mere ‘consumers at work’, contributing only the minimum level required to enjoy material dividends and career progression (Cheney 1999: 27, 29). Already in the 1970s, following the strike over remuneration policy, Ulgor lamented that the role of members was degrading to mere shareholding  (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 105), a situation which was still present over a decade later (Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992) and is still evident today (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014). In line with the type of ‘cultural degeneration’ described in Section 4.3.2, younger generations of members in particular seem to have adopted an “individualistic perspective on career and values” (ibid.: 656; see also Azkarraga Etxagibel, Cheney, and Udaondo 2012: 78).
Although the failed attempts at reforming the systems of both work and governance give reason for pessimism that Mondragón will resolve this crisis for the better, there are also reasons for optimism. Firstly, Mondragón’s organisational culture features an exceptional capacity for self-reflection and -criticism, with some of the most scathing reproaches coming from within the organisation (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 294-6​[143]​). This was true, for instance, when Mondragón (and especially Ulgor) underwent an intense period of soul-searching after the 1974 strike. In the context of internationalisation, the ‘Lanki’ Institute of Cooperative Studies, part of the University of Mondragón, was established in 1999 “with the objective of being a critical voice inside the corporation” (Azevedo and Gitahy 2010: 21; e.g. Altuna Gabilondo, Loloya Idiakez, and Pagalday Tricio 2013). In 2005, moreover, Mondragón held a debate entitled ‘Reflection on the Meaning and Future Directions of the Cooperative Experience’, in which it concluded that the group’s “cooperative identity” had deteriorated and that actions had to be taken to reinvigorate it (Azkarraga Etxagibel, Cheney, and Udaondo 2012: 84). TU Lankide, the group’s monthly magazine, is replete with probing articles on Mondragón’s ‘dark side’ (e.g. Larrañaga and Ugalde 2000). A number of authors have noted that this trait of ‘self-criticism’ helps counteract processes of bureaucratisation in participatory organisations​[144]​. 
Secondly, Mondragón’s structural innovations have emerged and adapted to meet specific challenges while adhering to a basic set of values (Morrison 1991: 52; Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992: 148). The Caja, for instance, was originally created to resolve the lack of cooperative finance, but as the group grew and diversified, it soon became the coordinating ‘brain’. Later, as part of the ‘corporate restructuring’ of the 1980s and ‘90s, its central role was replaced by the bodies associated with the Cooperative Congress. At present, Mondragón is revamping the education programme on cooperative principles that all members receive in order to make it more practical and less abstract (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014: 657). This pragmatic approach is epitomised by Arizmendarrieta’s aphorism that “we build the road as we travel” (Larrañaga 1981; Morrison 1991), a process that he accepted would be beset by trial and error, believing that “it is better to make mistakes than to do nothing” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 241). It is reflected today in the fact that Mondragón refers to itself as “the embodiment of a social-economic experiment” in its mission statement; indeed, its members often allude to their ‘experiencia cooperativa’, with the Spanish word experiencia denoting both ‘experience’ and ‘experiment’ (MacLeod 2000: 38). Rothschild and Whitt (1986: 83-4) argue that such a “provisional, experimental attitude may have considerable adaptive value for [a participatory] organization” by helping to guard against bureaucratisation and goal displacement. The Mondragón of today is therefore not the finished product; it is likely to continue evolving, both by creating new structures and adapting existing ones to meet new economic and social challenges.

5.7	Conclusion
In conclusion, I suggest that what Cole (1971, 1979) and Dore (1973) argued in relation to Japanese firms – that although their peculiar features emerged in response to the unique conditions, their form of organisation represents a possible solution to challenges that are inherent in industrialisation, and indeed, organisation – is true of Mondragón. As Morrison (1991: 36) states, “…while the Mondragón cooperative system grew out of a unique historical and cultural environment, it is not relevant only in the Basque context: it arose and still develops in response to conditions that exist throughout the industrialized world; it is a creative and successful adaptation to universal problems.” In the formulation of Chapter 2, the most critical of these problems is the trade-off between coordination and deep-level cooperation, which is exacerbated by the power structures inherent in conventionally-owned and -controlled firms. As I have shown in this chapter, Mondragón’s system of participatory governance – like that of Japanese firms – can alleviate this trade-off, especially when accompanied by a group structure that shields individual enterprises from hostile forces of institutional cumulative causation, even if such groups are not failsafe and involve their own set of challenges.





















Chapter 6: The Adaptation of the Mondragón Model in Valencia and Beyond

6.1	Introduction
The previous chapter argued that Mondragón represents a widely applicable model for activating the inherent advantages of cooperative organisation in terms of cooperation and coordination. This chapter will present evidence that the Mondragón Model – defined as a system in which worker-members elect managers, and in which multiple cooperatives are associated into an overarching structure – has indeed been widely utilised outside of the Basque Country amidst a variety of institutional and technological conditions.
Two types of example will be provided to this effect. Firstly, the chapter will examine cases that were directly inspired by Mondragón. The most comprehensive of these is the Valencian case, to which the bulk of the chapter is dedicated. The process of adapting the Mondragón Model to the Valencian context, investigated through both primary and secondary research, offers a ‘natural experiment’ to test the model’s applicability. Other examples are given from various regions in the United States, the foremost example being the Evergreen Initiative in Cleveland, Ohio. Second, the chapter will examine cases that were not necessarily inspired by Mondragón, but which nevertheless bear notable resemblance to it. These include: the Cajamar cluster in Almería, Spain; the Italian cooperative movement; the region of Santander, Colombia; the Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative in India; and the mid-century Polish cooperative movement.
In no case was the Mondragón Model mimicked or repeated in its entirety. Indeed, over the course of the chapter we will come across a plethora of organisational forms, including federations, districts/clusters, and leagues, each of which constitutes a distinct model in its own right with its own organisational innovations. In this regard, it is important to note that Mondragón is used simply as a starting/reference point on which to ground/focus the analysis, and is by no means considered to be somehow ‘prior’ to these other experiences. Nevertheless, social entrepreneurs in each case adapted the core features of what I have called ‘the Mondragón Model’ to their own technological and institutional circumstances.


6.2	Deliberate Attempts to Apply the Mondragón Model
Mondragón has had a global influence, attracting interest from as diverse sources as the Kibbutz in Israel, Chinese and Korean officials, and Welsh unions and councils (Whyte and Whyte 1988, Chapter 21; Morrison 1991: 229; Co-operatives Research Unit 1982; MacLeod personal correspondence). To take but one example, Professor Diogenes Molina Castro (personal correspondence) of the Universidad Pedagogica Experimental Libertador in Caracas relates that a large number of Basques immigrated to Venezuela in the second half of the twentieth century, some of whom were members of Mondragón who set up technical colleges to give Venezuelan students the chance to study in Mondragón. Indeed, already in 1988 Whyte and Whyte (1988: 282) stated that “[t]he attempts to derive practical lessons from Mondragón are already so numerous in so many countries that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive overview”. Without question, however, the most ambitious attempt to comprehensively imitate the Mondragón Model outside of the Basque Country has occurred in another Autonomous Community within Spain, namely Valencia.

6.2.1	The Cooperative Business Group of Valencia
6.2.1.1	‘Initial Conditions’ in Valencia versus Mondragón
An ideal test of the applicability of the Mondragón Model would involve an attempt to apply it in a region with a completely different technological and institutional environment. Before delving into the attempt of the Cooperative Business Group of Valencia (henceforth ‘the Group’) to apply the Mondragón Model, it is therefore worthwhile to compare the ‘initial conditions’ amidst which the Mondragón and Valencian groups emerged. Although the Valencian experience does not represent a perfect experiment, it is as good as can be hoped for in the social sciences (barring a randomised control trial, which would be unfeasible in this case given the scale and the qualitative nature of the phenomena at hand) and thus “provides an empirical test of claims of transferability” of the Mondragón Model (MacLeod 2000: 15).
The most obvious overlap between the two cases is that both Valencia and the Basque Country are Autonomous Communities within Spain. Like the Basque Country, moreover, Valencia has a distinct language (namely Valencian, which is related to Catalan), which forms an essential part of the region’s identity (Alba Benaches 2006: 91; MacLeod 2000: 99). Both regions’ identities, moreover, were reinvigorated following the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, who attempted to wrest power away from the Autonomous Communities and eliminate all languages other than Castellano. Indeed, like the Basques, most Valencians sided with the Republic (and against the Nationalists) during the Civil War. Furthermore, like the Basque Country, Valencia possesses a longstanding tradition of democratic institutions (in civil society if not in government), including guilds, working-class associations and syndicates, and various sorts of familial and neighbourhood institutions (Alonso Pérez 1991). 
Indeed, as in the Basque Country, cooperatives have long been a significant part of the Valencian economy and society. In fact, the first worker cooperatives in Spain arose in Valencia in the 1800s, along with the neighbouring region of Catalonia, in response to the harsh working conditions accompanying industrialisation (Alba Benaches 2006: 52-8). Usually directed by syndicates and leftist parties, these cooperatives purported to provide opportunities for work as well as education, saving, and consumption (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 499-506). Cooperatives began to emerge in rural areas soon thereafter, serving not only to bolster the profitability of individual farms (for instance by sharing resources and achieving more favourable prices for inputs and outputs), but also to provide services such as insurance, pensions, and healthcare to local communities (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 499-506). They therefore represented central institutions of rural societies, on par with town halls and churches (Alba Benaches 2006: 57-64, 103-4). Although initially not as widespread as in other parts of Spain, agricultural cooperatives in Valencia now have more members than in any other Autonomous Community, and a higher-than-average market share, especially in citrus fruits, wine, and oil (Vidal Giménez, del Campo Gomis, and García del Río 2000: 73). Agricultural cooperatives also formed the basis of the cajas rurales – mutual savings banks modelled on the Raiffeisen credit unions of Germany, which have become a mainstay of Valencia’s economy (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 453-4; Alba Benaches 2006: 159). Valencia was also one of the first of the Autonomous Communities to establish housing cooperatives, and has a strong tradition of sociedades laborales (companies that are at least 50% worker-owned), beginning with the public transport network in the 1964 (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 345; Alba Benaches 2006: 250). Most recently, Valencia has pioneered a system of cooperative healthcare provision in conjunction with regional and national governments.
	Nevertheless, the similarities between the two cultures and histories of cooperativism are matched by their differences. In personal interviews, both the leader of the Group, Josep María Soriano Bessó, and the president of the Confederation of Valencian Cooperatives, Emili Villaescusa, opined that the primary difference between the backgrounds of the two experiences was that whereas Basque culture contained a strong ethnic identity and tradition of cooperation that permeated all aspects of social life, Valencia’s culture was relatively individualistic. In her history of the Valencian cooperative movement, Alba Benaches (2006: 93) confirms that Valencia was long pervaded by an “agrarian mentality” that prioritised familial traditions such as private land ownership, speaking of the “proverbial individualism of the Valencian agriculturalist” (ibid.: 118-9; see also Abad 1991). It would therefore appear that the Valencian group started off with cultural conditions that were less favourable than those of the Basque Country to a cooperative organisation along the lines of Mondragón.
It should be noted, however, that this cultural difference is related to a technological difference, namely that whereas the economy of the town of Mondragón was primarily industrial when the cooperatives were founded, based on a prolific iron-ore industry, the Valencian economy was primarily agricultural when the Valencian group began to operate, based on horticulture (especially citrus fruits and wine). Recently, services have come to dominate Valencia’s economy, including the cooperative sector​[145]​. As explained in Section 4.2 (especially Sections 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.7.1), agriculture and services have generally been seen by the predominant theories of the firm to be more conducive to cooperative organisation than most industrial sectors, due to either the relative difficulty of enforcing surface-level cooperation or the lower relative need for surface-level coordination. Furthermore, by encouraging occupational rather than organisational trust and loyalty, the working-class identities and institutions stemming from the town of Mondragón’s iron ore industry, emphasised by Kasmir (1996), may have been as much an obstacle to cooperative organisation as the individualism pervasive in Valencian agriculture.
	That said, cooperatives in Valencia have, like those in the Basque Country, been continually embroiled in the complex political struggles of Spain. On the left, syndicates and socialist parties have generally maintained an ambivalent relationship with cooperatives due to the perennial tension between cooperativism and unionism (or, in this case, syndicalism) discussed in Section 4.2.7.3 and evident in Mondragón (see Section 5.6.5) (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 55; Alba Benaches 2006: 189-93). They have therefore tended to prefer sociedades laborales, which preserve their intermediary role along with the traditional class status of workers. On the right, the Catholic Church has tended to support the fomentation of cooperatives, especially agricultural cooperatives, precisely in order to counteract the control of syndicates (Alba Benaches 2006: 53, 64-5). With the accession of Franco, however, worker cooperatives severely diminished​[146]​ thanks to the creation of the Organización Sindical Española (OSE, or Spanish Syndical Organisation, informally known as the ‘Sindicato Vertical’ or ‘Vertical Syndicate’), which repressed any form of cooperativism (or unionism) suspected of being subversive (Alba Benaches 2006: 58-9; 194-5; Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 260). The OSE was accompanied by Uniones Territoriales de Cooperativas (UTECOs, or Territorial Cooperative Unions), institutions established in each province to control the Governing Councils of worker cooperatives​[147]​ (Alba Benaches 2006: 75-6). Although the UTECOs supported rural cooperatives (for instance through the provision of financial services and inputs), which were more prevalent in Valencia than in the Basque Country and continued to proliferate under Franco, Valencian cooperatives as a whole arguably suffered more from Franco’s repressive policies than did the largely isolated and overlooked Basque Country. In fact, as mentioned in Section 5.6.5, Franco saw the Mondragón cooperatives as a potential counterweight to the region’s working class activism.
It is true that, during its formative years, the Valencian group benefitted from the raft of national and regional institutions that were established to support cooperatives following Franco’s death and Spain’s democratisation, by which time the Mondragón group had already reached an advanced stage of maturity. However, as I will explain in Section 6.2.1.7, the Group was significantly involved in the formation of these institutions, which therefore cannot be classified as ‘initial conditions’. It is also true that both cooperative groups were founded during periods of widespread deprivation ultimately caused by the Franco regime – the immediate aftermath of the Civil War in 1950s Basque Country, which was especially devastated by the conflict, and the ongoing consequences of Franco’s economic mismanagement in 1960s Valencia, which experienced a shortage of housing and jobs. Crises such as these can facilitate the emergence of cooperative organisation by catalysing institutional change (see Sections 3.4.4 and 4.3.4). However, the Valencian group did not enjoy the ‘infant industry’ conditions of the isolated post-war Basque Country; on the contrary, the housing and jobs crisis that it purported to address stemmed from a deluge of immigration from the rest of Spain (Martínez Verdú 1993: 117). Furthermore, whereas the Mondragón group enjoyed an economic boom during its formative years, the incipient Valencian group had to persevere through the economic slump of the 1970s.

6.2.1.2	Origins of the Group: the Formation of Covipo and the Inspiration of Mondragón​[148]​
The pervasive destitution in 1960s Valencia, and the housing crisis in particular, was a primary concern of the Juventud de Acción Rural Católica (‘JARC’, or Rural Catholic Action Youth), an association dedicated to the practical application of Catholic teachings. Together with a business professor (Francisco ‘Paco’ Pons Alcoi), three especially motivated members of JARC that had been giving classes at an agricultural management school – Josep María Soriano Bessó (a dissident journalist recently qualified in law), Toni Ferrer (an architect), and Vicent Diego Ramón (an expert in construction) – attended a presentation on cooperativism at the Instituto Social Obrero (ISO, or Workers’ Social Institute), a Catholic organisation that provided consultancy and training for people interested in cooperatives (Martínez Verdú 1993: 25-6, 51-2). Inspired by the presentation, and guided by Vicent Diego Ramón’s previous experience managing a housing cooperative in which several other JARC members participated, these four ‘social entrepreneurs’ decided to combine their diverse skills to form the Cooperativa de Viviendas Populares (‘Covipo’, or People’s Housing Cooperative) in 1969. Legally registering the organisation as a cooperative was rendered impossible by the Vertical Syndicate, and Covipo functioned on an informal basis until 1972, when it was registered as a “civil society organisation” (ibid.: 28-9). It would nevertheless become the most significant housing cooperative in Valencia, constructing more than three-thousand houses (Alba Benaches 2006: 249). 
By avoiding intermediaries and speculation, and improving on the poor management that had tarnished previous housing coops, Covipo purported to provide affordable housing to the working class, especially young married couples. It went further than this, however, by striving to foment democratic awareness and motivation by offering an opportunity for participation at a time when all aspects of life were severely repressed (ibid.: 71). To this end, it also encouraged its members to participate in community organisations such as neighbourhood associations (ibid.: 25-7). Another part of the Covipo pioneers’ mission involved the protection of Valencian identity, history, and culture against the imperialist onslaught of the Franco regime (GECV 1988: 70). For example, it issued an informative bulletin, Vida Cooperativa [Cooperative Life], to cover issues of cooperativism in the Valencian language (Martínez Verdú 1993: 34-6). In short, the Covipo pioneers shared Mondragón’s principle of “social transformation” (ibid.: 26) along with Arizmendiarrieta’s conviction – and the overriding thesis of this dissertation – that the firm is a central institution of society capable of shaping behaviour at a fundamental level, and that cooperatives have an inherent advantage in performing this function (ibid.: 59-60). Indeed, in a booklet published in 1988, the cooperative group that eventually grew out of Covipo stated: “Because we believe in the company and seek to transform society, WE CHOOSE COOPERATIVISM, as the juridical form that frames our business project…” (GECV 1988: 20-1, emphasis in original).
Confirming the point made in Section 4.3.2 that the social returns of establishing cooperatives often exceed the private returns, MacLeod (2000: 102) points out that the pioneers of Covipo could have established a conventional business and become wealthy. Soriano Bessó likewise stated in an interview that instrumentally-motivated entrepreneurs generally prefer to form capitalist firms; the formation of cooperatives therefore requires substantively-motivated, ‘social’ entrepreneurs – like the founders of Mondragón’s original Ulgor cooperative, or the pioneers of Covipo – to ‘swim against the tide’. Indeed, the doctrine of Catholic Action that motivated the Covipo pioneers was also a primary influence on Don José María Arizmendiarrieta. Although the Valencian group revolved less around one key individual like Arizmendiarrieta (affectionately known as ‘Arizmendi’), Soriano Bessó (affectionately known as ‘Pepe’) would provide a constant source of leadership throughout its development from his time as a dissident journalist broadcasting censored information to his current role as president of the Caixa Popular, the cooperative bank later created by the Covipo pioneers (MacLeod 2000, Chapter 6; CIDEC 2007: 69).
Although the Covipo pioneers had not yet decided to imitate the Mondragón Model, there were signs of a group system even at this early stage. Though a single cooperative, Covipo was constituted by semi-autonomous housing groups of anywhere from fifteen to fifty members (Martínez Verdú 1993: 29-30). Members of the housing groups were represented in a General Assembly, which elected administrators to various departments (ibid.: 31-2). In turn, these departments were coordinated by a committee involving executives from each department. The rationale for this system was to stimulate deep-level cooperation by providing a hands-on, meaningful experience of democracy (ibid.: 32-36). Thus, to create a direct link between participation in work and participation in governance, votes were allocated according to hours spent working in the cooperative. Prefiguring a more cohesive group model, 75% of each group’s earnings were designated to a common reserve fund in return for legal and technical assistance, with the remaining 25% distributed among members. Furthermore, it was during this period that the Covipo pioneers created the Departamento de Actividades Empresariales y Comunidades (DAEC, or Department of Business and Community Activities), funded by a 1% deduction from Covipo’s net earnings and responsible for initiating and collaborating with community projects, many of which would have been considered subversive at the time (ibid.: 30-1). Mirroring the División Empresarial of Mondragón’s cooperative bank, the DAEC would, through its various incarnations, eventually become the coordinating backbone (“eje vertebrador”) of the cooperative group (ibid.: 36-7).
	By 1970, only one year after its formation, Covipo comprised almost one-thousand members (Martínez Verdú 1993: 37). The DAEC had grown in tandem – so much so, in fact, that it had more resources than it could effectively utilise in its existing sphere of activity. However, Covipo was already demanding increasingly more time and energy from its founders, who worked in the cooperative as unpaid volunteers on top of their day-jobs, often spending long nights in one of their homes and even marshalling the assistance of their wives (ibid.: 28; Alba Benaches 2006: 251). They thus began to contemplate the possibility of committing full-time to expanding the remit of the cooperative, but were uncertain how to proceed. According to Soriano Bessó, they “had a vague idea that a cooperative group existed in the Basque Country, and that one of the cooperatives manufactured the ‘Fagor’ brand and that it was an interesting experiment” (CIDEC 2007: 69). In search of inspiration, three of the Covipo pioneers therefore travelled to Mondragón to observe the cooperatives and to meet with Arizmendiarrieta. The trip made an immediate impression, persuading the Covipo pioneers to commit full-time to their cooperative projects. They also visited a diverse range of regions within Spain (Madrid, Catalonia, and Galicia), Europe (Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia), and beyond (USA, Argentina, and Algeria), to learn about other successful cooperative experiences (Martínez Verdú 1993: 53-4). Although the Covipo pioneers took lessons from each of these trips, it was Mondragón that provided the organisational combinations that most attracted the Covipo pioneers​[149]​. In an interview, Soriano Bessó identified six key principles that together constituted what he called the “Mondragonian spirit”: formación; the professionalisation of management; the creation of “community wealth”; the reinvestment of surplus; inter-cooperation between cooperatives of different sectors; and the innovation of a mixed consumer/worker cooperative in Eroski (see also Alba Benaches 2006: 88). 

6.2.1.3	First Steps: Formación and Professionalisation
	The first two of these principles – formación of members and managerial professionalisation – had comprised the bedrock of Arizmendiarrieta’s philosophy, and were manifested in the polytechnic school that represented Mondragón’s inception (see Section 5.4.2). The Covipo pioneers used these same principles as the starting point for their own cooperative group (Alba Benaches 2006: 251). Emulating the presentation at the ISO that had initially inspired them, in the mid-1970s they created the Seminar on Cooperativism in the Department of Political Economy at the University of Valencia in an attempt to bridge the gap between Valencian universities and cooperatives, and thus address the critical lack of professional managers and skilled workers in the cooperative sector (CIDEC 2007: 70). They concurrently decided to focus their efforts on the less-developed comarcas (districts) of Valencia, especially the severely backward agricultural sector, which the Covipo pioneers believed could particularly benefit from, and might be particularly amenable to, cooperative organisation (Alba Benaches 2006: 251; Martínez Verdú 1993: 36-9). Thus, after studying various models across the country, the Covipo pioneers created four agricultural schools over a four-year period: L’Horta and La Nostra Escola Comarcal in 1973, La Safor in 1974, and Xulilla in 1976 (Martínez Verdú 1993: 40).
Taking inspiration from the clandestine schools in Mondragón, the schools taught in the Valencian language and were grounded in the community through a combination of work and study. Furthermore, the schools provided not only an education in cooperativism, but also, through their democratic operation, an opportunity for direct participation. L’Horta was especially effective in creating a “dynamic of mobilisation”, becoming a focal point for the local progressivist movement. In 1976, the school created an agricultural journal that would form the basis of the important agricultural syndicate La Unió de Llauradors i Ramaders del Pais Valencià [the Valencian Union of Farmers and Ranchers], also co-editing a journal with La Safor (ibid.: 42-3, 142-3). However, due to the hostile political environment of the time, these activities variously earned them the labels ‘libertarias’ (libertarian), ‘rojas’ (communist), and ‘catalanistas’ (separatist), which severely limited their access to skilled teachers and administrators, as well as funding. The schools also struggled with a lack of demand due to the diminishment of social prestige attached to agriculture (ibid.: 37-42; Alba Benaches 2006: 251). These obstacles had a silver lining, however, as they compelled the schools to diversify into other professions such as engineering, leading in 1976 to the formation of the polytechnic school Florida. Like Mondragón’s own polytechnic, Florida would become a successful cooperative university, explicitly purporting to foster social attitudes of solidarity and cooperation, as captured in its slogan “formación, golden rule of cooperativism”.
In addition to providing agricultural education, the Covipo pioneers attempted to address the chronic problem of agricultural minifundismo – the persistence of inefficiently small plot sizes due to diffuse land ownership – by creating the Grupo Taronger, which would combine the fertilisation and pesticide resources of multiple fruit farm units into a single group (Martínez Verdú 1993: 46). When this initiative failed due to the refusal of Valencian farmers to cooperate, the Covipo pioneers created the Grupo Agrícola, which, in addition to providing shared greenhouses, purported to strengthen cooperative relationships and attitudes by connecting with cooperatives, religious brotherhoods, and other community organisations, including one of the agricultural schools, La Nostra Escola Comarcal (ibid.: 46-7). This group also failed, but primarily due to insufficient finance and expertise, as well as the fact that the emerging agricultural syndicate, which the Covipo pioneers had ironically been involved in creating, competed for the loyalty of farmers. Although the failures of the Grupo Taronger and the Grupo Agrícola prompted the Covipo pioneers to subsequently focus primarily on industrial and service sectors, they did have a social “multiplier effect”, inspiring other similar experiments elsewhere in Valencia (ibid.: 47-8).

6.2.1.4	The Group Takes Shape: the Advent of Coinser and the Caixa Popular
Besides professionalisation and formación, the Covipo pioneers also sought to apply the other principles garnered from the trip to Mondragón in 1970, namely the creation of “community wealth”, the reinvestment of surplus, and inter-cooperation between different sectors. Arizmendiarrieta had conveyed to them in no uncertain terms that their goal of socio-economic transformation could not be accomplished through the housing sector alone, but would rather require diversification into other sectors (ibid.: 28-9). Cooperative housing not only generated limited capital for reinvestment in the cooperative and the community, but also involved a limited form of participation, confined to the sphere of housing and to the period in which members’ houses were being built (ibid.: 29-30; MacLeod 2000: 99). Portending the problems of cooperative groups, many members therefore participated in the coop only instrumentally/transactionally in order to secure a lower price for their house, and lost interest once that objective had been fulfilled.
	Covipo initially attempted to expand beyond housing through the DAEC, primarily by collaborating with JARC members in other sectors of the Valencian economy (such as furniture, clothing, and footwear) as well as other areas of Valencian society (such as community libraries, neighbourhood associations, nurseries, recreational centres, and educational courses), all the while attempting to foment awareness of, and participation in, cooperatives (Martínez Verdú 1993: 48). On the whole, these projects were scattered and disparate, and failed to convince skilled individuals to forego their work in conventional firms and commit full-time (ibid.: 47-50, 67). One initiative, however, achieved a significant degree of ‘inter-cooperation’, namely the “joint management meetings”. Attended by representatives of Covipo in addition to several other Valencian coops with links to JARC (Covame, an electrical coop; Covapi, a painters’ coop; and Ferrer de Bunyol, a boilers’ coop), these meetings purported to facilitate mutual assistance in management issues, as well as to stimulate a cooperative mentality. Although the meetings were disbanded in 1973 when the other cooperatives expressed more loyalty to syndicates and the ISO, the DAEC subsequently replaced them with a cabinet responsible for providing consultancy services to a broader range of Valencian coops (ibid.: 49-50). A particularly valuable outcome of the cabinet’s activities was an inter-cooperative relationship with Coinco, a construction coop that would service Covipo’s housing ventures in exchange for financial and technical support (ibid.: 47-9).
	It was this relationship that finally prompted the Covipo pioneers to establish a cooperative group. In 1976, despite further opposition from the Vertical Syndicate, the Covipo pioneers founded Coinser to formally assume the role of the DAEC and to act as a central coordinating body (“eje vertebrador”) for the incipient group (ibid.: 55-6; CIDEC 2007: 69). Echoing the Caja Laboral Popular in Mondragón, Coinser also created an internal “credit section” to service Covipo’s housing groups, enabling groups with surpluses to lend to groups with deficits (ibid.: 57). This service was particularly useful at a time when cooperatives were severely limited in their access to credit and faced a hostile legal environment (ibid.: 73-4). This fund was eventually replaced by the Caixa Popular, the Group’s own cooperative bank, which would not only provide a more formal and secure means of lending between cooperatives, but would also allow the Group to admit other cooperatives and to invest in a broader range of larger-scale projects (ibid.: 57-8). Like Mondragón’s bank, the Caixa was initially funded by local savings: to achieve the high level of initial capital required by law, members of Covipo agreed to join the Caixa, paying minimum entry fees (ibid.: 59; Alba Benaches 2006: 99). It was also designed according to Mondragón’s model, with a mixed membership of bank staff and representatives from associated cooperatives and containing both a Banking Division and a Business/Entrepreneurial Division (the División Empresarial). In like fashion to Mondragón’s own División Empresarial, the latter of these would eventually take over from Coinser as the “eje vertebrador” of the Group, responsible for initiating, admitting, and coordinating member coops (ibid.: 75). 
Indeed, the establishment of the Caixa marked a quantum leap in the direction of an integrated cooperative group along the lines of Mondragón. Cooperatives served by the Caixa would not be merely clients, as was the case with the Coinser. Rather, following Mondragón’s example, Governing Councils would sign a “contract of association” that represented a binding commitment to the Group (ibid.: 79-82, 121). As in Mondragón, the contract stipulated that member coops would contribute a percentage of their net earnings to the Caixa, along with an initial entry fee, and abide by the principles of the Group (GECV 2000: 8). These principles directly corresponded to the features of the “Mondragonian spirit” that the Group had strove to emulate, including formación (cooperatives would invest in worker training and education); the professionalisation of management (managerial hierarchies would be implemented when necessary through a representative style of democracy, and cooperatives would prepare annual and long-term strategic plans); the reinvestment of surplus (fixed percentages would be dedicated to reserve and social funds, and the monetisation of cooperative wealth was generally prohibited); and inter-cooperation (GECV 1988: 67-70). Other principles borrowed from Mondragón included the sovereignty of labour (and thus the subservience of capital and management); democratic procedure (transparency of management, representation of members, etc.); one-worker-one-vote (weighted voting and non-member workers were prohibited); distributive solidarity (wage ratios were capped at 1:3); open membership (with an initial contribution, usually around five months of salary); political neutrality; and ethical business practice​[150]​.
As in Mondragón, a trial period would ensue after a cooperative had signed the contract of association, during which the Group would provide advisory services while assessing the feasibility of the new relationship. If the cooperative and the Caixa mutually agreed to integration, member cooperatives would be periodically and systematically evaluated to ensure that they were respecting the terms of the contract, and to gauge their attitudes towards the Group. In return, the Caixa would provide member cooperatives with financial and consultancy services, which were offered free of charge to cooperatives that were fully committed the Group in an attempt to achieve the ‘inter-organisational culture’ (or “common philosophical bedrock”) required for the system to function (Martínez Verdú 1993: 123). It would also offer training courses aimed at the formación of members and management courses aimed at cultivating managers who were both skilled and cooperatively-minded (ibid.: 84-5: GECV 1988: 64-5, 2000: 5). Finally, the Group would act as a representative umbrella for its members in cooperative associations (Martínez Verdú 1993: 64-5).
The group system, like that of Mondragón, was intended to compensate for the weaknesses of isolated cooperatives in resisting the forces of institutional cumulative causation (see Section 5.5.2) (ibid.: 76-83, 123). In its own words, the Group sought to create “a cultural micro-environment that facilitates the generation of an atmosphere appropriate for the development of an efficient and solidaristic cooperativism in the context of a market economy”, without which its member cooperatives would have been “confronted by the risk of being converted into pseudo-capitalist organisations, with [the degeneration] of the philosophical foundations of its members or even of its organisational goals” (GECV 1988: 21, 61, 63-4). To facilitate the preservation of cooperative principles and deep-level cooperation, the group system would alleviate the burden of surface-level coordination by coordinating the strategies, investments, and supply chains of member cooperatives, and to transfer personnel and finance between them. Its ultimate goal, however, was to improve and transform Valencian society. In addition to promoting awareness of cooperativism, the Group therefore endeavoured to express solidarity with the community by maintaining salaries that were in keeping with the rest of the economy, to provide stable employment, and to invest in community projects, especially those aiming to conserve Valencian history and culture​[151]​ – practices that had parallels in Mondragón (ibid.: 16, 20, 56-8, 63, 70). 

6.2.1.5	The Group Expands: Trial, Error, and Innovation
The Group expanded at a vertiginous rate following the creation of the Caixa, beginning in the same year with the formation of the consumer cooperative Consum, modelled on Mondragón’s Eroski cooperative (Macleod 2000: 102-5; Martínez Verdú 1993: 59-60). Eroski, which broke with the traditional model of consumer cooperativism by including workers as members in addition to consumers, had been one of the six stand-out components of the ‘Mondragonian spirit’ identified by the Covipo pioneers (GECV 1988: 7). Consum also emulated Eroski’s unitary structure, composed of a single coop with multiple branches, which the Group also observed in Madrid and elsewhere in Europe. This model differed from the collection of small, independent coops associated with a superordinate organ responsible for joint purchases found in Catalonia, which, although offering a greater feeling of local ownership, were less integrated and thus failed to generate the full advantages of inter-cooperation (Martínez Verdú 1993: 60-1). Although Consum’s early stages were precarious, by 1993 it had become by far the largest consumer cooperative in Valencia, and the second-largest in Spain behind Eroski (ibid.: 115; Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 475). In 1990, Consum merged with Eroski, but split in 2004 due to conflicting business models (Eroski wanted to diversify into non-food items, whereas Consum preferred to remain specialised in its supermarket activities), instead maintaining a strategic alliance (Alba Benaches 2006: 238; Emili Villaescusa, personal interview).
	Another institution that had impressed the Covipo pioneers since their first trip to Mondragón in 1970 was Auzo-Lagun, a women’s cooperative providing cleaning and catering services to the group’s member coops. Having contemplated the role of women in a predominantly patriarchal society since their time in JARC, they were particularly fascinated by Auzo-Lagun’s function of integrating women into the workplace (Martínez Verdú 1993: 64). They had, in fact, already tried to form a women’s clothes manufacturing coop, which never took off due to a lack of skilled workers. Following Auzo-Lagun’s example, Covamur (short for Cooperativa Valenciana de Mujeres, or Valencian Women’s Cooperative) was established in 1976 to provide cleaning and catering services to the cooperatives of the Group and to produce baked goods that would be marketed through Consum. However, while the Group was not yet large enough to generate sufficient demand for its services, Covamur was not competitive enough for the open market (ibid.: 64-5). Furthermore, part-time workers in the coop would not be covered by social security. Covamur was therefore dissolved after only a brief period of operation.
	The Covamur debacle was not the first time that the Group had struggled with the issue of social security. When Coinser was officially registered in 1976, the Group subscribed to the social security programme of the Autonomous Communities rather than the national programme (ibid.: 69). Although more affordable, the system left many gaps, which individual cooperatives had to fill at great cost (ibid.: 87-8). Coinser, which already provided fire insurance for Covipo’s housing projects, was able to ease this burden only partially, for instance by providing life insurance. After thoroughly studying the Lagun-Aro welfare coop, which had solved a similar problem in Mondragón (see Section 5.5.2), in 1982 the Group decided to create an internal mutual, the Mutua Popular (ibid.: 89). In return for a percentage of each member’s salary, the mutual would pay social security fees on behalf of member coops and provide them with services that were not covered by the system, such as disability pay, benefits for part-time workers, assistance for families of deceased workers, and some health services (ibid.: 69, 90). However, members viewed it only instrumentally/transactionally, and thus became disgruntled when they perceived it to be a ‘bad deal’ (ibid.: 91-3). In any event, the Ministry of Work eventually offered a supplementary package that would compensate for differences between the national and regional systems, making the Mutua redundant; it dissolved in 1984, only two years after commencing (ibid.: 70). That same year, however, the insurance activities organised by the Caixa were transferred to an independent cooperative, Assecoop. By associating with the Caixa, and by specialising in cooperatives, Assecoop was able to offer more favourable terms than mainstream suppliers (GECV 1988: 26).​[152]​
	Another area in which the Group experimented was the creation of manufacturing cooperatives. In previous years, the DAEC had enjoyed scant success in the manufacturing sector for the same reason that so many of its other initiatives failed, namely the inability to attract workers and managers that were both skilled and motivated to work in a cooperative (Martínez Verdú 1993: 63). One exception was Luis Ferre, a labour movement activist working in a glass factory who, along with the factory’s workers, was interested in forming a cooperative but faced political obstacles (MacLeod 2000: 105). Having known Soriano Bessó, Ferre approached the Caixa for assistance, and La Mediterranea was born in 1975 with two-hundred-fifty members, specialising in blown glass (GECV 1988: 41). Like many of the Group’s initiatives, La Mediterranea underwent a protracted and rocky gestation period, in which a lack of managerial expertise compelled the coop to reorganise three years later with only sixty members and Ferre as president. In due course, however, it would be at the centre of a massive merger with two other glass-making cooperatives (Codiva and Vidrieria Olleriense) in the region of L’Olleria, conducted by the Group and resulting in the largest worker cooperative in Valencia (Martínez Verdú 1993: 93-4). Although the merger was really an absorption by La Mediterranea of the other two coops – which, besides being much smaller and less efficient, were not members of the Group – it achieved economies of scale, improved productive and managerial systems, and eliminated competition between the three cooperatives involved (Alba Benaches 2006: 96). The Group also collaborated with Ferre to form the furniture cooperative Coop Moble in 1977, and several other manufacturing coops eventually joined the Group (Martínez Verdú 1993: 55).
	The success of La Mediterranea’s merger prompted the Group in 1981 to attempt the formation of sectoral sub-groups akin to those found in Mondragón (ibid.: 94-8). Several sub-groups were proposed, including in the sectors of furniture, construction, foodstuffs, and exports. On the whole, this ambitious attempt at inter-cooperation was unsuccessful, partly due to the economically disparate and geographically dispersed nature of the coops, but primarily due to the reluctance of individual coops to yield to the requirements of a group system. The Group therefore turned to a regional sub-group strategy, which Mondragón had implemented earlier in its history. The two regions with the highest concentration of associated coops, L’Horta and Costera-La Vall d’Albaida, were selected for the groups, the former containing a diverse range of coops in construction, furniture, and services, the latter concentrated primarily in artisanal goods and design. However, this proposal suffered the same fate as the sectoral groups, as individual coops refused to sacrifice autonomy, invest in joint projects, or share resources.

6.2.1.6	The Crisis and Rebirth of the Group
	By 1983, the number of cooperatives associated with the Group had reached thirty-nine, having nearly quadrupled in only five years (ibid.: 79, 103). However, the failures of the Grupo Taronger, the Mutua Popular, and the sectoral and regional groups had made it increasingly apparent that the Group had not achieved the type of ‘deep-level inter-cooperation’ observed in Mondragón, especially among some of the larger and more successful cooperatives (ibid.: 85-6, 100, 106-10, 121). Indeed, as Soriano Bessó stated, “[t]here were then thirty-something cooperatives associated to the Caixa Popular, but in reality there were very few that identified closely with the Mondragonian principles…” (CIDEC 2007: 71). Meanwhile, unable to stay afloat by exclusively serving the Group’s member coops, the Caixa had ceased providing all of their financial needs and started catering to non-member coops and even non-cooperative SMEs – changes which had undermined its perceived legitimacy (Martínez Verdú 1993: 101, 105). 
In March of that year, the Group therefore decided to make a concerted push towards a more cohesive group based around the Caixa, called the Grup Empresarial (‘Business’ or ‘Entrepreneurial’ Group) (ibid.: 98). Achieving this feat, however, would require that the contracts of association be more rigorously implemented and that more stringent financial criteria be used – conditions which were not well-received by the member coops (Martínez Verdú 1993: 104). The critical frailty of the Grup Empresarial was exposed less than a year after its formation, when a widespread economic crisis struck several of its key sectors, including housing, construction, furniture, and banking, leading to the collapse of Coinser and Covipo, the Group’s founding cooperatives (ibid.: 98, 100, 107-8). This triggered a chain reaction, starting with the demise of Coinco, one of the largest cooperatives in the group, which had relied on Covipo and Coinser’s demand for its construction services. In turn, the collapse of Coinco severely impaired the capacity of the Caixa to survive by only serving the firms within the Group, further compelling it to seek other clients, and thus further eroding  the Group’s cohesion (ibid.: 110). Ultimately, the Grup Empresarial came to be seen by both the Caixa and its associated coops as an unhelpful burden they would rather not bear, and it was abolished in December, 1983 (ibid.: 105-6).
The crisis of the Group initiated a period of soul-searching amongst its leaders (ibid.: 112). They soon realised that the Group had encountered the “chicken-and-egg problem”​[153]​ of creating cooperative groups from scratch, discussed in Section 5.5.3: as emphasised by Mario Amparo Camacho of Florida in an interview, while some critical number of cooperatives may be required before a group becomes viable, individual cooperatives are themselves unviable without a group to support them. Since the Caixa was established in 1975, the Group had attempted to overcome this dilemma through a ‘big push’, expanding as rapidly as possible by accepting new member coops regardless of their geographical location or proclivity for inter-cooperation (ibid.: 103). Unlike Mondragón during its own formative stages, the Group had even converted a failed capitalist firm into a member cooperative, namely the Trymobel furniture company, and also admitted a sociedad laboral, the Foradia machine tools manufacturer (Macleod 2000: 106-7). However, the ‘big push’ strategy had incurred a dilemma of its own, as the ‘inter-organisational culture’ of the Group had not kept up with its breakneck rate of expansion. Many member cooperatives had joined out of the purely instrumental motive of securing financial services and favourable interest rates from the Caixa, and most had not assimilated “the spirit or the philosophy emanating from Mondragón” (Martínez Verdú 1993: 102-7). Indeed, a survey carried out in 1987 by the Group revealed that over two-thirds of members in its affiliated cooperatives did not even know that the Group existed (GECV 1988: 77). Ultimately, the Group’s leaders concluded that they had not only “overreached” by expanding too rapidly (GECV 1988: 52-3), but had also applied the Mondragón Model “too mimetically”, without adapting it to the Valencian context (Martínez Verdú 1993: 101). 
The Group thenceforth moderated its aspirations to transplant the Mondragón Model (Martínez Verdú 1993: 112). The primary change was that the Caixa would cease to be the “eje vertebrador” (coordinating backbone) of the Group. As occurred with Mondragón’s own Caja, the Caixa’s División Empresarial was converted into an autonomous cooperative, Grupo-Coop. This organisation would spearhead a new group, admitting only those cooperatives that were genuinely committed to inter-cooperation. The remainder of the Caixa would continue to offer financial services to the Group, but in an essentially transactional manner, charging a basic subscription fee charged in proportion to the financial risks posed by each cooperative. It would, moreover, accept its own member cooperatives that were not part of the Group. With this more conservative strategy, the Group’s activities were reduced to a series of informal meetings between the managers of the handful of cooperatives that were genuinely committed to the Group, namely the Caixa Popular, Grupo-Coop, Assecoop, and Florida (ibid.: 54; CIDEC 2007: 71). The Group was therefore back to square one, coming full circle to the ‘joint management meetings’ held before the advent of Coinser, and it was clear that only “a minimal structure of cohesion and remainder of the basic principles of the Mondragón experience” had been retained (Martínez Verdú 1993: 114-5). Eventually, even the stalwart cooperatives, including Grupo-Coop itself, became distracted by the need to survive in an economically precarious climate, and the Group was plunged into yet another identity crisis (ibid.: 114). 
In search of inspiration, the managers of Grupo-Coop, Caixa Popular, and Consum appealed to Mondragón to direct a seminar on the Group’s experience, which was held in July of 1987 (ibid.: 159). The seminar reinvigorated the Group’s leaders to resume their efforts of effecting social change in Valencia by applying the Mondragón Model, and a commission was soon appointed with the task of defining the “Basic Principles” to which the Group, including its member cooperatives, would adhere. Many of the principles outlined by the commission reflected those of the original group (which in turn reflected those of Mondragón), such as managerial professionalisation, formación, and the redistribution of surpluses between cooperatives (ibid.: 123). However, in contrast to their previous reliance on the contract of association – which, fom the perspective of this dissertation, may have detracted from the non-contractual relationships that are likely to be more crucial for the achievement of ‘deep-level inter-cooperation’ (e.g. Section 4.2.5.1) – the Group attempted “[t]o consolidate, apply, and develop a common cooperative philosophy” by holding sessions to discuss “what it means to belong to cooperative group”; organising trips to Mondragón to experience the model on which the Group was based“in situ”; and publishing a monthly bulletin, La Veu del Grup, which would contain information relevant to the Group’s coops as well as thematic articles on business and cooperativism (GECV 2000: 6). 
In October 1987, the Grup Empresarial Cooperatiu Valencia (GECV, or Cooperative Business/Entrepreneurial Group of Valencia) was established to assume the role of “eje vertebrador” performed by the DAEC, Coinser, Caixa Popular, and Grupo-Coop before it (ibid.: 116). The new group initially comprised the Caixa Popular, Consum, Grupo-Coop, Assecoop, Florida, La Mediterranea, and En Canya, but many other cooperatives joined subsequently (GECV 1988, 2000). According to Soriano Bessó, the new group primarily purported to achieve economies of scope rather than scale, as its member cooperatives operated in diverse sectors (CIDEC 2007: 71). To this end, the GECV held joint work sessions for managers, workers, and Governing Councils to which advisors from Mondragón regularly contributed in order to promote managerial professionalisation and foster synergies between member cooperatives (GECV 2000: 5). A Technical Secretary was appointed and a database of the financial statistics of each cooperative was launched to further contribute to the ‘inter-coordination’ of member coops (Martínez Verdú 1993: 116). The GECV also provided office materials, managerial training courses, and other resources for fledgling cooperatives; ad hoc assistance to the management boards and democratic organs of member coops; and representation for member coops in cooperative federations and government institutions (GECV 2000: 6-7). In return, member coops would pay an initial entry fee, contribute pre-determined percentages of surpluses, and periodically submit their business plans and financial accounts to the Group (ibid.: 8). In 1992, moreover, the Group created an investment fund for cooperatives that were struggling or planned to expand to which each member cooperative would contribute 10% of its net earnings (CIDEC 2007: 71; GECV 2000: 6). 

6.2.1.7	Assessing the Adaptation of the Mondragón Model in Valencia
As with its previous incarnations, the GECV did not live up to the vision of the Covipo pioneers. Several key cooperatives exited the Group, either because they disputed its oversight (as in the case of En Canya and La Mediterranea) or because they ‘outgrew’ the need for its services (as in the case of Consum, the primary education cooperative Marti Sorolla, and Grupo Audit, which was bought up by the multinational company Deloitte). Moreover, in 1995 and 2005, Grupo-Coop and Assecoop were respectively absorbed into the Caixa, which now operates primarily outside of the Group – in 2000, 80% of its deposits were not from cooperatives, let alone members of the Group (Macleod 2000: 105), and in 2005, its cooperative investment fund was terminated due to a lack of commitment (CIDEC 2007: 71; GECV 2000: 6). Although there has been talk of reviving the Group’s original vision, the Group’s role has thus settled to one of informal consultancy and the occasional organisation of small-scale joint projects. The influence of Mondragón (which has also deviated from the original ‘Mondragón Model’, albeit by way of expansion rather than contraction) has in turn dissipated, although the Group’s leaders maintain an informal relationship with the Basque giant and still organise annual trips to Mondragón. 
	By no means, however, has the Valencian experiment been a complete failure. Five years after the crisis of 1983, the Group itself stated: “We are convinced that if the Cooperative Group had not existed…today some important cooperatives that were developed in its bosom would not exist today in the same form” (GECV 1988: 61). Consum, for example, is a leader in the Valencian supermarket industry, competing neck-and-neck with its capitalist rival, Mercadona. Following in the footsteps of Mondragón’s own polytechnic school, Florida has developed into an award-winning university, and regularly collaborates with research centres in Mondragón (Alba Benaches 2006: 98-9; María Amparo Camacho, personal interview). The Caixa Popular has also received numerous prizes, having dramatically expanded to comprise over a hundred associated cooperatives across Valencia (Alba Benaches 2006: 100). In 2000, 70% of its investment was directed to cooperatives (Macleod 2000: 105). While Consum, Florida, and the Caixa operate in service sectors, and may therefore have been less susceptible to the forces of institutional cumulative causation than industrial coops (see Section 4.1), La Mediterranea continues to be a major player in the Valencian glass industry, and the region of L’Olleria is now famous for its glass products (ibid.: 95-6). The Group itself continued to be a major player in the Valencian economy even after assuming its reduced form: in 1999 its total revenue amounted to over a 100 billion pesetas (equivalent to almost 1 billion euros today), making nearly 2 billion pesetas (roughly 17 million euros today) in profits and employing 5.5 thousand people (Biot 2000, para. 1) – a remarkable achievement considering its humble beginnings in a housing cooperative, with the original members working unpaid long into the night around one of their kitchen tables.
It should be remembered, moreover, that the Group faced an exceptionally hostile institutional environment (see Section 6.2.1.1). For example, deficiencies in social services led to the collapse of Covamur, the women’s cooperative; insufficient finance led to the collapse of Grupo Agrícola; and the inability to attract skilled workers and managers stifled the initiatives of the DAEC on many occasions. The repression of the Franco dictatorship was particularly detrimental, with Covipo and Coinser finding it difficult to legally register and even the agricultural schools facing discrimination for fomenting radical ideas. At the same time, the cooperatives often competed with the burgeoning unionist movement (to which they ironically contributed) for the loyalty of workers (see Section 4.2.7.3).
In fact, the Group’s most significant legacy has arguably been to alter the institutional environment in favour of cooperatives. For example, the Group has been successful in promoting formación and managerial professionalisation – the foremost of the six principles that the Covipo pioneers originally identified as the essence of the Mondragón Model – in Valencian cooperatives. According to the president of CONCOVAL [the Confederation of Valencian Cooperatives] Emili Villaescusa (personal interview), Valencian cooperatives seldom used terms like ‘plan de gestión’ (‘management plan’) before the Group existed. Pizarro Barceló et al. (2006, Chapter 2) confirm that the Valencian cooperative sector today boasts high levels of worker formación and managerial efficiency, which were previously lacking. Florida and the Caixa have been particularly dedicated to improving the skills of both managers and workers in cooperatives, especially by connecting cooperatives with educational institutions. In 1979, for example, the Caixa established the Centro de Educación Cooperativa [Centre of Cooperative Education] for this purpose (Alba Benaches 2006: 99-100; Martínez Verdú 1993: 145). More recently, Florida and the Caixa collaborated to implement the ‘LEINN’ [Entrepreneur and Innovation Leadership] course, first established by the University of Mondragón to provide students with real-world experience in managing cooperatives (Observatorio Español de la Economía Social 2014a). Although the proliferation of hierarchical management systems has encountered the array of problems associated with implementing organisational structures normally associated with capitalist firms​[154]​ (see Section 4.3.2), managerial efficiency, along with formación of members, has strengthened the competitiveness of Valencian coops (Alba Benaches 2006: 74; Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 260). 
The cooperatives created by the Group have also been involved in a number of inter-cooperative projects. The president of CONCOVAL Emili Villaescusa draws attention to ASCES, a cooperative group formed in 2001 by Florida and Consum along with the second-tier agricultural commercialisation cooperative Anecoop and the educational cooperative Grupo Sorolla (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 296). In addition to playing a representative function and undertaking overseas development projects, ASCES distributes information between its member cooperatives and offers educational programmes through Florida. In 2011, the ASCES’ total turnover amounted to nearly three billion dollars (World Co-operative Monitor 2013: 33). María Amparo Camacho (personal interview) of Florida states that ASCES was created to stimulate inter-cooperation in a culture which, unlike that of the Basque Country, has no tradition of sharing resources. ASCES maintains an informal relationship with Mondragón, although Soriano Bessó laments that it does not possess the “Mondragonian spirit” that animated the endeavours of the Covipo pioneers. In 2006, Florida also created AKOE, a group of nine educational cooperatives that purports to address the high rates of youth unemployment and lack of educational facilities affecting the rural districts of Valencia by sharing of resources and expertise.
Ever since their days in the Juventud de Acción Rural Católica (JARC, or Rural Catholic Action Youth), the Covipo pioneers also strove to support organisations beyond the Group that would represent the interests of workers (Martínez Verdú 1993: 143-4). As we saw in Section 6.2.1.3, they accomplished this objective even amidst the repression of the Franco regime when the agricultural school L’Horta produced La Unió de Llauradors i Ramaders del Pais Valencià [The Valencian Union of Farmers and Ranchers], which became a leading agricultural syndicate. After Franco’s death in 1975, and with the devolution of cooperative legislation to the Autonomous Communities in 1985, the Group’s leaders were significantly involved in the replacement of the Sindicato Vertical [Vertical Syndicate] and its Uniones Territoriales de Cooperativas (UTECOs, or Territorial Cooperative Unions)​[155]​, both of which had severely repressed worker cooperativism for over thirty years (see Section 6.2.1.1), with the current system of cooperative support and representation​[156]​ (Alba Benaches 2006: 74, 263; Martínez Verdú 1993: 144-5). 
A particularly valuable component of the new system is the Federación Valenciana de Empresas Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado (FEVECTA, or Valencian Federation of Worker Cooperatives), formed in 1988 with the participation of the Group’s leaders. Ninety-percent of large worker cooperatives in Valencia are associated with FEVECTA, which provides them with services such as finance and consultancy and represents them at regional, national, and European levels (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 265-7, 324). The Caixa Popular now collaborates with FEVECTA to help meet the financial needs of the federation’s associated cooperatives, and in 2007 was about to  agree with FEVECTA, along with various cajas rurales, to create a second-tier coop that would replace the GECV’s defunct cooperative investment fund (CIDEC 2007: 71; GECV 2000: 6). In addition to FEVECTA, there are separate federations for consumer/user coops, housing coops, services and transport coops, agricultural coops, and electricity coops. In 1989, the Group’s leaders were also involved in the formation of the Confederación de Cooperativas de la Comunidad Valenciana (CONCOVAL, or Confederation of Valencian Cooperatives), which agglomerates these various federations to represent Valencian cooperatives in political and legislative bodies. CONCOVAL maintains an informal relationship with Mondragón.
In addition to their federation, the Federació de Cooperatives Agroalimentáries de la Comunitat Valenciana, agricultural cooperatives in particular benefit from a number of second-tier cooperatives, with almost all agricultural coops in Valencia associated with at least one such organisation (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 210). Whereas the federation purports to represent Valencian agricultural cooperatives in CONCOVAL and political organs, Coarval and Anecoop are responsible for providing them with input and commercialisation services respectively. Anecoop, which is the largest horticultural cooperative in southern Europe with almost 600 million euros of turnover in 2012/13, additionally provides training services, R&D, and investment to its seventy-two member cooperatives (Anecoop n.d.a, n.d.b). Agricultural coops also benefit from the financial services of the cajas rurales.
Unlike the Mondragón and the Valencian groups, the various federations and second-tier coops established since Spain’s transition to democracy are not cooperative groups proper, as their member cooperatives remain fully autonomous. As both a cause and a consequence, they suffer from a lack of trust and loyalty, with member cooperatives participating only to further their own immediate interests (Alba Benaches 2006: 271). Furthermore, besides CONCOVAL, the federations are generally constituted by cooperatives from a single sector. As Soriano Bessó expressed in an interview, the federations therefore lack one of the key strengths that the Covipo pioneers had identified in the Mondragón Model, namely (deep-level) inter-cooperation, particularly between cooperatives of different sectors (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 144-5). Indeed, only a quarter of worker coops cooperate directly with other companies, which are anyway usually not cooperatives (ibid.: 210, 338). The lack of intercooperation is even more endemic in agricultural cooperatives, in which minifundismo (the persistence of uneconomically small plot sizes due to diffuse land ownership) and credit sections (inefficiently small and concentrated financial units of non-financial cooperatives that only admit deposits from members) are pervasive (Pedro Caballero and de Miguel 2006; Soler Tormo 1999; Campos i Climent, Fajardo García, and Sanchis Palacio 2006​[157]​). 
Despite these shortcomings, however, the Valencian cooperative sector has thrived under the post-Franco system, growing faster than the rest of the economy with its number of workers more than doubling in the decade between 1994 and 2004 from 25,943 to 56,014 (Pizarro Barceló et al. 2006, Chapter 2). By 2014, the 1994 figure had nearly tripled to 74,126 workers (Observatorio Valenciano de la Economía Social 2014c, paras. 10-11). Much of this growth in employment can be attributed to the agricultural second-tier coops, which, despite comprising only 10% of second-tier coops in Spain, accounted for 40% of their turnover and 46% of their employees in 2010 (Giagnocavo, Gerez, and Campos i Climent 2014: 28). The support and representation provided by the various (con)federations, and particularly their influence on legislation, have also been a crucial factor (Lewis 2000: 3, 6). In July 2014, for example, CONCOVAL successfully petitioned for an alteration in the Valencian Law of Cooperatives that makes it easier to establish and develop cooperatives (Observatorio Valenciano de la Economía Social 2014b).
Furthermore, Valencian cooperatives have not only multiplied thanks to the post-Franco institutions, but have also tended to improve on both economic criteria (such as productivity and quality of management) and social criteria (such as member participation and worker commitment) (Alba Benaches 2006: 74; Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 260). For example, Anecoop not only bolstered the bargaining position of Valencian agricultural cooperatives vis-à-vis capitalist distributors, but also “stimulated…a belief in cooperative principles” along with “the acceptance of [a] culture of professionalism” (Gallego Bono and Lamanthe 2011: 24), both of which had previously been lacking (Giagnocavo, Gerez, and Campos i Climent 2014: 629-30). Indeed, the Valencian post-Franco system seems to have enjoyed greater success in preventing the types of ‘degeneration’ evident in Mondragón​[158]​ (see Section 5.6). For example, the problem of bureaucratisation appears to be less acute in Valencia, where managers are members in over 95% of cooperatives (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 296-7). President of CONCOVAL Emili Villaescusa (personal interview) also emphasises that the practice of hiring non-member workers common in Mondragón is relatively uncommon in Valencia. Although this appears to be changing with the tertialisation of the economy (Pizarro Barceló et al. 2006, Chapter 2), legislation drafted in collaboration with FEVECTA has streamlined the process involved in extending mbmership status to temporary workers​[159]​ (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 132; Lewis 2000: 12), and most hired workers receive equivalent remuneration to members (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 294-5). The issue of non-cooperative subsidiaries, meanwhile, does not appear to have arisen at all. 
In part, Valencian cooperatives have undoubtedly managed to elude these problems of degeneration thanks to their small size and relatively simple divisions of labour and management systems; the average Valencian worker coop in 2012 consisted of only eleven staff, with the employment of non-member workers and managers more common in larger cooperatives (Observatorio Valenciano de la Economía Social 2014a; Pizarro Barceló et al. 2006, Chapters 2 and 3; Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 296-7). It could be argued, moreover, that the second-tier coops and federations have acted as a ‘crutch’ for this lack of scale and complexity, especially in agricultural cooperatives, by encouraging the proliferation of micro-cooperatives and leading to technological backwardness (Alba Benaches 2006: 103-9, 151, 209-10, 252, 270; Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 33, 130, 175, 225-6, 238-9, 265, 298-9). By the same token, however, it could be argued that, as Section 5.5.2 contended in relation to cooperative groups, the purpose of these institutions is precisely to allow individual cooperatives to remain small and simple enough to retain an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation without sacrificing the benefits of coordination, even though cooperation within Valencian  cooperatives does not appear to be as ‘deep’ as in Mondragón​[160]​ (Encinas Duval, Calatayud Piñero, and García Martínez 2011; Giagnocavo, Gerez, and Campos i Climent 2014: 623, 631; Lewis 2000: 12). Indeed, in animating the federal system, the Group’s leaders have arguably been a victim of their own success, obviating the need for a cooperative group as wide-ranging as that of Mondragón.
The Mondragón experience, in its entirety, is undoubtedly “unrepeatable”, to use a word invoked by both Martínez Verdú (1993: 116-7) in her history of the Valencian group and president of CONCOVAL Emili Villaescusa in a personal interview. Soriano Bessó even went so far as to conclude that “the inter-cooperative discipline and intensity practiced by the Basques was impossible to transfer to [the] Valencian reality…” (CIDEC 2007: 71). Nevertheless, Mondragón provided much of the organisational ‘raw material’ for the Valencian pioneers to creatively apply to the context of 1970s Valencia, with a very different technological and institutional environment from that of 1950s Mondragón. Such is the nature of imitation, involving innovation of its own, that the organisational combinations in each of the two “experiments” were bound to differ (MacLeod 2000: 110). In this respect, as emphasised by both Martínez Verdú (1993: 12) and Villaescusa (personal interview), it is more appropriate to refer to the ‘adaptation’ or ‘application’ of the Mondragón Model rather than its ‘transplantation’ or ‘replication’. 
In fact, as a model in its own right, the Valencian group has been used a point of reference for other regions, albeit not on the scale of Mondragón. After liaising with the GECV for almost a decade, Grup Clade was established in 2004 as the first cooperative group in Catalunya (Observatorio Español de la Economía Social 2014b). Constituted by ten cooperatives in a range of sectors from education to dairy, the group is directly modelled on the Valencian group, according to Soriano Bessó (personal interview). Villaescusa (personal interview) indicates that another Catalonian group based on the Valencian example, Abacus, has recently been founded. Furthermore, according to María Amparo Camacho (personal interview) of Florida, the town council and university of Rotherham in the UK have expressed interest in the university as a model for their own region. 


6.2.2	The Influence of the Mondragón Model in the United States
The Valencian group is unique in the degree to which it attempted to imitate the Mondragón Model. It is perhaps surprising, however, that the most substantial attempts to emulate aspects of the Mondragón Model outside of Spain have occurred in the United States, a country known for its individualistic culture and tradition of capitalist enterprise (but which, as explained in Section 4.2.5.3, actually boasts a rich history of cooperativism). Indeed, although I include what I believe to be the most significant examples, Mondragón’s influence in the country has been too wide-ranging to cover exhaustively​[161]​. This influence culminated in September 2013, when the recently-established National Cooperative Bank in Washington, D.C. announced an agreement with Laboral Kutxa, the successor of Mondragón’s Caja Laboral Popular, to encourage the formation and sustainability of worker coops (Islam and Crego 2013a; National Cooperative Bank 2013). 

6.2.2.1	The Evergreen Initiative in Cleveland, Ohio
The foremost example of adapting the Mondragón Model in the United States is the Evergreen Initiative in Cleveland, Ohio. Cleveland is a racially and culturally diverse city, in contrast to the relative homogeneity of the population of Mondragón, and possesses a tradition of capitalism and big business rather than communalism and political radicalism (Ieurvine, Stitely, and Hoyt 2010: 17). Cleveland’s economy, which had already been declining precipitously since the Great Depression, was unduly devastated by the recent financial crisis and its ensuing recession. Once an industrial powerhouse, the city has come to be irreverently branded “the mistake on the lake” for its depressed rust-belt economy and endemic urban decay. With jobs, skills, and capital fleeing inexorably, the city ranked second-to-bottom out of American cities in terms of median income in 2009, behind only Detroit (ibid.: 13: Ieurvine 2010: 28; Alperovitz, Howard, and Dubb 2009). 
One district on the east side of Cleveland, however, managed to buck the trend. The four-square-mile University Circle, while surrounded by depressed neighbourhoods, is flourishing, thanks to its cluster of renowned educational, medical, and cultural enterprises. In 2005, the Cleveland Foundation, a local charity, partnered with several of these institutions (including the Cleveland Clinic, Case Western Reserve University, University Hospitals, Veterans Administration Hospital, Cleveland Botanical Gardens, and Cleveland Museum of Art) to form the Greater University Circle Initiative (GUCI), aimed at addressing the economic and demographic issues afflicting the surrounding neighbourhoods (Howard 2012; Wang and Filion 2011). In December 2006, the GUCI awarded a grant to the Democracy Collaborative of the University of Maryland to organise a roundtable on “community wealth building”, bringing together a broad range of stakeholders including governmental organisations and Cleveland-based companies (Wang and Filion 2011: 31). 
At the roundtable, which included local cooperatives, the idea of community development through cooperatives was discussed. Cooperatives were not alien to Ohio – in 1977, thousands of workers laid off by the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to buy out the firm’s steel mill and control it themselves, with the assistance of the city of Youngstown (Alperovitz 2011: xiii). Furthermore, Kent State University’s Ohio Employee Ownership Center (OEOC), present at the roundtable, had long been fascinated with Mondragón and its relevance for Ohio (Thomas 2000; Logue 2001). One of its members, the late John Logue, was particularly adamant that the Initiative should look to Mondragón for inspiration. Five years before the roundtable, following a visit to Mondragón, he had stated in a 2001 edition of the Centre’s magazine, Owners at Work: “I went to Mondragón prepared to conclude that the Mondragón Model was unique to the Basque country. If we didn’t have any Basques, then we were out of luck…Visiting Mondragón encouraged me to envision an Ohio employee-owned sector with more cooperation among employee-owned firms, more involvement in the community, a common commitment to expanding employee ownership, a commitment by firms to incubate new employee-owned companies, and the creation of more joint institutions, including joint strategies for responding to economic globalization” (Logue 2001: 17).
Persuaded by Logue’s ideas, the team founded the Evergreen Initiative, which purported to regenerate Cleveland’s poorest neighbourhoods through cooperative enterprise. After visiting Mondragón in October 2008, many of its participants returned to Cleveland informed and inspired by the “eye-opening” and “life-changing” visit, during which Logue also became intrigued by Spain’s regional and national cooperative federations and support agencies, its policy of allowing unemployed workers to capitalise their benefits in order to start or join coops, and its sociedades laborales (‘mixed’ cooperatives that are at least 50% worker-owned) (Owners at Work 2008-9; Logue 2008-9: 12). The team also made two subsequent study trips to Mondragón, and later, in 2011, a US representative for Mondragón would give a talk at the OEOC, describing Mondragón as a model of import substitution relevant to the problems afflicting Ohio (Peck 2011: 16). 
Like Mondragón’s own humble beginnings, procuring start-up capital for the Evergreen Initiative was a challenge, in this case due to the hesitancy of banks to fund enterprises with social objectives and irregular ownership structures (Wang and Filion 2011: 32). Eventually, however, the Initiative secured a low-interest loan from the federal government and a tax credit package from Cleveland’s Economic Development Department. The first cooperative of the initiative, Evergreen Cooperative Laundry, was established in October 2009. Three others – Evergreen Energy Solutions (installer of solar energy systems), Green City Growers (urban greenhouse cultivators), and Evergreen Business Services (a business consultancy focusing on local cooperative development) – soon followed, with plans to establish ten new coops dedicated to services such as recycling and cleaning in the near future (Ieurvine, Stitely, and Hoyt 2010: 14). In the long term, the Initiative envisaged the creation of one-hundred coops, which, extrapolating from an estimated average of fifty workers in each of the existing coops, would employ five-thousand workers – ten percent of the target neighbourhoods’ combined population (Ieurvine 2010: 37).
The Evergreen Initiative has adopted several aspects of the Mondragón Model. Most obviously, it is an association of cooperatives, with first-tier coops supported by an overarching structure. It also uses a similar system of ‘internal capital accounts’; it was originally estimated that, after eight years of membership, a typical Evergreen worker would possess $65,000 worth of equity (Wang and Filion 2011: 32; Iuervine, Stitely, and Hoyt 2010: 14; Howard 2012: 211). The Evergreen coops also strive to provide “workforce training beyond technical skills”, echoing Mondragón’s emphasis on formación (Wang and Filion 2011: 35). These aspects of the Mondragón Model were implemented not only to generate “community wealth” – an objective also assumed by Mondragón, as well as its Valencian counterpart – but also “to achieve a different employment relationship” than the traditionally antagonistic struggle between capitalists and workers, and thus establish an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation (ibid.).
At the same time, the Evergreen Initiative has added its own unique ‘spins’ to the Mondragón Model, adapting it to the context of twenty-first century Cleveland (Iuervine 2010: 16). Most notably, whereas the founders of Mondragón created institutions like the Caja Laboral Popular to meet the needs of the cooperatives, the founders of the Evergreen Initiative have chosen to collaborate with local “anchor institutions” – public and private organisations like universities and health clinics, particularly those within the University Circle, that are rooted in the city of Cleveland. This strategy has provided the Initiative with a reliable source of finance from local and national government bodies, banks, and other large institutions, along with “impact investors” (Howard 2012: 211). The Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund, a revolving loan fund created by the Cleveland Foundation, has been particularly effective (ibid.: 212-3). It has also provided the Initiative with a stable source of demand, as the cooperatives are based on the “import replacement” strategy of meeting the procurement needs of the anchor institutions, which amount to billions of dollars per year, through the employment of local worker-members (Iuervine 2010: 16).
The reliance on anchor institutions, along with the fact that the Evergreen coops were developed as part of a broader initiative with the support of the public sector, has generated a unique governance structure consisting of three concentric groups. Firstly, there is a Core Group (or Leadership Team) comprising the leading institutions of the Evergreen Initiative, each of which plays a different role. For instance, the Cleveland Foundation and the Democracy Collaborative are responsible for developing and coordinating the Initiative; Kent State’s OEOC arranges the governance systems of the Evergreen cooperatives; and other companies deliver financial, training, and recruitment services (Iuervine, Stitely, and Hoyt 2010: 14). In addition to the Core Group, moreover, there is a Secondary Group comprising representatives from anchor institutions and local government. Given the centrality of these institutions to the economic feasibility of the cooperatives, the Secondary Group has significant clout. The emphasis on environmental sustainability evident in the Evergreen cooperatives, for example, arose as the behest of the anchor institutions. Finally, to cohere with the Initiative’s ultimate objective of reviving local communities, there is a Tertiary Group comprising local non-profit organisations dedicated to community development, such as community development corporations and affordable housing companies. Evergreen’s tripartite structure is currently being converted into the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation (ECC), “a kind of ‘holding company’” that will oversee the Evergreen cooperatives along with the aforementioned Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund, the Evergreen Land Trust, and Neighborhood Connections, an organisation that runs a local community newspaper (Wang and Filion 2011: 33-4). The corporation will own 20% of each of the Evergreen coops, and will be vested with the authority to prevent them from leaving the group or selling shares to outside investors. 
The involvement of ‘leading organisations’, anchor institutions, and community organisations in the systems of governance marks a significant contrast to Mondragón, wherein the cooperatives themselves – and the members of those cooperatives – command sovereignty in the organs of governance, such as the Cooperative Congress, the apex of Mondragón’s own corporate structure. This raises a potential problem of legitimacy, which is exacerbated by the fact that most of the worker-owners are low-income African-Americans while managers and members of the Leadership Team are predominantly middle- to upper-class whites (Iuervine, Stitely, and Hoyt 2010: 16; Iuervine 2010: 41). However, finding qualified managers from local, poor neighbourhoods is difficult – especially without a robust internal training programme like that of Mondragón – and there have already been some severe managerial blunders that have cost the cooperatives dearly (Iuervine 2010: 40). The Initiative also lacks several other key features of the Mondragón Model, such as a prolific R&D programme and a central cooperative bank, although the possibility of creating the latter has been discussed (ibid.: 42). 
So far, the Evergreen Initiative has not lived up to either the buoyant hopes of its founders or the unrealistic expectations set by a sensationalist and uncritical media (Friess 2014). The existing cooperatives are barely profitable, arguably due to a number of critical ‘design flaws’ made by the Evergreen leaders. For instance, demand for activities like laundry and horticulture has been disappointingly low, even from the anchor institutions, with the Cleveland Clinic having recently established its own in-house laundry service and several other institutions tied up in long-term contracts. As a result, many of the predicted statistics, such as the 5,000 created jobs and the $65,000 equity stake for each coop worker-owner, are now out of reach in the foreseeable future. Average employment per cooperative in fact seems to have stabilised at around half of the estimated fifty workers, with the four existing coops employing a total of less than a hundred workers. Furthermore, worker-members are using their increased incomes to move out of the poor target neighbourhoods, defeating the original purpose of regenerating inner-city neighbourhoods. Indeed, despite the frenzy of national and international press attention, local residents seem to be unaware of the Evergreen coops. The underwhelming performance of the Evergreen coops is especially disconcerting given that over $25 million has been spent on the project so far. Despite its flaws, however, the project is still in its early stages; according to Tim Howard, one of the project’s leaders, Evergreen “has been a learning laboratory; it’s been an experiment” (Friess 2014, para. 47). It has, moreover, raised awareness about the Mondragón Model and attracted interest from other groups, including government officials and students in Washington, D.C., Texas, Georgia, and New York, as well as the city councils of Preston and various Welsh localities in the UK (Romney 2011: 2; Iuervine 2010; Voinea 2014).

6.2.2.2	The United Steel Workers’ ‘Union Co-op Model’
Perhaps the most significant knock-on effect of the Evergreen Initiative has been to motivate the United Steel Workers (USW), the largest industrial labour union in North America, to collaborate with Mondragón in applying some key features of the Mondragón Model to the United States (Witherell, Cooper, and Peck 2012). Like the founders of the Evergreen Initiative, the USW was convinced that, whereas conventionally-owned firms are characterised by a culture of conflict, “[w]orker-owned companies that adopt an ownership culture have more productive employees because they are given autonomy and take ownership of their jobs and have more effective managers who are freed up from the inefficiencies of closely supervising subordinates, united in doing the best job they can to…sustain a profitable business” (Witherell, Cooper, and Peck 2012: 11). In the language of this dissertation, a change in the power structure facilitates an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation that is inaccessible to conventional firms. The USW was particularly attracted by Mondragón’s principle of formación, which it describes as “continuous training”, especially in in terms of the skills required for managing and working in a cooperative. It also concurred with Mondragón’s emphasis on the notion of work as an end in itself, rather than merely a means to income. However, the USW recognised that, as detailed in Sections 4.3.2 and 5.6.1, balancing the interests of members as owners and as workers can be difficult in cooperatives (ibid.: 10-1). This issue is exacerbated by a lack of workplace participation, which also characterises the employee stock ownership programmes (ESOPs) that have been proliferating in the US in recent years.
Thus, after several years of deliberation, the USW and Mondragón formally agreed in March 2012 to promote the “union co-op model”, an innovative blend of Mondragonian and unionist principles. The same Mondragón representative that gave the 2011 talk to the OEOC was involved, as was the OEOC itself. ‘Union coops’ will substitute Mondragón’s Social Council with a Union Committee, sanctioned to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of workers – rather than to merely ‘advise’ or ‘consult with’ management – on issues such as remuneration, benefits, and working conditions (ibid. 9, 14-5). The USW considers the adoption of Mondragón-style wage ratios a possibility, but envisages that these would be more flexible than in Mondragón. Union co-ops will also deviate from the Mondragón Model by granting workers limited-liability profit shares rather than credits in ‘internal capital accounts’, with a fraction of wages deducted into a reserve fund. The USW is also open to hybrid structures of worker ownership, either along the lines of Spain’s sociedades laborales or through joint ventures, at least in the short run. Besides improving worker representation, and thus organisational culture, the union co-op model will allow coops to benefit from the union’s buying power, seed capital, and benefits such as health insurance (ibid.: 6-7). A fund for the formation of new union coops is also being developed (Hoyer n.d., para. 11). Reflecting Mondragón’s principle of “social transformation”, union coops will also adopt a ‘buy local’ preference and express solidarity with other coops (Witherell, Cooper, and Peck 2012: 15-6).
The statement issued by the USW on the “Union Co-op Model” rhetorically asks: “Can such an idea really take root in an American culture steeped in individualism?” (ibid.: 4). They answer in the affirmative, because the Mondragón Model can be (re)interpreted from the perspective of self-reliance, ownership, and democracy – principles that are close to home for Americans. The report also discusses the historical ambivalence between unions and cooperatives, which has long been present in the United States as it has in Spain (see Section 4.2.7.3) (see Greenberg 1983, 1986; Gunn 1984; Jones 1984). In both cases, however, there are also instances of collaboration between the two movements (e.g. Curl 2009). Gar Alperovitz, an influential academic and member of the Democracy Collaborative (a leading organisation in the Cleveland experiment) is optimistic that the union coop model will take root and hopes that, along with other forms of ownership, they will one day “displace” conventional corporations (Flanders 2012, para. 15). The model has already been implemented in at least ten US cities, including Cleveland, Cincinnati, New York, Seattle, Chicago, and Denver. In Pittsburgh, the USW is basing the new coops on the Evergreen model of anchor institutions (Hoyer n.d., para. 6). 

6.2.2.3	Other American Examples
Aspects of the Mondragón Model are also being applied in the city of Richmond, California. Like Cleveland, Richmond is a former industrial giant struggling with rampant unemployment and depressed wages. Once the home of a large Standard Oil refinery, the famed Santa Fe Railroad, and a prolific World-War 2 shipyard, it notched up an unemployment rate of 19% at the height of the Great Recession and is consistently ranked as one of America’s most dangerous cities (Romney 2011; Badger 2012). Also like Cleveland – and unlike Mondragón – it features a socio-economically diverse population rife with tension and violence. However, this did not prevent Mayor Gayle McLaughlin of the Green Party from being inspired by Mondragón. Since visiting the Basque giant, McLaughlin has secured assistance from the California Center for Cooperative Development to establish cooperative enterprises throughout the city, which have so far included cafes and bicycle shops, amongst others.
A similar initiative is underway in Jackson, Mississippi, another declining industrial centre and one of the poorest cities in the United States. Before his death, the city’s mayor, Chokwe Lumamba, sought to revitalise the black communities in which the city’s poverty is concentrated through what he called “solidarity economics”, building on a long history of cooperatives as a means of economic empowerment that includes the Underground Railroad of the Civil War, the rural coops on which blacks relied thereafter, and the Civil Rights Movement (Siegel 2014). Aspiring to create “the Mondragón of the South”, the recently convened ‘Jackson Rising’ conference was attended by almost five-hundred participants from across the US (GRITtv 2014). With the support of various regional and national organisations, cooperatives dedicated to recycling, urban farming, laundry, and construction (activities that resemble those of both the Evergreen coops and the original Valencian group) have already emerged in Jackson.
	The San Francisco Bay Area is another cooperative hotspot, and has been since at least the 1970s, when cooperative organisations such as the Inter-Cooperative, the Alternatives Centre, and the Democratic Business Association successfully promoted worker coops and other unconventional enterprises (Marraffino 2009). San Francisco has recently produced a particularly interesting case in the Arizmendi Association of Cooperatives, founded in the 1990s on the basis of the existing Cheese Board Collective. Named after Mondragón’s founder, the Association provides new bakeries with start-up capital and a proven model of governance and business. It subsequently acts as a ‘second-tier coop’ by offering ongoing technical support in return for a membership fee (Marraffino 2011). At least four bakeries have already been established, with an average wage almost twice that of the industry (Marraffino 2009, para. 28).
	An earlier instance of Mondragón influencing American cooperatives occurred in North Carolina in the 1980s, when a socially-minded couple founded the Center for Community Self-Help in an attempt to combat the state’s rampant poverty (Nadeau and Thompson 1996: 110-12). The Center initially retrained redundant workers and provided them with technical assistance to form cooperatives, but the couple became convinced that the main obstacle to forming successful cooperatives in the region was a lack of finance. Inspired by Mondragón’s Caja Laboral Popular, in 1984 they therefore founded the Self-Help Credit Union, which purported to serve the financial needs of local coops. Just as Mondragón’s pioneers had raised the initial capital for the Caja through the chiquiteo – a Basque custom of socialising at bars after work that is often mentioned as an example of uniquely solidaristic nature of Basque culture (see Section 5.4.1) – the couple utilised the quintessentially American tradition of the bake sale to raise capital for their own credit union, with more funding eventually coming from the government in addition to religious groups and the cooperative organisation Co-op America. In 1985, the UN listed Self-Help as one of the twenty most successful rural development programmes in the US, and by 1995, having created some four thousand jobs through its cooperative support programmes, it was the largest community development credit union in the country with assets of $77 million – an uncanny reminder of the relatively measly $77 that it initially raised at the bake sale.


6.3	Parallels of the Mondragón Model
	In addition to examples that were directly inspired by Mondragón, there are experiences that emerged independently from, but nevertheless display many features of, the Mondragón Model. Although each of the examples discussed also features important differences with Mondragón, and constitutes a valuable model in its own right, the fact that entrepreneurs from around the world independently applied similar organisational combinations to a range of contexts demonstrates that Mondragón is, in the words of one of its pioneers, a “typical world phenomenon”​[162]​ (Gorroñogoitia 1987; see also Salvatori 2012). Indeed, parallels to Mondragón are too numerous to mention exhaustively; besides those discussed here, notable examples include the cities of Sunchales in Argentina and Nova Petropolis in Brazil, both national ‘capitols’ of cooperativism in which cooperatives constitute a major part of the economy and society (Salvatori 2012: 4); the John Lewis Partnership in the UK, which features a similar governance structure to Mondragón, operates on a divisional basis, and has struggled with similar problems of structural consistency and degeneration (Ridley-Duff and De Normanville 2014; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014; Paranque and Willmott 2014); and the New Dawn enterprises in Canada (MacLeod 2000, Chapter 7).

6.3.1	The Cajamar Cluster in Almería, Spain
The first parallel to Mondragón can be found relatively ‘close to home’ in the Spanish province of Almería, located within the Autonomous Community of Andalusia on the southern coast. Devastated by the Franco dictatorship like its Basque and Valencian counterparts, mid-century Almería suffered from “arid land, extensive out-migration, lack of infrastructure, geographical isolation, and subsistence level of livelihood”, leaving it the poorest province in Spain with an average income of less than half the national average (Giagnocavo, Fernández-Revuelta Pérez, and Uclés Aguilera 2013: 94, 99). Trade liberalisation in the 1960s exacerbated the province’s relative backwardness, with large companies from other autonomous communities (including Valencia) commercialising and exporting Almerian products under their own brands, thus capturing most of the added value (Giagnocavo, Gerez, and Campos i Climent 2014: 625).
In this context, a few local entrepreneurs began working with various agricultural syndicates to find new ways of assisting the impoverished farmers of the region, who were underserved by conventional finance and lacked the capital to start their own cajas. Although the author found no unequivocal evidence that these entrepreneurs were inspired by Mondragón (which is why the Almerian case is not located in Section 6.2), it is reasonable to surmise that they were aware of it; in any case their primary inspiration was the rural credit unions conceived by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in Germany (ibid.: 625-6). One of the entrepreneurs, the young lawyer Juan del Aguila Molina, began daily withdrawing funds from a commercial bank and distributing them amongst farmers, who would return to the money to Molina to be redeposited after they had conducted their business activities. In 1966 – in between the founding of Mondragón’s and Valencia’s cooperative banks – the entrepreneurs officially established the Caja Rural Provincial de Almería. This financial cooperative would eventually become Cajamar, currently the sixteenth largest bank and the largest cooperative bank in Spain. In less than half a century, the cooperatives connected to Cajamar transformed the province into a shining exemplar of agricultural development that has been studied and “exported” to numerous countries (Giagnocavo, Fernández-Revuelta Pérez, and Uclés Aguilera 2013: 93). 
The “Almería Model” bears striking resemblance to its Basque and Valencian counterparts (Bateman 2014: 14). For example, Giagnocavo et al. (2013) stress that Cajamar did more than merely overcome information asymmetries and transaction costs, which is the strength of cooperative finance that is usually emphasised, particularly in the agricultural sector (see Section 4.2.5.1). Rather, in like manner to the cooperative banks in Mondragón and Valencia, it played a crucial coordinating role for its associated cooperatives, assuming “the task of continuously adapting and adjusting production processes” (ibid.: 96). For instance, it encouraged farmers to market their produce cooperatively, and assisted them in diversifying their activities to protect against risk (ibid.: 96, 103). The bank also took the lead in agricultural innovation, which was especially important given that the region was initially “not the best candidate for agricultural development” due to its arid land, and lacked any agricultural research institutes (ibid.: 99). In 1975, for instance, in response to an increase in land and energy prices and the degradation of water and soil, it created three experimental farms, assuming the risks of production (ibid.: 101-3). In the same year, it established Las Palmerillas, a research institute which continues to enjoy an international reputation for both innovating and adapting new agricultural technologies (Aznar Sánchez, Galdeano Gómez, and Tapia León 2014). Finally, the bank mediated on behalf of Almerian cooperatives in local, national, and international politics (ibid.: 104, 107).
As in the Mondragón and Valencian groups, the cooperatives linked to Cajamar now operate in a range of sectors, and include universities, providers of services and infrastructure, and exporters in addition to agricultural coops. However, unlike in those groups – and like in the Valencian federations – the cooperatives are fully autonomous. Furthermore, although the bank initially acted as the ‘eje vertebrador’ (‘coordinating backbone) of the cluster, most coordination now occurs between first-tier cooperatives, which since the 1990s have tended to merge into larger entities (Giagnocavo, Gerez, and Campos i Climent 2014: 626). In this regard, the Almerian case differs from both the group and federal models, and is more akin to an industrial ‘cluster’ or ‘district’. This format appears to have allowed the Almerian cluster to avoid the “chicken-and-egg problem”​[163]​ of establishing groups that was so devastating in Valencia (see Sections 6.2.1.6 and 6.2.1.7). Whereas the Caixa Popular in Valencia was constantly faced with a dilemma between expanding beyond the Group and maintaining inter-cooperation, Cajamar expanded into a neighbouring province in the 1990s without relinquishing the local coordinator role that it played at the time, and in 2007 merged with a caja rural in a distant province with a completely different economic and financial profile (Giagnocavo, Fernández-Revuelta Pérez, and Uclés Aguilera 2013: 103-55). Today, Cajamar leads a nationwide group of cajas rurales, and is also collaborating with FEVECTA to serve Valencian cooperatives.
Indeed, despite breaking with the territorial nature of most cooperative banks, Cajamar was able to overcome initially unpromising cultural conditions. When Cajamar began its operations, the sort of cultural factors accredited with Mondragón’s success did not exist in Almería, with the devastation of the Civil War, the repression of the Franco regime, and the mass exodus of citizens conspiring to erode any “sense of community” and leaving a “civil society vacuum” (ibid.: 93, 97). Through its “proactive” role in the local society and economy, Cajamar filled this void by acting as “the force behind the construction of the social and economic community” (ibid.: 94). In its early days, for instance, it deviated from conventional finance by offering farmers unsecured loans backed only with the promise of labour, and later assumed the costs and risks of its experimental farms. As Giagnocavo and colleagues (ibid.: 101) emphasise, these actions “served as an impetus for farmers to organise”, formed the basis of social relationships based on trust, and ultimately “created a sense of community” (ibid.: 103). In short, “cooperative finance played an important role in defining and building community, and not the other way around” (ibid.: 97). 

6.3.2	The Italian Cooperative Movement
Apart from Mondragón, the Italian cooperative experience is the most widely celebrated in the world. In 2008, cooperatives accounted for 7% of Italian GNP and employed over a million workers (Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 106-7; Borzaga, Depedri, and Bodini n.d.: 9). There are three major organisations of cooperatives in Italy: the Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue (or Legacoop, usually referred to as ‘La Lega’), Confcooperative, and the Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane (AGCI). Unlike the cases reviewed so far, these organisations are intimately tied to the political sphere: La Lega is rooted in Italy’s socialist movement, while Confcooperative and AGCI are associated with the Catholic Church and social-democratic parties respectively. La Lega and Confcooperative, the two largest organisations by far – each several times larger than Mondragón, in fact​[164]​ – have traditionally focussed on different sectors (the former on worker and consumer cooperatives, the latter on agricultural and credit cooperatives) and on different regions (the former on central Italy, the latter on the northeast part of the country) (Borzaga, Depedri, and Bodini n.d.: 4-5).
While Confcooperative is similar to CONCOVAL in Valencia in that it is a confederation comprising nine sectoral federations (along with numerous regional federations), and while AGCI is a much smaller cooperative group, La Lega is distinct from all of the cases reviewed so far in that it is – as its name suggests – a league. It is difficult to pin down the league’s defining organisational format, as it is in fact an umbrella organisation comprising numerous kinds of association between cooperatives, including those that characterise groups, federations, and districts/clusters (Menzani and Zamagni 2010). In general, however, the integration (autonomy) of member cooperatives in La Lega is somewhere in between the district/cluster and federal formats on the lower (higher) end of the spectrum, and the group format on the higher (lower) end (see Figure 9, below): although cooperatives are technically autonomous, the league plays a “paternalistic” function by ensuring that its standards are met in its associated cooperatives, while the various associations within it formulate specific policies to which their cooperatives must adhere if they wish to retain their membership in those associations (Smith 2001: 12; see also p52).
Figure 9: Integration and Autonomy in Cooperative Associations​[165]​

The most notable feature of La Lega is arguably its ‘consortia’ – umbrella organisations that exist to achieve surface-level coordination for a set of first-tier coops by providing them with certain services (Smith 2001). To name but a few: Istituto Cooperativo per L'Innovazione (ICIE) is dedicated to innovating and adapting new technologies; Promosviluppo is responsible for starting and admitting new coops; SINNEA trains new managers; SMAER provides consultancy services, primarily to bolster worker participation and worker-manager relations; Consorzio Nazionale Approvviggionamenti (ACAM) negotiates to lower the cost of intermediate goods; Concoop arranges subcontracting; Fincooper, amongst other entities, provides financial services, with Unipol providing insurance; Comunicazione Italia is dedicated to public relations and advertising; Editrice Cooperativa is the publishing arm; and Inforcoop is responsible for coordinating the activities of the various second-tier coops and consortia. There are also specific consortia for each sector; an agricultural consortium, for example, would combine the purchasing of inputs and the marketing of outputs for its associated cooperatives. 
Although the consortia play a similar role to the second-tier coops of the Mondragón and Valencian groups, they are not cooperatives proper: rather than being members (along with representatives from the associated first-tier coops), the staff of the Legacoop consortia are employees hired by the associated cooperatives (ibid.: 45-6, 56). Furthermore, there is no central “eje vertebrador” (coordinating backbone) comparable to the cooperative banks of Mondragón, Valencia, and Almería, with coordination instead achieved on a more decentralised basis. In this regard, La Lega resembles a district/cluster even more than the Almerian case. In addition to the consortia, for example, coops engage in backward integration along supply chains and strategic alliances with coops in the same industry (Menzani and Zamagni 2010). Larger cooperatives play a key leadership role in this inter-firm coordination, including within the consortia and other associations (Smith 2001: 56-60). Indeed, in contrast to Mondragón’s historical policy of limiting the size of individual firms, including through spin-offs (see Section 5.5.2), La Lega has adopted a strategy of encouraging large size, including through mergers (Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 111-2). As a result – and in stark contrast to the federal model in Valencia – cooperatives are significantly larger than other firms in Italy, with an average of nineteen workers per enterprise as opposed to four for non-cooperatives in 2006, accounting for 9% of employment amongst firms with over five-hundred workers in 2008 (Borzaga, Depedri, and Bodini n.d.: 10; Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 106-7).
La Lega also reflects the district/cluster model in that its cooperatives are concentrated in a certain geographic region, namely northern Italy – particularly the region of Emilia-Romagna, which in 2006 accounted for almost half of the League’s turnover (Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 106). Emilia-Romagna has been widely studied and admired as a prime example of a prosperous industrial cluster/district, specialising primarily in high-end fashion design and textile manufacturing (e.g. Porter 1990; Piore and Sabel 1984). Cooperatives play a crucial role in the ‘Emilian Model’ (Brusco 1982), accounting for 40% of the region’s GDP in 2013 and over one-third of total Italian cooperative turnover in 2006 (Franke and Chasin 2013: 17; Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 106; Smith 2001: 34, 58). Although all of the cases discussed so far are inherently territorial, La Lega’s particularly strong geographic basis is also reflected in the fact that it contains both sectoral and regional divisions, in contrast to Mondragón, which is now organised entirely into sectoral divisions (Smith 2001: 12-3). 
La Lega’s success is demonstrated by its record of upgrading from its origins in craft-based manufacturing to high-tech production, which is due in large part to the activities of the ICIE (Smith 2001: 64). As in Mondragón, a second-tier cooperative, Promosviluppo, has played the ‘venture capitalist’ role of carrying out feasibility studies and forming new cooperatives. Most of these coops, however, are formed through conversions of failed capitalist firms. Although this practice has become increasingly common in Mondragón despite its traditional preference for creating new cooperatives de novo (see Section 5.6.2), La Lega’s conversions usually occur in collaboration with unions, in line with its political orientation (ibid.: 38; Thornley 1983). By merging failing enterprises with sounder ones, La Lega has tallied an impressive record of both generating employment and minimising job loss (Smith 2001: 38, 44, 71-5).
Furthermore, while the League has achieved an extraordinary degree of inter-coordination, its member coops – and particularly those in the Emilia-Romagna region – appear to have achieved an extraordinary degree of deep-level cooperation. This is evidenced by the fact that workers regularly choose to reinvest a greater share of surpluses into reserve funds than is required by law (Franke and Chasin 2013: 19). The ability of the cooperatives to achieve deep-level cooperation undoubtedly derives in part from their governance structure, which is remarkably similar to that of Mondragon. As in Mondragón, members participate intensively in a general assembly to elect a governing council, which in turn oversees managers (Hancock 2007: 63, cited in Franke and Chasin 2013: 21). Although managers are given substantial independence in making workplace decisions, they are ultimately accountable to the assembly, as per Mondragón’s ‘managerial sandwich’ (see Sections 4.2.7.1 and 5.3.1) (Holmström 1985). Wage differentials in La Lega are also very similar to those in Mondragón (see Section 5.4.2) (Franke and Chasin 2013: 20). Furthermore, the organisational culture of the Emilian cooperatives appears to have had a ‘spillover effect’ by contributing to the region’s solidaristic culture, which is hardly surprising given that 60% of the region’s inhabitants are members of at least one coop (Restakis 2010: 57). Indeed, when linking the region’s “social capital” to its level of development, Putnam, Leonardi, and Nannetti (1993) use the number of cooperatives as a measure of “civic virtues”.
The Italian cooperative movement has a similar history to its Spanish counterpart. Like Francisco Franco in Spain, the fascist dictator Benito Mussolini severely repressed cooperatives after coming to power in 1922. Indeed, Mussolini subordinated all worker coops to the National Fascist Organism of Cooperation, just as Franco had done with the Spanish Syndical Organisation (ibid.:  2). As in Spain, moreover, cooperativism flourished with the proliferation of favourable legislation that followed the country’s transition to democracy (Ammirato 1996). The Spanish law that allows unemployed workers to capitalise their benefits in order to start new coops (see Section 4.3.4), for example, was also adopted in Italy as the ‘Marcora Law’. Like the (con)federal system in Valencia, La Lega has been actively involved in the legislative process (Smith 2001: 38). Italian legislation is unique, however, in its emphasis on safeguarding the community benefits of cooperatives, in line with their concentration in education, healthcare, and other social services (Borzaga, Depedri, and Bodini n.d.: 5). For instance, both the proportion of profits that can be paid out to members and the rate at which each share can be remunerated are strictly limited, “making cooperative enterprises in effect not-for-profit organizations” (ibid.). Any profits remaining after these limits have been reached are transferred into a (tax-free) indivisible reserve fund, which not only prevents workers from ‘selling out’ to investors but also extends their time horizons and enhances their identification with the firm (Navarra 2011). Almost all Italian cooperatives adhere to these strict regulations, even though they technically apply only to subsidised cooperatives, which are technically allowed to opt for a less restrictive framework. 
Despite these restrictions, however, a series of acts were passed in 1993 at the behest of La Lega to allow cooperatives to access finance in more flexible ways (Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 105-6). While this has greatly bolstered their financial position, it has led to a number of problems of ‘degeneration’. For example, in line with the reforms, La Lega recently introduced a new membership class for capital providers (‘soci sovventori’ or ‘backer-members’), some of whom are given voting rights that can constitute up to 30% of total votes (Smith 2001: 22, 45-7, 66). Whereas Mondragón’s ‘mixed cooperatives’ were implemented in subsidiary enterprises in order to move them towards cooperativism, the soci sovventori were introduced within La Lega’s cooperatives in order to raise finance, which, due to a hostile institutional environment, cooperatives often lack (see Section 4.3.2). Another aspect of the reforms was to allow Italian cooperatives to purchase shares in private companies, which they have done extensively, especially overseas; the ceramic tile machine manufacturer SACMI, for instance, now owns eighty subsidiaries in twenty-four countries (Hancock 2007: 91, cited in Franke and Chasin 2013: 22). As in Mondragón, workers in these overseas plants are not granted membership status, although some have experimented with non-voting stock options. As in Mondragón, moreover, the underlying cause of this issue is institutional cumulative causation, and the geographical limitations of the league in overcoming it (see Section 5.6.4). This is demonstrated by the fact that La Lega has generally failed to establish new cooperatives on a large scale even in southern Italy, where coops are less common, integrated, and geographically concentrated (Smith 2001: 35).
Although La Lega is the largest of the three Italian cooperative organisations – and the most useful for purposes of comparison with the other cases reviewed in this chapter – one region in which the Catholic organisation Confcooperative dominates warrants specific mention, namely the north-eastern province of Trentino, Italy. The origins of the Trentino cooperatives bear striking resemblance to those of Mondragón in that they were founded by a Catholic priest from the Catholic Action tradition during a period of relative isolation from world markets through the consolidation of local savings (see Section 5.2) (Salvatori 2012: 4-5). Almost half of Trentino’s 500,000 inhabitants are members of at least one of its six-hundred or so cooperatives, which permeate all sectors of its society and economy, accounting for almost 14% of its GDP, 90% of its agricultural production, and 15% of its employment in 2012 (International Co-operative Alliance n.d.; Salvatori 2012: 11-2). The cooperatives, which consist primarily of agricultural and consumer coops along with credit unions and various social-service coops, are federated into a provincial subdivision of Confcooperative that also includes various consortia. The Trentino cooperatives have been widely used as a model, including in Bosnia (Bateman and Nuhanovic 2014) and the region of Santander in Colombia, the latter to which I now turn.


6.3.3	The Region of Santander, Colombia
The region of Santander – especially the city of San Gil, which is known as “the city of cooperatives” – comprises a comprehensive network of consumer, worker, and other cooperatives that are involved in all aspects of society and the economy (Fajardo Rojas and Toloza Suárez 2009; Fajardo Rojas 2012; Bateman 2013). The cooperatives, which were also founded by a priest and developed by the Catholic Church, are coordinated by Coopcentral, a second-tier cooperative created in 1964 that also oversees the various communal, syndical, and parochial organisations in the region (Fajardo Rojas 2012: 10-1). Coopcentral is now expanding into savings, credit, and other financial activities. In total, 120,000 citizens of the Santander region – a quarter of the population – are cooperative members. Reflecting Mondragón’s philosophy of formación (see Section 5.4.2), the Santander cooperatives embrace education, especially education in cooperative skills and principles, as their overarching “master strategy” (ibid.: 17). The cooperatives have had a marked impact on the region’s broader society. In a nation riven by narcotics trade, inequality, and crime (especially homicide), San Gil has no cocaine production, low levels of inequality, and low levels of crime (with no homicide) (Bateman, Duran-Ortiz, and Sinković 2014).

6.3.4	Kerala Dinesh Beedi in India
	India contains a vast cooperative sector, primarily in agriculture. As the world’s largest producer of milk, for example, India is known for its federations of dairy cooperatives, the most famous being Amul in Gujarat. The Indian cooperative that bears the most resemblance to Mondragón, however, is Kerala Dinesh Beedi (KDB), a manufacturer of beedis (thin cigarettes known as ‘the poor man’s cigarettes’). KDB arose in the mid-1960s when the owners of large beedi firms in the Kannur region of Kerala attempted to implement a piecework system of compensation and to introduce middlemen to hire or purchase from small groups of workers (Isaac, Franke, and Raghavan 1998, Chapter 3). In response, a number of workers formed the KDB cooperative in conjunction with the local communist movement. Eventually, KDB created the Central Society, which now federates eighteen semi-autonomous, first-tier coops (‘Primary Societies’) (ibid., Chapter 4). The Kerala Dinesh brand has since expanded into coconut milk, curry powder, pickled and processed foods, and umbrellas (Kerala Dinesh n.d.)
	Although KDB’s maximum salary differentials were within a 1:6 ratio in 1992, the challenges of its Mondragón-like system of representative democracy have been a persistent source of tension, undoubtedly due in part to the repetitive, mindless, and unpleasant nature of beedi rolling (Smith 2001: 27). Unlike in Mondragón, and like in Italy, these matters have been resolved largely through the role of trade unions, representatives of which are elected by workers to oversee managers, and through the participation of workers in workplace decisions (Isaac, Franke, and Raghavan 1998, Chapter 5). So far, there have been no major disputes – which is more than can be said for Mondragón (see Section 5.6.1). Indeed, KDB appears to have established a remarkably cooperative organisational culture. This is demonstrated both by extensive levels of mutual monitoring, which is all the more important given that beedi rolling is exceptionally difficult for managers to monitor, and by high levels of productivity despite KDB’s system of compensation offering scarce material incentives to produce above a minimum quota.
However, as a lone participatory organisation in an industry dominated by capitalist firms, like Mondragón KDB appears to be struggling with a sort of ‘cultural degeneration’, especially as its ideological roots become increasingly foreign to successive generations of members (see Section 5.6.6) (ibid.: 153-5, Chapter 6). Furthermore, although the federation has been able to grow and develop by reinvesting a large portion of surpluses, inter-cooperative tensions have arisen from the fact that annual bonuses are distributed uniformly across the Primary Societies despite large differences in productivity. Nevertheless, KDB has had a clear spillover effect on Keralan society and economy. Besides increasing pay and improving working conditions in other local firms, it has contributed to the ‘Kerala Model’ of democracy that has been so widely praised for its high levels of literacy, life expectancy, and other measures of ‘human development’ (most notably by Nobel-Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen) by encouraging citizens to participate in the region’s social and political movements (ibid., Chapter 1).

6.3.5	The Polish Cooperative Movement
	Remarkable similarities with Mondragón can also be found in the cooperative movement of mid-century Poland, even though Mondragón appears to have been unknown in the country at the time (Campbell 1984: 8). Although cooperatives had long played a significant role in the Polish economy, they received a major boost following the Second World War when the Communist government saw them as a solution to rampant poverty and unemployment (Sobczyk 2014, para. 3). Like Mondragón, the Polish cooperatives utilised the ‘managerial sandwich’ by separating management and governance, with members electing a governing council that would in turn appoint managers (Campbell 1984: 11, 13-4). Unlike in Mondragón, and like the Italian and Keralan coops, the Polish coops elected trade union representatives, and did not implement wage scales (ibid.: 11).
The Polish cooperative movement also featured inter-cooperation/-coordination, including through second-tier coops like Copexim, responsible for providing export services to first-tier coops (ibid.: 5-6). The system of distributing surpluses also resembled that of Mondragón, with a proportion (in fact, at 50%, a much higher proportion) being directed to reserve/investment funds and the remainder being transferred into individual accounts, which could be reduced if the coop made a loss and could only be redeemed upon retirement (ibid.: 9). Like Mondragón, the Polish cooperatives decided in 1976 to reorganise along sectoral rather than regional lines (ibid.: 12). However, the cooperatives were not compelled to create their own bank, as the local banks and credit unions that the government had concomitantly supported – as well as direct government provision of finance – were sufficient, especially given the cooperatives’ collective “buying power” (ibid.: 3-4).
	As Mondragón has discovered through its overseas expansion (see Section 5.6.4), Poland’s cooperative movement is no longer as robust as it used to be (Sobczyk 2014). With the dramatic institutional shift that occurred after the Cold War, cooperatives suffered from adverse fiscal regulations and a cultural perception that they were a relic of communism (ibid., para. 4). As a result, a multitude of cooperatives collapsed, ‘degenerated’ into capitalist firms, or experienced a decline in participation, and coperatives still account for only 1% of Polish GDP, compared with the European average of 6%​[166]​ (ibid., paras. 10-1, 14-5). The outlook for the cooperative movement looks set to improve, however, with an increase in EU funding and a pledge of support by the Polish government in a resolution passed in August of 2014 (ibid., para. 15). 

6.4	Conclusion
	This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that, while Mondragón is undoubtedly unique in many aspects and unrepeatable in its entirety, it is not an exception confined to the ‘initial conditions’ of the Basque Country in the 1950s. On the contrary, the Mondragón Model has been deliberately used as a model in a variety of contexts, and furthermore has significant parallels in other experiences around the world that have developed independently, demonstrating that it is inherently flexible (Salvatori 2012); indeed, one could go so far as to call it a “typical world phenomenon” (Gorroñogoitia 1987). To be sure, each of the cases discussed in the chapter also features significant differences with Mondragón, and constitutes a model in its own right offering its own sets of strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, virtually all of the models use both a ‘managerial sandwich’ in which worker-members elect managers and a system in which first-tier coops are associated into an overarching structure – what I have called ‘the Mondragón Model’.
Few of the regions that emulated or reflect the Mondragón Model shared the solidaristic traits of Basque culture, which, as explained in Section 5.4.1, have been accredited by many observers with Mondragón’s success. In fact, both Valencia and the United States, the regions which have been the most active in directly imitating the Mondragón Model, are known for their individualism – the former due to parochial agrarian traditions and the latter due to a liberal political philosophy. In personal interviews, both Villlaescusa and Soriano Bessó considered the lack of Basque solidarism to have been a limitation in the Valencian Group’s attempt to apply the Mondragón Model, but by no means an absolutely binding one. Indeed, in most if not all of the cases reviewed we have seen that cooperatives had a discernible ‘spillover effect’ on local society. Perhaps most striking is the the case of Cajamar, which created a socio-economic community where none existed before. 
The institutional structures prevalent in each of the cases discussed also differ from the setting of post-war Mondragón. For example, the Valencian Group emerged during the Franco dictatorship and experienced Spain’s transition to democracy; the United States is characterised by advanced capitalism; and Kerala Dinesh Beedi and the Polish cooperative movement took off under Communist regimes. To be sure, the institutional environment has posed an obstacle in most – if not all – of the cases reviewed, as it has in Mondragón. For example, the Valencian coops suffered from deficiencies in social services, finance, and skilled workers and managers, not to mention the repression of the Franco regime and competition from unions; the Italian coops have had to make compromises in order to raise finance and have failed to extend the benefits of the leagues to either the southern party of the country or their overseas subsidiaries; and the Polish coops have diminished since the country transitioned to a Western-style capitalist system. On the whole, however, the various sorts of inter-cooperative association (groups, federations, leagues, and districts/clusters) have allowed their member cooperatives to flourish despite these hostile forces of institutional cumulative causation. In several instances, moreover, we saw that the cooperatives altered the institutional environment in favour of cooperatives. In both Valencia and Italy, for example, the cooperative associations play an important role in influencing cooperative legislation, while in Kerala, cooperatives contributed significantly to the regions’ widely lauded democratic institutions.








This dissertation has attempted to restore the social foundations of economics to the theory of the firm by demonstrating that cooperation based on trust and loyalty is a ubiquitous requirement within the firm, which, as an intrinsically social institution, is capable of achieving this “deep-level cooperation” by “constituting” the cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour. By providing a systematic framework by which to conceptualise the firm that synthesises insights from a range of often segregated disciplines and offers insights that are absent from the predominant theories, I believe that the dissertation represents a unique and original contribution to the social sciences. 
The most important aspect of that framework is, in my opinion, its ability to show that cooperation and coordination are distinct objectives with distinct implications for organisation and economic development. This is important because cooperation and coordination are often conflated in the literature; even Marx (1887: 225) defined cooperation as a situation in which “numerous labourers work together side by side, whether in one and the same process, or in different but connected processes”, when – at least in this passage, and in this translation – he in fact appears to be referring to coordination. Consider, for example, the argument made in Chapter 4 that cooperatives possess an exceptional capacity for implementing the bureaucratic organisational structures required for surface-level coordination without relinquishing deep-level cooperation. This is by no means a standard argument; support for cooperatives from laypeople and academics alike tends to rely on either the assumption that workplaces can be dramatically reformed without sacrificing efficiency or the belief that a sacrifice in efficiency is the price to pay for a more ‘humane’ economy and society. This idealism is reflected in eulogies to Mondragón, which often fail to note the conspicuous ‘detail’ that its divisions of labour and management systems do not appear to be dramatically different from those in conventional enterprises operating in the same sectors. The cooperation/coordination dichotomy also offers a new perspective on the expediency of cooperative associations: although such associations have been widely studied (e.g. Joshi and Smith 2008), the idea that they alleviate the burden of surface-level coordination in order to allow first-tier coops to focus on deep-level cooperation is novel. 
Some may consider my case for cooperatives to be offensive, disconcerting, or downright wrong – not least those of Marxist ilk who deem the labour process to contain the essence of the power of the firm and to be the arena of revolution. Indeed, we have seen in this dissertation that Japanese firms and cooperatives have both attracted considerable indignation from Marxists and other radicals for their inculcation of ‘false consciousness’ and tendency towards ‘self-exploitation’, particularly given their ability to maintain deep-level cooperation while implementing organisational structures that would appear to be alienating, and which may not even be tolerated in a unionised firm​[168]​ (see Sections 2.3.2, 4.2.7.3, and 5.6.5). At a more general level, my argument may be criticised for being excessively functionalist, given that organisational culture can never be politically or ethically neutral (Dow 1987; Johnson 2006; Willmott 1993). It cannot be ignored, for example, that working conditions in Japanese firms have often been so harsh as to result in alarmingly high rates of occupational disease, job fatalities, and suicides (Kamata 1982). Mondragón is no “workers’ paradise” either, as The Economist (2013) sardonically referred to it – a reality that is true for other coops as well (e.g. Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg 1996).
It is true that my argument for cooperatives is conservative rather than radical (or at least reformative rather than revolutionary) from a Marxist point of view. However, because I have deemed the essence of power within the firm to reside in control rights (usually bundled with ownership) rather than the labour process (see Sections 3.2.4 and 4.2.7), I deem the ‘relations of production’ to be fundamentally distinct in a worker-controlled firm and a capitalist-controlled firm. Consequently, I do not consider the consciousness of cooperative worker-members (or Japanese workers, who in Section 2.3.3 I suggested effectively control their firms) to be ‘false’, nor do I consider their tolerance of complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems to amount to ‘self-exploitation’. As Dore (1973: 265) rhetorically asked in relation to Japanese firms, if cooperatives are “hypocritically devious form[s] of exploitation”, then “who, exactly, is conning whom?” With that said, it is worth noting that if more ‘organic’ divisions of labour and more egalitarian management systems can efficiently coexist with advanced technologies – which may increasingly be the case, even according to the technological determinists (see Section 3.2.1) – then the behavioural advantages of cooperatives may be equally, if not more, pronounced (see Section 4.2.5.1).
At this point, I feel obliged to clarify why I have not paid a great of deal of attention to an issue that usually concerns sociologists studying firms – and that would concern economists, if they dispensed with the preposterous assumption that individuals view all work as mere ‘disutility’ to be endured purely for the sake of increasing income and consumption (Pagano 1985; Spencer 2015) – namely job satisfaction. The reason is that this dissertation is concerned with behaviour; and, as I argued in Section 5.6.1 in relation to the Mondragón cooperatives, the relationship between job satisfaction and behaviour is not clear-cut (Perrow 1979; Redding 1972; Alvesson 1987). Although a positive correlation between job satisfaction (dissatisfaction) and solidaristic (individualistic) behaviour can be clearly discerned (Altman 2001), there are occasions in which this correlation could be obscured, and even inverted. For instance, the British manufacturing workers in Goldthorpe et al.’s (1969) study were satisfied with monotonous jobs and undesirable conditions so long as their pay was adequate precisely because they viewed their jobs (and thus behaved) instrumentally/transactionally. In this vein, the lead singer and songwriter for the 1970s rock band Joy Division once said: “…I used to work in a factory, and I was really happy because I could daydream all day. All I had to do was push this wagon with cotton things in it up and down. But I didn't have to think. I could think about the weekend, imagine what I was going to spend me money on, which LP I was going to buy...You can live in your own little world” (The Quietus 2012, para. 55). Conversely, the substantive motivations and social relationships (that is, solidaristic behaviour) of Japanese workers apparently caused them to be less satisfied with mundane work (Cole 1979, Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 24-6). 
Obviously, we should be concerned with job satisfaction even if it is not not associated (at least in a predictable fashion) with solidaristic behaviour. However, precisely because preferences are institutionally endogenous (Hodgson 1988; Bowles 1998; Bowles and Gintis 2000), the question arises as to whether we should assess worker well-being on the basis of objective or subjective criteria. For example, should we attempt to provide more meaningful work or more pleasant working conditions to individuals who, perhaps because they perceive their work only instrumentally or perhaps because they are blinded by ‘false consciousness’, express satisfaction with (and in the case of a cooperative, democratically choose to endure) meaningless work or harsh working conditions (Chang 2014, Chapter 6)​[169]​? To answer this question, which is central the ‘critical management’ literature​[170]​, would take the discussion too far afield, into vast topics of political philosophy and the works of such authors as Foucault, Gramsci, and Bourdieu. Hirschman’s (1970) voice-exit-loyalty framework would also come into play; it is interesting to note, for example, that unionised workers consistently express lower levels of job satisfaction than their non-unionised counterparts (Bender and Sloane 1998). Suffice it to say that there is certainly a danger of falling back on the liberal (and neoclassical) argument that workers have exercised their ‘right to choose’ (and thus ‘revealed their preferences’), for example by joining a cooperative and even democratically agreeing to tolerate alienating workplaces. Nevertheless, by allowing their members to ultimately design and govern their own workplaces – whatever organisational structures thay may choose to implement – cooperatives may have a unique advantage in not only satisfying preferences for work (Pagano 1985; Altman 2006), but also in overcoming many of capitalism’s social maladies – its ‘contradictions’, if you will – such as inequality and alienation (Clarke 2005; Dow 2003; Restakis 2010). Recent evidence even suggests that industrial democracy may have positive effects on workers’ health (Erdal 2014; McQuaid et al. 2012), although it is often accompanied by high levels of stress (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 155-7).
Now, while my argument is not Marxist per se, some may still deem it to be somewhat ‘socialist’; after all, was it not the naive ambition of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations to create an industrial powerhouse coordinated by a vast bureaucracy yet based on the trust and loyalty of individual workers? Be that as it may, the reality is that firms themselves rely on a significant degree of both surface-level coordination and deep-level cooperation, and the tension between the two is no less present within modern firms – including capitalist firms, which, it should not be forgotten, initially gave Marx the idea of central planning – than it was within a socialist economy. Indeed, I have argued that capitalist firms may be limited in their ability to alleviate this tension due to their asymmetric power structures. Granted, the tension is not absent in cooperative firms, but is rather manifested as a dichotomy between bureaucracy and democracy. As I have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically, however, this dichotomy is not intractable, but can rather be alleviated in the same ways that it is alleviated in political democracies – namely, through systems of representative governance (such as the ‘managerial sandwich’) and federal association (such the cooperative group). To the extent that the dichotomy persists, moreover, I have argued that it is largely a function of the prevailing institutional environment rather than an inherent deficiency of cooperative organisation.
Admittedly, this argument is somewhat simplistic. Indeed, one of the major lessons that I learned over the course of the research is that reality is much ‘messier’ than one would like, and than theories can handle. Nevertheless, I hope that the perspective taken in this dissertation will supplement and bolster the repertoire of socio-economic benefits offered by cooperatives (which I far from covered exhaustively in Section 4.3.2) and give further weight to calls for policy-makers to systematically protect cooperatives from the forces of institutional cumulative causation (see Pagano and Rowthorn 1996; Putterman 1982; Dow 2003). I believe that this research is especially opportune given that it comes at a time when the recent memory of financial crisis, the current economic malaise, and the disconcerting outlook for the future (not to mention the abject failure of the economics discipline to address these issues) have created an extraordinarily receptive intellectual climate (in the real world if not in the economics academy), with cooperatives increasingly in the spotlight as a potential alternative to capitalist organisation (e.g. Restakis 2010; Novkovic and Webb 2014; Cheney et al. 2014). This is demonstrated, for example, by the United Nations declaring 2012 to be the ‘International Year of Cooperatives’ and all of the major political parties in the UK extolling the ‘John Lewis model’ of employee ownership.
This raises the question, however, of why governments have not more extensively supported cooperatives. Indeed, in applying the idea of cumulative causation, Veblen and Myrdal were also interested in the political forces that sustained a given institutional trajectory. A potential explanation is that cooperatives are “everybody’s (ideological) half-brother”​[171]​: conservative groups have been attracted by their potential to promote ‘self-determination’ and reduce dependency on the state, but have been deterred by their socialist aura and requirement of government support; leftist groups, meanwhile, have been attracted by their potential to elevate the position of labour and improve working life, but have been deterred by their tendency to ‘step on the toes’ of trade unions (see Sections 4.2.7.3 and 5.6.5). A vivid example of this ubiquitous political ambivalence can be found in the UK. In 1976, a Labour-controlled Parliament awarded the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM, a sort of cooperative federation) £100,000 of seed funding, along with £50,000 for its Scottish counterpart, to promote cooperativism (Coates n.d.; Atherton 2009a, 2009b). Although the Movement successfully promoted the creation of over two-thousand worker cooperatives, dominant figures in the Labour Party advocated collective bargaining rather than direct control of enterprise; Arthur Scargill, leader of the National Union of Mineworkers, once claimed that cooperatives were “a recipe for collaboration designed to frustrate the real aspirations of the working class” (Kirkup 2010, para. 7). So, in the same year as it awarded the grant to ICOM, the Labour government issued the Bullock Report, which recommended creating company boards rather than cooperative firms. Although Labour did establish the Co-operative Development Agency in 1978 to unify the various local co-operative development agencies that had emerged around the country, the Conservative government that came to power the following year eventually closed it (Atherton 2009b). It also discontinued funding for ICOM, preferring partial employee ownership within capitalist firms to full-blown cooperatives. In some cases, however, most notably Italy (see Section 6.3.2), cooperatives have represented not a political “no man’s land”​[172]​ but rather a common ground for diverse political movements, and in those cases, cooperatives have thrived. During socio-economic crises, moreover, cooperatives may come to be seen as a ‘third way’ even in less favourable political systems (see Section 4.3.4).
The real limitations of the dissertation, in my opinion, follow from its primary strengths: in order to develop a theory of the firm that is sufficiently wide-ranging to address the broad deficiencies of the predominant theories and to offer insights into cases beyond those examined in the text, I have been obliged to take a broad-spectrum approach in Chapters 2-4, making a number of generalisations and abstractions that are not confined to – but do not completely explain – the idiosyncrasies of any particular case. Concepts like behavioural modes, levels of cooperation/coordination, and organisational structures and cultures, for example, are analytical constructs designed to assist in understanding the dynamics of the firm as an institution (which can itself be considered an artificial category, although that is subject to debate), rather than a narrow set of organisations, be it a single firm, type of firm, or population of firms. Although I have provided examples from secondary sources on Japanese firms, moreover, some may consider these to be superficial. In actuality, though, this trade-off between explanatory scope and empirical detail, which was mentioned in Section 2.4, is inherent to all theories, and there is always a danger of becoming a ‘jack of all trades, but master of none’. Furthermore, the concepts developed in the early chapters do not merely amount to vague platitudes, but are rather applied in detail to cooperative firms in Chapters 5 and 6. Indeed, although the Mondragón case has been and continues to be widely studied, the Valencian case in particular is not widely known. My primary research in Valencia, which involved conducting interviews and accessing historical records, not only honed my abilities as a researcher (and stretched my Spanish language skills), but also represents, I believe, an important contribution in its own right. Finally, although some may dislike the chosen format of progressing from primarily theoretical chapters to primarily empirical chapters, preferring instead a more integrated style, I believe that it has best facilitated elucidation of the key concepts and has provided the most coherent ‘flow’. 
With all of that said, there a number of ways in which the theory could be further grounded, which in fact represent promising options for future research. For example, it may be expedient to analyse the various cooperative associations discussed in Chapter 6 in more detail than space has permitted me, assessing whether their distinct organisational features serve to address distinct institutional environments and/or reflect their own processes of institutional cumulative causation. A comparative ethnography of a cooperative firm and an otherwise similar capitalist firm, meanwhile, may serve to test and illustrate the arguments made in Chapter 4, although it may fall prey to the fallacies of comparative statics (see, e.g., Valentinov 2004: 3-4; Hodgson 1998). To be sure, comparative studies have been carried out between Mondragón and capitalist firms, but these have taken the form of either surveys (Bradley and Gelb 1981) or economic/statistical analysis (Thomas and Logan 1981; Arando et al. 2011). Contariwise, Greenwood and Gonzalez’ (1992) study is ethnographic but not comparative. A comparison of sorts could also be attempted between Japanese firms: although Dore (1973: 335) found “no evidence of ‘the Japanese system’ changing rapidly towards a British-type pattern”, a sort of ‘degeneration’ into the US corporate model has become apparent in some companies of late (e.g. Kwon 2004). Although some have welcomed this transition, blaming the very style of corporate governance lauded in this dissertation for Japan’s persistent economic travails (e.g. The Economist 2015), casual observation would suggest that Sony, arguably the most ‘Americanised’ of the lot, has in fact struggled the most since Ronald Dore published his seminal study.
Furthermore, the theory developed in this dissertation could be extended to a wider variety of cases, including not only the multifarious types of cooperative and participatory enterprise (as well as hybrid organisations like Spain’s sociedades laborales), but also other forms of organisation. Valentinov (2011), for instance, has shown that the Old Institutionalism – which in Section 1.6 I argued provides valuable insights for the theory of the firm, and which informed the subsequent chapters of the dissertation – can improve our understanding of non-profit organisation. Rose-Ackerman (1996) and Young (1983), meanwhile, have considered the non-instrumental motivations involved in non-profits, and Chang (2007) has argued that organisational culture and non-individualistic behaviour must be considered when analysing state-owned enterprises. The concepts developed in this dissertation, such as the cooperation/coordination dilemma, may also be applicable outside of the theory of the firm. They may, for example, offer a lens through which to compare alternative political systems, such as federal vs. centralised, proportional representation vs. single-member plurality, and presidential vs. parliamentary systems.
Cooperatives themselves lie at the crossroads of many overlapping areas of under-explored research to which the contents of this dissertation may be pertinent. Indeed, it perhaps their interdisciplinary nature – along with the disciplinary aloofness of economics – that has caused cooperatives to ‘slip between the cracks’ of mainstream research agendas (Kalmi 2007). One relevant topic, for example, is the potential role of cooperatives in a socialist system – perhaps some sort of ‘market socialism’ (Pagano 1985, Chapters 8-9; Hindmoor 1999; Miller 1989). Cuba and Venezuela would represent appropriate cases in which to ground such research given their sizeable cooperative sectors and respective movements towards market competition and state control (Piñeiro Harnecker 2009a, 2013). Historical examples could also be used, such as Lenin’s New Economic Policy and the post-Soviet Yugoslav system of self-management, the latter of which is especially pertinent given that the neoclassical models of the ‘Labour-Managed Firm’ were based on the “Illyrian” self-managed enterprises (see Section 4.2.4) (Vanek 1970).
I would finally take this opportunity to pre-empt the criticism that the dissertation is not based on answering a given set of well-defined research questions. In response, I would direct the reader to Section 1.2, wherein I explain that all theories of the firm – including, as it happens, my own theory – implicitly seek to answer three related questions: first, why do firms exist (what is their purpose); second, what do firms do (what is their function); and third, what are firms (what is their nature). Based on the theoretical and empirical research presented in this dissertation, my answer to these questions is the following. Firms are social institutions that exist to develop and apply productive knowledge. Although they fulfil this purpose by achieving both cooperation and coordination, their primary function is to achieve cooperation based on trust and loyalty, which, as social institutions, they do not only by harnessing behaviour but also by ‘constituting’ the very cognitive and relational foundations of behaviour. Deep-level cooperation is, in short, “the very nature and rationale” of the institution of the firm (Simon 1991: 33).
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^6	  Partial exceptions include Penrose 1959; Teece 1976; Teece and Pisano 1994; and Knight 1921.
^7	  See also Goffin and Koners 2011; Schmidt and Hunter 1993; Lave and Wenger 1991.
^8	  Drawing on Friedrich List (1904 [1841]: 182-3), Hodgson (1999: 261-3) traces this deficiency to Adam Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations, which, although allowing for the enhancement and deterioration of skills and cognitive capacities, left “the workers’ aims and conceptions…unchanged”. However, we will see in several sections (1.6.2, 2.2.4, 2.4, and 3.2.3) that Smith (1904 [1776], Book V, Chapter 1, para. 178) in fact acknowledged that “the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments”, considering both the positive and negative behavioural effects of specialisation in the first chapter of Books I and V respectively.
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^11	  See Penrose 1959; Teece 1982, 1986; Foss 1993, 1996a; Kogut and Zander 1992.
^12	  This requirement cannot be avoided by stating that the bearers of skills can be hired to perform a service, which seems to be what Coase (1937: 92) had in mind when he claimed that “[w]e can imagine a system where all advice or knowledge was bought as required”. In such cases, the skill itself is not being purchased, because it remains inextricable from its possessor. Rather, labour is being hired, which brings us back to the peculiarity of labour. Similarly, although someone may pay to be taught a certain skill, what is exchanged is not the skill itself but rather the labour of teaching, which involves context-dependent practice and continuous interaction between teacher and learner.
^13	  See also Malmgren 1961; Runge 1984; Ostrom 1990, 2000.
^14	  See also see also Teece 1982, 1986; Nelson 1980; Dosi and Egidi 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992; Foss 1993, 1996; Hodgson 1998, 1999: 252.
^15	  See also Dosi et al. 1988; Hodgson 1998, 1999: 252-6. The literature on ‘organisational learning’ has made this point repeatedly – see, for example, Senge 1990 and Cohen and Sproull 1996.
^16	  This relates to the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Although risk-aversion is a common explanation of incentive failures in contract-based theories, the concept of uncertainty implies an altogether different rationale for the firm. When evaluating an issue, individuals may attach a probability or utility value to a set of possible outcomes; but whether or not that issue is salient in the first place depends on their cognitive framework.
^17	  See also Langlois 1984, 2007; Argyres and Liebeskind 1999; Madhok 2002.
^18	  “Just as the offensive power of a squadron of cavalry, or the defensive power of a regiment of infantry is essentially different from the sum of the offensive or defensive powers of the individual cavalry or infantry soldiers taken separately, so the sum total of the mechanical forces exerted by isolated workmen differs from the social force that is developed, when many hands take part simultaneously in one and the same undivided operation, such as raising a heavy weight, turning a winch, or removing an obstacle. In such cases the effect of the combined labour could either not be produced at all by isolated individual labour, or it could only be produced by a great expenditure of time, or on a very dwarfed scale. Not only have we here an increase in the productive power of the individual, by means of co-operation, but the creation of a new power, namely, the collective power of masses” (Marx 1887: 225).
^19	  Admittedly, What Marx meant by “co-operation” differs from the usage in this dissertation. According to Marx (1887: 225), “[w]hen numerous labourers work together side by side, whether in one and the same process, or in different but connected processes, they are said to co-operate, or to work in co-operation”. In this passage at least, Marx in fact appears to be referring to surface-level coordination (see Section 2.3).
^20	  See also Jacobides and Winter 2005: 400; Argyres and Liebeskind 1999; Argyres and Mayer 2004, 2007; Madhok 2002. See Carter and Hodgson 2006 for a critical review of the empirical literature on transaction-cost economics.
^21	  As Nooteboom (2009) demonstrates, the literature on ‘communities of practice’, which attempts to explain how specialised knowledge is formed and disseminated, is instructive in this regard: it appreciates that cooperation cannot be taken for granted (as in competence-based theories), but nor can it be achieved through pre-determined, self-interested agents (as in contract-based theories). See Brown and Duguid 1991, 2000; Wenger 1998; Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002; Goffin and Koners 2011; Schmidt and Hunter 1993.
^22	  As Bendix (1963: 251, quoted in Fox 1974: 149) phrased it: “Beyond what commands can effect and supervision can control, beyond what incentives can induce and penalties prevent, there exists an exercise of discretion important even in relatively menial jobs.”
^23	  It should be noted that the characterisations of the two predominant schools posed here are largely the result of deduction and generalisation. Much of the literature, especially within contract-based theories, does not address behaviour explicitly, let alone make statements about the determinants of behaviour.
^24	  The distinction between instrumental and substantive rationality corresponds to Weber’s distinction between “formal rationality” and “substantive” or “value rationality”. Although I have adopted Weber’s “substantive rationality”, I consider the term “formal” to be misleading. Note also that I am not using the phrase “substantive rationality” in the same sense as Simon (1976: 130-1), who used it to describe behaviour that “is appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints” – precisely what I have called “instrumental rationality”. Simon (ibid.) distinguished this “substantive rationality” assumed in mainstream economics from the “procedural rationality” assumed in psychology, which refers to “the outcome of appropriate deliberation” – precisely what I have called “substantive rationality”.
^25	  Note that this type of motivation cannot be accurately captured by the method of Neoclassical Economics of simply including a ‘preference’ for interaction in the ‘utility function’ that the actor is assumed to maximise, because the whole point is that the actor does not view interaction as merely a means to enhancing her own welfare – it is not necessarily something that she wants to do, but rather something that she thinks – perhaps subconsciously – that she should do (Sen 1977).
^26	  Blau and Simmel distinguish between economic and social exchange. The distinction espoused here is similar, but does not accept that “social exchange” is somehow not “economic”. On the contrary, social relationships are important within the firm precisely because they are required to achieve the firm’s economic purpose of developing and applying productive knowledge.
^27	  See also Zerubavel 1997; Lindenberg 2000, 2003; Nooteboom 1992, 2009: 50ff; Mead 1934.
^28	  The literature on organisational culture is too vast to cite exhaustively. Other well-known texts besides those cited in this section include Davis 1984 and Kanter 1984, 1990.
^29	  For example, see Abu-Jarad, Yusof, and Nikbin 2010 for a review of attempts to evaluate the relationship between organisational culture and performance.
^30	  See also Simon 1947, Chapter 10; 1991: 36; 1996: 44; Etzioni 1961.
^31	  The dichotomy between organisational structures and organisational culture is admittedly artificial; it is temporarily maintained for the sake of exposition and will be relaxed in later sections.
^32	  See Turner and Oakes 1986; Hogg and Vaughan 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1981, 1984, 2013; Lindenberg 2000, 2003.
^33	  Chang and Evans (2005) refer to this as the “constitutive” role of institutions.
^34	  See Greenberg 1986: 22 for a list of other modern advocates of this view.
^35	  Espinosa and Zimbalist 1978; Piñeiro Harnecker 2009b: 323, 330; Mukolo, Briscoe, and Salim 2006; Greenberg 1983, 1986; see Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 67. Greenberg (1983, 1986) actually deems the political and attitudinal effects predicted by the spillover thesis to be absent and even negative in economies without well-developed labour movements (“unmediated market economies”), and minimal even in economies with such movements (“mediated market economies”) (see also Gunn 1984; Jenkins 1974). However, given his admission that even cooperatives in unmediated economies tend to “foster cooperative and egalitarian relations among their members” (Greenberg 1983: 204), this conclusion seems premature.
^36	  See Lepper and Greene 1978; Deci 1971, 1975, Deci and Ryan 1985; Frey 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001. For meta-studies that confirm the ‘crowding out’ effect, see Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999a; Rummel and Feinberg 1988; Wiersma 1992; Tang and Hall 1995. Cameron and Pierce (1994) and Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) challenge the conclusions of these studies, but are rebuffed by Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999b).
^37	  See Akerlof and Kranton 2008; Frey 1993; Boly 2011; Dickinson and Villeval 2008; Falk and Kosfeld 2006. Besides directly affecting workers’ cognitive frames, organisational structures based on material rewards and punishments could also affect the pool of interested or eligible workers in a type of ‘adverse selection’ (Petit 1996: 77).
^38	  See also Blau and Scott 1963: 125; Chamberlain and Kuhn 1965: 428; Zimring and Hawkins 1973; Leibenstein 1987: 150.
^39	  Ironically, managers in modern times have often harked back to the paternalism of the master-servant relationship (without assuming the obligations thus entailed) in an attempt to combat this adverse behavioural consequence.
^40	  Fox (1974: 40-5) reviews a subset of these, including those cited here in addition to several others.
^41	  I use the terms “hierarchical management systems” and “managerial hierarchies” interchangeably.
^42	  There is also a geographic dimension to the trade-off, as the spatial dispersion of personnel precludes the face-to-face interaction that, in some cases the common sense of territory, that may be required for deep-level cooperation (Mozas Moral and Bernal Jurado 2006; Borzaga and Tortia 2008: 41-50).
^43	  See also March and Simon 1958; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 98-9, 145, 170, 181; Kalleberg 1977.
^44	  See also Bendix 1956; Satow 1975; Willer 1967; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977.
^45	  For example, tall managerial hierarchies with narrow spans of control are variously thought to either impede deep-level cooperation by involving overbearing supervision, preventing horizontal communication, and generating a sense of isolation from peers, or enhance deep-level cooperation by tying career aspirations to the structure of the firm, allowing for vertical communication, and breaking up class formation (Blau 1968; Galbraith 1977; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 183-4). Arguably, tall hierarchies could simultaneously induce alienation and commitment, by impacting vertical and horizontal relationships in distinct ways (Fox 1974: 81). For instance, workers may become alienated from their peers, but display more commitment to their superiors; indeed, this is intrinsic to ‘bureaucratic control’. The reverse could be the case with ‘flatter’ structures.
^46	  See also Parker and Slaughter 1988; Rinehart, Huxley, and Robinson 1997; Hanappi-Egger 1996.
^47	  Kogut and Zander (1996) call this “notional consistency”.
^48	  See also Itami 1988; Clark 1979; Yoshino 1971.
^49	  See also Filby and Willmott 1988; Knights and Willmott 1987, 1989; Grey and Willmott 2005; Alvesson and Willmott 2003; Alvesson 1987; Anthony 1989; Parker 2002.
^50	  See also Jones and Pliskin 1989; Long 1979; Adams 2003; Ros 2003.
^51	  Of course, power-holders are unlikely to actually arrive at this ‘optimal level’ of participation – not only are they unable to perfectly predict workers’ reactions to changes in participation (represented by the Total Benefits of Deep-Level Cooperation curve), they are unlikely to think in terms of maximisation. There is also the issue that the functions depicted in the figure may be ‘dynamic’ rather than ‘static’, meaning that they change as different levels of participation and deep-level cooperation are attained.
^52	  Note: Whereas the Loss of Power curve is purely a function of the Degree of Participation (the x-axis), the Total Benefits of Deep-Level Cooperation curve depends on any number of factors, including organisational culture. For the sake of exposition, I have assumed diminishing returns to participation in terms of deep-level cooperation. The dashed line is a parallel transposition of the Loss of Power curve to identify the point at which the difference between the two curves is maximised.
^53	  Note, however, that some tasks are easier to ‘value’ than others, especially given differences in discretion, firm-specificity, and so on. There may be a clear market price for basic production tasks, whereas managers’ responsibilities may be more diffuse and variable. Of course, this is not inconsistent with Wootton’s explanation.
^54	  See also Rinehart, Huxley, and Robinson 1997; Parker and Slaughter 1988; Hanappi-Egger 1996.
^55	  See Footnote 2 for references to this phrase.
^56	  To quote Adam Smith (1904 [1776], Book V, Chapter 1, para. 178), “the understandings of the greater part of men” – including what in 1759 he referred to as their “moral sentiments” and “mutual sympathies” – “are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments”
^57	  See also Malmgren 1961; Runge 1984; Ostrom 1990, 2000; Kogut and Zander 1996: 512; Nooteboom 2009: 78; Petit 1996.
^58	  He also applied his “caveat” of “atmosphere” only to “those transactions for which attitudinal spillovers are thought to be especially strong”, namely those that would otherwise require especially “intens[e]” monitoring (Williamson 1975: 39, 79). As I argued in Section 2.2.1, however, the need for deep-level cooperation is ubiquitous in production.
^59	  The market primacy paradigm is essentially the result of a thought experiment, employed by philosophers such as Hobbes and Mill to justify or condemn institutions such as the state and slavery, which poses the question of what would prevail in a ‘primordial’ society with no institutional influence.
^60	  Although this wide scope may appear at first glance to be a weakness of imprecision, it is in fact an explanatory strength.  If the firm plays a constitutive role in society, as argued in this dissertation, that role is augmented by the prevalence of the firm. The constitutive role of the family, for instance, is indisputable, since the family is spatially and temporally universal – recall Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) “primary socialization”. If the primacy of the firm is comparable to that of the family, it too is capable of extensive and intensive socialisation, which is precisely Berger and Luckmann’s “secondary socialization”.
^61	  Of course, this framework involves its own ambiguous cases, such as families, monastic communities, and institutions of the ‘social economy’ that may engage in production even though it is not their primary objective.
^62	  Fox (1974: 40-5) reviews a number of additional theories that use similar distinctions.
^63	  Each author offers a slightly distinct typology here. Touraine’s (1955) and Woodward’s (1965) are similar, both containing “small-batch production” (or “unit technology”), “large-batch production” (or “mass technology), and “continuous process production”. Blauner (1964), who was specifically interested in the effects of automation on alienation, included four categories: “craft industry”, “machine-minding industry”, “assembly-line industry”, and “process industry”, with “machine-minding industry” arguably representing an intermediate form between Touraine’s and Woodward’s “small-batch” and “large-batch” stages.
^64	  See Williams and Edge 1996 for a review.
^65	  I use the terms “hierarchical management systems” and “managerial hierarchies” interchangeably.
^66	  It is true that innovations in the division of labour itself could attenuate its adverse behavioural effects. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, this seems to be borne out in Japanese firms. However, such innovations are unlikely to be sufficient for structural consistency, which seems to be reflected in the range of other organisational structures geared towards eliciting solidaristic behaviour in Japanese firms.
^67	  The video game developer Valve, for example, is famous for maintaining no formal management system (or division of labour) whatsoever, giving its employees full autonomy to organise and execute their work and even using a peer-based remuneration system (Varoufakis 2012). Recently, however, it has begun to emerge that the private company, which is majority-owned by billionaire Gabe Newell, in fact contains a ‘hidden hierarchy’ that disciplines workers who do not adhere to its implicit rules (French 2013).
^68	  To clarify, I am not using the term ‘control’ in the same sense as Bearle and Means (1932), who argue that de facto control (what they call ‘control’) is separated from de jure control (what they call ‘ownership’) in a corporation. I am in fact making the case that de jure control (embodied in formal control rights), even if not frequently exercised, may still contain a sort of ‘ultimate control’ if it affords the ability to revoke any control delegated to other parties.
^69	  For example, Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Fagerberg 1987, 1988; Dosi et al. 1990; Verspagen 1991. For an overview, see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004.
^70	  For example, Fransman 1982; Fransman and King 1984; Dahlman et al. 1987; Rosenberg and Frischtak 1985; Bell and Pavitt 1993, 1995 and Lall 1987, 1990, 1992.
^71	  See Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967; Crozier 1970; Evan 1976; and Morgan 2006.
^72	  Hofstede (2001 [1980]) initially specified four such dimensions: power distance; uncertainty avoidance; individualism vs. collectivism; and masculinity vs. femininity. He later added short- vs. long-term orientation (Hofstede 1991) and indulgence vs. restraint (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010).
^73	  See also Koike 1994; Takezawa and Whitehill 1981; Ohtsu 2002; Hofstede 1983; Deresky 1997.
^74	  Of course, these findings imply that culture is ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘national’, at least in the short run. 
^75	  See also Pascale 1978, Yoshino 1976: 166-78; Tsurumi 1976: 102.
^76	  The former is characteristic of much of the ‘management’ literature, for instance, which injudiciously treats alternative organisational forms as mere blueprints that can be applied ‘off-the-shelf’.
^77	  Of course, technology and institutions are also likely to co-evolve, meaning that the two types of cumulative causation discussed here cannot be separated in reality (Schwardt 2013).
^78	  A related point often found in the Evolutionary Economics literature is that, whereas biological evolution is “Darwinian” in that only inherited characteristics can be passed on, organisational change is “Lamarckian” in that acquired characteristic are passed on. Although this distinction is substantively sound, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006) argue that the labels are inaccurate. “Lamarckian” change, according to them, would require that the selection mechanism acts on the underlying characteristics of firms (analogous to genotypes), when in fact it acts on their actual behaviour (analogous to phenotypes).
^79	  Of course, culturalists could argue that even the actions of these entrepreneurs are culturally determined. Apetrei et al. (2013), for instance, apply Hofstede’s cultural “dimensions” to social entrepreneurs, finding a strong correlation between certain traits and social entrepreneurship. According to Knight, however, the actions of entrepreneurs are, like all human agency, fundamentally uncertain.
^80	  This strategy has the advantage of obviating the need to account for all possible contingencies through a comprehensive set of contracts or rules (Ostrom 2005, Chapter 4; Nooteboom 2009: 70).
^81	  See also Argyres and Liebeskind 1999; Argyres and Mayer 2004, 2007; Madhok 2002.
^82	  See also Powell 1990; Granovetter 1995; Grabher 1993; Goldberg 1980.
^83	  Some recent ‘new growth theories’ have recommended that countries lagging in technological progress embrace free movement of goods and capital in order to expedite the diffusion of technology (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1991; Coe and Helpman 1995). This is despite the fact that new growth theories often attribute their foundation to Allyn Young (1928), who, taking inspiration from Veblen (as well as Adam Smith), explained that increasingly complex divisions of labour co-evolve with increasingly advanced technologies through the mechanism of increasing returns to scale, leading to enduring discrepancies in economic development between industries and between regions – that is, cumulative causation. This idea, which was extended by Young’s student Kaldor (1966) and later by Krugman (1981), and subsequently spawned the literature on ‘economic geography’, motivated Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) ‘big push’ argument that countries should engage in large-scale strategic investments to escape low-income “traps”.
^84	  Prominent authors in this tradition include Hans Singer, Raúl Prebisch, Paul A. Baran, Paul Sweezy, Andre G. Franke, Fernando H. Cardoso, Rosa Luxemburg, and Immanuel Wallerstein.
^85	  I use the terms “hierarchical management systems” and “managerial hierarchies” interchangeably.
^86	  In any case, it will most likely be impossible to eliminate all “other sources of unequal influence [besides competencies]…such as commitment level, verbal fluency, and social skills” (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 71; see also pp. 60-1, 104-5, 111).
^87	  In Holmstrom’s model, an incentive scheme that maximises efficiency must “break the budget” – that is, it must offer rewards that exceed output, or impose punishments that waste output – since, to maintain a ‘balanced budget’, an incentive for one worker would require an offsetting disincentive for other workers, and vice versa. Worker-owners, however, could not credibly commit to enforcing such a scheme on themselves, as each individual worker would always have an incentive to cancel the scheme ex post in order to avoid incurring debt and wasting output.
^88	  A comprehensive review of the vast LMF literature can be found in Bonin and Putterman 2001. Note that I am using the term ‘LMF’ in a broad sense to include both firms in which workers provide their own financial capital and thus purchase physical capital through retained earnings (often referred to as ‘worker-managed firms’ or ‘WMFs’) and firms in which workers hire physical and/or financial capital (LMFs proper). Although these two distinct forms of enterprise may have distinct behavioural implications, both are owned and controlled by their workers, albeit the former individually and by virtue of their capital and the latter collectively and by virtue of their labour.
^89	  Coase did not compare alternative types of firms in the manner of Williamson, but only the firm in general with the market, a point which he (1988c: 47) later clarified (see Hodgson 1999: 203).
^90	  In fact, none of the dismal predictions of the LMF models are consistently borne out in practice (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman 1993; Dow and Putterman 1996).
^91	  Bayo-Moriones, Galilea-Salvatierra, and Merino-Díaz de Ciero (2003), however, find no difference between the productivity effects of participation in capitalist and cooperative firms.
^92	  See also Rabin 1993; Carpenter, Bowles, and Gintis 2006; Russell 1985; Ros 2003.
^93	  See also Freeman 1987; Gjerding 1992; Leibenstein 1987; Urabe, Child, and Kagono 1988.
^94	  Fox (1974: 40-5) reviews the work of several other relevant theorists.
^95	  Once derided as inefficient (and exploitative) by the likes of Adam Smith (1776, Book II, Chapter 2) and John Stuart Mill (1848, Book II, Chapter 8) due to the poor incentives facing workers when a portion of their production is appropriated by landlords, sharecropping was later justified from the transaction-cost perspective on the grounds that it more efficiently addresses the costs of monitoring and the risks of production than rental contracts amidst the conditions that characterise agriculture (Cheung 1969; Stiglitz 1974).
^96	  The ability of cooperatives to achieve deep-level cooperation could also explain their prevalence in social services (Borzaga and Tortia 2008; Borzaga and Bertagnoni 2007). Not only are social services difficult to contract and monitor due to their non-standardised and multidimensional nature, but many organisations of the ‘third sector’ or ‘social economy’ operate on a non-profit basis, targeting disadvantages social groups or striving for non-economic objectives. For both reasons, substantive rationality and social relationships are compulsory.
^97	  For analyses of sub-goal pursuit, see Bearle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; March and Simon 1958, Chapter 5; Cyert and March 1963, Chapter 3.
^98	  Although he does point out that innovations in steam power and electricity required exceptionally capital-intensive forms of production, this is an explanation for why capitalists rather than workers do own/control the firm, not why they should, at least from a competence-based perspective.
^99	  For example, although managerial positions are officially subject to job rotation, managers often exceed their tenure or are rotated between managerial posts (Leibenstein 1987: 146). Even when the rotation system is adhered to, leadership figures often emerge to provide deep-level coordination (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 88). Furthermore, although the kibbutzim long operated according to the philosophy of “from each according to ability, to each according to need,” differential wage systems began to arise at the turn of the century and are now the norm (Satt 2007; Russell, Hanneman, and Getz 2010).
^100	  If it seems unfeasible for workers to elect managers without sacrificing ultimate control, consider that shareholders in capitalist corporations essentially do the same – although managers are delegated with the authority to initiate and implement decisions (“decision management”), shareholders nevertheless retain the authority to ratify and monitor decisions (“decision control”) (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
^101	  Fox refers to this possibility as the “Spontaneous Consensus Model” of organisation, which, although rare, may outperform the “Power Model” that characterises conventional firms and is subject to the distributive dilemma.
^102	  This point also applies to the dismal predictions of LMF models that cooperatives will incur a ‘horizon problem’ (as worker-owners will be reluctant to make investments that do not pay off until after they have retired) and engender risk-aversion (as worker-owners will be unable to diversify or transfer their wealth).
^103	  As Compa (1982: 300, quoted in Morrison 1991: 152) puts it, “When workers control a firm, their interest are identical with management’s. They no longer struggle for the betterment of workers in general or for the betterment of those in a particular trade or industrial sector; they think in terms of making their own workplace more profitable. In effect, workers become capitalist with capitalists’ problems.”
^104	  In 1883, for example, Robert Owen’s attempt to unite his cooperatives with British trade unions into the Grand Moral Union of Useful and Productive Classes (later the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union) soon failed due to their conflicting ideologies, with unions advocating class struggle and cooperatives preferring political reforms (Cornforth et al. 1988: 12).
^105	  Whether this objective involves establishing new technologies or establishing new divisions of labour for existing technologies is a matter of dispute within Marxian thought, and hinges on whether the first premise of technological determinism (that a given technology stipulates a certain division of labour) is or is not accepted (see Section 3.2.2).
^106	  The Marxist criticism is (perhaps ironically) supported by the fact that cooperatives have historically been used as instruments of state exploitation. Indeed, Marx (1875: 94, quoted in Jossa, 2005: 8) claimed that “co-operative societies…are of value only insofar as they are the independent creations of workers and not protégés either of governments or of the bourgeoisie’”. In the Chinese, Tanzanian, and other episodes of ‘forced collectivisation’, for example, the state manipulated ostensibly cooperative structures to substantiate its ideological exhortations, thus legitimising harsh working conditions while retaining ultimate control (Meisner 1999). Similar abuses of “false coops” have been observed across the globe (e.g. Bateman and Nuhanovic 2014). In all of these cases, the state played the role of the capitalist master by extracting labour surplus while overcoming the behavioural and distributive dilemmas associated with capitalist organisation. In none of these cases, however, were the “false coops” owned or controlled by their workers, despite the state’s claims to the contrary.
^107	  See also Cornforth et al. 1988: 115; Mellor, Hannah, and Stirling 1988: 70.
^108	  See Ben-Ner 1988a, 1988b; Estrin 1985; Estrin and Jones 1992; Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1993, 1995; Burdín and Dean 2009; Burdín 2012; Pencavel, Pistaferri, and Schivardi 2006; Pérotin 2006; Birchall and Ketilson 2009; Smith and Rothbaum 2014; Roelants et al. 2012.
^109	  Other sorts of cooperative enterprise besides worker coops may have similar positive spillovers. For example, because they are run in the interest of their (probably risk-averse) members rather than (often short-sighted) shareholders, financial cooperatives may be less inclined to engage in the sort of risky behaviour that led to the financial crisis of 2007/8, such as subprime lending (Birchall and Ketilson 2009).
^110	  See Dow and Putterman 1996 for a review of the ‘degeneration’ literature.
^111	  Ben-Ner (1984), however, argues that such markets would not prevent the tendency to hire non-member workers. It is nevertheless interesting to note that ‘new generation’ agricultural processing cooperatives in North America, which have proliferated in recent years, use transferrable delivery rights that are essentially stocks.
^112	  Although he has in mind partially-worker-owned firms rather than cooperatives proper, Weitzman (1984) argues that although workers would be better off in an economy based on “share contracting” than in the current wage system, receiving the same pay without the threat of unemployment, they would be worse off in a firm that unilaterally converts to worker ownership. Such a firm would pay its workers less than the market wage, as its employers, who are assumed to pay workers out of a fixed proportion of profits, would have an incentive to keep taking on new workers until marginal productivity is driven down to zero, thus acting as “employer of last resort” to the rest of the economy. Overpaid managers would also resist incremental changes (ibid.: 108), and even a referendum on the issue would fail to achieve the superior equilibrium of share contracting as no single voter would internalise social costs and benefits (ibid.: 126-7). 
^113	  This phrase appears to be an adapation of the notion of ‘collective egoism’ coined by anarchist and social critic Peter Kropotkin.
^114	  See Bearle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983.
^115	  See Varman and Chakrabarti 2004; Batstone 1983; Cornforth 1995; Cornforth et al. 1988; Estrin and Jones 1992; Hernandez 2006; Stryjan 1994; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014.
^116	  Italian cooperative policy is another pertinent example, and overlaps considerably with the Spanish case (Ammirato 1996).
^117	  Admittedly, this is a crude comparison, for at least two reasons. First, much of the difference is undoubtedly due to the sectoral composition of each country’s economy; in particular, agriculture constitutes a higher proportion of GDP in Spain than in the UK, and as we have seen, cooperatives are often favoured (and even required) in agriculture even amidst a hostile institutional environment. Second, cooperatives are more difficult to count in the UK because they operate under a number of legal forms.
^118	  Comprehensive histories can be found in Whyte and Whyte (1988) and Morrison (1991), amongst others.
^119	  Interestingly, in line with this dissertation, he thought that Japanese firms were similarly capable (MacLeod 2000: 71).
^120	  For instance, in 2012 it won the Cambio16 Award from Cambio Financiero for ‘Most Innovative Company’ in Spain, and in 2013, it won the ‘Boldness in Business’ Award from the Financial Times in 2013 in the ‘Drivers of Change’ category. In 2014, one of its most celebrated cooperatives, Copreci, won the ‘Vesta Award’ for innovation, while the Cikautxo Group won the Mitel ‘Customer Innovation Momentum Award’.
^121	  Max Weber (2002: 309, quoted in Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014: 646) painted a similar picture of Basque society in 1987, stating that “[t]he entire structure of the country, society’s uses and institutions, are strictly democratic”.
^122	  See also MacLeod 2000: 51, 55, 68, 79; Larrañaga 1981: 815; Ormaetxea 1993.
^123	  See also Whyte and Whyte 1988: 296; Whyte and Blasi 1982; Morrison 1991: 29.
^124	  Mondragón’s report on its “Corporate Management Model” cited here translates formación as “education”.
^125	  In this process, applications are evaluated not only on skills and experience, but also on their social qualities such as a predisposition towards cooperation, which workers must further demonstrate during a ‘trial period’, and which contribute significantly to promotional opportunities.
^126	  One Mondragón cooperative has done so, but only after leaving the group (Smith 2001: 21).
^127	  See also Whyte and Whyte 1988: 226; Bakaikoa et al. 2004: 74-5; Cheney 1999: 27, 29; Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014: 652-6.
^128	  Even the Catholic Church bemoaned “the elitist behavior of the cooperative leaders” (Azurmendi 1984: 632, quoted in Whyte and Whyte 1988: 99).
^129	  This was starkly demonstrated in in the late 1970s, when changes in employment and compensation policies proposed by Ulgor’s Governing Council took fifteen weeks to be ratified by the Permanent Central Commission. Despite this painstaking process, Ulgor’s Social Council later “stated that in the future more time should be given to the education, discussion, and decision-making process when such major changes were proposed” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 140-1).
^130	  To ensure that all members participate in the General Assembly, attendance (or proxy voting) is mandatory, with a member’s absence resulting in the revocation of their vote in the next meeting (Quigley 2014).
^131	  See also Whyte and Whyte 1988: 75, 83-6, 223-4; Morrison 1991: 161; Smith 2001: 40.
^132	  Although Mondragón has also experienced an increase in the employment of temporary worker-members, this is only due to the recent creation of this job category by the Spanish and Basque governments (Bakaikoa et al. 2004: 76).
^133	  See also Altuna Gabilondo 2008; Arando et al. 2010; Ormaetxea 1993, 2003, 2006.
^134	  In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Mondragón Corporation (n.d.a, emphasis added) defines its principle of Social Transformation as “[t]he willingness to ensure fair social transformation with other peoples by being involved in an expansion process that helps towards their economic and social reconstruction and with the construction of a freer, fairer and more caring Basque society”. In a recent report, moreover, it depicted the principle of Social Transformation, along with ‘Universal Nature’ (solidarity with the cooperative movement) and ‘Inter-cooperation’ (cooperation with other cooperatives), as peripheral to the rest of the Ten Principles (Mondragón Corporation 2012b: 17, 21).
^135	  It is interesting to note that the mixed cooperatives closely resemble both the partially-employee-owned firms suggested by Weitzman (1984) as a remedy to stagflation and the “unequal partnerships” suggested by Meade (1989) as a solution to inequality between capital and labour and the financial constraints facing labour-managed firms.
^136	  Of course, much of my disagreement with the Marxist evaluation of Mondragón revolves around where the essence of power within the firm is assumed to be located: if it is located in the labour process, as assumed by Marxists, then the argument that Mondragón is essentially a capitalist firm holds more water than I have implied. However, the very fact that workers are imposing these alienating structures on themselves is evidence that they retain ‘ultimate control’, which in Sections 3.2.4 and 4.2.7.1 I argued contains the essence of power.
^137	  She points out, for instance, that Mondragón featured a long history of industrial conflict and strikes, and that the Communist Party endured in Mondragón during the Civil War after it had disappeared elsewhere in Guipuzcoa (ibid.: 61, 150, 163). In fact, during the Civil War, Mondragón sent three battalions to fight on the side of the Republic for Basque autonomy (Bradley and Gelb 1982: 21). During a miners’ revolt in Asturias in 1934, moreover, the only armed reinforcement from outside the region came from Mondragón (Oakeshott 1978: 167). Arizmendiarrieta himself once stated: “This was an active and restless town even before the war, and there was considerable solidaristic orientation” (Whyte and Whyte 1988: 26).
^138	  Some of this tension with the labour and independence movements is evident in Mondragón’s founder. Although he believed that cooperatives were not intrinsically opposed to the labour union movement and political parties, believing these entities would work alongside the cooperative movement in effecting social change, Arizmendiarrieta rejected state socialism and violent revolution, and insisted that Mondragón remain politically neutral (MacLeod 2000: 60-1, 75, 90).
^139	  Members are allowed to participate in protests to express solidarity with workers in other firms, but according to Kasmir (1996: 113-4), managers have rarely allowed this to result in any substantial work stoppages within the cooperatives.
^140	  A Leninist faction similarly claimed that Mondragón’s newspaper was “impeding the real solidarity of the working class, which is the only guarantee of real struggle against capitalism and the regime” (ibid.: 251). In fact, the name of that newspaper – Trabajo y Unión, Lankide – reveals the ambiguous class (and ethnic) identity of the cooperative member: while ‘trabajo y unión’ means ‘work and union’ in Spanish, ‘lankide’ means ‘co-worker’ in Basque.
^141	  The Mondragón cooperatives have also contributed to the toleration of hierarchical management systems elsewhere in the Basque Country (Cheney 2005; Heras-Saizarbitoria 2013, 2014: 656-7).
^142	  She highlights, for instance, that separatist activism was exceptionally strong in Mondragón, to the extent that ETA maintained a “special unit” there (ibid.: 97).
^143	  See also Altuna Gabilondo 2008; Sarasua 2010; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014; Greenwood and Gonzalez 1992.
^144	  For example, see Cornforth 1995; Stryjan 1994; Batstone 1983; Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 84; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman 2014.
^145	  Services now account for more growth and employment than any other sector in Valencia (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 66-75, 269-70, 287). Over half of cooperative workers now operate in services (primarily business services, construction, education, and transport, in line with the composition of Valencian production), with approximately one-third in agriculture and one-tenth in industry (Pizarro Barceló et al. 2006, Chapter 2). Almost 75% of Valencian worker coops formed in 2003 were in the tertiary sector, well above the Spanish average of 61% (Alba Benaches 2006: 209-10).
^146	  In 1932, before the War, 270 worker coops had operated; afterwards, only around 100 remained (Alba Benaches 2006: 194).
^147	  The domination of the UTECOs prompted Spain’s expulsion from the International Co-operative Alliance, which is committed to political neutrality.
^148	  The official history of the Group is given by Martínez Verdú (1993). All quotations are my own translation from the original Spanish text.
^149	  All of the other experiences contained aspects that were incompatible with the Covipo pioneers’ objectives. For example, the Swedish coops were generally concentrated in consumption and agriculture, whereas the Covipo pioneers also sought to promote the more intensive participation of producer cooperativism; the Italian coops were politically oriented, which would be unfeasible in politically repressed Spain; and many of the Spanish coops were familial and inward-looking, which contradicted the Covipo pioneers’ aspiration of transforming society (Martínez Verdú 1993: 53-4: 31).
^150	  The Group also imported Mondragón’s Social Councils, but these were implemented in only a few coops.
^151	  For example, from early on the Group maintained a subdivision of Coinser called Esplai Popular, dedicated to organising excursions to other parts of Valencia in members’ free time (Martínez Verdú 1993: 70-1).
^152	  In the ’90s, the Group also created an organisation to provide domestic services to elderly people (Comismar), but it was not financially sustainable and was soon closed (MacLeod 2000: 109; personal correspondence).
^153	  This term is also found in Smith and Rothbaum 2014: 236. See also Joshi and Smith 2008; Dow and Putterman 1996: 67-70; Smith 2001: 33-5.
^154	  For example, a director in Povisad, a Valencian cooperative that purports to provide employment to economically marginalised workers, referred to a “delicate balancing of tensions” resulting from the lack of “conventional employer-employee relations” (Lewis 2000: 13).
^155	  In actuality, the Vertical Syndicate was initially retained, and the UTECOs were initially replaced by a system of Federaciones Provinciales de Cooperativas (‘Provincial Cooperative Federations’) that were substantively identical to the UTECOs. These were replaced in 1985 by the current devolved system.
^156	  Although a federal system also exists in the Basque Country (and also in other European countries, such as France), it does not appear to be as active as the Valencian system. One possible reason is that Mondragón’s predominance undermines either the perceived value of the federations of their ability to represent member coops equally, but that is purely speculative.
^157	  See also Vidal Giménez, del Campo Gomis, and García del Río 2000; Sanchis Palacio and Soriano Hernández 1999.
^158	  It is true that the incidence of cooperatives ‘degenerating’ into capitalist firms or other legal forms such as sociedades laborales is high in Valencia, with a quarter of cooperatives ultimately doing so (Alba Benaches 2006: 209-10). However, this problem derives from the practice of converting failed capitalist firms into cooperatives as a last resort to salvage employment, which is especially common in Valencia, and which tends to become prevalent during economic crises, such as those of the 1970s, 1980s, the 2000s, and the 2010s (Tomás Carpi and Monzón Campos 1997: 70, 199-200, 260, 287). Between 1981 and 1985, for example, the number of worker coops in Valencia practically doubled, as 820 were created, approximately 90% of which were converted from bankrupt firms (ibid.: 200).
^159	  Valencian law also caps the proportion of permanent hired employees at 10%, which is less than the 20% figure common in Mondragón coops and is almost certainly a more binding constraint than the Spanish law stipulating that non-members cannot account for more than 30% of total hours worked (Observatorio Valenciano de la Economía Social 2014a; Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social n.d.).
^160	  Paradoxically, this relative lack of deep-level cooperation could account for the fact that worker discontent appears to be less pervasive in Valencia (see Section 5.6.1).
^161	  In one case reported by Whyte and Whyte (1988: 288), for example, the archbishop of Boston was inspired by Mondragón in the 1980s to protect local lobster fishers from real estate developers. The head of Boston’s archdiocese reportedly stated: “We can’t transplant Mondragón, but we can use it as our model” (Newsweek 1984, quoted in Whyte and Whyte 1988: 288). To take a more recent example, the Austin Polytechnical Academy, a public training centre founded in 2007 in collaboration with local trade unions and high-tech manufacturing firms in a deprived neighbourhood of Chicago, has taken lead from Mondragón’s own polytechnic by integrating the principles of worker participation and ownership into its mission and curriculum. According to Davidson (2012: 240), the school has sent several students to Mondragón on study trips.
^162	  Indeed, Mondragón’s official set of ‘Ten Principles’ are essentially an augmented version of the International Co-operative Alliance’s own set of seven principles, which are recognised and adopted by cooperatives the world over. The idiosyncracies of Mondragón’s principles are significant, however, as they “emphasize the importance of labour control over capital and [Mondragón’s] mission of job preservation” (Novkovic, 2008: 2170).
^163	  This term is also found in Smith and Rothbaum 2014: 236.
^164	  In 2006, Legacoop and Confcooperative earned approximately 59.2 billion and 67.5 billion dollars of turnover respectively (Menzani and Zamagni 2010: 106), as compared to Mondragón’s 19.2 billion in 2011 (World Co-operative Monitor 2013: 57–71).
^165	  The relative positions of the Almerian cluster and the Valencian federations on this spectrum are ambiguous, given that the associated cooperatives in both cases are fully autonomous. In fact, the obligations of a member cooperative in a federation often consist of little else than paying an annual subscription fee, while inclusion in a district/cluster could well entail a more substantial sacrifice in autonomy. However, the proposed ranking seems to be the most appropriate given that the federations are at least formal entities, as opposed to the largely informal associations that make up the Almerian cluster.
^166	  Although cooperatives experienced a minor revival following the recent financial crisis, they generally took the form of consumer and social cooperatives with high rates of failure.
^167	  Although the Group was generally unsuccessful in the manufacturing sector, it did create La Mediterranea, a resoundingly successful glass manufacturing cooperative that has made the region of L’Olleria famous for its glass products (see Sections 6.2.1.5 and 6.2.1.7).
^168	  Japanese firms in fact contain ‘enterprise unions’, but these do not operate in the manner of traditional Western unions (see Section 2.3.3) and are similar to Mondragón’s Social Councils (see Section 5.6.1).
^169	  This issue is even further complicated by the fact that worker-members may face an internal conflict of interests between their dual roles, as explained in Section 4.3.2.
^170	  See Willmott 1993; Filby and Willmott 1988; Knights and Willmott 1987, 1989; Grey and Willmott 2005; Alvesson and Willmott 2003; Alvesson 1987; Anthony 1989; Parker 2002.
^171	  I owe this phrase to my supervisor, Dr. Ha-Joon Chang.
^172	  I owe this phrase to my supervisor, Dr. Ha-Joon Chang.
